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Abstract 
This dissertation is concerned with expanding the scope of transaction cost 
theory from its primary concern with governance alignment to also 
encompass transaction value. The aim is to provide strategic management 
guidance, not only on how transactors best can structure their transactions, 
but also on how they can maximize the joint value created through these 
transactions.  
Value creation is implicitly embedded in the governance alignment literature 
in that efficient governance contributes to creating value by reducing 
transaction costs. But this literature does not account for the value creation 
effects of transaction-specific investments even though these investments are 
made for this very purpose. To resolve this shortcoming, a transaction value 
model is proposed that incorporates both sets of effects. 
The proposed model rests on the relationship between transaction-specific 
investments and transaction governance structure. Within the transaction 
cost literature, the effects of specific investments on governance structure is 
one of the most important, tested and confirmed tenets. However, the origins 
of specific investments are less explored. Yet, understanding the origins of 
these investments is strategically important, as they may contribute 
significantly more towards joint value maximization among the transactors 
than investments into general purpose assets. Hence, this study turns the 
possibly most central TCE tenet upside-down and asks: How does the choice 
of governance structure affect the transaction parties’ specific investments? 
To explore this question, I have carried out a microanalytic study of 
transactions between theatrical feature film producers and distributors in the 
North American motion picture industry. These transactions require 
substantial specific investments into both production and distribution, and 
they are governed by a variety of contracting forms spread across the 
market-hierarchy continuum. As such they offer a rich empirical setting for 
exploring the effects of contracting on specific investments. 
The study finds that contracting does affect specific investments in the 
production-distribution transactions. Patterns emerged from the data that 
showed, first, that more integrated types of contracting reduce certain kinds 
of uncertainty that encourage specific investments by lowering the 
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associated risk. Second, certain specific investments have inherent 
coordination requirements that are only satisfied by more integrated 
contracting. Third, the relationship between structure and specific 
investments may be better understood in terms of interdependence, which is 
a product of specific investment requirements and affects contracting. 
Finally, the data suggests that in the presence of positive spillovers, 
integrated contracting induces specific investments by internalizing these 
effects, thereby creating greater economies of scale and scope for a 
transactor’s investments. 
These findings support the proposed transaction value model, which 
provides a basis and framework for further transaction value research.  
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1 Introduction 
Transaction cost theory’s core variables make up some of the most central 
parameters for understanding value creation in the motion picture industry. 
The importance of transaction-specific investments, uncertainty and 
contracting in this regard is well recognized by industry practitioners, not as 
theoretical constructs but in their practical applications. However, in terms 
of explaining value creation, transaction cost theory remains underdeveloped 
and our scholarly understanding of the impact these variables have on value 
creation is thus limited and fragmented.  
For the motion picture industry’s practitioners, understanding the conditions 
under which investments are made into the production of particular movies 
is essential since these investments represent the very basis for their value 
creation. The assets created from investments made into any particular 
movie project, such as the script, production design, recorded picture and 
sound material and the edited final cut, cannot be redeployed to another 
project without a total or significant loss of productive value; therefore they 
represent an archetypical example of asset specificity, upon which 
transaction cost economics (TCE) (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985) bases so much of its explanatory power. Production 
investments are hence largely transaction specific, and industry value 
creation is dependent on these specific investments. 
The importance of production investments for value creation is recognized 
by scholars in the field of media economics. They have for instance 
identified investments into a particular movie as a key variable for 
determining commercial performance in domestic and international markets. 
Through mechanisms triggered by the substantial scale economies present in 
the motion picture industry, this relationship between investments and 
performance has substantially contributed in explaining the dominant 
position of American products in the international markets for audiovisual 
products (Jayakar & Waterman, 2000; Lee & Waterman, 2007; Waterman, 
1988, 1993; Wildman & Siwek, 1988). 
Less recognized, also by media economy scholars (Hadida, 2009), are the 
investments made into the marketing of a particular movie. These do create 
specific assets in much the same way as production investments. For 
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instance, an advertising campaign created for one movie cannot be 
redeployed to another without a total or significant loss of productive value. 
These assets also contribute to value creation in a similar way to those 
created in the production of a movie, and as discussed in more detail in 
Section 1.2 below, it is the sum of these investments that affects the ultimate 
value of a movie and hence also the return on both sets of investments. 
Production investments are typically the responsibility of a movie’s 
producer, while marketing investments fall under its distributor. Hence, the 
governance structure applied to the transaction between the production and 
distribution functions is also central to our understanding of the ultimate 
value creation because it represents an important part of the context within 
which each type of investment is made. The possibly most central tenant of 
TCE theory is its probabilistic predictions of the discriminating alignment of 
transaction governance structure with asset specificity (Williamson, 1991). 
Governance structures range from the market in one end via various 
contractual and/or equity-based hybrids to the hierarchy of internal 
organization (the firm) in the other. The specter of governance structures 
deployed for seemingly similar transactions between the production and 
distribution functions in the motion picture industry is wider and contains 
richer variances than one may expect. It spans from fully integrated 
structures in which production and distribution, with their corresponding 
investments, take place within one single company to almost pure market 
transactions, where a distributor purchases a movie financed and completed 
by an individual production company to promote and sell through its own 
channels (Cones, 1997). There is thus a great deal of variation in the 
structural context in which the transaction-specific motion picture 
investments are carried out. 
For practitioners, the importance of understanding the conditions for 
investments to be made into single movie projects is closely linked to a third 
TCE variable: The high level of uncertainty that characterizes the motion 
picture industry. Research carried out by DeVany and Walls (1996, 1999) 
has largely confirmed the industry proverb that “nobody knows anything”, a 
phrase first coined by screenwriter and novelist William Goldman (1984), 
which refers to the belief that prior to a movie’s release nobody in the 
industry has any real idea how well it will do. DeVany and Walls discovered 
that revenues from individual movies are asymptotically Pareto-distributed 
and have infinite variance. Revenues diverge over all scales, and revenue 
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forecasts have zero precision. Under these conditions, the capital markets 
will not function as they normally do. Generally speaking, the more 
profitable projects attract capital to better conditions and the projects 
promising better returns are therefore realized while others are not, but when 
revenue forecasts are grossly unreliable it becomes accordingly difficult to 
distinguish profitable from unprofitable projects at the time an investment 
decision has to be made.  
Given the industry’s reliance on transaction-specific investments for value 
creation, the high level of uncertainty combined with specificity, and the 
significant variance in governance structures applied to the production-
distribution transactions, any guidance the theory can provide a better 
understanding of how these variables affect investment conditions, and thus 
value creation, should be welcomed as an important strategic management 
tool. 
1.1 A TCE Perspective: Preliminary Considerations 
As briefly illustrated above specific investments, contracting and uncertainty 
are key variables to our understanding of value creation in the motion picture 
industry, and since the relationship between the first two represents the 
possibly most important tenant of TCE theory the TCE literature also 
becomes on obvious place to look for guidance. However, while a vast 
empirical TCE literature generally supports the predictions the theory makes 
of governance structure based on the level of asset specificity present in a 
transaction (David & Han, 2004; Macher & Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997), the understanding of the reverse relationship and the origins of 
specific investments in general is underdeveloped. Several calls have been 
made for an endogenous treatment of specific investments (Bensaou & 
Anderson, 1999; Kang, Mahoney, & Tan, 2009; Macher & Richman, 2008), 
but as of yet the literature offers only very limited guidance on structural 
conditions for specific investments. 
Understanding the conditions for investments into specific assets is 
important because these assets generally improve productivity and generate 
more value compared with nonspecific assets (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; 
Williamson, 1985). Contextualized in the motion picture industry, in which 
every movie project resembles an R&D project with overwhelmingly 
specific assets, the benefit of better understanding what conditions may 
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induce investments into such assets is apparent, but it applies to all 
industries. The lack of endogenous treatment in the TCE literature is 
therefore a shortcoming that becomes particularly evident seen from a value 
creation perspective. Given the established correlation between the two key 
TCE constructs, an endogenous treatment of specific investments should 
start with developing a better understanding of how contracting affects these 
investments.  
The third variable discussed above, uncertainty, is considered a key feature 
of the transaction cost argument (Coase, 1937) and defined as one of the key 
dimensions of a transaction (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Yet, it is mostly 
considered as explaining governance structure, and the theory’s uncertainty-
related predictions have not received the same level of empirical support as 
those based on asset specificity (David & Han, 2004). To further develop our 
understanding of the uncertainty construct and its impact on other TCE 
constructs is thus desirable, and given the level of uncertainty present in the 
motion picture industry, it offers a rich empirical environment for pursuing 
this objective.  
1.2 Value Creation in the Motion Picture Industry 
Understanding the motion picture industry’s dependence on transaction 
specific investments and how the production-distribution transaction joins 
the two main categories of such investments are central to the arguments 
being made here. 
That producing a new movie generates value is obvious even to most casual 
observers: Cast and crew are assembled by a producer to record the 
performance of an ideally intriguing story under the creative leadership of a 
director. The output of all these creative and “humdrum” inputs is a recorded 
media product that may be sold in several media markets, including 
theatrical, home video and television, around the world or only in selected 
local media markets. Today, producing theatrical feature films for a broad 
international audience is a major enterprise requiring substantial 
investments. Statistical data that was published annually up until 2008 from 
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), an interest group for 
the major American studios, shows that the average production cost of a 
theatrical feature film produced by their members was USD 70.8 million in 
2007 (MPAA, 2008). Bigger recent event movies like The Dark Knight 
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Rises and John Carter have production budgets of approximately USD250 
million (IMDbPro, 2012a, c). While production costs or investments give an 
indication of the value created, such measures may not necessarily equal the 
value. A movie’s value is ultimately dependent on its earnings in the 
marketplace, and this is not only dependent on the investments made into the 
movie, measured in its costs, but also on numerous other factors such as the 
quality of the performances, the movie’s technical quality, the cleverness of 
its story or concept, and so forth. The two measures for estimating value – 
production costs/investments and estimated revenues – are also reflected in 
the United States accounting standards for the movie industry, in which the 
value of film assets is determined either by capitalized costs or by estimated 
ultimate revenues (Levine & Siegel, 2001). However, other things being 
equal, higher production spending or costs for a movie increases its value, 
and since production cost seems to be the best available measure until a 
movie has been through its exploitation cycle when the ultimate revenues are 
determined, not only estimated, it has also been used extensively as an 
operational variable for measuring the sector’s value creation in media 
economic studies (Wildman & Siwek, 1988, 1993). 
What seems to be less recognized, despite the increasing attention paid to the 
subject in the industry trade press, is the value creation that takes place in 
connection with the marketing of a movie. The average marketing costs for 
an MPAA-member theatrical feature film was USD 35.9 million in 2007 
(MPAA, 2008), representing 34% of the average movie’s total production 
and marketing costs. The fact that the average marketing investments 
represents one-third of the total production and marketing investments, and 
that the marketing costs of a movie in some cases grossly exceed its 
production costs (Grove, 1999), signals that industry practitioners indeed see 
marketing as a crucial ingredient to the total value creation in the motion 
picture industry.  
When a new movie is released theatrically, its share of the cinemagoing 
audience, and therefore its commercial success will depend on its 
performance in the short-run competition with the other movies in the 
marketplace at the time. For the distributor releasing the movie, the problem 
is to convey to potential viewers credible information on the type and 
character of the movie and the quality level they may expect from it (Caves, 
2000). This is particularly important since there is no price competition 
between movies in the consumer market (Vogel, 2010). Through advertising 
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campaigns and investments in other forms of promotion, the distributor may 
communicate specific characteristics of the movie and create an expectation 
of a certain level of quality (true or false) to potential cinemagoers, and 
thereby attract a larger market share and higher revenues. Marketing 
investments into a specific movie may function as an indicator of that 
movie’s value, in the same manner as production investments are seen as 
such an indicator. This view is also supported by the United States 
accounting standards for the industry in which capitalized marketing costs 
also contribute to film assets (Levine & Siegel, 2001). 
Studying the joint value created through production and marketing requires a 
joint product view on the production and distribution sectors’ respective 
contributions, which coincides the governance value analysis approach of 
TCE (Ghosh & John, 1999). Table 1.1 below shows outputs associated with 
the production and distribution sectors of the motion picture industry. The 
product columns specify both the output of the particular sector and the 
cumulative output produced up to each stage. For the first stage, the 
production sector, where the first copy of the actual movie is assembled – 
combining cast, crew, direction, music and so forth before recording and 
editing the performance – the product is the film itself or the first copy movie 
materialized in the film negative (or digital equivalent) and the bundle of 
contracts that follows it. The distribution sector adds marketing and 
circulation by licensing copies of the movie to different media in the 
exhibition sector. The cumulative product of the movie itself and these 
distribution efforts may best be described as the movie’s image, as this term 
is used by Boorstin (1961). A movie’s image is the audience’s pre-
consumption perception of the movie, which determines its attractiveness. 
The image includes certain perceptions about both the movie’s 
characteristics and its quality.   
Vertical Sector Product Cumulative Product 
Production Film Negative (first copy) Film Negative (first copy) 
Distribution Awareness / Circulation The Movie’s Image 
Table 1.1 - Product and cumulative product by sector 
Following from this joint product view in which the movie’s image 
represents the joint product, the joint value (JVA) created in the production-
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distribution transaction will be a function of the transaction parties’ total 
specific investments in the movie’s production (IP) and marketing (ID), as 
well as other factors.   
 (1.1) JVA = f(ΣIP; ΣID; other factors) 
Other factors being equal, joint value increases with larger production 
investments, and joint value also increases with larger distribution 
(marketing) investments. 
1.3 Theory Development and Contributions 
TCE has become a dominant paradigm for studying vertical relationships, 
and with its more recent first extensions into governance or transaction value 
analysis (Ghosh & John, 1999, 2005; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), it offers a 
promising analytical framework for studying joint value creation and 
governance structures applied in cooperative joint product relationships. 
However, the value creation perspective is underdeveloped, still unable to 
provide any clear guidance on issues as those discussed above. Hence, the 
overall objective of this study is to further develop TCE in a transaction 
value direction. 
It will be shown in Chapter 3 below that important transaction value 
shortcomings in the theory mainly rest on its almost exclusively exogenous 
treatment of specific investments. While the transaction cost literature has 
firmly established explanations and evidence for how transaction-specific 
investments affect governance structure, the reverse causal relationship of 
how structure affects investments has received only very limited attention. 
However, the correlation between certain types of governance structures and 
certain levels of specific investments is uncovered by the empirical testing of 
the TCE asset specificity–structure predictions (David & Han, 2004; 
Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006; Macher & Richman, 2008; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997), so the express aim of this study is to better 
understand the causality of the reverse directional dimension of this 
relationship: How and why does structure affect specific investments? 
The answer to this question will offer a key to opening up for broader 
transaction value analysis, and it will unlock TCE’s greater potential as a 
strategic management tool to also be used for guidance in value creation and 
accumulation matters. 
8 
 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 provides an overview over TCE theory as well as relevant media 
economic research that informs our understanding of the empirical context in 
which this study is made. Chapter 3 discusses in more detail the TCE-based 
conceptual framework of this study and focuses on the development of a 
conceptual transaction value model and the theoretical implications of an 
endogenous treatment of specific investments. In Chapter 4, a study outline 
of the qualitative case-study approach is provided, together with discussions 
of the methodological choices made for the study. Chapter 5 provides an 
empirical bottom-up analysis of the transactions involved in the motion 
picture industry value chain, with the aim of building a thorough 
understanding of production and distribution transactions and the dimensions 
of the production-distribution transaction. Chapter 6 provides primarily 
within-case analyses of the various contracting forms utilized between 
producers and distributors, including discussions of the transactors’ value 
creation and claiming within each.  In Chapter 7, the empirically grounded 
patterns that emerge between contracting and specific investments are 
described and discussed. Chapter 8 discusses the theoretical implications of 
the findings presented in the previous chapters to achieve a better 
understanding of the impact of contracting on specific investments. Finally, 
Chapter 9 discusses the implications of the findings on the proposed 
transaction value model, as well as the methodological, policy and 
managerial implications of the findings, and it also provides suggestions for 
further research.  
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2 Media Economics and Transaction Cost 
Economics  
This study is covering phenomena that have previously been studied by 
media economic scholars, albeit from different perspectives and with other 
objectives, and there are valuable inputs to be found in their studies. So 
while my research objectives are clearly defined by and within the TCE 
framework, the media economic literature offers a broad and empirically 
driven informative approach to understanding the specific context in which 
the study is made: The motion picture industry. Hence, this literature review 
chapter starts with a brief overview of relevant media economic literature 
before providing the same for the transaction cost literature. A deeper 
probing of the particular areas of the TCE literature leading towards my 
research objective follows in the next chapter. 
2.1 Media Economics: An Overview 
This section starts with a broad view of media economic research and its 
origins and traditions before narrowing in on the relevant research 
specifically carried out on the motion picture industry. Finally, it also 
reviews media economic research drawing on various branches of New 
Institutional Economics (to which TCE belongs).  
2.1.1 Origins and Research Traditions 
The academic field of research known as media economics is empirically 
driven, multi-disciplinary and very much an applied science. As its name 
indicates, it is closely related to both communications and media studies on 
the one hand, and to economics and business administration disciplines on 
the other. Various media economic scholars have contributed to defining the 
field of media economics: According to Picard (1989), media economics “is 
concerned with how media operators meet the informational and 
entertainment wants and needs of audiences, advertisers and society with 
available resources.” According to Alexander et al. (1998), media economics 
refers to “the business operations and financial activities of firms producing 
and selling output into the various media industries,” while Doyle (2002) 
defines it as being “concerned with the changing economic forces that direct 
and constrain the choices of managers, practitioners and other decision-
makers across the media.” Albarran (2002) defines media economics as “the 
study of how media industries use scarce resources to produce content that is 
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distributed among consumers in a society to satisfy various wants and 
needs,” and he defines the media economy as, “the study of how media firms 
and industries function across different levels of activity (e.g. global, 
national, household, and individual) in tandem with other forces (e.g. 
globalization, regulation, technology, and social aspects) through the use of 
theories, concepts and the principles drawn from macroeconomic and 
microeconomic perspectives” (Albarran, 2010).  
Media economics is empirically driven in that its focus on the media 
industries determines the boundaries of empirical research. Unless the 
research is somehow related to the media industries, it is not media 
economics. In studying the economic and business aspects of the media 
industries, media economics may draw on the full range of economics and 
business administration theories and methods, including associated 
disciplines such as psychology (e.g. in relation to consumer behavior issues) 
and sociology (e.g. in relation to management issues).  
Still, one may argue that media economics is different from and more than 
straightforward economics and business administration studies with an 
empirical focus on the media industries. This is because it attempts to 
consistently implement in its analysis specific economic characteristics that 
are typically found in media products and services, as well as some quite 
specific traits of the media industries. Non-rival products, high first copy 
costs and low marginal distribution costs are typical product characteristics 
for media products, while industry traits include such issues as operating in 
both economic/business and cultural spheres, serving dual markets (media 
consumers and advertisers), etc. Implications are manifold but include, e.g. 
that much of the media economic studies and research have to implement 
significant scale economies and natural monopolies into its analysis. This is 
paramount for understanding international trade with recorded media 
products (Hoskins, Mirus, & Rozeboom, 1988; Waterman, 1993; Wildman 
& Siwek, 1988) and the nature of local cable or newspaper markets (Owen 
& Wildman, 1992; Picard & Brody, 1997). Another implication is that 
strong regulatory interests often have to be taken into consideration since the 
industries operate within the cultural sphere. Free market mechanisms and 
logic may therefore not work for media industries, even in countries where 
the institutional environment is typical for a market economy. For instance, 
governments may try to regulate the ownership of newspapers to secure 
diversity in published opinions and channels available for the public, as is 
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seen in Norway (Høyer, 1999). Yet another implication is that the special 
dynamics of serving dual markets, as experienced by advertising-supported 
newspapers, radio and television and much of the new media, have to be 
taken into consideration (see e.g. Albarran (2010) , Helgesen and Gaustad 
(2002), Owen and Wildman (1992)). 
This does not mean that media economics follows different kinds of logic 
than suggested by the general economic and business administration theories 
or that these theories are not valid for the media industries. Instead, media 
economic studies share common sets of assumptions for which the analyses 
drawing on these general theories have to be adjusted. From an economics 
and business studies perspective, it is these common sets of assumptions that 
are tied to and follows from its empirical focus, which sets media economics 
apart as a separate field. And for much of the media economics research it is 
indeed an objective in itself to uncover and define these assumptions or 
special conditions so that the analyses built on general economic or business 
administration theories can be adjusted to better fit the media industries. 
While media economics shares its theoretical and methodological toolbox 
with economics and business studies, the relationship between media 
economics and media studies is a shared empirical basis - both fields focus 
on studies of the media. Media economics is more narrowly focused than 
media studies since its focus is on economic and business aspects of the 
media only, so it may therefore be seen as a sub-field of media studies 
(Helgesen & Gaustad, 2002). In itself, media studies is a relatively 
fragmented academic field, but its roots can be traced back to two main 
sources: Mass Communication Studies and Interpersonal Communication 
Studies (Rice, Borgman, & Reeves, 1988). Typical topics in the mass 
communication studies tradition are the mass media’s influence on 
democracy and its place in society. Studies where the individual – often the 
media end-user – is at the center typically come out of the other main 
tradition. One example would be a study of how children draw on media 
content in their interaction between each other.  
Economic studies of the media can be traced as far back as to the mid 19th 
century. Among the first published studies was a predominantly economic 
study of journalism and the publishing business in the first half of the 19th 
century (Estreicher, 1867). Mosco (1999) argues that beyond single cases 
like this one, one can trace research traditions, which – at least with some 
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goodwill – may be placed within the field of media economics all the way 
back to Karl Marx, and he includes critical communication sociology as an 
example. However, if one shall consider media economics as an academic 
field as it is outlined above, the time horizon significantly shortens. In this 
form, media economics took form in the 1980s when the Journal of Media 
Economics was also established as the first international peer reviewed 
scholarly journal solely covering media economic topics. It first came out in 
1987, before this media economic research was scattered over numerous 
media studies, economic and business studies journals. 
Due to its specific empirical focus on the media industries, one also finds 
branches within media economics related to specific media. One branch is 
studying the economics of newspapers, one is studying television markets 
and one is focusing on the motion picture industry. As the media may 
converge and interact, so do of course these research branches. Online 
newspapers integrate the newspaper research branch with the new media 
branch and the motion picture industry and television branches naturally 
overlap, as one industry is a major content provider for the other.  
2.1.2 Media Economic Research on the Motion Picture Industry 
Since this study is particularly concerned with transaction value and the 
relationship between contracting and investments in the motion picture 
industry, the focus here is on studies aiming to explain the market 
performance of motion pictures. And that is because the findings from these 
studies help explain why the level of investments into particular motion 
pictures is an absolutely central variable in understanding the motion picture 
industry and its markets. 
Investments and Performance 
The significant, sometimes overwhelming presence of movies produced by 
American companies in many countries around the world has been the origin 
for complaints and criticism by cultural policymakers in the “importing” 
countries, which have made attempts to limit American imports through 
quotas, currency controls or other trade barriers (Jayakar & Waterman, 2000; 
Lee & Waterman, 2007). This issue has also triggered significant media 
economic research on trade in recorded media products, with most of this 
research based on three related and quite similar assumptions: a) economies 
of scale in distribution; b) cultural discount (which means that all other 
things being equal, audiences are assumed to prefer movies that are 
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produced in their own native languages or which reflect their cultural 
values); and c) that movies in which greater production resources have been 
invested (i.e. movies with bigger production budgets) will be more attractive 
to consumers (Hoskins et al., 1988; Waterman, 1988; Wildman & Siwek, 
1988).  
The theoretical framework established in these three assumptions may be 
referred to as the Domestic Opportunity Advantage (DOA) model since the 
size of the domestic market is a key explanatory factor. The model shows 
that due to economies of scale in movie distribution, producers in larger 
home markets enjoy greater marginal productivity from extra investments in 
their movies than producers within smaller home markets. Thus, American 
producers, with their large and rich home markets, produce higher budget 
movies than their foreign competitors, and due to their higher budgets the 
American movies are preferred in the international export markets. Figure 
2.1 illustrates causal links in the DOA model. Empirical research based on 
this DOA model does support its logic, including the three basic assumptions 
of scale economies, cultural discount and attractiveness being linked to 
budget (Dupagne & Waterman, 1998; Jayakar & Waterman, 2000; 
Waterman, 1993).  
 
Figure 2.1 - The DOA model 
The DOA model assumption linking budget and thus investments with the 
attractiveness of the product is of particular importance to this study, and 
will be discussed further in Section 7.4 below.    
Other Research on Performance 
Among media scholars there were initially two other distinct research 
approaches attempting to shed light on the underlying factors determining 
the performance of motion pictures: The psychological approach that 
focused on the consumer, and thus on factors outside the direct control of the 
industry, and the economic approach, which focused primarily on supply-
side factors. 
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The psychological approach has focused on individual moviegoer’s decision 
to: 1) attend movies among a vast array of entertainment options, and 2) to 
select particular movies. The psychological approach includes work within 
the uses and gratification paradigm, which assumes that audiences are 
active, that media use is goal directed, that media use fulfills a wide range of 
gratifications, and that the gratifications reported can be due to media 
content, the practice of exposure in and of itself, or the social situation in 
which the media-audience interaction takes place (Knapp & Sherman, 1986; 
Palmgreen & Lawrence, 1991) and research that combines the uses and 
gratification approach with a diffusion of innovations model (Austin, 1986, 
1989). The independent variables tested in this psychological approach are 
demand-side oriented and related to audience members’ motivation, and 
contains mostly non-economic factors such as seeking entertainment, social 
utility, mood enhancement, etc. Among the few economic variables tested 
under the psychological approach is the price for theater attendance, which, 
not surprisingly, is found to be a significant negative predictor for movie 
attendance. 
This psychological approach has later been expanded to include a broader set 
of individual spectator traits, and it has been joined by another approach that 
also focuses on factors outside the industry’s direct control, namely third-
party information sources (Hadida, 2009). Studies based on this latter 
approach investigate the impact of non-experts (word-of-mouth), experts 
(professional critics and reviews) and peer-based sources (nominations and 
awards).  
On the other hand, an economic approach has investigated the economic 
factors typically more within the industry’s control that influence collective 
movie attendance decisions, and paid special attention to supply-side 
variables. While the psychological approach tries to “explain” movie 
attendance, the economic approach attempts to uncover the ingredients of 
movie success and ultimately predict movie performance in the future 
(Litman & Ahn, 1998). One of the key independent variables that has been 
tested by researchers following the economic approach is the movie’s 
production budget. A number of major empirical studies have found 
significant positive effect of this independent variable on the dependent 
variable of movie performance (Basuroy, Chatterjee, & Ravid, 2003; Chang 
& Ki, 2005; De Vany & Walls, 1999; Hsu, 2006; Litman, 1983; Litman & 
Kohl, 1989; Liu, 2006; Miller & Shamsie, 2001; Pokorny & Sedgwick, 
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2001; Ravid, 1999; Sochay, 1994; Walls, 2005; Wyatt, 1991). Among the 
distribution-related variables tested for which one can find significant effects 
are “P&A,” “release by major,” “number of screens” and “advertising 
intensity” (Ainslie, Dreze, & Zufryden, 2005; Basuroy, Desai, & Talukdar, 
2006; Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Eliashberg, Jonker, Sawhney, & 
Wierenga, 2000; Hennig-Thurau, Houston, & Walsh, 2006; Lehmann & 
Weinberg, 2000; Litman & Ahn, 1998). These distribution-related variables 
are interesting to this study because they all indicate the investment level 
into a specific movie by the distributor. “P&A” is the abbreviation for prints 
and advertising, and refers to the amount of resources spent on the marketing 
and distribution of a movie. “Release by major” refers to a movie being 
released by one of the large North-American distribution companies (Buena 
Vista/Disney, Warner Brothers, Sony (Columbia/TriStar), Universal, 
Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, and in some cases also Lionsgate and 
MGM/UA), which on average put significantly larger resources behind the 
release of a movie than the smaller “independent” distribution companies. 
“Release by major” thus indicates high distribution investments. “Number of 
screens” refers to the number of cinema screens for which a movie has been 
released. Releasing a movie “wide” on a high number of screens requires 
higher distribution investments (for more advertising, including expensive 
national television spots, more film copies, etc.) than a more “narrow” 
release on fewer screens. A high number of screens therefore indicate high 
distribution investments. “Advertising intensity” refers to the amount of paid 
advertising used to support the release of a movie, and hence also indicates 
the level of distribution investments. 
In general, this economic approach to studying the financial performance of 
motion pictures finds that higher investments, whether in production or 
distribution, result in better performance. Furthermore, recent research also 
indicates that financial resources or investments serve as a catalyst to other 
factors for which studies have found significant positive effects on 
performance such as lead actors’ and the director’s star power (Hadida, 
2010). Note that performance generally refers to gross revenues and not 
profitability, and that this research is thus of little guidance in the question of 
optimal investment levels. In fact, one major study found that while the 
budget had a positive effect on performance, it had a negative effect for 
return on investment (Ravid, 1999). However, the studies do confirm the 
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positive relationship between investments and the type of performance that 
is assumed in the DOA model.  
2.1.3 New Institutional Economics Applied in Media Economics 
While the use of neoclassical economics within the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm of industrial organization theory has been the 
dominant approach and much of the media economic research falls within 
this paradigm, other approaches can also be found in the media economic 
literature. Theories and research based on TCE and other theories within the 
New Institutional Economics paradigm, which are reviewed in the next 
section, are most relevant to this study.  
Caves (2000, 2003) draws on contract theory to analyze and explain the 
organization of media industries such as the motion picture industry, the 
music industry and the book publishing industry. His contract theory 
approach focuses on the efficiency of contracting and incentive alignments 
between the contracting parties. With this approach, he is contributing to 
filling a gap left by the industrial organization approach: Caves’ contract 
theory approach seeks to explain the industry structures, which is a variable 
generally treated as a given in the dominant industrial organization studies.  
An economic property rights approach has been central to studies focusing 
on the production of media products (Koboldt, 1995; Landes, 2002; Merges, 
1995; Taylor & Towse, 1998; Towse, 2001, 2007). Here, the basic emphasis 
is that ownership matters and that efficient outcomes depend on the rights of 
ownership being placed with those who can utilize those rights most 
productively. Due to the intangible nature of media products, much of this 
literature focuses on economic copyright research. For example, Towse’s 
research does include analyses of how different copyright regimes may 
affect incentives and awards to artists, while Merges’ work emphasizes how 
legislators can create state-sponsored incentives for product creation through 
intellectual property rights. Due to its product and production focus, this 
economic property rights literature is most prominent around the somewhat 
blurred line between media economics and cultural economics. Media 
economists focus on media products, while cultural economists focus on 
cultural products that are not necessarily media content products.  
Agency theory has been used to explain variability in media content across 
different media organizations (Napoli, 1997). Napoli uses agency theory to 
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identify organizational and structural independent variables such as implicit 
control mechanisms, organizational size and ownership type, and analyzes 
how these affect media content. It may be argued that this principal-agent 
approach shares the dominant industrial organization approach’s focus on 
how structure influences conduct, but it does represent a variation to the 
dominant approaches by drawing on theory outside the neoclassical 
paradigm. Agency theory has also been used to analyze the efficiency of 
markets for private film financiers (Bagella & Becchetti, 1995). Here, the 
authors investigate typical principal-agency problems, including the adverse 
selection and monitoring costs in the specific setting of a comparative study 
of film financing markets in the US, France and Italy, concluding that the 
first is more efficient that the latter two markets due to a greater market 
thickening and risk spreading. 
Examples of transaction cost analyses of the media industries are still very 
rare. It has however been used to explain why the contracting between movie 
actors and the major studios changed from long-term contracting in the Age 
of the Studio (1929-1948) to market contracting in the most recent era 
(Chisholm, 1993). The use of long-term contracts – in some cases lasting 
seven years – in the Age of the Studio is explained by the high degree of 
asset specificity, or relationship-specific investments, between the actors and 
the studio and the high transaction frequency implied by serial movie 
production. During the Age of the Studio era the studios invested heavily in 
building stars who were also type cast or character-specific for a series of 
movies. Long-term contracts guaranteed that the studios, which were then 
vertically integrated, controlled all stages from production to exhibition, as 
well as the stream of income from the repeat appearances of the 
star/character. The actor or actress had an incentive to sign long-term 
contracts to stay with the studio since he or she would gain from the 
publicity received in the current employment relationship by the 
enhancement of future employment opportunities. With the breakup of the 
studios’ vertical integration into exhibition through the US Supreme Court’s 
Paramount decision in 1948, the studios’ ability to exhibit all movies within 
a “series” diminished, and the trend away from serial movie production 
decreased the degree of specific investments associated with a given 
agreement between an actor and a producer. Underlining the importance of 
specific investments associated with serial production for the contracting 
form, Chisholm also points out in her analysis that within the television 
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industry, which is still today involved extensively in the production of serial 
television shows, the dominant form of the employment relationship 
between actors and producers is still long-term contracts. 
2.2 Transaction Cost Economics: An Overview  
This section will first discuss the origins of transaction cost economics 
(TCE) in the context of New Institutional Economics, and then provide a 
brief overview of the theory and its applications. A more detailed discussion 
of the specific facets of particular relevance to this study follows in the next 
chapter.  
2.2.1 TCE Origins and Context 
Transaction cost economics is part of the New Institutional Economics 
research tradition. New Institutional Economics, which gained momentum in 
the late 1960s and 70s (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Arrow, 1969; Davis & 
North, 1971; Demsetz, 1967; Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1971, 1975, 
1976, 1979), is different from the earlier institutional economics of the 
1930s, including the works of Ronald Coase (1937) and John R. Commons 
(1934), in that it not only challenges the neoclassical paradigm, but also 
proposes a positive research agenda (Williamson, 1998a). Unlike 
mainstream neoclassical economics, which tend to treat the modern 
corporation as a “black box” or production function, the different branches 
of institutional economics, including transaction cost economics, primarily 
see the firm as a governance structure. While neoclassical economics studies 
the behavior of the profit-maximizing firm in the market, institutional 
economics is typically more concerned with the changing character of 
economic organization or governance.  
The neoclassical literature has indeed considerably advanced our 
understanding of the market and market mechanisms. Within the 
neoclassical paradigm the market is, as Friedrich Hayek (1945) puts it, a 
“marvel.” Nevertheless, from a neoclassical viewpoint, transactions 
organized in non-market or quasi-market modes are regarded as examples of 
“market failure” (Arrow, 1969). By contrast, institutional economics takes 
the view of Ronald Coase. In his classic 1937 paper on “The Nature of the 
Firm,” he describes firms and markets as alternative means for doing the 
very same thing (Coase, 1937). In this tradition, new institutional economics 
seeks to explain “market failure” behavior by studying it from a perspective 
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of economic actors choosing alternative forms of economic organization for 
the market. 
Within New Institutional Economics, one may distinguish between those 
approaches in which incentive alignments are emphasized and those which 
feature economies of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). The incentive 
branch includes the property rights approach and agency theory, of which 
the first primarily operates on an institutional level that provides the rules of 
the game within which economic activity is organized, whereas the latter 
operates on a lower resource allocation and employment level primarily 
concerned with marginal analysis (Williamson, 1998b, 2000). The property 
rights literature (Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn & Pejovich, 1974; Grossman & 
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; North, 1984, 1991) emphasizes that 
ownership matters, and argues that new forms of property rights and 
complex contracting are efforts to overcome the incentive deficiencies of 
simpler property rights and contracting traditions. Discrete market 
contracting is replaced by more complex forms of contracting because that is 
the way residual rights to control can be placed in the hands of those who 
can use those rights most productively. Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Holmstrom, 1979; Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) studies the contractual relationship in which one 
party (the “principal”) delegates work to another (the “agent”). The focus of 
the theory is on determining the most efficient contract to govern a particular 
relationship given the characteristics of the parties involved and the fact that 
environmental uncertainty and the cost of obtaining information make it 
impossible for the principal to monitor the agent completely. Though most 
of the agency literature addresses explicit, formal contracts, it can also be 
used to evaluate implicit “social contracts” such as social norms, peer 
pressure and peer acceptance (White, 1985). Most agency models define 
efficiency from the principal’s point of view, and an efficient contract is one 
that brings about the best possible outcome for the principal, rather than one 
that maximizes the joint utility of both principal and agent (Bergen, Dutta, & 
Walker, 1992). Agency problems include precontractual problems that arise 
before the principal decides to offer an agent a contract and postcontractual 
problems, which emerge after the principal and agent engage in a 
relationship. Precontractual, or ex ante, problems tend to be emphasized, 
particularly in the more formal “principal-agent” branch of agency theory 
(Harris & Raviv, 1979).  
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The other branch of the new institutional economics is transaction cost 
economics (TCE), which operates in between the institutional and resource 
allocation levels on a governance level, where one is concerned with the play 
of the game (Williamson, 1998b, 2000).TCE again is split into a governance 
branch and a measurement branch (Williamson, 1985). The measurement 
branch (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 1982) is concerned with the 
performance and attribute ambiguities associated with the supply of a good 
or service, and the measurement literature thus focuses on measurement 
costs. The governance branch (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1979, 
1985), which has become the dominant branch of transaction cost economics 
and to which this study belongs, emphasizes economic efficiency issues by 
comparing alternative forms of governance structures. Hence, it is more 
concerned with assessing transaction costs in a comparative institutional 
way, in which one mode of contracting is compared with another, than with 
determining the absolute magnitude of transaction costs. For the governance 
branch, it is the difference in rather than the exact size of transaction costs 
that matters. 
2.2.2 The Fundaments for Oliver Williamson’s Key Contributions 
Particularly for the development of the governance branch, the works of 
Oliver Williamson have been of key importance, and in 2009 he received the 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions. His first two books 
in particular, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications 
(1975) and The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985), are seminal, but 
also his third book, The Mechanisms of Governance (1996), contributed to a 
comprehensive transaction cost theory with testable implications.  
In The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Williamson dedicates the book 
as follows: “To my teachers: Kenneth J. Arrow, Alfred D. Chandler Jr., 
Roald H. Coase, Herbert A. Simon.” The work of these four scholars 
represents important parts of the basis for Williamson’s work. Williamson 
(1999b) points to Arrow’s work on market failure, in which Arrow observes 
that “market failure is not absolute; it is better to consider a broader 
category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular 
cases block the formation of markets” (1969:49). Chandler (1962) 
demonstrates that the organization form has important business performance 
consequences, and Williamson writes that “the mistaken notion that 
economic efficiency was substantially independent of internal organization 
was no longer tenable after the book appeared” (1985:11). Coase’s classic 
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article on “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) was the most prominent early 
contribution to the governance perspective, in which firms and markets are 
described as alternative forms of governance, while his later article on “The 
Problem of Social Costs” (1960) introduced the fiction of zero transaction 
costs. And finally, Simon’s (1961) work on bounded rationality defines a 
key behavioral assumption for Williamson’s work.  
Among other key contributors to the basis for Williamson’s work were John 
R. Commons, who identified the transaction as the ultimate unit of activity 
(1934) and Chester Barnard, an early scholar who insisted on the importance 
of organization and economizing (1938). 
2.2.3 Efficiency 
Transaction cost economics, as developed by Williamson (1975, 1985) and 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), proposes that economic institutions 
have the primary purpose of economizing on transaction costs and explains 
differences in economic organization accordingly. It subscribes to 
Commons’ view (1924, 1934) that the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis. Efficiency purposes are served by matching transaction governance 
structures to the attributes of transactions. Identifying the critical dimensions 
with respect to which transactions differ, as well as the strengths and 
weaknesses of various governance structures, is therefore of great 
operational significance. TCE emphasizes organizational features where 
neoclassical economics focuses on technological features related to its basic 
understanding of the firm as a production function. When firms expand 
beyond what is seen as their natural boundaries, defined by a core 
technology (Thompson, 1967), neoclassical economics presumes that such 
behavior has a monopoly purpose and effect. TCE subscribes such behavior 
to efficiency purposes. The firm may expand beyond its technologically 
“natural” boundaries if this allows the firm to gain from first-order 
economizing, i.e. the effective adaptation and the elimination of waste, 
related to the transaction in question (Williamson, 1985).  
2.2.4 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs have been defined as the “costs of running the economic 
system” (Arrow, 1969:48).  Such costs are different from production costs, 
which is the cost category with which neoclassical analysis has been 
preoccupied, whereas transaction costs may best be understood as the 
economic equivalent of friction in physical systems (Williamson, 1985:19). 
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As physicists have successfully used the unrealistic assumption of “no 
friction” to understand the attributes of complex systems, neoclassical 
economists have assumed “no transaction costs” in their models.  
Williamson (1975, 1985) distinguishes transaction costs as either ex ante or 
ex post types. Ex ante transaction costs include the costs of drafting, 
negotiating, and safeguard an agreement. Drafting may be done with a great 
deal of care, resulting in complex documents in which numerous 
contingencies are recognized and appropriate adaptations by the parties are 
stipulated and agreed on in advance, or it may be done with less care, using 
simple and incomplete documents so that the gaps have to be filled in by the 
parties as the contingencies arise. Drafting complex documents result in 
significant ex ante transaction costs, while simple documents reduce such ex 
ante transaction costs. Safeguards can take many forms, the most obvious 
being common ownership. Parties to a transaction anticipating contracting 
difficulties may substitute internal organization for the market. Interfirm 
safeguards include signaling credible commitments. Safeguards are 
important because unlike neoclassical economics and many other studies of 
economic exchange, transaction cost theory does not assume that efficacious 
rules of law regarding contract disputes are in place and being applied by the 
courts in an informed, sophisticated, and low-cost way. In the transaction 
cost literature, it is assumed that individual parties to an exchange may 
contract away from the governance structures of the state by devising private 
orderings (Klein, 1980; Telser, 1980; Williamson, 1983, 1985). 
Ex post transaction costs include maladaptation costs, haggling costs 
(incurred if parties seek to correct ex post misalignments), setup and running 
costs for the governance structure and the bonding costs of effecting secure 
commitments (Williamson, 1985). Suppose that a contract stipulates x but 
that the parties in hindsight recognize that they should have done y, getting 
from x to y may then not be easy. The manner in which the associated 
benefits are divided is apt to give rise to intensive, self-interested bargaining 
(haggling costs). An incomplete adaptation will be realized if the parties 
move not to y but to y’ (maladaptation costs). 
Ex ante and ex post transaction costs are interdependent and should therefore 
be addressed simultaneously rather than sequentially. Reducing the ex ante 
costs of drafting may for example result in higher ex post haggling costs.  
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Transaction costs include both the direct costs of establishing and managing 
relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making inferior 
governance decisions.  
2.2.5 Behavioral Assumptions 
Transaction cost theory assumes bounded rationality and opportunism. The 
cognitive assumption of bounded rationality is a semi-strong form of 
rationality in which economic actors are assumed to be “intendedly rational, 
but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1961:xxiv). With limited rationality 
comprehensive contracting is not a realistic organizational alternative since it 
is impossible for an economic actor who is intended rational, but only 
limited so, to foresee any and all contingencies when drafting a contract. The 
cognitive constraints become particularly problematic in uncertain 
environments, in which circumstances surrounding an exchange cannot be 
specified ex ante (i.e. environmental uncertainty) and performance cannot be 
easily verified ex post (i.e. behavioral uncertainty). Transaction cost 
economics is concerned with the economizing consequences of assigning 
transactions to governance structures in a discriminating way. Confronted 
with the realities of bounded rationality, the costs of planning, adapting and 
monitoring transactions need to be expressively considered. Everything else 
being equal, contracting modes that make large demands against cognitive 
competence are relatively disfavored (Williamson, 1985). 
Transaction cost theory subscribes to the strongest form of self-interest 
seeking, opportunism. Williamson (1985:47) defines it as “self-interest 
seeking with guile”: “This includes, but is scarcely limited to the more 
blatant forms, such as lying, stealing, and cheating. Opportunism more often 
involves subtle forms of deceit. Both active and passive forms and both ex 
ante and ex post types are included.” In the transaction cost literature, 
opportunism typically refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of 
information, especially in relation to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, 
disguise or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or contrived 
conditions of information asymmetry that vastly complicate problems of 
economic organization. Transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism 
will benefit if appropriate safeguards can be devised ex ante. Opportunism 
poses significant problems for transactions supported by specific assets 
whose value is limited outside the specific relationship (Klein et al., 1978). 
Specific assets “lock” the parties into the transaction; market competition 
can therefore no longer serve as a restraint on opportunism. This lock-in 
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effect is what Williamson refers to as the fundamental transformation 
(1985:61). 
Assuming bounded rationality and opportunism, it also becomes difficult for 
the transactors to communicate their plans in such a way that an uninformed 
third-party, such as a court, could reasonably enforce them. Hence, it is 
difficult for a third-party enforcer to verify the parties’ claims in the event of 
a dispute (Lewis & Sappington, 1991). 
2.2.6 Governance Forms and Transaction Attributes 
Transaction cost economics holds that transactions that differ in their 
attributes are aligned with governance structures that differ in their costs and 
competence in a discriminating way (Williamson, 1991, 1999a). This view 
implies that the degree to which transactions are governed by vertically 
integrated hierarchies or left to the market is largely determined by the 
nature of the transaction.  
As reflected by the title, in Markets and Hierarchies, Williamson, as Coase 
did, considers markets and hierarchies as the alternative governance forms. 
He only briefly discusses intermediate forms such as long-term contracts 
(1975:87), but it should be noted that he does suggest empirical studies of 
quasi-integrated modes of organization for further research (1975:263). The 
focus on markets and hierarchies is carried forward in The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism, even though here he includes more thorough 
discussions of intermediate types in the form of nonstandard contracting 
such as the use of franchises in cable TV (Williamson, 1985:352). However, 
in response to criticism for dealing with the polar forms while neglecting the 
intermediate forms, Williamson (1991) introduces the hybrid form into his 
models, now distinguishing between three generic forms of governance – 
market, hybrid and hierarchy.   
Following Masten’s (1988) recognition of different governance forms being 
supported by different legal regimes, Williamson (1991) argues that each of 
these three generic forms needs to be supported by a different form of 
contract law and that they are intrinsically different from each other because 
they are supported by different forms of contract law. Classical contract law 
applies to market transactions. In such transactions, there are no dependency 
relationships between buyers and sellers. These transactions are monetized 
to an extreme degree; contract law is interpreted in a very legalistic way; 
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more formal terms supercede less formal, and they are characterized by hard 
bargaining (Macneil, 1974, 1978). 
Neoclassical contract law and the excuse doctrine support the transactions 
governed by hybrid structures. This form of contract law relieves parties 
from strict enforcement and applies to contracts in which the parties 
maintain autonomy, but are bilaterally dependent on each other to a 
nontrivial degree. Contracts are mediated by an elastic contracting 
mechanism. This contract regime is therefore better suited for transactions in 
which efficient coordinated adaptation is important (Williamson, 1991). This 
is typically the case for long-term, incomplete contracts that require special 
adaptive mechanisms to effect realignment and restore efficiency when beset 
by unanticipated disturbances. The long-term contractual relationship 
between General Motors and Fisher Body prior to the 1926 merger has been 
widely studied by transaction cost economists, mostly for its failure to offer 
the required adaptation and realignment (Coase, 2000; Klein, 1988, 2000; 
Klein et al., 1978), but Williamson (1991) uses a 32-year coal supply 
agreement between the Nevada Power Company and the Northwest Trading 
Company as an illustrative example. This latter contract contemplates 
unanticipated disturbances for which adaptation is needed, provides a 
tolerance zone within which misalignments will be absorbed, requires 
information disclosure and substantiation if adaptation is proposed and 
provides arbitration in the event a voluntary agreement fails. As seen is this 
example, within the neoclassical contract regime disputes are referred to 
arbitration rather the courts, whereas disputes under the classical contract 
law regime governing market transactions is referred directly to the courts. 
While arbitration is costly to administer, it is generally more efficient and 
economical than the courts. The hybrid structure thus offers more efficient 
coordinated adaptation than the market structure, even if the parties to a 
transaction should end up in a dispute. Long-term contracts, franchises, 
partnering and alliances are typical examples of hybrid governance 
structures - also referred to as relational governance in parts of the 
transaction cost literature. 
The implicit contract law of hierarchy or internal organization is that of 
forbearance. The courts will refuse to hear disputes between one internal 
division and another, and as access to the courts is being denied, the parties 
must resolve their differences internally. Accordingly, hierarchy is its own 
court of ultimate appeal (Williamson, 1991). The underlying rationale for 
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forbearance law is twofold: (1) parties to an internal dispute possess a deep 
knowledge that can be communicated to the court only at a great cost, and 
(2) permitting internal disputes to be appealed to the court would undermine 
the efficacy and integrity of hierarchy or internal organization. Under the 
forbearance regime, parties to an internal exchange can work out their 
differences (e.g. appropriate transfer prices, the damages to be ascribed to 
delays, failures or quality) themselves or appeal unresolved disputes to the 
hierarchy for a decision. But this exhausts their alternatives. Consequently, 
firms can and do exercise authority relationships that markets cannot.  
The primary benefits of hierarchy stem not from ownership or integration 
per se, but rather from the ability to exercise decision control (Heide, 1994). 
Since the ability to govern by means of authority is not limited to intrafirm 
settings but also can be achieved between firms by means of contractual 
provisions (Stinchcombe, 1985), the key distinction between the most 
integrated types of contractual hybrids and hierarchy is that the first is based 
on neoclassical contract law and the excuse doctrine, while the latter is based 
on forbearance. 
The two polar governance structures are market and hierarchy. Compared to 
markets, hierarchies have superior abilities to minimize the transaction costs 
that arise due to a lack of adaptation from disturbances that require 
cooperation and coordinated responses. This is because organizations have 
more powerful control and monitoring mechanisms; they can provide 
rewards that are long term in nature, and they provide an organizational 
atmosphere and culture that may create convergent goals between parties. 
These organizational abilities represent potential transaction costs savings by 
reducing the opportunity costs raised by an ill adaptation to disturbances 
requiring a coordinated adaptation. However, the advantages of these 
organizational abilities come at the direct cost of running an organization 
and the indirect costs of: (a) giving up the high-powered incentive structures 
of the market, and (b) a relatively weaker ability to adapt to market changes 
(i.e. changes in the demand or supply of a commodity or service). The 
relevant tradeoff is therefore that of one between the costs represented by ill 
coordinated adaptations and these hierarchal costs. Transaction cost theory 
does recognize the production cost advantages of market procurement such 
as economies of scale and scope. Accordingly, transaction will be organized 
in markets unless transaction cost disabilities appear (Williamson, 1981b). 
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One may thus say that the default governance structure is market 
governance. 
While Williamson (1991) refers to market, hybrid and hierarchy as three 
distinct governance structures for analytical purposes, one may also consider 
structures along a continuum with market and hierarchy at each polar end 
(Gatignon & Anderson, 1988; Klein, 1989; Masten, Meehan, & Snyder, 
1989). 
According to transaction cost theory, the most efficient governance structure 
is determined by the attributes of the particular transaction. The principal 
dimensions with which transactions differ are asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency (Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
Asset specificity refers to investments in specific assets that support the 
transaction in question. If assets are redeployable outside the context of the 
transaction without sacrificing productive value, they are not transaction 
specific. If they cannot be redeployed without a loss of productive value, 
they are transaction specific. Assets with a high degree of specificity 
represent sunk costs that have little value outside a particular exchange 
relationship. Such assets create a bilateral dependency between the 
transaction parties and therefore added contracting hazards, as in the form of 
opportunistic appropriation (Joskow, 1988; Klein et al., 1978). Without 
suggesting to be exhaustive, Williamson (1996) identifies six types of asset 
specificity: (1) site specificity, as to where successive stages of production 
are located together to economize on inventory and transportation expenses, 
(2) physical asset specificity, such as specialized dies that are required to 
produce a component, (3) human asset specificity, which arises in a learning-
by-doing fashion, (4) dedicated assets, which are discrete investments in 
general purpose plants that are made at the behest of a particular customer to 
which (5) brand name capital and (6) temporal have been added. 
The importance of transaction-specific investments or asset specificity to 
transaction cost economics is difficult to exaggerate, and asset specificity is 
also the principal factor with which transaction cost economics explains 
vertical integration. In general, hierarchy is favored in situations where asset 
specificity is great due to the associated ex post appropriability hazards for 
the quasi rents created (Klein et al., 1978), and because the high degree of 
bilateral dependency that exists in those circumstances requires a 
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coordinated adaptation to disturbances (Williamson, 1985). It should be 
noted however that asset specificity increases the transaction costs of all 
forms of governance. Added specificity is hence only warranted if these 
added governance costs are more than offset by production-cost savings 
and/or increases in revenues. The relationship between asset specificity and 
governance costs and structure is illustrated below in the Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 - Governance costs as a function of asset specificity (Williamson, 
1991:284) 
M = M(k;θ), X = X(k;θ), and H = H(k;θ) are reduced form expressions that 
denote market, hybrid and hierarchy governance costs as a function of asset 
specificity (k) and a vector of shift parameters (θ). Two relationships are 
important (Williamson, 1991): 
 (2.1) M(0) < X(0) < H(0) 
With no asset specificity (k=0), market will have the lowest governance cost, 
followed by hybrid and hierarchy, because there is no or little bilateral 
dependency between the transaction parties and thus no need for a 
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coordinated adaptation to disturbances. With no asset specificity, the most 
important attribute to the governance structure is its ability to let each 
transaction party effectuate an autonomous adaptation to market 
disturbances; in this respect, market governance is superior to hybrid and 
hierarchy.  
 (2.2) M’ > X’ > H’ 
When asset specificity is introduced it creates a bilateral dependency, and 
the ability of each form of governance structure in effectuating a coordinated 
adaptation to disturbances becomes important. Since hierarchy has superior 
coordinated adaptation abilities, it has the lowest marginal increase in 
governance costs as asset specificity increases. Hybrid structures can 
effectuate a coordinated adaptation more efficiently than market structure, 
but less efficiently than hierarchy.  
At a certain level of asset specificity (K1), the governance costs of market 
governance will have increased to equal the governance cost of a hybrid 
structure. At a higher level of asset specificity (K2), hybrid governance costs 
have increased to equal hierarchy governance costs. Thus, at asset specificity 
levels from zero to K1, the market is the most efficient governance structure; 
at levels from K1 to K2, hybrid governance is most efficient, and at levels 
higher than K2, hierarchy will be most efficient. 
The second principal dimension of a transaction is uncertainty, which Arrow 
(1974) identified as a fundamental driver of market frictions and one of the 
driving economic forces behind the formation of managerial organizations. 
Uncertainty is always assumed at some level in transaction cost theory, as 
uncertainty is the basis for adaptive, sequential decision-making 
(Williamson, 1985). The constraints of bounded rationality become 
problematic in uncertain environments, in which the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction cannot be specified ex ante (i.e. environmental 
uncertainty) and performance cannot be easily verified ex post (i.e. 
behavioral uncertainty). The primary consequence of environmental 
uncertainty is an adaptation problem, i.e. modifying agreements to changing 
circumstances. The effect of behavioral uncertainty is a performance 
evaluation problem, i.e. difficulties in verifying whether compliance with 
established agreements has occurred. The influence of uncertainty on 
economic organization is, however, conditional. Increased uncertainty has 
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little consequence for nonspecific transactions. With no asset specificity, 
new trading relations are easily arranged, continuity has little value and 
behavioral uncertainty is irrelevant. Accordingly, market exchange continues 
and the discrete contracting paradigm holds across standardized transactions 
of all kinds, whatever the degree of uncertainty (Williamson, 1985). For 
transactions involving specific assets, increasing the degree of uncertainty 
will make it more important for the parties to devise a governance structure 
to “work things out” since contractual gaps will be larger and the occasions 
for sequential adaptation will increase in number and importance as the 
degree of uncertainty increases. Concerns over behavioral uncertainty also 
become an important issue (Klein et al., 1978). The interaction effect with 
asset specificity will thus work so that the marginal increase in governance 
cost resulting from increasing asset specificity will be higher (i.e. the slope 
of the M(k), X(k), and H(k) in Figure 2.2 will be steeper and K1 and K2 will 
shift to the left with a higher degree of uncertainty). 
Finally, the third principal dimension, the frequency of the transaction, is 
relevant to the tradeoff between the transaction cost savings obtained from 
hierarchy structures for nonstandard transactions and the cost of operating 
the hierarchy. The cost of organizational structure will be easier to recover 
for large transactions of a recurring kind (Williamson, 1985). The high 
governance cost of internal organization is generally not justified for 
infrequent transactions. 
These three dimensions all affect the governance choice decision, which may 
also be influenced by other factors. TCE theory hence yields probabilistic, 
not deterministic, predictions (Masten, 2000). For instance, holding other 
things constant (uncertainty, frequency, complexity, etc.), the likelihood that 
a more integrated governance arrangement will be adopted increases when 
production involves large relationship-specific investments. Nonetheless, the 
theory cannot predict that such arrangements will be adopted. 
2.2.7 Applications 
Oliver Williamson (1985) proposes that any issue that can be formulated as a 
contracting problem can be investigated to advantage in transaction cost 
economizing terms. This very broad scope of the theory is reflected in the 
wide variety of academic disciplines beyond economics that have adapted 
the transaction cost approach. These include strategic management, 
accounting, sociology, political science, organizational theory, contract law, 
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international business, corporate finance and marketing. Empirical 
applications range from issues of marriage (Treas, 1993) to international 
trade (Hennart & Anderson, 1993) and are too widespread to be summarized 
here, but various reviews of the empirical TCE research provide an overview 
(David & Han, 2004; Joskow, 1988; Macher & Richman, 2008; Masten & 
Saussier, 2000; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Shelanski & Klein, 1995). Only 
a selection of important early empirical articles in key areas of vertical and 
horizontal integration, as well as applications to strategic management, 
follows here.  
The earliest and most common applications of transaction cost theory are 
vertical integration studies. These include both studies of a firm’s decision to 
backwardly integrate into the supply of materials or components (Joskow, 
1985; Masten, 1984; Monteverde & Teece, 1982b; Walker & Weber, 1984) 
and studies of forward integration into distribution and sales (Anderson, 
1985; Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; John & Weitz, 1988). Closely related to 
these are the vertical interorganizational relationship studies that focus on 
how governance problems can be managed without common ownership 
(Heide & John, 1988; Monteverde & Teece, 1982a). Issues here include the 
use of safeguards, relational contracting, the role of relational norms and the 
use of pledges in building credible commitments. While transaction cost 
scholars have traditionally focused on vertical interorganizational 
relationships, there are a growing number of studies focusing on horizontal 
interorganizational relationships seeking to understand and explain a variety 
of relationships between firms at the same point in the value chain. Adding 
and applying transaction cost principals to the neoclassical theory on scope 
economies, Teece (1980) first extended TCE to the horizontal analysis of 
multiproduct diversification, and among the better-known horizontal studies 
is Bucklin and Sengupta’s (1993) study, which explores the role of asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency on power imbalances in co-marketing 
alliances.  
More recent research within strategic management applies TCE to consider 
the performance implications of organizational form. Leiblein et al. (2002) 
find that organizational governance influences technological performance in 
a way largely consistent with TCE predictions in the semiconductor industry.  
Measured in terms of post-alliance patent productivity, Sampson (2004) 
finds that alliances improve innovative performance when selected 
32 
 
according to TCE hazard mitigation arguments in the telecommunications 
industry. 
TCE has also been applied successfully in combination with other theories of 
strategy such as the resource-based view (RBV), which has grown from 
Penrose’s (1959) early work.  For example, Mayer and Salomon (2006) find 
that outsourcing to partner firms is more likely if firms possess superior 
capabilities, as capabilities help shape governance capabilities in selecting, 
monitoring and sharing knowledge with suppliers. Another study combining 
TCE with other traditions within strategic management is one by Nickerson 
et al. (2001), which links TCE with Porter’s (1985) strategic positioning 
framework (SPF) in an examination of the international courier and small 
package services industry in Japan. The authors argue that both TCE and 
SPF, if applied alone, lead to inferior statistical performance when compared 
with a joint positioning-economizing lens that better predicts firm’s choices 
on market position, resource profile and organization.  
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3 Conceptual Framework and Research Objective: 
A TCE-based Joint Value Approach 
 
A primary strength of transaction cost theory is its ability to explain the 
relationship between transaction-specific investments or asset specificity on 
the one hand and transaction governance structure on the other (Williamson, 
1999b), with the empirical support for its refutable predictions on this 
relationship generally being strong (David & Han, 2004; Macher & 
Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Hence, TCE offers a platform 
for a set of normative implications when choosing among alternative 
governance arrangements, and the theory has for instance been central in 
studies of interorganizational relationships in the alliances literature (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Kogut, 1988). Other contributions include research on make-
or-buy decisions for firms considering backward vertical integration into the 
supply of materials or components (Lieberman, 1991; Masten et al., 1989; 
Monteverde & Teece, 1982b), research on forward vertical integration 
focusing on manufacturers’ choice of integrating distribution functions 
(Anderson, 1985; John & Weitz, 1988; Weiss & Anderson, 1992), as well as 
a related branch of research focusing on foreign market entry modes 
(Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Klein, 1989; 
Klein & Roth, 1990; Petersen, Welch, & Benito, 2010).  
However, the reverse relationship embedded in the theory – how the level of 
transaction-specific investments is affected by governance structure – is not 
well explored. As first pointed out by Bensaou and Anderson (1999), and 
more recently by Macher and Richmand (2008) and Kang et al. (2009), little 
attention has been focused on the origins of transaction-specific investments 
generally within the transaction cost literature. Yu and Liao (2008) set out to 
explore the impact of governance mechanisms on transaction specific 
investments and find a positive relationship. However, their cross-sectional 
analysis only tests hypotheses of positive correlations and fails to confirm 
the directionality of the relationship. Thus, the causality is not empirically 
grounded but limited to their reasoning.  Furthermore, Maches and Richman 
(2008) identify the almost exclusively exogenous treatment of asset 
specificity and the level of a firm’s investment in those as an important gap 
in the existing empirical literature. Given the importance of specific 
investments, which generally enhance productivity and value creation 
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(Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; Williamson, 1985), a better understanding of 
their origins and the further development of the reverse relationship between 
governance structure and specific investments would add significantly to 
TCE’s power as a guide to strategic management.  
For instance, a focal firm in an alliance dyad may experience governance 
structure and relationship-specific investments as equal choice variables. 
Specific investments, or the investment decisions, may or may not be made 
prior to that of governance structure (Kang et al., 2009; Williamson, 1999b), 
and the overwhelmingly exogenous treatment of specific investments in the 
literature therefore seem in need of being balanced by a more endogenous 
treatment. For the focal firm, the ultimate objective will be neither 
governance structure nor specific investments, but realized gain by entering 
into or continuing the alliance. According to Williamson (1999b), 
governance is a means to accommodate opportunities, including that of 
making relationship-specific investments, to realize mutual gains. Hence, for 
the alliance dyad the objective will be to maximize joint value (Ghosh & 
John, 1999, 2005; Zajac & Olsen, 1993). 
Zajac and Olsen (1993) introduced their transaction value analysis 
framework as an alternative to TCE, which they criticized  for neglecting 
transaction partners’ interdependent pursuit of joint value. Nevertheless, it is 
argued here that their criticism confuses the largely reduced form of 
exogenous treatment of specific investments in the empirical literature with 
the more nuanced treatment in transaction cost theory. If specific 
investments are treated as being endogenous, as Macher and Richman (2008) 
argue they should be, there is not necessarily any conflict between TCE and 
the transactional value analysis proposed by Zajec and Olsen.  
A better understanding of the origins of specific investments within the 
context of transaction cost theory will increase the transaction cost theory’s 
explanatory power and expand its applications into studies of how such 
investment needs may be facilitated, thereby broadening the strategic scope 
from being primarily those of governance decisions to also including those 
of investment decisions. And the investment decisions are not of less 
significance than the governance decisions, as the ultimate goal guiding both 
is to maximize transaction value. Moreover, investing in specific assets may 
be seen as expanding a firm’s strategic core (Reve, 1990), a decision which 
is clearly not trivial in terms of strategy. Variables other than governance 
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structure may of course be found to have a significant impact on transaction-
specific investments, but since the relationship between asset specificity and 
governance structure has a key position in the theory, it is a good place to 
start.  
3.1 The Value of Transaction-Specific Investments 
Asset specificity is created when a transaction partner makes an investment 
into assets that can only be redeployed outside the transaction context with a 
significant reduction in productive value or at significant direct costs. The 
empirical transaction cost literature catalogues many examples of both 
tangible and intangible specific assets. Pirrong (1993) offers a relatively 
extreme though unambiguous example in the enormous oceangoing cargo 
ships fitted to maximize the efficient Pacific crossing, loading and unloading 
of Honda Accords and nothing else. While such a ship is clearly of great use 
to the Accord division of Honda, it is far less efficient in other applications. 
It may transport other cars, but with much less efficiency than it transports 
the Accords (i.e. it may be redeployed, but with a significant reduction in 
productive value). Overcoming these inefficiencies would involve expensive 
retrofitting (i.e. redeployed at significant direct costs). In the motion picture 
sector, cinemas represent a similar but maybe somewhat less extreme 
example of tangible transaction-specific assets. A multiplex cinema building 
can only be used for purposes other than showing movies with a substantial 
loss in productive value. Alternatively, it may be refitted for other use, but 
only at a substantial direct cost. 
Transaction-specific assets are cospecialized to fit the needs of the 
transaction parties. In the cargo shipping example above, the ship is 
specialized for the shipping company, which can offer Honda’s Accord 
division more competitive transportation than shipping companies operating 
“general purpose” car transportation vessels due to its ability to transport 
Honda Accords more efficiently, in addition to the fact that it is also 
specialized for Honda, which can cover their transportation needs more 
efficiently than they would if no special purpose vessels were available. In 
the movie business example the movie exhibition venue is co-specialized to 
fit the needs of the firm owning cinemas, which obviously can offer movie 
suppliers more competitive movie presentation facilities than owners of 
other types of real estate, and the firm supplying the movie (the distributor), 
36 
 
which benefits from cinemas as efficient venues to reach its customers, the 
audience.  
The transaction parties in both the shipping and movie examples may be part 
of the same corporation. Honda may own the shipping unit that operates the 
special purpose vessel, and a movie distributor may also own the cinemas. 
Indeed, TCE will predict, other things being equal, that with high levels of 
asset specificity integrated structures will offer the most efficient governance 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). The main point here, however, is that the 
presence of the transaction-specific investments is valuable to both 
transaction partners since the specific assets allow them to effectuate the 
transaction more efficiently than would have been possible without such 
assets. 
3.2 Joint Value and Transaction Costs 
The connection between joint value and transaction costs is well explained 
by Ghosh and John (1999). Like Williamson (1996) they observe as a 
starting point that transaction cost economics can be summarized as 
unpacking the ramifications of the Coase-theorem. According to this 
theorem, in the absence of transaction costs, parties to an exchange will 
devise joint value maximizing transactions regardless of their power 
differentials or resource endowments. Since transaction costs are never 
really at zero, it is the subsequent implications for nonzero transaction cost 
worlds that are really of interest. With positive transaction costs, the core 
principle of transaction cost theory is that parties will strive to align 
governance forms with exchange attributes to minimize the transaction costs 
of exchange. And they do so because such an alignment gets them closer to 
the desired goal of joint value maximization. Reducing transaction costs 
results in increasing joint value. 
Bensaou and Anderson (1999) argue that co-specialized assets generate 
enormous added value in terms of production cost savings and product 
differentiation. So, while asset specificity increases transaction costs as 
demands for safeguards increase, it reduces production costs. While TCE 
focuses on transaction costs, it does not ignore production cost issues. 
Organizing commercial transactions in an efficient cost-economizing manner 
takes two parts: economizing on production expense and economizing of 
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transaction costs. These are not independent and need to be addressed 
simultaneously (Riordan & Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1981b).  
Both production cost savings and product differentiation effects are 
illustrated in the Honda Accord vessel and cinema examples. The 
justification of making specific investments by production cost 
considerations is found in the special purpose vessel case in the 
transportation cost savings realized by employing such specialized vessels. 
Similarly, with a real estate property specifically fitted for the exhibition of 
motion pictures, one may exhibit movies to paying patrons for a much lower 
per-customer cost than what is possible without such specific assets (e.g. 
through special “open air” screenings, etc.). Typically, the more specified 
the assets, the bigger the production cost savings that may be realized. More 
formally, one may say that the production cost (PC) curve set up as a 
function of asset specificity has a negative slope (PC’ < 1).  
In the cinema case one may consider two commonly appearing alternatives: 
In one case, one may have a city center single screen cinema that may also 
be used, or which maybe has previously been used, for live theater or other 
live performances. In another case, one may have a so-called megaplex 
theater (a cinema with 14 or more screens). The latter is more specialized 
since good alternative uses are more difficult to find, but it offers 
considerably larger “production cost” savings than the single-screen cinema 
since it can realize economies of scale by serving more patrons from 
common support facilities (e.g. the box-office, bath-rooms, concession 
stands, projection booths, etc.) (AMC, 2002). In the special purpose vessel 
example, product differentiation is clearly obtained by being able to offer the 
Accord division of Honda transportation facilities that are different from and 
superior to any other kind of ship on the market. And cinema owners are 
likewise able to offer real estate facilities that for the purpose of movie 
exhibition are different from and superior to any other kind of real estate on 
the market. Generally, the alternative to the use of specific assets is using 
general-purpose assets, which implies fewer possibilities for product 
differentiation. 
While transaction-specific investments are valuable to the transaction 
parties, these investments are also very vulnerable. This is because once the 
investment has been made, the transaction parties are effectively operating in 
a bilateral (or at least quasi-bilateral) exchange relationship for a 
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considerable period thereafter (Williamson, 1981b). They are “locked into” 
the transaction. Slipping into a small-numbers bargaining position, the 
parties are subjects to both the dangers of behavioral uncertainty 
(opportunism) and environmental uncertainly. The danger of opportunism is 
obvious: Specific investments cannot easily be redeployed to any other 
transaction partner and the current transaction partner may therefore, at least 
up to a point, breach its promises, knowing that the other party is better off 
tolerating such opportunistic behavior than attempting to punish it. Research 
on the contracting between multi- and megaplex cinema owners and 
operators in the UK indicates such opportunistic behavior. Cinema operators 
may argue that the return earned on the property does not support rent 
escalators built into the long-term leases. Due to the inflexibility of these real 
estate structures and the absence of alternative tenants, owners may choose 
to settle for less favorable terms than those actually stipulated in the contract 
(Sayce, Smith, & Walker, 2001). However, the strategic hazards arising from 
the non-redeployable character of specific assets are very much present even 
without opportunistic behavior, simply because of environmental 
uncertainty. A good example is found in Bensaou and Anderson’s (1999) 
empirical research on the auto industry: Toyota lost a week of production 
when Aisin, its proportioning valves supplier, suffered a factory fire. No cars 
could be produced until alternative suppliers could be brought up to speed.  
Transaction-specific investments thus pose the following dilemma: On the 
one hand, there are ex post out-of-pocket costs from opportunistic behavior 
and environmental uncertainty. On the other hand, scaling back these 
investments or forgoing the deal altogether involves ex ante opportunity 
costs. The key question is whether the prospective cost savings afforded by 
special purpose assets justify the strategic hazards that arise as a 
consequence of their nonsalvageable character. A tradeoff is therefore posed 
and needs to be evaluated (Ghosh & John, 1999; Williamson, 1985). This 
may be seen as a tradeoff between production economies and transaction 
cost economies (Williamson, 1981a). 
3.3 Exogenous and Endogenous Treatments of Transaction-
Specific Investments 
Coping with the tradeoff between the prospective cost savings and strategic 
hazards posted by transaction-specific investments, the transaction parties 
are motivated to devise governance forms that possess sufficient safeguards 
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to secure these valuable but vulnerable investments in order to minimize 
total transaction costs, including ex post costs due to opportunistic behavior 
and ex ante opportunity costs of foregone investments or deals (Klein et al., 
1978; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Although the empirical work on this 
particular prediction is quite significant and shows consistent support, 
virtually all the studies rely on a reduced-form version of the prediction; 
namely, the presence of larger specific investments will be associated with 
stronger governance safeguards (David & Han, 2004; Macher & Richman, 
2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Through tests of this reduced-form 
prediction, the transaction-specific investments appear to be exogenous, and 
the very reason for the specific investments is obscured (Ghosh & John, 
1999). 
This reduced-form exogenous treatment of transaction-specific investments 
found in most of the empirical material has caused some confusion and 
invited counterarguments from critics. Particularly relevant to this study is 
Zajac and Olsen’s (1993) criticism, which claims that the transaction cost 
approach neglects the issue of joint value. Instead of a transaction cost 
approach, they propose a transaction value framework that emphasizes joint 
value maximization and the process by which exchange partners create and 
claim value. As discussed above, also emphasizing joint value maximizing, 
but within the framework of mainstream transaction cost theory, Ghosh and 
John (1999) argue that joint value is created when transaction costs are 
reduced and that Zajac and Olsen’s criticism is not consistent with 
transaction cost theory, but that it originates from a misunderstood reading 
of the reduced-form empirical work. Much of Zajec and Olsen’s criticism 
seems to be based on an assumption of an exogenous treatment of specific 
investments in transaction cost economics. For example, they argue that in a 
situation in which transaction parties consider two alternatives of 
interorganizational governance, in which one form involves a substantial 
committed investment that will benefit the performance of both companies, a 
pure transaction cost analysis would favor the other because the committed 
investment entails substantial transaction costs. They conclude: “[…] when 
the pursuit of transaction value necessitates higher transaction costs, and 
expected joint gains outweigh transaction cost considerations […], 
interorganizational strategies having greater joint value will typically require 
the use of less efficient (from a transaction cost perspective) governance 
structures” (p.138). This argument is not only based on an assumption that 
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transaction cost economics does not allow for an endogenous treatment of 
specific investments, but it also ignores transaction cost theory’s explicit 
treatment of the tradeoff between production economies and transaction cost 
economies. A sound transaction cost treatment of the problem posted in 
Zajac and Olsen’s example would consider both the opportunity cost of 
foregone investments (or production economies effects) and the ex post 
transaction cost of alternative governance structures. 
Allowing for an endogenous treatment of specific investments, the above 
problem may be analyzed in a transaction cost framework without any 
conflict between transaction cost and joint value considerations. First, based 
on transaction cost reasoning, assume a relationship between governance 
structure and transaction-specific investments in which more integrated 
structures have a positive effect on the level of transaction-specific 
investments. The logic is that by providing stronger safeguards for such 
investments, integrated structures create exchange environments in which 
transaction partners have stronger incentives to invest in specific assets, 
thereby reaping production economic benefits. Building on this assumption, 
one may analyze a stylized example resembling the situation referred to by 
Zajac and Olsen above. The two parties to a transaction are considering two 
alternative governance structures: Alternative A is closer to a market 
transaction mode and reflects a lesser degree of integration between the 
parties, while alternative B is closer to a hierarchical transaction mode and 
reflects a higher degree of integration. Choosing alternative A, the 
transaction parties will enjoy lower governance costs directly from saving 
the costs of operating a hierarchical structure.  Furthermore, with the 
assumed relationship between governance structure and specific 
investments, the transaction parties will invest less in specific assets with 
this governance alternative. Since asset specificity generally increases 
governance costs, less transaction-specific investments will imply lower 
governance costs. However, low asset specificity will not yield the 
production economies one could realize with a higher level of transaction-
specific investments. In sum, alternative A offers lower governance costs but 
not the benefits from said production economies. Choosing alternative B, the 
transaction parties will carry higher governance costs just from the 
hierarchical costs of a more integrated structure. With the assumed positive 
relationship between more integrated structures and the level of transaction 
specific investments, transaction parties choosing this alternative will invest 
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more in specific assets. A higher level of asset specificity will entail 
increased governance costs. However, the transaction parties will realize 
production economies from their specific investments. In sum, alternative B 
will imply higher governance costs, but let the transaction parties realize 
more favorable production economies.1  
 
Figure 3.1 - Stylized example for alternative governance structures 
For a more formal comparative analysis of the two structural alternatives, the 
governance costs carried by the transaction parties if they choose alternative 
A may be labeled GCA. Choosing alternative B, they will endure higher 
governance costs, labeled GCB. The governance cost savings realized by 
choosing A instead of B may be labeled ΔGCA-B. 
 (3.1) ΔGCA-B = GCB – GCA  
If the net gain in production economies somewhat simplified is labeled 
production cost savings, one may say that the production cost savings 
                                                     
1Better production economies will be realized through production cost savings and/or through 
creating higher joint value (by creating an end product more valuable to end consumers).   
Less Integrated Structure 
Less TSI 
More Integrated Structure 
More TSI 
- TC 
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+ TC 
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realized by choosing B instead of A (ΔPCB-A) equal the production costs 
incurred with little specific assets in alternative A (PCA) minus the 
production costs incurred with more specific assets in B (PCB) as follows: 
 (3.2) ΔPCB-A = PCA – PCB 
To optimize joint value, the transaction has to be organized in a cost 
economizing way (Ghosh & John, 1999). This requires economizing both 
production expense and transaction costs (Williamson, 1981b). Labeling the 
sum of production and governance costs combined costs (CC), the combined 
costs in alternative A (CCA) equals the sum of governance costs of structure 
A (GCA) and the production costs of structure A (PCA). It follows from (3.2) 
above that the production costs of structure A equal the production costs of 
structure B plus the production cost savings of moving from A to B (ΔPCB-
A). The combined costs of structure A may therefore be expressed as 
follows: 
 (3.3) CCA = GCA + PCB + ΔPCB-A 
Similarly, the combined costs of structure B (CCB) equal the governance 
costs of structure B (GCB) plus the production costs of structure B (PCB). It 
follows from (3.1) above that the governance costs of structure B equal the 
governance costs of structure A plus the governance cost savings realized by 
choosing A instead of B. The combined costs of structure B may therefore 
be expressed as follows: 
 (3.4) CCB = GCA + ΔGCA-B + PCB  
The benefit, if any, to the transaction parties of choosing structure B instead 
of A, may therefore be expressed as the reduction in combined costs, if any, 
obtained by moving from A to B: 
 (3.5) ΔCCB-A = CCA – CCB 
   =  [GCA + PCB + ΔPCB-A] – [GCA + ΔGCA-B + PCB] 
   =  ΔPCB-A – ΔGCA-B 
From (3.5), one sees that there will be a net benefit for the transaction 
partners or a gain in joint value from choosing structure B instead of A if the 
production cost savings associated with structure B (ΔPCB-A) are greater than 
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the governance cost savings associated with structure A (ΔGCA-B). However, 
if the difference in governance costs (ΔGCA-B) is greater than the difference 
in production costs (ΔPCB-A), then the net effect of moving from A to B 
(ΔCCA-B) is negative and the transaction parties should choose structure A. 
The net benefit of choosing one structure instead of the other will guide the 
transaction parties in the choice between the two alternatives: 
 (3.6) if ΔCCB-A > 0 (i.e. ΔPCB-A > ΔGCA-B), choose alternative B 
 (3.7) if ΔCCB-A < 0 (i.e. ΔPCB-A < ΔGCA-B), choose alternative A 
Generally, given the assumed relationship between governance structure and 
specific investments, the above analysis shows that if the production cost 
savings realized with a more integrated governance structure are greater than 
the added governance costs following from such governance structure, the 
transaction parties would benefit from choosing this integrated structure. 
And this is basically an unpacking of the key tradeoff issue posted by 
Williamson (1985) with regard to transaction specific investments: “Do the 
prospective cost savings afforded by the special purpose technology justify 
the strategic hazards that arise as a consequence of their nonsalvageable 
character?” (p.54). 
Production cost savings are used here to denote the production economies of 
enhanced productivity and value creation that entail specific investments. 
The tradeoff is thus more fully understood as a tradeoff between governance 
economies and production economies.   
The analysis of this stylized example illustrates how important it may be to 
treat transaction-specific investments as a dependent variable when 
analyzing joint value issues. With an exogenous treatment of transaction-
specific investments the above analysis would fall apart. With specific 
investments given, the production cost savings (ΔPC) would also be given 
and not be dependent on the choice of governance structure. It is implied in 
Zajac and Olsen’s (1993) criticism of transaction cost economics that the 
theory does treat asset specificity as a given, and that it thus ignores 
production cost savings derived from transaction-specific investments. 
Taking the effects of production economies (ΔPC) out of the above analysis 
and only focusing on direct governance cost savings (ΔGC), one would 
arrive at the same conclusion as Zajac and Olsen, namely that “transaction 
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value” would suffer from pure “transaction cost considerations,” which 
would guide the transaction parties towards alternative A.  
3.4 Loss of Production Economies as a Transaction Cost 
Borrowing Ghosh and John’s (1999) argumentation, one may fit the joint 
value maximizing argument involving effects of production economies into 
the mainstream transaction cost framework. In a neoclassical framework in 
which the unit of analysis is the firm straightforward production cost 
thinking is unproblematic. However, fitting the full argument into a 
transaction cost framework requires that one also adapt to transaction cost 
theory’s unit of analysis, which is the transaction. In this framework, the 
potential loss of production economies effects is recognized as an ex ante 
transaction cost, namely the opportunity cost of foregone investments. 
Following this approach, one may bring the full production economies 
considerations in the above analysis into a mainstream transaction cost 
framework without having to deal explicitly with production economies in 
addition to transaction cost economies. This solves the unit of analysis 
problem, allowing the full analysis to be carried out with a focus on the 
transaction, and not on the firm. With the assumed relationship between 
governance structure and transaction-specific investments, the foregone 
production cost savings from utilizing specific assets becomes an 
opportunity cost of choosing certain types of governance structures (i.e. less 
integrated structures). Including this ex ante transaction cost into an analysis 
of the total transaction costs, one will maximize joint value by minimizing 
transaction costs. 
One should note that arriving at this result is also the intention of Zajac and 
Olsen’s (1993) transaction value framework. They propose this as “a 
framework that views the cost of addressing transaction cost concerns (i.e. 
the risk of exploitation by one’s exchange partner) as simply a subset of total 
costs to be aggregated and then compared with the set of total benefits/gains 
in an overall calculation of the value of an interorganizational strategy” 
(p.133). Since they fail to recognize the opportunity costs of foregone 
investments as an ex ante transaction cost, they claim that this cannot be 
done solely within the framework of transaction cost theory. 
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For the sake of convenience, I will be referring to production economies in 
the following, even though it more precisely may be described as an ex ante 
transaction cost as discussed above. 
3.5 Research Objective: From Governance Alignment to 
Transaction Value  
TCE proposes that economic institutions have the primary purpose of 
economizing on transaction costs, and efficiency purposes are served by 
matching transaction governance structures to the attributes of the 
transactions, of which specific investments, uncertainty and frequency are 
considered the most important. In the relationship between structure and 
specific investments, it is not surprising then that attention first and foremost 
has been given to the effect of transaction-specific investments on 
governance structure, and with strong empirical support, the theory’s 
guidance on this particular relationship may be seen as the key TCE 
contribution to strategy.  
Nonetheless, it is argued above that this approach needs to be complemented 
with an endogenous treatment of transaction-specific investments. This will 
allow us to shift focus from governance alignment, with which the 
influential reduced-form analysis proposed by Williamson (1991) is 
primarily concerned, to the more strategically interesting underlying 
objective of maximizing transaction value. The above analysis has shown 
that to achieve this objective, the key tradeoff to be considered is one 
between governance economies and production economies. The reduced-
form analysis largely ignores the latter, while the model suggested here 
endeavors to provide a fuller analysis that makes allowances for both.  
My proposed model based on the analysis above is illustrated in Figure 3.2 
below. Drawing on the reduced form analysis, it shows that governance 
economies are affected by governance structure and specific investments, 
that structure is affected by specific investments, and that the effect of 
enhanced governance economies is increased transaction value. However, it 
explicitly adds production economies as a key variable, and shows that these 
depend on specific investments and that they affect transaction value. And 
since transaction value is determined by the sum of production and 
governance economies, the marginal tradeoff between the two identified in 
Section 3.3 above becomes decisive when seeking to maximize transaction 
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value. Finally, the model makes specific investments dependent on structure. 
Without this latter relationship, the model would fall subject to Zajac and 
Olsen’s (1993) criticism, and the marginal tradeoff between production and 
governance economies would also be void as discussed in Section 3.3 above. 
 
Figure 3.2 - Framework for a TCE-based transaction value analysis  
The proposed model rests on an assumed relationship between governance 
structure and specific investments in which more integrated structures have a 
positive effect on the level of transaction-specific investments. The 
assumption is based on transaction cost theory, with the causality primarily 
founded on the effects of added safeguards provided by more integrated 
structures. Given the empirically established correlations between specific 
investments and governance structures the assumed relationship seems 
likely. However, since the TCE literature’s treatment of specific investments 
has been almost entirely exogenous, the causality is not empirically 
grounded and its explanatory power is accordingly limited.  
Hence, while the overall objective of this study is to shift the focus from 
governance alignment to the ultimate goal of maximizing transaction value, 
it can only be reached by applying an endogenous treatment of transaction-
specific investments. Through a micro-analytic investigation of the 
heretofore assumed effects of governance structure on specific investments, 
my empirical work seeks to explain the causality of the relationship and 
therefore also to validate the proposed model. 
Transaction 
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The endogenous treatment of transaction-specific investments is applied 
within the context of the motion picture industry. In the following two 
chapters, it will be shown that motion picture production and distribution 
investments are largely specific to the transaction between the producer and 
distributor of a movie. The transaction value of a production-distribution 
transaction is thus closely linked to the joint value created by the producer 
and distributor(s) through their joint cooperative investments. It is the 
aggregate of these distribution and production investments that affects the 
attractiveness of the movie and its expected market performance, and in 
Chapter 1 the cumulative output of production and distribution function 
value creation, the joint product, was labeled the movie’s image (see Table 
1.1). The transaction value of these production-distribution transactions is 
determined by this cumulative value creation into the joint product (the 
production economies) minus the transaction costs incurred by producer and 
distributor (the governance economies). It is therefore important not only to 
understand the well-established relationship between the producer and 
distributor’s respective specific investments and their contracting options, 
which enable us to carry out comparative transaction cost analyses, but also 
the reverse relationship of how different contracting options are likely to 
influence the parties’ respective investments in the joint product. A better 
understanding of this reverse relationship between production-distribution 
structure and production-distribution investments is necessary to align 
structure with the sought after balance of production and distribution 
investments. Only then, can the transactors consider the ensuing joint value 
in a tradeoff with governance costs to maximize transaction value.  
Provided this reverse relationship can be established and explained within 
the TCE framework, the theory will not only be a powerful guide for 
understanding and choosing vertical structures, but also a more important 
strategic management tool guiding industry practitioners towards 
maximizing transaction value. Understanding the effects of structure on 
specific investments represents the first required step in pursuing a fuller 
transaction value analysis as proposed in the model above. Hence, 
elaborating on TCE theory to better understand and explain this reverse 
relationship between structure and specific investments becomes the express 
objective of this study. 
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3.6 Research Question: How Structure Affects Specific 
Investments 
The objective of this study as set out above is pursued by utilizing the rich 
context of contracting and investments by and between producers and 
distributors in the motion picture industry, in which transaction-specific 
investments are treated as the dependent variable in relation to structure.  It 
follows from the proposed transaction value model that I do not start with a 
blank canvas looking for any variables explaining how transaction-specific 
investments come about. Instead, I concentrate on a narrower scope seeking 
to enhance: (a) the understanding of how structure affects specific 
investments, and thus also (b) the understanding of the interdependent 
relationship between structure and transaction-specific investments. 
Following from this approach, the main research question is: 
How do different types of contractual production-distribution structures 
utilized in the motion picture industry affect the transactors’ production and 
distribution investments in a feature film project? 
The contractual production-distribution structures refer to the contracting 
used to govern transactions between producers and distributors (between the 
production and distribution functions), and the production and distribution 
investments represent the transactors’ cooperative specific investments into 
the joint product. On a more generalized or theoretical level, this research 
question asks how governance structure may affect the transaction parties’ 
specific investments.  
While the “how” question could be interpreted to simply establishing 
correlations, the aim of this study is to establish a deeper understanding of 
the processes involved. Given the amount of empirical research carried out 
on the effects that specific investments have on governance structure, 
establishing correlations is less interesting than understanding exactly how 
the reverse relationship works. That means understanding the contracting 
and investment processes, how these processes play out and the sequence of 
the actions involved. Being able to answer the “how” question in such detail 
is what eventually will give the theory elaboration explanatory power. 
Consequently, one may also say that there is a “why” question embedded in 
the research question following from the research objective of theory 
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extension. The objective is not so much searching for generalities as 
searching for causes. 
Seen in the context of established transaction cost theory, the research 
question indicates an interdependent relationship between structure and 
transaction specific investments. In Figure 3.3 below, which offers a more 
detailed view of the left-side relationships between structure and specific 
investments in Figure 3.2 above, the causal relationships established in the 
TCE literature are marked with dotted arrows, while the relationships subject 
to this study – representing the theory elaboration - are marked with solid 
arrows. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Research model. Core variables: Governance structure (vertical 
and horizontal) and transaction-specific investments. 
In Figure 3.3 above, a distinction is made between vertical and horizontal 
governance structure in the producer-distributor relationship. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 above, vertical integration and vertical interorganizational 
relationships have dominated transaction cost research, but there have also 
been a number of studies on horizontal interorganizational relationships. 
While maybe less obvious than vertical relationships in the context of 
production-distribution contracting, horizontal relationships represent a 
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dimension of contracting structure that should not be ignored in this study. 
However, rather than adding a horizontal perspective by looking at the 
relationships between functions at the same horizontal level in the value 
chain, as for example studying co-marketing efforts between distributors of 
the same feature film, the horizontal perspective is added to the vertical 
production-distribution transaction. A horizontal perspective is therefore 
added to the core transaction being studied (Figure 3.4A) rather than to 
relationships between functions or entities at the same level in the value 
chain (Figure 3.4B). The horizontal variation in the production-distribution 
transaction is created because a producer, for one specific movie may 
contract with one distributor (known in the industry as an all rights deal) or 
two or more distributors (e.g. one domestic and one international as 
illustrated in Figure 3.4A) (a split rights deal). Thus, this treatment of the 
horizontal transaction dimension is more similar to Bradach and Eccles’ 
(1989) “plural forms” approach, in which the focus is expanded from a 
single governance form to a combination of governance forms. This 
approach focuses on organizations that apply two different structures with 
different strengths and weaknesses, such as company and franchise 
arrangements, so that each can be used to leverage the strengths and 
ameliorate the weaknesses of the other. While similar in certain ways to the 
plural forms approach, the horizontal treatment here is somewhat simpler, 
primarily focusing on the level of horizontal integration, i.e. the involvement 
of one versus two or more distributors. 
 
Figures 3.4A - Horizontal dimension of P-D transaction, and 3.4B - 
Horizontal D-D relationships 
P P 
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The study hence investigates both the vertical and horizontal dimension of 
the production-distribution transaction: 
1) Vertical: The relationship (marked A in Figure 3.3) between the 
degree of vertical integration in the production-distribution dyad (the 
vertical P-D structure) and the level of transaction-specific 
investments made in the joint product; and  
2) Horizontal: The relationship (marked B in Figure 3.3) between the 
integration of the distribution functions (the horizontal P-D 
structure) and the level of transaction-specific investments made in 
the joint product. 
Finally, seeking a deeper understanding of the contracting and investment 
processes, one may expect to find some key intermediate variables that help 
explain the causal links between structure and transaction-specific 
distribution investments. An important contribution of the study would 
therefore be to identify intermediate variables (marked "i" in Figure 3.3 
above) and explain the casual links between these and the core variables, 
structure and transaction-specific investments. These “new” variables are 
therefore not brought in as alternative independent variables to structure 
explaining transaction specific investments but as dependent variables to 
structure that subsequently act as independent variables in relation to 
transaction-specific investments. Identifying and explaining the causal 
relationship between these intermediate variables and our core variables is 
similar to the process of identifying the intervening causal process between 
two variables, which have been termed by some as process tracing (Welch, 
Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mantymaki, 2011). 
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4 Study Outline and Methodology 
This chapter will elaborate on methodological issues encountered in 
pursuing the research objective and answering the research question set out 
in the previous chapter. It first discusses the choice of a qualitative approach, 
then the case study research strategy and design and the methods of data 
collection and analysis utilized, before finally making a note on the chosen 
approach to theory building. 
4.1 A Qualitative Approach 
It follows from the research objective and research questions that theory 
building is the key feature of this study, and while a number of quantitative 
research methods have excellent qualities for theory testing, qualitative 
approaches are often better suited for theory building purposes since they 
offer a better context for answering the “why” questions, in addition to the 
“what” and “how” questions that in many instances can also be addressed 
with quantitative methods (Andersen, 1997; Yin, 2009). The “what” 
questions determine which factors are considered as part of the explanation 
of the phenomena, whereas the “how” questions determine how these factors 
are related. Taken together, these elements constitute the domain or subject 
of the theory. However, it is the “why” questions that specify the economic 
dynamics that justify the selection of factors and the proposed causal 
relationship. This rationale constitutes the theory’s assumptions – the 
theoretical glue that welds the model together (Whetten, 1989). Indeed, some 
of the seminal TCE developments have been based on qualitative 
approaches, including Coase (1937) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian 
(1978).  
Here the “whats” are the key phenomena, structure/contracting and 
transaction-specific investments, as well as the intermediate variables or 
phenomena identified through the data collection and analysis. It is noted in 
the previous section that the “how” question asked here goes beyond a 
simple correlation type understanding of how specific investments are 
related to structure; it seeks a deeper understanding of causes and 
consequences. This is more in line with Eriksson and Kovalainen’s (2008) 
broader approach to “how” questions being suited for qualitative methods in 
business research, in which the aim is to shape understandings of how 
something takes place, works or interacts. This incorporates the economic 
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dynamics, typically associated with “why” questions, in addition to 
determining how the factors or phenomena are related; hence, this type of 
“how” is not strictly distinguished and separated from “why” but also 
involves a “why” in a broader and more profound use of the “how” question. 
To develop this type of understanding of how structure affects transaction-
specific investments also necessarily demands a thorough understanding of 
these phenomena themselves as they appear in the given context.  It is not 
sufficient to learn that a producer and distributor use this or that kind of 
contracting and make what type of investments, we also need to understand 
how the contracting, investments and the transactions actually take place. 
We need to understand the dynamics, including for instance how and when 
the investment decisions occur. Silverman (2006) notes that “(t)he main 
strength of qualitative research is its ability to study phenomena which are 
simply unavailable elsewhere. Quantitative researchers are rightly concerned 
to establish correlations between variables. However, while their approach 
can tell us a lot about inputs and outputs to some phenomenon (…), it has to 
be satisfied with a purely ‘operational’ definition of the phenomenon and 
does not have the resources to describe how that phenomenon is locally 
constituted” (p. 43). As will be developed further later in this chapter, the 
qualitative approach was chosen precisely because it offers the best 
possibilities for developing a deeper understanding of how contracting and 
transaction-specific investments play out in the transactions between motion 
picture producers and distributors. 
Before moving on to the specifics of the chosen qualitative approach, it is 
interesting to contemplate the possibilities and implications of a quantitative 
alternative. The choice between quantitative methods and a qualitative 
approach is sometimes attributed to a choice between studying a few issues 
in many observations or many issues in a few observations (Larsson, 1993). 
Since the theory development element of this study is rooted in the existing 
framework of TCE theory in which key variables are given, it would be 
possible to limit the variables (phenomena) to these key variables, thus 
abandoning the search for intermediate variables and choosing a quantitative 
approach that focuses on governance structure and transaction-specific 
investments. As we shall see, it is possible to categorize the most frequently 
used forms of production-distribution contracting into relatively broad 
idealized categories of contracts and then relate these to Williamson’s (1991) 
generic forms of governance structure. Therefore, at least in principle, this 
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opens up the possibility of carrying out a study similar to this one as a 
quantitative survey. But many problems remain, some related to theory 
building and some of a more pragmatic nature. First, an exploratory 
quantitative survey may indicate how (in a correlation type of way) 
distribution investments are affected by structure, but such studies are 
seldom able to give any strong indications on why (Yin, 2009), which is 
important in a theory development process like this one. Answering the how 
questions would give us an indication of the correlation between the key 
variables, but since the main purpose of this study is to determine the causal 
relationship in the direction from governance structure to specific 
investments, simply establishing correlation would be, as discussed above, 
unsatisfactory. And again, since the reverse relationship between specific 
investments and governance structure is well established in transaction cost 
literature, the correlation between these key variables is to a large extent 
given, and establishing such a correlation would not produce any significant 
new knowledge unless the findings would contradict established transaction 
cost theory. 
Second, on a pragmatic level, even if the broad contracting categories are 
helpful in effectively relating the most common production-distribution 
contracts to Williamson’s generic forms of governance structure and 
corresponding contract law, it remains a considerable analytical job to fit 
real production-distribution contracting into the idealized categories. Unless 
one can rely on secondary data, in which contracts are already categorized in 
a way relevant to this study, or on substantial resources to carry out the 
categorization oneself, one would risk ending up with a very low N for any 
such survey. To the best of my knowledge, no sufficient categorized data is 
available and prior to this study the categories were also underdeveloped in 
relation to TCE theory. Further complicating a survey approach is the 
availability of primary uncategorized data. A preliminary round of 
interviews that I carried out among US producers, distributors and 
entertainment lawyers, as well as scholars doing research on the motion 
picture industry, at an early stage in this research project indicated that 
production-distribution agreements typically are kept confidential and a 
researcher aiming to do a survey is therefore likely to encounter major 
difficulties in obtaining access to a sufficient number of recent documents. 
Furthermore, even in what seems like the unlikely case that one would gain 
access to a sufficient number of contracts, particularly sensitive information 
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– including the specific amounts invested – would most likely be blanked 
out, hence creating difficulties in establishing the other key variable. 
Relaxing the contemporary requirement, one may gain access to written 
contracts that are parts of significantly older archives donated to research 
institutions by production or distribution companies or otherwise made 
available to academics, but even these may be restricted by certain 
confidentiality clauses. The Warner Bros. Archives at the University of 
Southern California (USC) was identified as one possible source for such 
historic documents. It was donated to USC in 1977 by Warner 
Communications and contains documents from 1918 to 1968, including legal 
files for Warner feature films (USC, 2011). However, these files may not 
hold sufficient information for each feature film project to determine 
contracting structure and investment levels split between production and 
distribution, not to mention that the variance in contracting structure has 
changed and significantly intensified since this historic period (Putnam & 
Watson, 1997).  
As a result, there would be significant pragmatic hurdles to carrying out a 
quantitative survey. Since the economic case for qualitative studies is 
strongest where the required information is not readily available in aggregate 
data or in good secondary sources and is intrinsically hard to get (Eckstein, 
1975), this also suggests a qualitative approach as containing the most 
efficient methods for the research objectives raised here. But, even if these 
pragmatic issues could be overcome, the critical argument against a 
quantitative approach for this study remains that it would not provide the 
ability to study the key phenomena with the microanalytic detail necessary 
for the sought theory development. 
4.2 The Case Study 
Qualitative research is not one neatly defined and contained methodological 
approach, but instead covers a wide range of different and even conflicting 
activities (Creswell, 2007; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Silverman, 2006). 
Among the most common approaches are ethnographic research (reports 
shared patterns of behavior, beliefs and language for a cultural group), 
narrative research (reports the life and experience of a single individual with 
a focus on the sequence of events to generate meaning), phenomenological 
research (reports on the lived experience of a concept or phenomenon for 
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several individuals), grounded theory research (applies a number of 
systematic procedures to move beyond description generating or discovering 
middle-range theory, as opposed to broad, macro-level theory), action 
research (researcher actively engages and collaborates with the research 
object and its practical problem solving to generate knowledge) and case 
study research (reports on an issue or issues explored through one or more 
cases within a bounded system). Among these approaches, the qualitative 
case study was deemed best suited for this study for the reasons specified in 
the following pages.  
Case studies are often associated with the use of qualitative data and 
ethnographic data collection methods (observation and interviews). 
However, as with some of the other approaches listed above the case study 
approach does not imply the use of any particular type of evidence nor the 
use of a particular data collection method. The case study approach 
represents a research strategy, and as such, the distinguishing characteristic 
of the case study is that it attempts to examine: (a) a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when (b) the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not evident (as it is for example with 
experiments) (Yin, 1981). In this study, the contemporary phenomenon is the 
link between contracting and specific investments, and the context is the 
motion picture industry. And it is not evident at the outset where the 
boundaries between our relationship of interest and the industry are drawn. If 
such boundaries were clear, the search for intermediate variables or 
phenomena would be redundant. But before these are identified through data 
collection and analysis, it is not possible to say which phenomena occurring 
in the industry are integral to the understanding of the contracting - specific 
investment relationship and which are not. 
A case study’s focus is on understanding the dynamics present within single 
settings, and it therefore typically involves in-depth studies of one or a few 
cases in which the unit of analysis is seen as a complex entity where subunits 
and their relationship to each other are subject to extensive analysis 
(Andersen, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Such qualities are easily recognized in 
relatively early groundbreaking case studies like Allison’s (1971) study of 
the Cuban missile crisis, Lysgaard’s (1961) study of labor sociology in The 
Workers’ Collective and Whyte’s (1955) study of community sociology in 
Street Corner Society. The equivalent for the present study would be to 
apply a less prestructured approach as for instance with an objective of 
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simply seeking a better understanding of specific investments in the motion 
picture industry. However, as we shall see, this study’s highly prestructured 
approach differs from these classic case studies in terms of intensity and the 
number of cases. 
The number of cases is used by Yin (2009) as a primary classification of 
case studies into those that involve a single case and those that involve 
multiple cases (single-case design vs. multiple-case design). The single-case 
design is often associated with “classic” case studies, including those 
mentioned above, in which the researcher engages in the most in-depth and 
detailed study of a single case that resources allow (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991), 
while the multi-case design is sometimes seen as a hybrid form of case 
research with more of an emphasis on developing clear constructs and 
testable propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989b). This classification is similar to 
Eriksson and Kovalainen’s (2008) distinction between intensive and 
extensive case studies. An intensive case study defines one (or few) unit(s) 
or individual(s) as “case(s)” and its objective is to learn how this specific or 
unique case works. This is done through contextualized and “thick 
descriptions” of the case. A thick description is one that analyzes the 
multiple levels of meaning and is able to crystallize the reasons behind the 
multifaceted details of the case (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Silverman, 
2006). On the other hand, an extensive case study is one that focuses on a 
phenomenon that may be studied by using several units or individuals as 
instruments in the study. The emphasis is therefore not on the cases (units or 
individuals) as intrinsically interesting in themselves, but on the 
phenomenon or phenomena studied through the cases. The objective is often 
– as with this study – to elaborate on gaps in existing theory. Compared to 
the intensive case study the description is typically “thinner”, sparely 
described and more abstract in nature since the cases are not studied in every 
detail, but according to the researcher’s predefined research interest. Finally, 
it should be noted that a strict distinction between single and multiple case 
designs may be difficult to draw. As shown by Eisenhardt (1991), even 
classic case studies generally considered of single-case design apply many of 
the analytical methods associated with multiple-case design studies. For 
instance, in the Street Corner Society, Whyte studies multiple gangs in a 
single setting, Boston’s North End. The single setting has classified it as a 
single-case study, but many of the observations are repeated across gangs, 
leading to generalizations similar to a multi-case design approach.  
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The prestructured approach and theory elaboration objective following from 
the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 3 clearly place this case study in 
the extensive category. Our focus is on the key phenomena of contracting 
and specific investment and on the link between these, and not on the 
specific cases in themselves. The study also has what Yin would classify as a 
multiple-case design, which will be evident from the case definitions 
following the unit of analysis definitions below. The key motivation for the 
multiple-case design is to obtain variance in our independent variable 
(contracting forms) to see if and how different forms of contracting vary in 
their impact on specific investments. 
4.3 Unit of Analysis 
The study’s unit of analysis largely follows from the research question and 
its origin in TCE theory. Transaction cost economics is based on Commons’ 
concept of the transaction being the basic unit of analysis in economic 
research rather than the firm (Commons, 1924, 1934). This study is 
concerned with the transaction between the producer and distributor of a 
movie (that is the transaction between production transactions on the one 
hand and distribution transactions on the other), and how the governance 
structure for such a transaction affects the parties’ specific investment. It is 
thus concerned with the production-distribution transaction, and this 
transaction is defined as the study’s unit of analysis.  
However, as we have seen (Figures 3.4A and 3.4B), the production-
distribution transaction for a movie may consist of more than two parties and 
a set of related transactions rather than a single discrete transaction, and the 
transactions involved may be categorized along a vertical and horizontal 
dimension. Yin (1994) classifies case studies into those that have a single 
unit of analysis (holistic case studies) and those that have multiple units of 
analysis within a single study (embedded case studies). Since our unit of 
analysis may be divided into vertical and horizontal dimensions, these 
dimensions are considered subunits. With the two subunits of the vertical 
production-distribution transaction and the horizontal dimension of the 
production-distribution transaction, the study may best be categorized as 
embedded in following Yin’s classification. 
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4.4 Selection and Definition of the Cases 
Case definitions follow from how the unit of analysis is defined (Yin, 2009). 
Our case or cases will therefore be one or more production-distribution 
transactions, and this particular type of transaction represents the study’s 
initial population. Even so, thousands of movies are produced every year 
involving some form of contracting between producer and distributor, and 
these movies range from large “blockbusters” like Avatar and Pirates of the 
Caribbean to smaller student projects. This study will only look at 
production-distribution contracting for theatrical feature films, meaning 
movies longer than 80 minutes in running time that are given a general 
cinema release. The marketing and release of a theatrical movie is quite 
different from the marketing and release of a home video or television movie 
(a movie that is not given a theatrical run but released directly to home video 
or television), and mixing categories of theatrical, home video and 
television-movies is likely to create a significant disturbance from contextual 
variables. Furthermore, theatrical feature films are per definition the 
category that is released in most media and markets since they are released 
theatrically as well as in home video and television markets.  It is therefore 
more likely that they are handled by different distributors, and production-
distribution contracting for theatrical movies therefore best serves to study 
the impact of split distribution functions or the level of horizontal integration 
on cooperative-specific investments.  
It could be interesting in itself to study production-distribution relationships 
in different markets around the world since coherent findings with regard to 
our key variables would create powerful results due to a strong variance in 
contextual variables. However, the study limits itself to look at the 
contracting for American theatrical movies (so-called Hollywood movies). 
This is done because the variance in contextual variables could easily turn 
out to be so strong that it would be difficult to subscribe any variance in our 
dependent variable to the independent variables we are interested in 
studying, even using a qualitative approach. While the American film 
industry probably has the most “industrial” organization of the world’s 
national motion picture industries, many European countries operate a quite 
different system settled more deeply into the cultural sphere where the 
motion picture sector is heavily dependent and thus controlled by public or 
state incentives (Dale, 1997; Putnam & Watson, 1997). To give an example: 
As to the  question of why producers and distributors contract before the 
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commencement of production regardless of contracting form, a Norwegian 
producer or distributor would most likely answer that it is done because it is 
a requirement of the Norwegian Film Institute (Gaustad, 2009). With state 
regulations and support systems varying from country to country, it is likely 
that such strong contextual differences would make direct comparisons 
between data from different countries very difficult. Avoiding these kinds of 
regulatory biases is also important, as the transaction cost theory relies on 
the efficiency of competition to perform a sorting between more and less 
efficient governance structures and to shift resources in favor of the former 
(Williamson, 1985). 
However, if the resources were available, one could certainly gain from 
carrying out parallel studies in different countries to see whether theoretical 
propositions gaining support in one context also did so in others. This would 
be in line with a “most different systems” research design (Andersen, 1997), 
and a follow-up study of this nature would greatly enhance our finding’s 
external validity. But since the focus here is on theory development, 
advancing the understanding of the theoretical questions of what, how and 
why needs to take center stage. When these core elements of theory are in 
place, work involving parallel studies in different environments would be a 
natural second step to look more deeply into the questions of who, where and 
when, which would define temporal and contextual boundaries of the 
developed theory. Finally, carrying out parallel studies – each with the depth 
necessary for theory development purposes – would not have been possible 
with the limited resources available for this study. 
To control for extraneous/environmental variation, the initial population of 
motion picture industry production-distribution transactions is narrowed 
down to production-distribution transactions for American theatrical motion 
pictures, which also helps in defining the limits for generalizing the findings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). Limiting extraneous variation by narrowing the initial 
population also means that the choice of cases will reflect a “most similar 
system” research strategy (Andersen, 1997) in which cases are chosen to 
obtain variance in key variables, while limiting as much variance as possible 
otherwise.  
For extensive case studies or multiple-cases designs like this study, cases are 
chosen and defined according to theoretical, not statistical, criteria 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Yin, 1994). Our key 
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variables are transaction-specific distribution investments and governance 
structure or contracting form, and a comparative case study will therefore be 
used to investigate the incentives and conditions for transaction-specific 
distribution investments under the different contracting forms used in the 
American motion picture industry. For the vertical dimension of governance 
structure, which based on our theoretical framework represents our primary 
interest for the independent variable, two cases were chosen and defined to 
reflect relatively polar points on a scale from pure market to pure hierarchy. 
As Eisenhardt (1989b) notes, with the objective of building theory it makes 
sense to select polar types of cases since the process then becomes more 
“transparently observable.” Choosing polar type cases excludes a specific 
treatment of the hybrid form, but for the purpose of theory development the 
key issue is to obtain unambiguous variance in the degree of integration, not 
to define cases that fit one-to-one with Williamson’s three categories of 
market, hybrid and hierarchy. The vertical governance structure cases 
studied here are therefore: 
 1. Acquisition contracting 
 2. Output contracting 
While these cases respectively represent relatively non-integrated and 
integrated governance structures, they do not equal Williamson's polar 
categories of market and hierarchy. Acquisition contracting does for instance 
not necessarily fit with the faceless nature of pure market transactions and 
the output contracting involve contracting between two separate business 
entities, not within the hierarchy of internal organization. Generally, both 
forms are located somewhat in a hybrid direction from the theoretical polar 
forms of market and hierarchy. Within both categories of contracting, there 
is some variation among the standard contracting forms (Baumgarten, 
Farber, & Fleicher, 1992; Variety.com, 2002) and sub-categories are thus 
defined in the following chapters. It may be argued that the least integrated 
sub-category of output contracting is as close to a theoretical hybrid form as 
to hierarchy, and that the most integrated sub-category of acquisition 
contracting is as close to a hybrid form as to market. Yet, both acquisition 
and output contracting represents standard forms of contracting in this 
industry that correspond to distinctively different levels on the market-
hierarchy scale (as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below), and the relative 
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difference between them will therefore offer the theoretically sought after 
variation with regard to vertical governance structure. 
 
Figure 4.1 - Acquisition and output contracting on a scale from market to 
hierarchy 
To address the subunits and study the relationship between horizontal 
contracting forms and transaction-specific distribution investments we will 
look at two forms of contracting that in a similar way represent relatively 
polar forms, but on a horizontal scale: 
 A. Split rights deals 
 B. All rights deals 
All rights deals refer to those producer-distributor relations in which all 
distribution rights are handled by one distributor that may or may not 
sublicense some rights to other distributors. Split rights deals refer to all 
producer-distributor relationships in which the distribution rights are split 
between two or more distributors directly from the producer’s hand (Cones, 
1992).  
We hence have two transaction cases defined by their degree of vertical 
integration, each with two embedded cases defined according to horizontal 
integration, as illustrated in Table 4.1 below. The less integrated contracting 
is found in the upper left square (1A) and the most integrated in the bottom 
right (2B). 
 Acquisition Output 
Split rights deals 1A 2A 
All rights deals 1B 2B 
Table 4.1 - Cases and embedded cases 
To a certain extent, these four cases all represent constructs of standard 
contracting forms between producers and distributors in the motion picture 
Market Hybrid Hierarchy 
Acquisition 
 
Output 
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industry rather than a sample of actual "real life" contracts directly observed 
in a sample of specific transactions. The empirical world, and indeed real 
production-distribution contracting, is limitless in its detail, complexity, 
specificity and uniqueness, which raises the potential problem of finding the 
clear boundaries of a case. However, the four construct categories defining 
our cases refer to conventional units used in the motion picture industry, 
which greatly simplifies delimiting the cases. Using for example the 
empirically non-conventional vertical categories of market and hierarchy 
rather than acquisition and output contracting would have severely 
complicated the relationship between theory and data since it would have 
been difficult to define the boundaries of such cases in the empirical world. 
The conventional categories chosen highlight certain features of the 
empirical contracting that fit into each category and washes such empirical 
units of their specificity. Ragin (1992) argues that defining cases, which he 
refers to as "casing," is a research method bringing operational closure to 
problematic relationships between ideas and evidence, between theory and 
data. The cases defined here do indeed bring such operational closure to the 
relationship between theoretical ideas about governance structures and 
empirical evidence for the motion picture industry. 
Pragmatic considerations also favored working with contracting categories 
as cases rather than the alternative, which would have been a sample of 
specific transactions (movie projects) to fit units and subunits as specified in 
Table 4.1. Already in the preliminary round of interviews, it became clear 
that obtaining the sought after amount and detail of information for any 
specific movie project would prove to be a challenge. Questions regarding 
production-distribution contracting and investments are sensitive since they 
eventually also become important for how project earnings and revenues are 
split and distributed - the value claiming part of the joint value approach. It 
is not unusual that cases with both substantial losses and earnings end with 
disputes and court procedures (Cones, 1997), so for this reason both 
producers and distributors tend to be extremely careful not to disclose – in 
document, interview or any other form – any  kind of information that may 
be sensitive and unfavorable in any such dispute. Given these stakes, 
promises of anonymity for both case and interviewee are not sufficient to 
rest these concerns since each movie project is unique to a certain degree and 
may therefore still be identified even if sought to be anonymized. Publicly 
available documentation for specific projects is also limited. At best, trade 
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journal articles cover only one or few aspects of interest sufficiently for any 
given film project. There are some monographs written about certain movie 
projects that yield rich insight into key issues of contracting, organization 
and investment decisions, such as Bach’s (1985) detailed account of the 
production and distribution of Heaven’s Gate, a project that eventually 
caused United Artists (at the time one of the major studios) to go bankrupt, 
but these are few and finding at least four that covered reasonable recent 
projects, with each representing a subunit of analysis, was not possible.  
If specific projects could have been used as cases, this would have had a 
clear fit with the notion that extensive case studies are interested in certain 
phenomena found in the cases - the contracting used and investments made 
for the specific project. Having defined the cases as specific categories of 
contracting, it may be argued that a key phenomenon is itself used as case, 
blurring the distinction between phenomenon and case. From this 
perspective, one may say that this study utilizes a somewhat fringe case 
definition. Nonetheless, the chosen approach gives access to a better quality 
and depth of data, and the case structure provides an economic and fruitful 
framework for analysis, thus giving operational closure to the relationship 
between data and theory. 
Additionally, a note should be made about Eisenhardt’s (1989b) 
recommendation to use at least four cases when aiming to build theory. The 
argument here being that it may be difficult to generate theory with much 
complexity when using fewer cases; the empirical grounding of the theory 
may then also be less convincing. However, each of the vertical cases used 
here are divided into sub-cases, thereby providing more detail and variation, 
and furthermore as will be discussed in more detail below, each of the cases 
contains a large number of “mini-cases” within it in the form of specific 
production-distribution transactions fitting the category, which are made 
reference to in the various data sources. As Eisenhardt acknowledges, in 
these instances a lower number of cases will still produce rich data that does 
not limit either theory complexity or sound grounding. Eisenhardt (1991) 
also notes that debating the number of cases may obscure the essential point 
of how much new information is likely to be learned from incremental cases. 
For this study, it was considered more efficient allocating the research 
resources obtaining a deeper understanding of each of the two identified 
cases, than to add another case (contracting category) on the continuum from 
market to hierarchy.  
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Finally, it is important to note that the research question asks about the 
relationship between structure and specific investments concerning a feature 
film project or, in other words, how the production-distribution contracting 
used for a specific movie project affects the transaction parties’ investments 
in specific assets supporting the transaction for that particular movie. A 
transaction may be a slippery unit of analysis, thus a precise definition is 
important. Here, choosing the perspective of a singular transaction for a 
project instead of plural transactions has fundamental implications for the 
definition and understanding of key transaction dimensions. When looking at 
the production and distribution of a single movie, the transaction output is 
not the copyright and master copy of the movie, but the movie performances 
and copies (the cinema screenings, the DVD-copies, the TV broadcasts, etc., 
see also Table 1.1). The copyright and master copy, as well as the awareness 
about the movie created by marketing efforts, does in fact represent specific 
assets supporting the transaction, and investments into these assets are 
therefore transaction specific investments. This may be compared to a 
pharmaceutical company’s investments into research and development for an 
approved and patented first copy of a specific new drug and subsequently 
into the marketing of this drug, and how these investments may be seen as 
transaction specific from the perspective of the transactions concerning this 
particular drug. It follows from this project-oriented thinking that the 
transaction frequency is best described in terms of the number of copies or 
performances sold (and in the pharmaceutical example, the sales volume of 
that specific new drug). For a successful movie this will be a very high 
number of small transactions, but as sales will always be unknown until the 
movie is released (De Vany & Walls, 1999), implications include a 
significant uncertainty about the frequency at the time the investment 
decisions are made. Keeping in mind that the key relevance of frequency for 
asset specificity is that specific investments are easier to recover for large 
and frequent transactions, which ultimately means that one should expect 
these transaction-specific investments to be associated with a significant 
level of risk. If, instead, taking the perspective of plural production-
distribution transactions, the output would be the master copies or movie 
projects. Production-specific assets would be of the kind that support the 
manufacturing of movies such as sound stages and specialized equipment 
(cameras, lighting, low-riders, etc.), and distribution-specific assets of the 
kind that support the licensing and marketing of movies such as human asset 
specificity (skilled licensing and marketing personnel), although none of 
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these would necessarily be specific to the production-distribution 
transaction. For instance, if the transaction was a quite typical output deal 
covering a slate of 10 movies to be produced over five years, transaction-
specific investments within this perspective would be limited to the 
contracting (ex ante) and governance structures overseeing the transaction 
(which may have included dedicated personnel at both the producer and 
distributor). Neither these nor the production- and distribution-specific assets 
are specific assets from the project-oriented perspective, as they could be 
redeployed from one project to another without any value lost. Within the 
plural perspective, frequency would relate to the number of movies a 
producer and distributor dyad transacts, and uncertainty would not be related 
directly to the market uncertainty of each specific movie. Still, the plural 
perspective may of course inform the project-oriented view. For example, 
the transaction frequency of a particular producer-distributor dyad would be 
likely to also have implications when a project perspective is taken on one of 
the movies, but yet clearly choosing and specifying the perspective of a 
feature film project has obvious important implications for the reading of 
case analyses and the conclusions drawn. 
The case descriptions provided for the chosen contracting categories in this 
section are cursory and only for the purpose of explaining research design 
and methods, though of course the cases are thoroughly described in the 
following chapters. 
4.5 Data Collection 
Caves (2000) has noted that the organization of the creative industries, 
including the motion picture industry, has received surprisingly little 
attention from economists, and he argues that one of the main reasons is that 
“economists, proud of their theoretical apparatus and facility with statistical 
tools, are put off from industries such as these that yield few congenial data 
sets”. But he also observes that “[…] while systematic data is scarce, 
copious information on deals and trade practices is available in trade journals 
and general newspapers, as well as in books by nontechnical observers of 
these activities. If one settles for information that is heterogeneous and 
largely qualitative, but nonetheless abundant, a great deal can be learned of 
the economic organization and the behavior of these sectors” (p. vii). 
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In line with Cave’s observations and the discussion of the qualitative 
approach above, the data collection for my cases relied on a number of 
sources of evidence within two main categories: documentation and 
interviews.  
4.5.1 Documentation 
All documentation or textual data used were preexisting texts, i.e. secondary 
data and publicly available requiring no specific consent for use. As such the 
use of this data contributes to greater transparency (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008). The primary categories of sources are trade journal articles, sample 
contracts and monographs. 
Trade journal articles represents a significant and easily accessible source of 
documentation, as they report on a wide range of business issues within the 
industry on a daily or weekly basis. The leading trade journal for the North 
American motion picture industry is Variety (daily, weekly and 
variety.com), followed by its competitor The Hollywood Reporter 
(electronic daily, printed weekly, special reports and 
hollywoodreporter.com). Of these, Variety was used as the primary trade 
journal for this study, but supplemented by articles from The Hollywood 
Reporter. In addition to the trade journals, some newspaper articles were also 
used, primarily from The Los Angeles Times. With the main cluster of the 
North American motion picture industry located within the greater Los 
Angeles area, hence representing one of its main industries, the Los Angeles 
Times has a dedicated part of its business section to covering the industry 
(the “Company Town” section) and in addition to shorter news articles, it 
frequently runs feature length articles on specific industry topics or cases. 
In a manner similar to how cases were selected by theory-driven, and not 
statistical criteria, articles were also searched for and identified based on 
themes or key words that appeared to be interesting based on the theoretical 
framework. Articles concerning contracting or deals between producers and 
distributors were sought out at an early stage since this theme follows 
directly from the research question. These articles then revealed other 
themes that were thought to be interesting, and the analysis of these again 
would lead to new themes and searches. Similarly, when one particularly 
interesting transaction was identified, further searches were made for more 
articles that covered this transaction. This was the basic thematic 
snowballing selection strategy used. The first batch of articles were found at 
68 
 
the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences’ Margaret Herric Library 
in Beverly Hills, which keeps a by now old fashioned but very useful archive 
of newspaper and trade journal clippings sorted by topics, themes and 
names. Further searches were made electronically with the added advantage 
of getting the articles in an electronic format, which greatly simplifyed the 
analytical process. 
Sample and standard written agreements were found for acquisition types of 
contracting only, suggesting that these types of transactions are more 
standardized and represent a higher volume of transactions than output 
contracting. Sample acquisition agreements were found in both relatively 
inexpensive sample contract collections aimed primarily towards 
independent producers (Litwak, 1998), as well as in the high priced 
collections, available at the Margaret Herric Library, aimed primarily 
towards legal professionals, which also includes more detailed comments 
and notes to specific contract clauses (Farber, 2001a). These sources also 
contained other contracts that through the data analysis also turned out to be 
of relevance.  
North American written agreements are generally extensive in form, and 
contain a wealth of information about the transactions they govern. The 
sample contracts therefore represented an important tool in setting some of 
the key parameters for the different contracting forms, and they sometimes 
also gave indications as to the relationship between contracting form and 
investments.  
The final documentation source category is monographs written about the 
North American motion picture industry. These typically tell the story 
behind a specific film project or an industry personality. While none were 
identified that specifically dealt with contracting and investments, many 
contained bits and pieces of information on relevant topics, including 
contracting, financing, distribution and marketing. 
4.5.2 Interviews 
While interviews are sometimes considered a taken-for-granted method 
within qualitative business research, Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008) urge a 
careful consideration of the often underestimated difficulties of doing good 
interviews, and even more so of analyzing them well. However, for this 
study interviews were considered both necessary and valuable since they 
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offered the only viable method of directing a deeper inquiry into specific 
topics and issues of interest. The preexisting documentation only offered the 
data that was already produced, leaving little opportunity for digging deeper 
into particular issues or cases beyond searching for more preexisting 
documentation. Through the interviews, however, it was possible to ask 
follow up questions, requesting the interviewees to elaborate, suggest topics 
they felt would be relevant to the context of the study and so forth. With 
many, it was also possible to return at later stages in the project with follow-
up questions.  
The key criteria for selecting interviewees were that professionals from both 
sides of the transactions (producers and distributors) needed to be included 
and they should be experienced - ideally decision makers in relation to both 
contracting and investments and with experience from all different types of 
transactions covering the embedded cases. The first criterion obviously 
follows from studying transactions, but is also linked to dealing with the 
challenge of bias. To avoid the criticism that theory built from interview data 
is really just retrospective sensemaking by image-conscious informants, the 
use of informants that view the focal phenomenon from diverse perspectives 
is useful as it is unlikely that these people will engage in convergent 
retrospective sensemaking and/or impression management (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). The remaining criteria specify desired knowledge and 
experience, particularly in relation to making strategic decisions. 
Particularly at the beginning of the process, one sometimes fell into a 
quantitative thinking trap, worrying about the number of interviews, equal 
representation for different categories of players, etc. Such thinking would 
easily cause stress as Hollywood executives are not particularly accessible, 
and gaining access to interviewees required systematic and relentless work. 
However, for a qualitative study of this nature it is essential to maintain 
focus on the quality rather than the quantity of the data. One well conducted 
interview with a single well placed and knowledgeable interviewee with 
decision-making experience is likely to produce data more valuable than 20 
interviews with more marginal, less knowledgeable industry professionals 
without decision-making experience. Hence, the focus soon turned to 
acquiring access to a shorter list of “most desired” interviewees and then 
preparing carefully for each of these interviews to get the most out of each of 
them. 
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Anonymity was offered to all interviewees. Arguments may be made against 
anonymity, including that non-anonymous case studies can be reviewed 
more readily than anonymous studies (Yin, 1994), but anonymity was 
deemed necessary to protect the participants, giving them more comfort to 
speak openly about the issues. While the cases discussed were categories of 
contracting and not specific production-distribution transactions all 
interviewees made references to particular projects during the interviews as 
examples of various points made. Without anonymity, it is reasonable to 
believe that they would have been more reluctant to offer such details. 
Based on the above criteria, 68 industry professionals were identified and 
approached with a written request to be interviewed. The request included a 
short presentation of the project, information about anonymity, the estimated 
time required for the interview and a timeframe within which I would be in 
Los Angeles to conduct the interviews. Important tools and sources in the 
identification process included industry directories, references made in trade 
journal articles and recommendations based on the initial round of informal 
interviews with Los Angeles-based researchers, entertainment attorneys and 
industry professionals. The opportunity to use snowballing (in which one 
interviewee recommends others) was restricted since my stay in Los Angeles 
was limited. Typical challenges faced in obtaining interviews included the 
industry professionals’ tight schedules and general unavailability, but a 
hesitation to participate based on the perceived sensitivity of the topics was 
also encountered. The example of a production executive at one of the major 
studios is illustrative of the latter: After receiving the request and me making 
follow-up calls with the assistant, the executive contacts me via telephone, 
expresses interest in the project and makes further inquiries about 
anonymity, upon which he is offered a formal contract. He promises to get 
back to me within one to three days and does so, but with a pass on the 
interview. In one sense, the identification of a challenge like this one 
represents a finding in itself, and was included when analyzing the obtained 
data.  
Despite such challenges, interviews with 10 of these well placed industry 
executives, all with extensive and relevant decision-making experience, were 
obtained. Six of these were producers or production company executives, 
while four were distribution company executives. 
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Alias Position Company 
James Producer / President Independent Production 
Ryan President Worldwide Marketing and Distribution  Independent Production 
George Producer / President Independent Production 
Michael Chairman and CEO Pact Production 
Brad CEO Independent Production 
Johnny Producer / President Pact Production 
Table 4.2 - Production side interviewees 
The production side interviewees are listed with names (alias), position and 
production company type in Table 4.2 above. Following case definitions 
production companies are split in two types, which are dependent on the 
dominant type of distribution contracting used at the time. Companies 
working primarily with acquisition type contracting are labeled Independent 
Production, whereas companies working primarily under output contracting 
are labeled Pact Production (since an output type contract is often referred to 
as a “pact” in the industry). Most interviewees had direct experience with a 
variety of distribution contracting forms. For example, James was currently 
operating without any output contracts, but had previously worked under 
output deals with one of the major studios. Some also had experience from 
the distribution side, having previously worked at major studios. Michael is a 
former Chairman and CEO for one of the major studios, and Ryan had more 
than 19 years of experience as an international marketing and distribution 
executive at another studio. None of the interviewees on the production side 
worked for the same company. 
Alias Position Company 
Tom COO Major Studio 
Julia Executive VP Worldwide Marketing Mini-Major 
Emilie President Domestic Marketing Major Studio 
Jennifer President Marketing Major Studio Subsidiary 
Table 4.3 - Distribution side interviewees 
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The distribution side interviewees are listed with names (alias), position and 
distribution company type in Table 4.3 above. All the distribution companies 
work with both acquisition and output types of contracting, but are 
distinguished according to type, primarily by size and scope. A Major Studio 
is one of the six big Hollywood-based distribution- and financing-driven 
integrated motion picture companies.2 A Mini-Major is a similar type of 
integrated distribution- and financing-driven company, but operating with 
less volume and scope, typically lacking some of the integrated resources of 
a Major Studio (such as an international distribution and marketing 
network).3 Some of the Major Studios also have separate subsidiaries 
dedicated to specific types of movies (typically for so-called arthouse and 
genre movies). One of the interviewees, Jennifer, was the head of marketing 
for such subsidiary. She works very much in the same way as her 
counterpart at the parent studio, but with responsibilities limited to a specific 
type of movie. One of the distribution side interviewees, Tom, also has a 
very strong production side background as the founder of a production 
company that grew into one of the leading Hollywood production 
companies. Tom has a particularly central role in the selection and financing 
of all movies handled by his studio. As COO he has the final word on which 
movies receive studio financing and which do not, which in practical terms 
translates to what movies are handled by the studio since the financing 
decision includes both production and distribution financing. Two of the 
distribution side interviewees worked for the same company. 
The interviews were carried out at the interviewees’ offices and lasted from 
45 minutes to two hours. They were all recorded, but during the interview 
with Brad the recording was cut off prematurely due to a flat battery, and 
extensive notes were made later the same day to compensate for the lost 
recording.  
The approach to the interviews may be best described as semi-structured 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). As is typical for these kinds of interviews, 
an interview guide was prepared prior to each interview with a list of topics 
                                                     
2 Paramount, Sony (Columbia/Tristar), Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, Walt Disney and 
Warner Bros. 
3 E.g. Lionsgate, Summit Entertainment (recently merged with Lionsgate) and MGM 
(formerly a major studio) 
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and questions developed based on: 1) the research questions and 
(preliminary) analysis of other data collected up to that point, and 2) a 
review of the interviewee’s position and background, including specific 
projects and deals the interviewee had been involved in. The basic objectives 
of the guide was to cover issues which would provide material that would 
help answer the research question through analysis, as well as providing a 
framework within which the interviewees could express their understandings 
in their own terms. As suggested by Patton (1990), early questions would be 
about present activities and experiences, questions that encouraged the 
interviewee to talk descriptively. An example of this would be: How do you 
work differently now with movies being acquired on a project-to-project 
basis than you did during your first-look deal with a Major Studio? When a 
context is created through the response and further probing into these 
questions, other questions involving more interpretations and opinions would 
be asked. An example would be: How and to what degree do you think the 
lack of formal integration through a first-look deal can be compensated for 
by informal integration through personal relationships? 
Most interviews were also carried out semi-structured in which topics were 
covered in a relatively systematic order, while the tone was kept 
conversational. Some interviews, however, turned out to more open as the 
interviewees would bring up important themes and topics not directly 
covered in the guide, but that typically followed from probing more deeply 
into some of the planned topics. The outlined topics were all still covered, 
but the interviews extended beyond these. 
4.5.3 Data Triangulation 
The opportunity to use multiple data collection methods and different 
sources of evidence is a major strength of case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989b), 
and it was particularly useful to this study since the cases consisted of 
construct categories in which the construct validity may more easily be 
questioned than when pure data categories are used. The understanding of 
“output contracting” is naturally open to wider interpretation than the 
understanding of “Universal’s first-look deal with Playtone”. However, with 
numerous sources, converging lines of evidence can be created through data 
triangulation (Patton, 1990; Yin, 1994). Different data sources reveal 
different aspects of the phenomena, and evidence from one category may 
corroborate information from other sources. For instance, data from some 
distribution side interviews revealed other aspects of output contracting than 
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data from some production side interviews, and the combination of these 
may corroborate with data from trade journal articles and monographs. This 
combination provides a more complete and nuanced understanding of the 
phenomenon and through the corroboration a cross-data validity check is 
created. Hence, the triangulation provides stronger substantiation of 
constructs, and as will be seen in the next section, also of hypotheses.  
The potential importance of data triangulation for improving internal validity 
in case studies is reflected in the recent controversy (Coase, 2006) around 
the influential TCE case study of the relationship between General Motors 
and Fisher Body prior to the 1926 merger (Klein et al., 1978). Coase (2000, 
2006) is not only casting doubt on the original authors’ interpretation of 
certain events as opportunistic behavior, but he also questions the authors’ 
representation of the facts. 
4.6 Data Analysis 
In an epistemological debate, this study would most likely be placed to the 
positivist side of the center on a continuum in which positivist and critical 
studies are found at each polar end with social constructivism placed around 
the center, just like the majority of studies building theory from cases would 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Welch et al., 2011). It is theory based, highly 
pre-structured, and sees contracting and investments in the motion picture 
industry as phenomena with various sub-phenomena to be understood and 
interpreted. On the critical side of the center, contracting and investments 
might instead be seen as socially constructed entities with social rules and 
patterned actions to be critically analyzed (Jarzabkowski, 2011). The 
implication for data analysis is that we are seeking facts, not only 
interpretations. Yet, the study should not be considered as purely positivistic 
either. Interview data and documentation are not considered as “truth 
mirrors,” but as biased data requiring an interpretation to be understood in 
context. One would expect that the information provided by producers 
Johnny and James on working under output contracting would differ since 
Johnny was working under his first output contract at the time of the 
interview, while James had lost his and was working with acquisition 
contracting. Similarly, one should not assume that documentation lacks bias 
(Yin, 1994). For instance, a sample acquisition contract found in a collection 
aimed primarily at producers is likely to be worded more favorably from a 
producer’s than a distributor’s point of view, and may therefore not give the 
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best picture of what fully negotiated and executed acquisition contracts look 
like. Both interview and documentation data thus demand interpretation. 
Finally, a purely positivist approach to data analysis combined with a 
subscription to TCE’s behavioral assumptions would also seem a somewhat 
odd couple. On the one hand, you would consider data obtained through 
interviews and documentation as facts, while on the other you would assume 
both cognitive constraints and opportunism. It seems more likely that the 
same producer who may disclose incomplete and distorted information while 
contracting may also do so during an interview about contracting.  
In a strong interpretive social constructionist view, such incomplete and 
distorted information would be less of a concern (or of no concern) since the 
aim would be to understand how meaning is constructed rather than “truth-
seeking” (Silverman, 2006), but in the more positivist approach taken when 
building theory from cases (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) this kind of 
incomplete and distorted information represents a challenge of bias. Taking 
this approach, the challenges are partly mitigated by data collection criteria 
and strategies as described in the previous sections above, and partly through 
the analytical process. 
This paradigmatic positioning is useful in ensuring consistency and fit 
between research objectives, questions, design and analytical approach, but I 
subscribe to Miles and Huberman’s (1994) position that research is actually 
more a craft than a slavish adherence to methodological rules, and that while 
it may be tempting to operate at the poles in epistemological debates, most 
researchers are closer to the center, with multiple overlaps in their actual 
practice of empirical research.  
The analytical process of this study may be described within the framework 
of Miles and Huberman’s (1994) general model for qualitative analysis. 
They define analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data 
reduction, data display and conclusion drawing/verification. Data reduction 
refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming the data (and not to the quantification of data as it would be 
understood in a quantitative study). Data display refers to an organized, 
compressed assembly of information, and includes a wide variety of formats 
ranging from extended texts to graphs and charts. Conclusion drawing refers 
generally to the generation of meaning (finding regularities, patterns, 
explanations, possible configurations, causal flows and propositions), and 
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the emphasis here is particularly on theorizing. In the analytical process, 
verification may be as brief as a fleeting second thought crossing the 
analyst’s mind during writing, or it may be thorough and elaborate with 
extensive efforts to replicate a finding in other data.  
 
Figure 4.2 - Components of Data Analysis: Flow Model (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:10) 
These three flows of analytical activity are concurrent, including with data 
collection. As indicated in Figure 4.2, the data analysis starts even before 
data collection, with data reduction. This anticipatory reduction includes a 
choice of conceptual framework, cases, research questions and collection 
approaches, which all necessarily involve data selection and are analytical in 
nature. Once data collection commences, data display and conclusion 
drawing/verification activities will also start and continue in an interactive, 
iterative and cyclical fashion until the final report is completed.  
Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that conceptually speaking, the process is 
no more complex than the analysis modes quantitative researchers use also 
when engaging in data reduction (computing means, standard deviations, 
indexes), data display (correlation tables, regression printouts) and 
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conclusion drawing/verification (significance levels, experimental/control 
differences), but that while theirs’ are carried out through well-defined, 
familiar methods guided by canons, qualitative researchers are in a more 
fluid and pioneering position.  
Beyond the data selection procedures described in previous sections above, 
the key data reduction activities in my analysis were the coding and writing 
of memos and vignettes. 
Coding is used to overcome the qualitative analysis challenges of data 
overload and data retrieval (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Transcripts of long 
in-depth interviews and a significant amount of documentation amount to a 
large amount of textual data. Words are “fatter” than numbers, often have 
multiple meanings and may be meaningless unless seen in contexts (such as 
“this” or “them”). Compared to numbers, they are harder to work with and 
cannot be processed in the same economical manner. And within a mass of 
data of this type, finding the pieces that matter the most is difficult. Coding 
is therefore used to tag or label specific “chunks” of data (words, phrases, 
sentences, whole paragraphs, etc.) in which coded data may be retrieved, 
organized and displayed in a manner that sets the stage for drawing 
conclusions.  
The coding was carried out using the CAQDAS (computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis) software NVivo. Here, you start out with three 
basic categories of codes (or nodes under which you code your data): cases, 
free nodes and tree nodes.  These NVivo nodes work very much in the same 
manner as designated hanging files do for manual coding, a storage point for 
each topic or concept (Bazeley, 2007). Case nodes were simply used to 
allocate data to cases and sub-cases so that data relevant to a specific sub-
case or case could easily be retrieved for review and reflection. Free nodes 
are nodes that do not presume any relationship and connection to other 
nodes, while tree nodes are hierarchical, branching structures in which 
parent nodes serve as connecting points for subcategories or types of 
concepts, representing what Richards (2005) refers to as category systems. 
The distinction between data-driven and theory-driven analysis (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008) was reflected in the coding used and the dynamic process 
of working with NVivo nodes. The study’s theoretical framework with its a 
priori specification of constructs provided a guide to the first sets of codes 
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and to their structure within a tree nodes system. For instance, working with 
TCE, one knows that asset specificity is a key concept that needs to be 
allocated a node. This parent node would then branch into two sub-
categories, non-specific assets and specific assets, and the latter of these 
would again branch into ex ante specific investments and ex post specific 
investments. When coded, all data relevant to asset specificity may be 
retrieved and reviewed under the parent node, while only that part of this 
data specifically related to non-specific assets is retrieved under this sub-
node and the parts specifically related to ex post specific investments is 
retrieved under that sub-node. Naturally, the amount of data is diminishing 
the further you go down a specific tree branch. Some tree nodes could also 
be set up initially for data driven analysis, as for instance when coding for 
actors/players the players node was already being divided into producers, 
distributors, and others sub-nodes at the outset, and distributors were again 
divided into studios and independent nodes before each distribution 
company was given a separate node in the fourth level of player nodes. 
More typical, however, for the data driven analysis was to allocate codes in 
free nodes since it was unknown in the early stages of analysis as to how the 
category or topic would relate to others. For example, the node for talent 
backend participation (which refers to any kind of cash flow or profit share 
an actor, director or other talent has negotiated to receive from a movie 
project) was created as a free node. The topic was identified frequently in the 
data and seemed important even though it was unclear in the early analysis 
exactly how. However, as the amount of data under this node grew, it was 
reviewed again and it became apparent that this topic was an integral part of 
the issue of value claiming for distributors and producers. The node was then 
moved from free nodes to tree nodes, where it became a sub-node under the 
parent node of value claiming. This was a two-step, but interactive 
conclusion-drawing activity of identifying and defining a topic, issue or 
construct and then placing it in relation to others. Eisenhardt (1989b) refers 
to the first as the sharpening of the constructs, and names it as a first step in 
shaping hypotheses. Hence, coding was not only preparing the ground for 
further analysis and theorizing, but was an integral part of the theorizing 
process in itself. 
The data-driven analysis was dynamic in at least two ways: New topics, 
issues or constructs would be identified and nodes for each of these created 
throughout the analytical process, and these nodes would usually only 
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subsequently be conceptually and structurally ordered. Richards (2005) 
identifies this type of dynamic and flexible coding as one of the key aspects 
in which qualitative analysis differs from quantitative. However, in this 
dynamic and flexible process of coding, organizing the nodes conceptually 
and structurally is important in order to keep the analytical process effective. 
As Miles and Huberman (1994:62) argue, without such structure adding, 
removing or reconfiguring, codes will produce “a ragbag that usually 
induces a shapeless, purely opportunistic analysis,” and it will make codes 
harder to memorize and use, as well as making the retrieval and organization 
of the material burdensome. 
The dynamic process of coding also reflects the generally fluid process of 
qualitative analysis. The three flows of activity in Miles and Huberman’s 
model above is not neatly separated, but concurrent and interactive. At the 
outset, coding is a data reduction activity as it identifies some data to be 
coded and is thus included for further analysis, while other data is not coded 
for further analysis. The process of retrieving data under a specific node, 
however, is a simple data display activity, as it shows the chunks of texts 
coded under the node. Reviewing and reflecting upon the retrieved texts 
involves both data reduction and conclusion drawing because one now may 
also uncode data one sees should not be there, which is important to avoid 
losing focus (Richards, 2005). Finally, the processes of sharpening 
constructs and structuring free nodes into tree nodes is a conclusion-drawing 
activity, as it is based on decisions made about conceptual and structural 
patterns. Verification typically comes in a subsequent stage. Once the node 
is placed in a tree, further coding using this node in the new hierarchical 
structure will either verify or contest the decision made when relocating the 
node. In a similar manner, the sharpening of concepts is verified or contested 
when coding on. These types of verification processes are named by 
Eisenhardt (1989b) as a second step in shaping hypotheses. 
The more advanced coding was done using what Miles and Huberman 
(1994) refers to as pattern coding and which Bazeley (2007) refers to as 
metacoding. While first-level coding labels data relating to a specific 
category or issue for the primary purpose of summarizing these segments of 
data, pattern codes are explanatory or inferential codes, identifying an 
emergent theme, configuration or explanation, and they group the primary 
code summaries into a smaller number of sets, themes or constructs (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). In NVivo, this was done using sets and relationships. A 
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set was used simply to group items (nodes and sources) that related to a 
common concept and for labeling this concept. For example, a set was 
created for layered P-D contracting, a concept which refers to situations in 
which a production company (1st layer) under an output deal (the parent 
deal) with a distributor subsequently enters into output deals with other 
smaller production companies (2nd layer), which then also comes under the 
distributor’s parent deal via the 1st layer production company. This set then 
included the relevant P-D contracting case nodes, three nodes for the 
involved players, a tree node for transaction frequency and a memo (source) 
describing the layered contracting construct. The set was then saved as a 
node and used in further (re)coding to identify data relevant to this concept. 
As with first-level nodes, these constructs (sets) were sharpened and verified 
when coding on and recoding.  
A relationship was created and used to identify linkages between already 
identified constructs. The linkage could be a simple association or a one-way 
or two-way directionality, and it would be marked with the specific type of 
linkage, most typically affects or is associated with. These types of 
relationship nodes are thus more directly related to the theory building. For 
example, a relationship node was created between vertical and horizontal 
contracting structures (two case nodes): “Vertical P-D structure affects 
Horizontal P-D structure”. As with sets, relationships were saved as nodes 
and used, sharpened and verified in subsequent (re)coding. When a 
relationship code was created, data involving the related nodes would be 
revisited for recoding using the coding query function described below. 
Creating the pattern codes has strong elements of a conclusion-drawing 
activity, and the subsequent use involves verification. In such verification 
processes the code would never become discounted (since its creation was 
grounded in data); instead it would be qualified,  meaning that the conditions 
under which it holds were specified (Miles & Huberman, 1994:71). For 
instance, a relationship code was created for “Coordination affects 
Distribution investments” but later qualified for only projects at certain 
budget levels. This type of verification process is representative of the 
replication logic central to theory building (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). A 
pattern code, such as “Vertical P-D structure affects Horizontal P-D 
structure” would for instance be considered for numerous “mini-cases” 
(vertical and horizontal P-D contracting for specific movie projects referred 
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to in the data) like a series of distinct experiments that serve as replications, 
contrasts and extensions to emerging theory.  
While manual qualitative analysis often required much burdensome work to 
create various forms of matrices for more advanced data displays (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994), CAQDAS-based analysis has greatly simplified this 
process. A key NVivo display function used in this study was the coding 
query. While nodes themselves offer the possibility for retrieving the 
relevant coded data under the specific (parent- or sub)node, coding query 
offers access to what Bazeley (2007:113) refers to as the intersections of 
coding. In its simplest form, the query allows to ask for data coded under 
two nodes, e.g. value claiming AND acquisition contracting. Only data 
coded under both nodes (value claiming in the context of acquisition 
contracting) are then displayed. Such queries may be extended to matrices 
with for instance two case nodes horizontally and four free nodes vertically. 
This creates an eight field matrix in which each field will provide data coded 
under a specific case and a specific free node. By summarizing the texts 
displayed for each field, one creates the traditional matrix, which particularly 
for larger matrices is useful for seeing a complete picture on a single sheet. 
Some queries were also made more complex, also using OR, NOT and 
NEAR (such as within the same scope item), retrieving smaller amounts of 
more specific data. Using these CAQDAS-tools was highly efficient for 
creating displays as a basis for conclusion drawing and theorizing, but the 
actual conclusion drawing and theorizing were done by reviewing and 
reflecting upon the data as displayed. Hence, the CAQDAS-tools should not 
be mistaken for having the same function as computer-based tools used in 
quantitative research, which to a greater extent help produce the analytical 
result. Finally, the efficiency of coding queries was wholly dependent on the 
quality of the coding. When coding the data it was therefore important to see 
it from different dimensions. If one is lost in the coding process, that 
particular chunk of data will not be retrieved when running queries involving 
nodes along that particular dimension. The idea behind thorough and sound 
coding is hence very similar to the idea promoted by Eisenhardt (1989b) for 
cross-case searching tactics: The investigator must be forced to go beyond 
initial impressions, especially through the use of structured and diverse 
lenses on the data. A well conceptually and structurally organized coding 
system provides such sets of lenses. 
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Besides coding, the writing of memos and vignettes were used for data 
reduction, display and conclusion-drawing/verification activities. These are 
subcategories of what Eisenhardt (1989b) generally refers to as write-ups. 
Writing memos, or memoing, was used to create theorizing write-ups of 
ideas as they struck, typically about codes (first-level and pattern), sets, 
relationships and queries. Memos would be brief, from only a few sentences 
and seldom more than one page, and they were written by myself to myself, 
often in a stream-of-consciousness manner, without paying careful attention 
to the language. The primary function was to capture ideas as they occurred 
while working with the data, so these memos could be seen as field notes 
from the analytical process. Many times these memos would be elaborated 
upon, but then usually in the form of a new memo, and some of these again 
would become important foundations for thematic sections in the following 
chapters. As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994:73), memos were 
always linked to particular data and nodes, and they were themselves coded 
and saved in NVivo as data was. In this way they could be retrieved together 
with relevant data and be displayed together with that data.  
Vignettes were used for slightly different purposes. These were written to 
produce a focused and coherent description of a series of events or a 
phenomenon that in some way was considered to be representative and 
typical. One example could be a specific production-distribution relationship 
reported in several trade journal articles or a specific theme touched upon by 
several of the interviewees. Compared to the memos, they would have a 
more narrative, structured format and typically be somewhat longer. Writing 
the vignettes most often proved helpful in formulating core issues and my 
theories of what was happening.  
Applying these analytical methods, the analysis followed a within-case and 
cross-case strategy as suggested by Yin (1981) and Eisenhardt (1989b). The 
goal of this strategy is to become intimately familiar with each case as a 
stand-alone entity to discover unique patterns of the case before 
investigating patterns across the cases. However, my application of this 
strategy was less sequential than the description provided by Eisenhardt 
(1989b) may indicate.  This may partly have been because data collection for 
the cases was parallel and not sequential. Insight and understanding of the 
cases thus grew at a somewhat similar pace, and as an interesting theme 
would appear in one case it would typically immediately also be analyzed in 
the context of the other. Then as part of the cyclical process of developing 
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the understanding of the theme in the context of both cases, data collection 
adjustments were also done in some instances (adding a question to the 
interview guide, searching and collecting additional articles, etc.). Hence, a 
more strict sequential order of the two analytical processes did not seem 
practical in this study. Yet, as described here, the themes emerging were 
usually triggered by an enhanced understanding of a case so that the 
sequential order of analysis per theme would still go from within-case to 
cross-case. Finally, while the early stages of analysis involved intense 
within-case analysis gaining a clearer understanding of each contracting 
form and their implications, the later stages of the analytical processes were 
mainly focused on finding cross-case patterns. It could therefore be said to 
be an overlapping analytical process in which the focus shifted from within-
case to cross-case analysis as the study advanced.  
4.7 A Note on Theory Building 
In general, theory is developed through incremental empirical testing and 
extension (Kuhn, 1970), and more specifically these two approaches consist 
of deductive theory testing and inductive theory building (Parkhe, 1993; 
Perry, 1998). Theory development using a case study approach does indeed 
involve a significant amount of inductive theory building, and this is 
sometimes confused with a more radical approach of pure induction. This 
extreme induction school is most significantly rooted in the grounded theory 
approach, in which the objective is to generate theory from data alone 
(Glasser & Strauss, 1967). The extreme position of grounded theory research 
is one where “logico deductive” theory is discarded and there is no theory 
under consideration and no hypothesis to test. This extreme position has later 
been refined; acknowledging that in practice it is difficult to ignore the 
theory accrued in one’s mind before commencing the research process 
(Strauss, 1987).  
A somewhat similar approach to the case study strategy has been proposed 
by Eisenhardt (1989b), who argues that theory-building research is begun as 
close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration, and that 
preordained theoretical perspectives or propositions may bias and limit the 
findings.  However, Yin (1994) argues that the relationship to theory before 
commencing the research is a key difference between case studies and 
grounded theory. According to his view, theory is indeed useful for 
structuring the study and essential to the design phase. Pure induction may 
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prevent the researcher from benefiting from existing theory, just as pure 
deduction might prevent the development of new and useful theory. Parkhe 
(1993), Perry (1998) and others argue in a similar fashion as Yin that both 
prior theory and theory emerging from the data are always involved and that 
it is impossible to go theory-free into a study.  
This study is both deductive (theory inspired) and inductive (data inspired). 
As shown in this chapter, it involves deduction based on prior TCE theory in 
its approach to both research objective and questions, and for a case study 
the initial framework may thus be described as somewhat “tight.” Some of 
the main advantages of this “tight” framework are that the research question 
and definition of key constructs and variables are very specifically set at the 
start of the research process, which makes the study more economical. For 
instance, case selection as well as the initial data collection and initial coding 
scheme followed from deduction.  Furthermore, since the relationship 
between governance structure and specific investments is thoroughly 
discussed in the TCE literature, which also includes calls for an endogenous 
treatment of specific investments (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; Kang et al., 
2009; Macher & Richman, 2008), the risk of “discovering” existing theory is 
greatly reduced by not taking a pure inductive approach. Yet, the key 
contributions sought by the study follow from its inductive work. Such 
inductive work is called for in the research objective of identifying 
intermediate variables to help explain the relationship from contracting 
forms to specific investments. It is also at the heart of the analytical work 
with the various conclusion-drawing activities, as well as more generally 
throughout the data driven analysis. In sum, while inspired by Eisenhardt’s 
(1989b) approach to building theory from case studies, which some label 
inductive (Welch et al., 2011), this case study involves strong elements of 
both induction and deduction in its theory building. 
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5 Transactions in the Motion Picture Industry 
This chapter will provide a description of the context within which the 
investments and transactions of interest takes place, the American motion 
picture industry. Following a brief overview of the industry’s size and scope, 
the industry value configuration system is discussed as a framework for 
categorizing and organizing the numerous transactions involved in any 
movie project. Then, systematically following the industry value system, but 
on a micro-level, key transactions are described based on documentation and 
interviews and then discussed in terms of transaction-specific investments, 
uncertainty and frequency with producers and distributors as focal 
transaction partners. Since it is the transaction between these two partners 
for a movie project, the production-distribution transaction, that is our 
ultimate interest, the micro-level transaction attributes are primarily 
discussed in relation to this transaction and not each individual micro-level 
transaction. The chapter is concluded with a summarizing discussion of these 
transaction dimensions from a project-oriented perspective. As such, the 
chapter builds a foundation for understanding and discussing the various 
strategies of organizing and integrating these micro-level transactions as 
represented by our cases of higher-level producer-distribution transactions, 
which are discussed in the following chapter. Contracting related directly to 
production and distribution investments, and how these are related to the 
production-distribution transaction, is also discussed there. The bottom-up 
analytical approach of these two chapters to help in understanding the 
production-distribution transaction for a movie project is illustrated below in 
Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 - The relationship between micro-level transactions covered in 
Chapter 5 and the higher-level production-distribution transaction cases 
covered in Chapter 6 
5.1 A Substantial and Commercially Driven Industry 
The production and distribution of motion pictures is a significant industry in 
the United States. Recent aggregate figures for theatrical motion pictures 
only is difficult to find, but in 2009 the industry employed 272,000 people in 
the core business of producing, marketing, manufacturing and distributing 
motion pictures and television shows. Additionally, there were over 430,000 
jobs in related businesses that distribute motion pictures and television 
shows to consumers. The industry created USD 13.8 billion in film and 
television exports, making it one of the more important US export industries 
(MPAA, 2011a). In 2010, gross theatrical ticket sales, referred to as Box 
Office in the industry, was USD 10.6 billion in North America (US and 
Canada), typically referred to as Domestic Box Office, and USD 21.2 billion 
in the rest of the world, typically referred to as International Box Office 
(MPAA, 2011b). 
Unlike the film sector in European countries, the American motion picture 
industry operates as a private sector commercially-driven industry 
independent of direct government financial cultural support and 
Production Distribution Exhibition 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 5 
Production activities Distribution activities Exhibition activities 
Movie Project 
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accompanying regulations. While European governments have historically 
tended to treat their film industries within a cultural policy perspective with 
an emphasis on protectionism and national cultural production, the US 
government has primarily supported its movie industry as an important 
export industry fighting trade barriers such as culturally rationalized  import 
restrictions in export markets (Finney, 2010; Putnam & Watson, 1997). As a 
result, the American industry operates in a market economy setting with 
relatively few industry-specific restrictions and regulations, so it is fair to 
assume that the transactional patterns found are based on competitive 
mechanisms that have favored the more efficient modes. 
5.2 The Motion Picture Industry Value System  
We are interested in production-distribution transactions for specific movie 
projects – the contracting between the production activities and the 
distribution activities required for a specific movie. These are bundles or 
categories containing numerous micro-level transactions. As a framework 
for describing both the context and complexity of the production-distribution 
transaction, Porter’s (1985) value system and value chain models are useful. 
The industry’s value creation logic is basically that of transforming various 
creative and humdrum inputs into products in the form of movies (Caves, 
2000), and as we shall see, the main interactivity relationship logic is 
sequential and the industry value system structure is best described as the 
interlinked chains of the firms. Together, these characteristics fit well with 
Porter’s value configuration models, which are associated with Thompson’s 
(1967) long-linked type of technology that involves serial interdependence 
(Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). 
It should be noted, however, that within this value system, in which the 
primary transactions are best understood as creating a value chain, there are 
elements, particularly in the production function, that rely on intensive 
technology (Thompson, 1967) and would therefore fall under Stabell and 
Fjeldstad’s (1998) value shop configuration. The inputs required are 
dependent on the movie’s unique requirements, thus the variety of inputs 
drawn upon changes from one project to another. For this reason, the 
frequency of each particular micro-level transaction remains low and 
prevents a higher degree of integration, even in the presence of asset 
specificity and uncertainty. 
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Figure - 5.2 The Basic Loop: Product and money flows in the American 
motion picture industry (Murphy, 1995a) 
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An empirically derived model of the product and money flows that provides 
a good basis for a value system model is provided by movie industry analyst 
A.D. Murphy (1995a) in Figure 5.2 above. Murphy named it The Basic Loop 
since it shows the circular flow of product and money between creative 
inputs in the one end and the movie consuming public in the other. 
Transactions between various activities are indicated by the solid output and 
dashed money arrows, while the boxes indicate integrated activities. Here, 
the industry is divided vertically in three main sectors according to their 
functions: production, distribution and exhibition, which is the most 
common vertical industry division used in both practice and literature 
(Finney, 2010; Hadida, 2009; Litman, 1998; Wasko, 2003). Production 
covers all activities required to create a movie from concept to a completed 
viewable product. In the distribution sector, marketing and licensing 
activities are carried out to build a potential audience and to make the movie 
available in the various market channels. The exhibition sector, which 
earned its name based on its historic ties to movie theaters but more 
generally could have been referred to as the movie retail sector, presents and 
makes the movie available for consumption by end users.  Hence, in its 
simplest form the industry value system may be shown as in Figure 5.3 
below.  
 
Figure 5.3 - The motion picture industry value system 
For this study, the primary interest is in understanding the transaction joining 
production and distribution value chains for a movie project – the 
production-distribution transaction – and the transaction-specific 
investments made in view of this focal transaction. To that end, the 
examination of micro-level transactions in the production and distribution 
sectors is emphasized in the following sections. Exhibition is included to 
complete the picture with an emphasis on its implications for production- 
and distribution-related transactions. 
Production Value 
Chains 
Distribution Value 
Chains 
Exhibition Value 
Chains 
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5.3 Production Value Chain Activities and Transactions 
In John W. Cones’ dictionary of terms for the motion picture industry, 
“production” is defined as “[…] the processes involved in making all the 
original materials that are the basis for a finished motion picture” (Cones 
1992). Production is therefore similar to the popular understanding of “film-
making.” It includes all activities necessary to complete a first copy of the 
movie. As key activities Murphy (1995) lists in sequence: the initiation and 
development of the project, the preparation of the script, the hiring of the 
director, cast and crew, the physical planning of production, the rehearsals 
and tests, the budgeting, the principal photography and the post-production, 
all of which are included in the production function shown in Figure 5.2. 
Note that creative, technical and material inputs to the production function 
are shown separately to the far left from the production box, thus indicating 
the frequent use of independent contractors and freelance workers (Blair, 
Culkin, & Randle, 2003) and the low degree of integration between the 
production entity and inputs.  
The production function is typically broken down into three stages or 
categories of activities: development, production and post-production. 
However, for the purpose of this study it will be split into more strategically 
important groups of activities: development, packaging and production 
(Figure 5.4), each of which will be discussed below. Compared to the former 
set of categories, it defines packaging as separate from development and 
combines production and post-production into one. Several of the 
interviewees identified packaging specifically as a strategically important set 
of activities for a movie project since this is where key elements such as the 
lead cast and director are determined. Production and post-production are 
film-making activities historically split into those taking place before and 
after the cameras stop rolling, but in terms of key variables to this study 
(investments, uncertainty, transactions) there is no significant difference 
between these activities; consequently, they are treated as one activity group. 
 
Figure 5.4 - The production value chain 
Development 
Activities 
Packaging 
Activities 
Production 
Activities 
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5.3.1 Key Development Transactions 
Development describes the initial stage in the preparation of a movie, those 
activities relating specifically to taking an idea or concept and turning it into 
a finished screenplay (Cones, 1992), as well as those required to create a 
production cost estimate of the screenplay (Clevé, 2006). It includes 
formulating and organizing the idea or concept for the movie, the acquisition 
of rights to the underlying literary work or screenplay and preparing a 
screenplay, that together with its production cost estimate is complete and 
finished enough to support a decision to produce or not.  
The Screenplay Transaction 
The screenplay transaction may be defined as the transaction between the 
producer or production company that wishes to make a movie and the 
writer(s) carrying out the creative work. It may furthermore be split into two 
stages or two transactions, the first related to the movie concept and the 
second to the screenplay. 
First, considering the concept, any random sample of movies is likely to 
reveal that the origin of movie projects varies widely. It may be a rather 
vague idea in the form of an original concept conceived by a producer, 
director or screenwriter, a concept based on a newspaper or magazine article 
or the desire to make a movie based on a comic book figure. Or it may be a 
much thicker and richer idea in the form of the desire to adapt an existing 
literary property such as a novel, short story or stage play into a movie. 
Further still, it may be the idea to make a remake of an existing movie, a 
movie based on a TV series or any idea arriving from numerous other 
origins.  Hence, the concept transaction may be fully internalized (when the 
concept is originated by the producer), market based (when the producer 
acquires the concept, such as buying the movie rights to a comic book) or of 
a hybrid type (when for instance the producer collaborates with one or more 
writers).  
Regardless of what the origin of a project may be, the preparation of the 
screenplay is a key development activity. In this process, the movie idea is 
developed from the original concept to a finished screenplay that specifically 
describes the movie’s story through every scene with dialogue, action and 
environments. The process is typically done in stages of increased 
specificity, starting with a synopsis covering the basic idea, story and 
characters, and then adding more detail in an outline, including the full story 
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and better character descriptions, before finally arriving at a full screenplay. 
The process usually continues with rewrites and polishes of the screenplay, 
adjusting it to creative inputs from director, actors, producers, etc., which is 
dependent on who is involved or attached to the project at this stage, as well 
as also to production, technical and economical requirements.  
The screenplay transactions are often of a hybrid nature: The writers are not 
permanent employees of the producer, but all screenplay development 
activities are carried out under the control of a producer where the writers 
are contracted and paid by the producer as they write. The writer’s output is 
deemed work-made-for-hire owned by the producer (Baumgarten et al., 
1992). In Figure 5.2 the writer is then the creative input at the far left 
contracted by the producer.  
However, a large number of screenplays are created by writers working 
independently of producers, and when they do it a more or less finished 
screenplay is acquired by the producer, making the screenplay transaction 
between writer and producer resemble a market transaction. In the industry, 
these screenplays developed without a producer are referred to as spec 
scripts since there is no guarantee that they will ever be acquired by a 
producer and get any further from the writing stage into the development and 
production processes. According to the interviewees, there is a saying in 
Hollywood that every waiter in Los Angeles has a spec script he or she is 
constantly trying to sell producers who are eating out. While this is an 
exaggeration, there is a large number of spec scripts being written every year 
and the quality of these obviously vary a great deal. This represents a 
challenge for producers trying to identify the best scripts suitable for 
production and with limited resources, primarily in the form of having the 
time to review the large number of scripts available. Spending resources on 
obtaining information about the quality of a screenplay by hiring dedicated 
readers is therefore an important transaction cost associated with screenplay 
market transactions. While readers are employed or hired on a freelance 
basis by producers, the demand for these search and quality assessment 
activities have also created a market for literary agents whose primary 
function is to identify quality writers and scripts, take on representation for 
these writers and scripts and then secure the best possible terms for these 
when contracting with producers (Rosenberg, 2004). Most established 
producers only assess spec scripts brought to them by agents, and do not 
accept unsolicited scripts – thereby outsourcing much of the search 
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activities. While the vast majority of spec scripts never receive any interest, 
attractive spec scripts – typically from already established writers – 
sometimes trigger intense bidding wars among producers in a very typical 
market transaction manner (see Box 5.1). Yet, once a producer has acquired 
a spec script, the producer may want to continue the screenplay development 
process by hiring the original writer and/or other writers to carry out further 
rewrites, adjusting the screenplay to production requirements or creative 
requirements from the director and/or actors. This continuation of the 
screenplay transaction would then take a hybrid form similar to that 
discussed above. 
 
Fully integrated screenplay transactions are rare and generally only occur 
when an individual producer is also a writer, and even then, primarily to 
Box 5.1 
Variety reports on a spec script acquisition (Swanson, 2001): 
On a recent October afternoon, five Hollywood studios joined Regency 
Enterprises [a production company] in a heated bidding battle for spec script 
"Stay," a supernatural thriller buzzed as the next "Sixth Sense." 
As offers crested the million-dollar mark, Regency decided to call the 
competition with a $1.8 million progress-to-production offer, promising to start 
making the David Benioff-penned pic within a year. And the company insisted on 
an immediate answer. 
"I knew if we got off the phone, we wouldn't get a second chance at the script," 
recalled Regency production prexy Sanford Panitch, who, with CEO-prexy 
David Matalon, had conferenced in Regency topper Arnon Milchan to negotiate 
with the agents. 
The gamble worked and the spec joined a flurry of recent projects initiated by 
the Fox-based mini-major. 
The movie was produced with a production budget estimated to USD 50 million, 
directed by Marc Foster and starring Ewan McGregor, Ryan Gosling, Naomi 
Watts and other stars. It was released in 2005 but performed modestly with a 
total domestic box office gross of USD 3.6 million during its six week theatrical 
run. It never made it into the weekly top 10 list (IMDbPro, 2011b). 
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make transparent the chain of rights ownership (the chain of title), a contract 
is typically made between the writer/producer and the production company 
specifically for each screenplay in a hybrid transaction manner as discussed 
above.   
Specific Investments 
In a narrow view of this micro-level transaction alone, specific investments 
are low or absent. Typically, no specific assets supporting the screenplay 
transaction will be required. The writer is likely to use some specific 
screenwriting software, but even these modest investments will not be 
specific to any particular transaction or relationship. However, we are not 
interested in the making of the screenplay itself, but in the screenplay 
transaction as one of the micro-level transactions on the production side in a 
project’s production-distribution transaction. Our ultimate interest is in 
understanding asset specificity in relation to the production-distribution 
transaction for a movie, consequently the following discussion of the 
specificity of screenplay investments is in the project perspective of this 
focal transaction. And seen from this view, the creation of the screenplay is 
in fact the making of a specific asset supporting the production-distribution 
transaction. 
Investments made into creating and securing the ownership of the concept 
are transaction specific to the degree the value created is reduced outside the 
context of the particular production-distribution transaction or outside movie 
project. Specificity may therefore vary depending on the nature of each 
project. When purchasing movie rights to an existing property, it will be 
high since those rights will have no value outside the context of producing a 
movie based on the property. Specificity will be lower when a producer 
works with a team of writers to create a concept for a particular type of 
movie. If the team comes up with a concept for a children’s animated movie, 
there may be elements or ideas from this concept that can be carried over to 
other similar movies if the particular project should fail to be realized and 
the loss of value is limited accordingly. However, it is hard to think of any 
situations in which a loss could be eliminated, so it is fair to assume that 
these investments always – but to varying degrees – will be specific. 
Investments into the next step will generally be more specific since the 
output created is more specific to the movie project, and increasingly so the 
further out in the process from synopsis towards rewrites and polishes one 
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gets. Scenes, characters and dialogs can most often not be redeployed from 
the movie for which they were created to other projects without a significant 
loss of value. And the full screenplay cannot be redeployed since it defines 
the movie project. Investments made into the screenplay will thus have a 
high degree of specificity. 
Often, the producer will seek to limit the scope of these early specific 
investments by utilizing various forms of option contracting (Baumgarten et 
al., 1992; Caves, 2000; Litwak, 1998). If an acquisition type of screenplay 
transaction is made, the contract may be structured so that only a relatively 
modest option fee is paid up front, with full payment only due upon the first 
day of principal photography, i.e. after a positive production decision is 
made for the project. Similarly, in hybrid types of transactions, the up-front 
writer fees may be kept low with higher bonus payments becoming due upon 
the commencement of production, and only if the project is realized. 
Nonetheless, while such forms of option contracting reduce producer’s 
initial specific investments, they do not reduce the specific investments made 
into the project in terms of the resources spent. Instead, they only 
(temporarily) shift part of the investments from the producer to the writer. 
Only in terms of byproducts will there be elements of non-specificity in the 
screenplay transaction: The producer create a valuable relationship with the 
writer, the producer gains credibility for working with an established writer, 
and so forth.   
Uncertainty 
As with most transactions in creative industries (Caves, 2000),  the 
screenplay transaction involves a great deal of uncertainty with regard to the 
quality of the output. At the very first stage in a movie project when the 
screenplay transaction is initiated, the information available about the nature 
of the finished product may vary from something as vague as a key concept 
written down on a restaurant napkin to something as specific as an existing 
novel or stage play. Either way, the uncertainty must be regarded as high 
since the quality of the screenplay, the cast, director, the production and 
everything that comes after is unknown.  
As the work progresses, information about the nature and quality of the 
output is gradually revealed. Accordingly, a standard writer’s contract used 
for hybrid types of screenplay transactions will typically have a structure in 
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which the producer has the option to continue working with a writer on each 
subsequent step of the process (synopsis, outline, screenplay, rewrites and 
polishes) to predetermined terms and conditions that follow a review and 
assessment of the latest submitted output (Farber, 2001a; Litwak, 1998). 
These so-called step deals somewhat reduce a producer’s risk, as writers can 
be replaced in the process if the quality of their work is not satisfactory. But 
even so, uncertainty about the quality of the ultimate output, the movie, will 
be significant this early in the production process.  
There may not only be uncertainty about the quality of the work, but also 
with regard to the more general direction the partners involved wish to take 
for the particular project. An example is provided in Box 5.2. 
 
So while a writer contracted in a hybrid type of screenplay transaction is 
working under the control of the producer, the producer will have to adjust 
the directions given to the writer to fit the wishes and requirements from 
other parties on which the producer depend in order to realize the project, as 
exemplified in the quote by a distributor and a director who is at one point 
replaced. This generally adds to the uncertainty under which the screenplay 
transaction takes place.  
When market type transactions are used and the producer acquires a spec 
script, the uncertainty about the quality of the outcome is eliminated since 
the screenplay is already written. However, the uncertainty about the quality 
of the movie remains high and the producer may also not be certain that the 
Box 5.2 
Johnny, a producer, provides a brief description of the development process for 
one of his past movies: 
So, as with [Movie Title], I sold [Distributor] a book and then we wrote a script 
and then we re-wrote the script and then we re-re-wrote the script; then we 
found the director, we re-wrote the script, then we lost the director, then we 
found another and then we lost the director and then we found another, rewrote 
the script and another script and then they [the Distributor] said, “OK, let’s 
make a movie.” 
Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
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movie can be produced. Due to this latter uncertainty option structured 
contracts are frequently used to reduce a producer’s risk. As described 
above, the producer then only pays an option fee up front and the full 
acquisition price typically upon the start of principal photography. Hence, if 
a positive production decision is not reached for the project the producer’s 
loss on this particular screenplay transaction is limited to the option fee (and 
the rights fall back to the writer). However, in a market environment this 
approach may not work for attractive screenplays, as illustrated by the 
example in Box 5.1. In this particular transaction, the producer not only 
commits the full acquisition price, but also makes further commitments to 
actually produce a movie based on the script and to start production within a 
specified time limit.  
Like in most other industries, environmental uncertainty may also affect the 
screenplay transactions, and the possibility of strikes has turned out to be 
particularly relevant here. Most professional American screenwriters are 
organized in the Writers Guild of America (WGA), so the impact of a WGA-
initiated strike would be significant. The effects of a strike would mostly be 
felt through the difficulties of initiating new transactions, but it may also 
affect ex post, as shown by the example in Box 5.3.   
 
Frequency  
The frequency of screenplay transactions between specific writers and 
producers is generally low. Most writers work with a number of producers 
and vice versa. A writer and producer may therefore not work together on 
more than one project, and if they do, the projects will most likely be years 
apart. Exceptions are sequel movie projects, in which the producer will often 
engage the same writers again and when semi-permanent teams of freelance 
Box 5.3 
In the summer of 2007 United Artists, a production company, made a positive 
production decision on “Pinkville,” a movie about the My Lai massacre to be 
directed by Oliver Stone, with actor Bruce Willis attached for the lead role. 
When the WGA went on strike from November 2007 through February 2008 the 
project hit a roadblock due to script problems that could not be resolved. The 
strike prevented the writers from performing the necessary rewrites and polishes 
in time for the movie to be produced within the time window Stone and Willis 
had set aside for it. Consequently, the project was abandoned (Fleming, 2008e). 
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workers (Blair, 2001) include a writer. Writers may also utilize the services 
of agents, which will affect frequency, as discussed in detail for the 
packaging transaction below. 
Other Transactions 
Other important development work includes preparing a schedule and budget 
for the production. Based on the screenplay, a project breakdown is prepared 
from which a detailed list of the resources required to produce the movie is 
derived. This provides answers to questions that include how many days are 
needed to shoot it, how many actors and actresses are required for what 
amount of time, what kind of locations, sets and studio constructions are 
required, what visual effects are required, etc. Based on the resource 
estimates, a first draft production budget is created that indicate the total cost 
of production (Clevé, 2006). Certain cost elements, will still be unknown 
until all key inputs are determined, such as the compensation paid to star 
talent (Blume, 2006), but with the screenplay and budget in place, a producer 
is able to provide a quite detailed description of the desired movie and a 
fairly accurate estimate of its total production costs, assuming a specific 
level of star talent being involved.  
The budgeting and scheduling transaction may be integrated (carried out by 
the producer or permanent employees of the production company) or hybrid 
(a freelance producer or production manager is hired to carry out the work 
under the producer’s control and supervision). Compared to the screenplay-
transaction, the required resources and investments are moderate but specific 
since a budget is only relevant for the screenplay upon which it is based. 
Uncertainty with regard to the quality of the output is lower and can more 
easily be reduced, and will primarily depend on the experience of those 
carrying out the work and on the complexity and novelty of the project. The 
transaction frequency is higher than for the screenplay transaction, as it is 
typically the same personnel doing budgeting and scheduling for all projects 
that a production company handles. Working with the same personnel is also 
a means to reduce uncertainty as the production company learns who has 
delivered high quality work on previous projects. 
5.3.2 The Packaging Transactions 
The packaging transactions are those whereby the producer obtains 
commitments from the key talent to participate in the movie, thereby 
significantly reducing uncertainty about its final shape. The most important 
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and common packaging transactions are those made for the director and 
actors for the leading role(s). Before providing a commitment, the talent will 
evaluate the mini-package of producer and screenplay, the financial 
compensation offered as well as any proposed schedule for production and 
possible scheduling conflicts with other projects the talent has accepted or 
considered. 
Packaging transactions typically takes market or hybrid forms. It may 
resemble something close to a market transaction for an actor considering 
the attractiveness of the role (screenplay quality) and financial compensation 
against other competing offers. Or it may take a more hybrid form for a 
director who is asked to also participate in the further development of the 
screenplay, and who may also be offered certain out-clauses should the 
project not develop in a satisfying way. Integrated transactions are rarer 
since the talent in most cases will not be tied to any particular production 
company. The exceptions are found in those cases in which the talent is in 
fact already part of the production company. For instance, director Steven 
Spielberg is an owner and executive at Dreamworks, so when Spielberg 
decides to commit to a Dreamworks movie as a director or producer the 
transaction may be seen as being integrated. However, Spielberg may still 
decide to make a strong enough distinction between his roles as owner and 
executive on the one hand and director and producer on the other to tip the 
transaction over to a hybrid category. Similarly, a number of star actors own 
or are partners in production companies. Actor Brad Pitt is a partner in Plan 
B, a production company that produces movies both starring and not starring 
Brad Pitt. So when Plan B packages a movie with Brad Pitt, the packaging 
transaction may be seen as being integrated even though Pitt is also likely to 
distinguish between his role as a company partner and actor.  
Packaging transactions may also be interdependent. A certain director 
attached to a project may attract certain actors and one actor may attract 
another, and in these instances the packaging transactions takes on a certain 
snowballing nature.  For example, upon the announcement of a new alliance 
with acclaimed director Martin Scorsese, Paramount’s chairman Brad Grey 
stressed Scorsese’s ability to attract top actors: "For the last year and a half, 
my priority has been to attract the best talent we can, both in front of and 
behind the camera. I wanted to create a home here for Marty. I believe that 
talent attracts talent, and we're honored to have him here" (McClintock, 
2006a).  
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Packaging transactions involve ax ante and ex post transaction costs. For 
talent, who in most cases lack business training, even the ex ante transaction 
costs of assessing offers and negotiating sound deals for the ones they want 
to pursue may be overwhelming in view of the limited time most wish to 
spend on such matters. These transaction costs thus create a market for 
agents; as a result, talent agents and agencies often play an important part in 
packaging movies. The agencies represent talent, helping actors, directors 
and other talent to procure work, negotiating contract terms with producers 
on the talent’s behalf, and so forth against a fee typically calculated as a 
percentage of the talent’s compensation (Tuchinsky, 2004). Their operations 
are licensed and regulated by the states (Cones, 1992), and most importantly 
in the context of this study, Hollywood agents are prevented from acting as 
producers by the California Talent Agency Act, which forbids agencies from 
splitting profits with employers (Fleming, 2006). The packaging is therefore 
always controlled by a producer, but to optimize the scope of their operation 
and their own revenues, agencies may sometimes insist on tying their more 
attractive talent to the less attractive among their clients in the packaging for 
a movie project, thus bundling the packaging transactions. A producer may 
only obtain access to a popular actor if the producer also agrees to hire other 
less known clients for other parts, or the agency may decide to promote the 
career of a new and upcoming director by teaming him or her with a popular 
actor on their client list. Johnny, a producer operating under an output deal, 
gives an example: 
Often the agency of the director... when a director is in on the 
movie... I don’t have an agent. Producers don’t have agents. 
Directors have agents and they call up their agency. In our case the 
director is this guy, named [Director]. He is a client of [Major 
Agency]. He makes a lot of money as a writer. You know 
[Blockbuster I], he re-wrote [Blockbuster II] and [Blockbuster III]. 
He makes a lot of money as a writer. And he says, “Look I wrote this 
little script and I wanna get this made as director. Will you guys 
help me to get actors?” And they say “OK”. So it’s not an accident 
that [Star Actor I], [Star Actor II], [Star Actress I] and [Star Actress 
II] are all [Major Agency’s] clients. All of them! 
  Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
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Finally, a light form of packing transactions is made when talent or their 
agents issue a letter of intent (LOI) to the producer. The LOI typically states 
that the talent wishes to participate in the project provided certain conditions 
are met, and these typically include financial compensation and availability. 
Hence, an LOI does not commit the talent and may not be legally binding 
(depending on the language used) (Cones, 1992).  
Specific Investments 
The packaging transactions require investments to cover transaction costs, 
but on the producer’s end also in some cases production costs in the form of 
option payments, often referred to as so-called holding money (Garey, 2006). 
Since a talent’s time is valuable, they will not always pledge their 
availability to a particular project and thus block out competing offers for the 
same time-period without some payment for which they will be willing to 
give the producer a temporary hold on their services. For LOIs, no 
commitments are made, and thus no payments are made in return. 
In the packaging transaction the talent commits to a specific movie, often 
also based on a specific screenplay. Hence, the commitment cannot be 
shifted to any other of the producer’s movies without full renegotiation and 
the talent’s option to drop out. Investments made into the packaging 
transactions are therefore highly specific, as they cannot be reallocated to 
other projects without a significant (full renegotiation) or complete (drop 
out) loss of value. 
The direct transaction and production costs for the packaging transactions 
are moderate relative to a movie’s full production budget. On average, 
approximately 10%  of the total production costs is spent in development 
and packaging (Finney, 2010). However, the offers made to talent and 
contracts made will include a financial compensation payable upon the start 
of principal photography, and for star talent typically also in the form of 
contingent compensation payable from the movie’s revenues. For this 
reason, the implied costs of talent fees triggered upon the start of principal 
photography may be significant, as star talent receives fees up to 20 million 
dollars or more and such fees can represent one-third or more of a movie’s 
production budget. While in some cases the fee is only payable when and if 
the project goes into principal photography, producers may in other cases 
commit to the full fee in a variety of ways. Producers may commit to 
actually producing the movie (similar to the example given for screenplay 
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rights in Box 5.1). Such commitments are known as pay and play deals - the 
producer commits to producing the movie and utilizing the services of the 
talent (Cones, 1992). From the talent’s perspective, these forms of 
commitments are particularly important if the financial compensation 
offered is principally contingent compensation. A more common form of 
commitment to the talent is a contract in which the producer offers a fixed 
fee that will be paid whether or not the services of the talent are required. If 
for any reason the project does not proceed to production the producer’s 
commitment is limited to paying the talent’s fixed compensation, while the 
talent, who foregoes the opportunity to appear in what was obviously 
perceived as a desirable vehicle, may experience some down-time and is also 
cut off from any contingent compensation related to the project. These types 
of packaging contracts are known as pay or play deals (Cones, 1992).  
In sum, the investments associated with packaging transactions are highly 
transaction specific, but may vary in size from moderate if no or little 
holding money is involved to significant if any pay or play (or indeed any 
pay and play) deals are utilized. However, even in the latter case of 
significant investments, the producer’s cash flow is limited to option 
payments. 
Again, it may be argued that investments are partly non-specific in terms of 
byproduct outcomes (building relationships, reputation, etc.) in a similar 
fashion as discussed for the screenplay transaction above. 
Uncertainty 
Similar to that discussed with regard to writers for the screenplay 
transaction, there will always be some degree of uncertainty related to the 
talent’s performance. However, this is production-related uncertainty, and 
not directly related to the packaging transaction. The objective of the 
packaging transaction is to add key creative inputs to the movie project, 
thereby creating a better basis for the production decision and making it a 
more informed decision. The mini-package of producer and screenplay may 
be good, but only very good and sufficiently strong for production when 
allied with these other creative elements through the packaging transactions. 
Caves (2000) argues that movies have multiplicative production functions, 
meaning that a weakness in one key input cannot be compensated by the 
strength of others. This obviously further strengthens the demand for the 
quality, fit and completeness of a project package ahead of the production 
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decision. In this more narrow view of the packaging transaction, the relevant 
properties of the contracted elements – the talents’ popularity, creative 
strengths and style, track record, etc. and hence their estimated value to the 
project – will be known when the packaging transactions are initiated. This 
reduces the uncertainty related directly to the packaging transaction.  
Packaging transactions may be subject to behavioral uncertainty. Talent may 
change their minds about projects and behave opportunistically if other more 
attractive offers are received ex post the packaging transaction, but before 
services are rendered. Talent’s ability for such opportunistic behavior greatly 
depends on the extent of the producer’s safeguards built into the packaging 
contract. However, since the packaging transaction is typically made prior to 
completing the final draft screenplay used for production (the so-called 
shooting script) talent is sometimes given screenplay approval. As illustrated 
in Box 5.4, the talent may refuse approving the script as a way to terminate 
their commitments.  
 
Taking a broader view, it follows that the objective of the packaging 
transactions is to reduce uncertainty with regards to the ultimate output, the 
movie and its market performance. The packaging transactions add another 
level of important information about the particular movie project: who will 
direct and who will star in the movie. These two elements are perceived in 
the industry as being among the most important, apart from the qualities of 
the screenplay, in determining a movie’s commercial potential. This view is 
supported by Hadida (2010), who found that these were the two independent 
variables with the strongest direct and indirect effect on a movie’s 
commercial success. These results are also consistent with most other studies 
Box 5.4 
Variety reports (Fleming, 2008f): 
[Universal’s] crash course in talent relations came last year in their efforts to 
get "State of Play" into production. Weeks before it was to begin shooting, Brad 
Pitt left the project. The studio threatened to sue, putting them at odds with the 
actor and his reps at CAA [a talent agency], who maintain that he never signed 
off on the script. But the parties cooled down after U landed Russell Crowe for 
Pitt's role, and there are now settlement talks that could even put Pitt in a future 
U movie. 
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of correlations between talent and a movie’s commercial success (see 
Hadida (2009) for an empirical research review). 
With a director attached to a project, it can be better assessed in view of the 
director’s previous work in revealing information about his or her particular 
style, strengths and weaknesses, ways of approaching creative challenges, 
ability to work with talent and technical crew, and so forth. The director will 
often also provide a detailed statement about his or her vision for the project, 
thus providing valuable information about the anticipated nature of the 
finished movie. Finally, but not least important, with the director being 
identified it is easier to assess the operational risk of the production itself. 
Some directors, as for instance Terry Gilliam (“Life of Brian”, “The 
Adventures of Baron Munchausen“, “Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas”), 
have a reputation for being artistically and creatively brilliant, but also 
generally “out of control,”  thereby adding uncertainty about the producer’s 
ability to execute the production in accordance with the budget and schedule. 
In Terry Gilliam’s case, this reputation comes from having directed several 
highly acclaimed movies that experienced serious difficulties during the 
production process and many of the difficulties have been – justifiably or not 
– blamed on Gilliam’s way of working (Fulton & Pepe, 2002).  
Obtaining commitments from actors to take lead roles in a movie is 
perceived as important for two related reasons. First, knowing who will play 
a part makes it easier to assess the anticipated quality of the role 
performance - does the actor fit the character, what qualities will the actor 
add to the character, how will the character in the person of this actor work 
with other lead characters, and so on. Second, star actors are perceived as a 
key tool for marketing a movie and are therefore also a key determinant of a 
movie’s market value.  
A number of studies have been carried out that test whether star lead actors 
can be consistently correlated with stronger market performance, and while 
not all can identify a positive relationship, the majority do – to some degree 
– record a correlation (Hadida, 2009). Among the more interesting studies is 
one by De Vany and Walls (1999), who collected data for 2,015 movies 
released in the closed interval from 1984 to 1996 and found that only 19 
stars (17 actors and 2 directors) had a statistically significant impact on a 
movie’s probability to become a box office hit. But even among these top 
stars, none could guarantee a hit. They all faced infinite variance, thus 
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bringing a measure of risk with them, and the strength and certainty of 
impact varied. For example, the study indicated that Tom Hanks had the 
most certain impact, but that it was smaller than that for others, including 
Tom Cruise, Jim Carrey and Michelle Pfeiffer. The authors conclude that 
that while some actors do have a significant impact, no star can guarantee 
any outcome and that every star has a sizeable probability of making “a 
bomb.” Nevertheless, the positive impact of top stars identified by De Vany 
and Walls reflects the perceived value of the most attractive talent in the 
industry. The scarcity of those top actors who actually have a possible 
impact on a movie’s commercial success is reflected in the compensation 
paid to them, which in some cases reaches more than USD 20 million per 
movie (sometimes as much as one-third of the total production costs) 
(Fleming, 2008a) that are typically paid as advances against shares of up to 
25% of a studio distributor’s gross income from the movie (Blume, 2006; 
Dunkley & Brodesser, 2002). And as discussed above, these payments are 
often also guaranteed in the packaging transaction using pay or play (and 
sometimes pay and play) deals. 
Frequency 
As with screenplay transactions, the frequency of packaging transactions 
between a particular producer and a specific talent is low. However, with 
talent agencies involved as middlemen, the transaction frequency between 
producer and agency on the one hand and agency and talent on the other is 
significantly higher. The agency handles all packaging transactions for the 
talent and is involved in every transaction the talent is party to. The “Big 
Four” talent agencies – William Morris Endeavour (WME), Creative Artists 
Agency (CAA), International Creative Management (ICM) and United 
Talent Agency (UTA) – represent most of the top talent, so a producer is 
likely to do packaging transactions involving one or more of them for each 
movie project. Moreover, as discussed above, agencies may wish to bundle 
these transactions further increasing the frequency. 
The higher frequency resulting from involving agencies may curb 
opportunistic behavior since such behavior between producer and talent not 
only strains the relationship between these two transaction partners, but also 
between the producer and agency or the agency and talent. In the example 
provided in Box 5.4, Universal, here acting on behalf of the producer, and 
Brad Pitt, the talent, not only risk a loss of a relationship with each other, but 
also with CAA. 
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5.3.3 The Production Transactions 
The decision to undertake the production of a packaged project represents a 
major milestone and is referred to as greenlighting a movie. It is the decision 
to take a project as it has been developed and packaged up to that point all 
the way through production so that it can be delivered to distributors as a 
completed movie ready for exploitation. Hence, the production decision 
requires that one or more parties commit financing for the full production 
budget, and in that capacity these parties, which may be producers, 
distributors or third party financiers, play the decisive role in this important 
decision making process. In 2007, the average production cost of the 179 
major studio movies release that year was USD 70.8 million (MPAA, 2008). 
Since development and packaging costs only represent about 10% of the 
total production cost, the production decision on the average 2007 studio-
movie involved committing approximately USD 63.5 million to the project, 
an amount that underlines the gravity of the decision. The alternatives to a 
positive decision giving a movie greenlight are to either abandon the project 
or to endeavor to sell the project to another producer, known as putting a 
movie in turnaround. For the first alternative all investments made into it 
will be lost, while in the latter the loss will equal these investments less the 
turnaround acquisition price obtained (typically lower than the investments 
made). The ratio of developed and packaged projects to movies produced is 
somewhere between 20 or 10 to one (Dale, 1997; Finney, 2010). 
The production financing transactions vary a great deal depending on 
sources and other factors, but are fundamentally dependent on the type of 
production-distribution contracting under which a project is carried out and 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The production transactions consist of a large number of transactions 
through which the producer assembles all the resources necessary to 
complete the movie. They include the contracting of individual personnel, 
both creative (director, actors, photographers, designers, composers, digital 
artists, etc.) and technical (drivers, carpenters, electricians, caterers, etc.) and 
service companies, again both creative (special effects, visual effects, 
orchestras, etc.) and technical (equipment rental, hotels, transport, etc.).  
The production process is typically split into pre-production, principal 
photography and post-production. Pre-production activities comprise all the 
detailed preparation and planning for the actual recording of the movie. 
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Creative decisions are finalized, casting and crewing is completed, sets and 
props are prepared, etc. (Clevé, 2006).  During principal photography, all the 
scripted material is actually filmed in studios and on location, while post-
production includes editing, looping, the application of music, visual effects 
and titles (Cones 1992). Historically, these stages have been quite strictly 
sequential but with new technology the degree of overlap is increasing (e.g. 
draft visual effects are prepared and shown in the camera monitor during 
photography to enable the real action to be better coordinated with the visual 
effects that will be finalized following principal photography). 
However, using the same division into these three stages for the production 
transactions may not be particularly fruitful. First, many of the resources are 
contracted for more than one stage and there is thus no significant distinction 
in the contract between these stages. For instance, an actor is typically hired 
to render services in pre-production (rehearsals), production (main 
performances) and post-production (additional voice recording) (Farber, 
2001a). Second, as discussed in more detail below, the overall variance with 
regard to the transaction dimensions is relatively modest.  
Production transactions range from market to hierarchical types of 
transactions. With very few exceptions, only a few key positions on a movie 
production are covered by production company employees. The individual 
producer is often, though not always, a permanent production company 
employee (or partner), and the line-producer, an administrative position 
directly below the producer with the primary responsibility of ensuring that 
the production is completed on budget and schedule, may also be 
permanently employed by the production company. Everyone else are 
typically freelance workers hired on a project-to-project basis. Equally, most 
equipment and physical resources are hired on a project-to-project basis 
(Blair et al., 2003; Clevé, 2006). Furthermore, the production company will 
often set up a separate company, a special purpose vehicle (SPV), for each 
movie, so the freelance workers and service providers are not contracted 
directly by the production company, but by the SPV. The hiring and 
assembly of the project organization resemble market transactions in that 
individuals and services compete for jobs, and production companies 
compete for inputs based on price and quality. However, once hired and 
contracted, the project organization functions strictly hierarchically, with 
functional departments (camera, production design, sound, etc.), and with 
each department head reporting to the director on creative matters and to the 
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producer (via the line-producer) on administrative matters (Clevé, 2006). 
Individuals providing services on behalf of service companies will find 
themselves in a typical matrix project organization that follows both the 
project organization hierarchy and their permanent service company 
hierarchy.  
Specific Investments 
Again, as seen with the screenplay transaction from the narrow perspective 
of each production transaction, asset specificity is limited. Assets used in 
terms of cameras, lights, visual effects software, etc. are typically not 
specific to each transaction, but of a general purpose type, and in this view 
one may say, as Caves (2000) does, that asset specificity for motion picture 
production is generally low. But again, taking the project-oriented 
perspective changes the picture dramatically since the question then becomes 
to what degree investments are specific to a particular movie. 
As with investments made into the screenplay transaction, those made into 
the production transactions are highly specific to the movie project, as they 
cannot be redeployed to any other movie project without a significant or 
total loss of value. Footage of a scene shot for one movie cannot be 
redeployed to others, with the exception of only very general footage of 
landscapes, etc. (so-called stock footage). Set designs constructed for one 
movie are generally worthless to others because, first, it will seldom fit the 
specific needs of other movies, and second, the storage costs until a new 
project comes along with those specific requirements would be prohibitive. 
Music created for one movie would in most cases not fit the dramatic and 
atmospheric requirements of another movie without significant rewriting and 
rearranging, and so forth. With costs to the producer of approximately USD 
63.5 million for an average 2007 studio-movie, and with only a minor share 
of the output re-deployable, the production transactions represent significant 
transaction-specific investments toward a project’s production-distribution 
transaction.  
Uncertainty 
Similar to that discussed for the screenplay and packaging transactions 
above, there is significant performance uncertainty tied to the production 
transactions that involve creative components. The performance of the 
director, actors, photographers, designers, composers, editors and others is 
unknown until the work has actually been carried out. This uncertainty is 
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relevant both in view of each specific transaction and in the view of the 
production-distribution transaction.  
The performance uncertainty is coupled with significant environmental 
uncertainty, typically in the form of unpredictable weather conditions when 
filming outside on locations. While skilled technicians can create substitutes 
for natural sunlight, rain, fog, etc., a change in weather conditions may still 
cause delays and force rescheduling to less optimal utilization of resources. 
Other types of environmental uncertainty may also cause delays, such as 
illness among personnel typically considered irreplaceable at this stage (the 
director and lead cast). Once a project has moved into pre-production, delays 
are particularly burdensome because substantial losses may incur if the 
process is halted (e.g. prepared sets and other construction may have to be 
torn down to give way for other productions, etc.). Other characteristics 
interplay with uncertainty, thus further amplifying the risks resulting from 
these uncertainties (Caves, 2000). The uniqueness of star talent, both in 
terms of popularity and artistic qualities, makes them less replaceable. The 
requirements of temporal coordination make such replacements difficult, 
even when replacements can be found.  And finally, due to the multiplicative 
production function, the consequences of a less than optimal replacement 
may be severe for the entire project. Entering into pre-production is therefore 
usually seen as a point of no return for a production, which is also why a 
project typically needs to receive a greenlight for the complete production 
before entering this stage. 
From the first day of principal photography the full cast and crew is hired, so 
the daily project turnover is therefore at its peak during this period. Delays in 
this process may result in total production costs running significantly over 
budget since the costs per day of operation are high. Thorough development 
and pre-production work may reduce the risk of running over budget during 
principal photography since many eventualities can be planned and prepared 
for (Putnam, 2004). However, due to performance uncertainty, unforeseen 
problems may be related to creative elements such as fulfilling the director’s 
vision. Any problems of this character pose a dilemma in that deciding not to 
spend additional money to complete the movie may diminish the value of the 
investments already made. Without taking the extra costs, one may not be 
able to complete a movie at all, or if so, only at an inferior quality-level. On 
the other hand, spending extra money may be “throwing good money after 
bad,” thus increasing the final losses. Two high-profile and relatively 
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extreme cases of movies going over budget during principal photography 
illustrate the dilemma: “Titanic” (1997, directed by James Cameron and 
financed by Twentieth Century Fox and Paramount Pictures) exceeded its 
original budget by approximately 80%, which made it one of the most 
expensive movies ever produced at the time of production. However, the 
decision to spend extra money turned out to pay off since the completed 
movie ended up as one of the most commercially successful movies ever at 
the box office (Madigan 1999; Petrikin 1999). “Heaven’s Gate” (1980, 
directed by Michael Cimino and financed by United Artists) also grossly 
exceeded its production budget to comply with the director’s vision while in 
the process of principal photography. But this movie turned out to be 
commercially unsuccessful despite the extra money spent, and the losses it 
inflicted on United Artists (a major studio at that time) eventually brought 
the company down (Bach 1985).   
Upon completion of production, a master copy of the movie will be available 
for review and assessment. This leap in information available obviously 
greatly reduces the uncertainty related to the production-distribution 
transaction.  
Frequency 
As with the screenplay and packaging transactions, the frequency of the 
production transactions is generally low. While the variation is significant, 
most production companies do not produce more than a few movies each 
year. Additionally, different projects often require different skills, so some 
talent, crew and service providers fitting one project may not be suitable for 
others.  
5.4 Distribution Value Chain Activities and Transactions 
Distribution is defined by Cones (1992) as “the selling and licensing of a 
motion picture in various markets along with the advertising and promotion 
of the film.” Murphy (1995b) similarly defines it as the function involving 
the two primary interdependent activities of licensing and promotion.  
Compared with the categories of activities involved in the production 
function these two sets of distribution activities are less sequential in nature, 
and many activities from both occur concurrently. 
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Figure 5.5 - The distribution value chain 
5.4.1 Licensing Transactions 
The licensing transactions are the transactions between the distributor and 
the various retailers/exhibitors for the exploitation of a movie. These are 
limited licenses under copyright that give the exhibitor the right to exploit a 
movie, but are restricted by territory, media and time. The licenses are 
granted in return for financial compensation known as film rental, which is 
usually determined as a percentage of the licensee’s earnings on a particular 
movie, but sometimes also in the form of a flat fee (known as outright sales 
in the industry, even though the transactions are not technically sales) 
(Cones, 1997; Farber, 2001a). Exhibitors include cinema operators, home 
video (DVD/Bluray) retailers, video-on-demand (VOD) service operators 
(such as Netflix) and TV channels. The licensing divisions of distribution 
companies, which handle these transactions, are typically referred to as 
distribution divisions in the industry, and licensing activities are usually 
referred to as distribution activities, but to avoid confusion with the overall 
distribution function of licensing and marketing and the production-
distribution transaction, the licensing terms will be used here for both 
transactions and activities. 
Licensing transactions and related activities for the theatrical market include 
sales to and negotiations with cinema-operators/licensees, determining the 
number of physical and/or digital prints or copies with which a movie will be 
released in theaters, the actual production and distribution of film 
prints/copies and other related materials to licensees and collecting film 
rental or license-fees. Furthermore, since the distributor’s compensation is 
typically determined as a function of the licensee’s revenues, the distributor 
will monitor the licensee’s exploitation of the movie to help curb 
opportunistic behavior such as licensees reporting too low sales and revenue-
figures. For ancillary markets (including VOD, DVD/Bluray, pay-TV, free-
TV and new media), the licensing transactions may be carried out by 
specialty licensing divisions for specific markets. Activities involved in 
Licensing 
Activities 
Marketing 
Activities 
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these transactions on the distributor’s side are primarily the negotiation of 
terms, the production and delivery of materials, and for some markets, the 
collection of contingent compensation (royalties). 
Movies are licensed to be made available to consumers in different markets 
in succession, and this sequential marketing strategy is known in the industry 
as windowing (Hennig-Thurau, Henning, Sattler, Eggers, & Houston, 2007; 
Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006; Owen & Wildman, 1992). The theatrical market 
will have the first exclusive window lasting from three to six months from 
the premiere. A movie is then released in the home video market, typically 
first on DVD/Bluray and then on VOD-services, before it finally is made 
available for television broadcasts, first on pay-TV channels and then on 
free-TV channels. The price paid by a consumer will be highest in the first 
window and then gradually decrease in the following windows, with the 
purpose of this price discrimination being to maximize the revenues from 
any single movie.  
Specific Investments 
In terms of the licensing transactions, there is a degree of human asset 
specificity involved. Some of the specificity stems from experience with and 
knowledge of specific types of licensing transactions similar to what one 
would find in most transactions requiring skilled personnel, but it primarily 
comes from personal industry relationships. A distributor’s more senior and 
valuable licensing personnel will have built solid personal relationships with 
key personnel among the licensees within their specific area defined by 
media and territory. For instance, the distributor’s staff in its domestic 
theatrical distribution department will have strong relationships with the lead 
acquisition staff at the main cinema chains, and its staff in the international 
TV sales department will have similar relationships with acquisition 
executives at TV channels around the world. It follows that redeploying a 
licensing executive from domestic theatrical licensing to international 
licensing will decrease his or her value to the distributor. Investing in 
personnel with the proper and strong relationships thus represents a 
transaction specific investment, with the importance of such investments 
illustrated in the clip from a Variety report on new entrant distributors in 
Box 5.5.  
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However, in the project-oriented view of the production-distribution 
transaction, there are no or only negligible specific investments. A 
distribution executive may invite an acquisition executive for lunch to 
discuss a specific project, but beyond such petty investments there are none 
made in licensing transactions.  
In terms of transaction-specific investments, the situation is therefore the 
opposite of that seen in the production process transactions, with low asset 
specificity for each production transaction, but high asset specificity in the 
project view of the production-distribution transaction. For the licensing 
transactions asset, specificity is higher in the narrow view of these 
transactions than in the project view. 
Uncertainty 
The uncertainty surrounding and integrated into licensing transactions are 
first and foremost tied to retail outlet access, and primarily so for the 
theatrical market. It originates from the interaction of performance 
uncertainty, behavioral uncertainty and sometimes environmental 
uncertainty as well.   
Box 5.5 
In 2007, the COO of the then newly established distribution company Overture, 
Danny Rosett, is interviewed by Variety about the company’s entrance into the 
market and asked about their distinct advantages (Hayes, 2007): 
"For a startup, we have pretty impressive resources to put behind our movies." 
When engaging in the physical rollout of films, a new entrant like Overture has 
to essentially sell a theater owner on relationships, probably even more than 
actual product. Rosett, for example, worked at United Artists; Peter Adee, who 
oversees marketing and distribution, is a veteran of four studios; and CEO 
Chris McGurk ran MGM after stints at Disney and Universal. 
Robert Friedman, the longtime Paramount and Warner Bros. exec who runs 
Summit [another then newly established distributor] with Patrick Wachsberger, 
also isn't an unknown quantity to exhibitors. And he hired a well-regarded 
lieutenant, longtime AMC [a major cinema chain] vet Richie Fay. 
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For a theatrical release, the retail outlets – the cinema screens – are scarce. In 
2007 there were 6,277 cinemas providing a total of 40,077 screens in the 
United States (MPAA, 2008). Release windows are limited to the 52 
weekends in the year, and the total annual capacity is given by the number of 
screens for 52 weeks, which in 2007 gave 2,084,404 screen weeks. The same 
year, 603 movies were released, of which 179 came from the major studios 
(MPAA, 2008). Assuming for the sake of argument that these movies would 
be given 500 screens on average, the average theatrical run would be less 
than seven weeks. However, a wide movie release will usually occupy 
somewhere between 1,500 and 4,000 screens for the movie’s opening week, 
and successful movies have runs lasting much longer than seven weeks. 
According to imdb.com, Titanic (1997, directed by James Cameron and 
financed by Twentieth Century Fox and Paramount Pictures) had 40 weeks, 
with 22 of those playing on from 1,000 to more than 3,000 screens, while 
Avatar (2009, directed by James Cameron and financed by Twentieth 
Century Fox) had 46 weeks, with 14 of those on from 1,000 to more than 
3,000 screens. The successes of these two movies were unusual, but it 
follows that even with much more modest successes, the competition 
between distributors to secure screens for their movies may be fierce. Many 
movies will struggle to achieve a theatrical release, and even if they do, they 
may be both limited to fewer screens and have their runs cut short if the 
performance does not meet expectations.  
Cinema operators rely on ticket sales as their primary source of income 
(Redstone, 2006), and will be eager to terminate the engagement of a movie 
that does not fill enough seats and have it replaced by a new movie. Herein 
lays the performance and behavioral uncertainty. Even with a completed 
movie that can be reviewed (and a known marketing plan), it is difficult to 
predict its market performance (Caves, 2000). Furthermore, for the biggest 
budget projects, the so-called tentpole movies, the theatrical licensing 
transactions are commonly carried out even before the movie is produced. 
Hence, the ex ante performance uncertainty will be significant. Once the 
movie is completed and delivered, the opening weekend performance may 
fall short of expectations. Even if the value sharing provisions of the 
contracts are often structured to reduce the cinema operator’s risk (Redstone, 
2006), poor market performance may trigger behavioral uncertainty in that 
the cinema operator will have strong incentives to prematurely terminate the 
movie’s engagement to open up capacity for other more successful movies 
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playing in the market for which distributors are looking to expand the width 
of the release, or to other new movies for which distributors are still seeking 
additional screening capacity. Any such premature terminations will of 
course further reduce a movie’s ability to generate revenues since market 
access is lost. Finally, the time sensitivity of the release also leaves the 
transaction more exposed to environmental uncertainty. Bad weather in one 
or more of the major cities may prevent people from reaching the cinemas 
and thus affect the opening weekend performance. The movie has then lost 
an important window and will also rely on performing well the following 
weekend, but then in competition with a new slate of fresh product.  
Box 5.6 provides an illustration of the uncertainty associated with theatrical 
licensing transactions. 
 
Box 5.6 
Early in the summer of 2008, the Los Angeles Times reported on issues facing 
distributors this peak season (Eller & Friedman, 2008): 
Tom Rothman and Jim Gianopulos may run a movie studio, but these days they 
often feel more like traffic cops, making sure 20th Century Fox's releases don't 
crash into rival films at the multiplex. 
To help them through the congestion, the movie chiefs pore over slick white 
boards in their offices cluttered with color-coded magnetic strips showing the 
titles of films set for release through 2010. Like chess players in a high-stakes 
game, they shift films around hoping to outmaneuver rivals. 
With a glut of titles flooding the marketplace, all studio bosses fear that the 
surplus is impeding an already rugged road to profitability. Studios and 
independent distributors last year released a record 517 films -- an average of 
10 a weekend, up 49% from a decade earlier -- and this year movies are coming 
at the same pace. 
"This is one of the biggest issues facing Hollywood today," said Rothman, 
noting that it's just as crucial to pick the right release dates for movies as it is to 
select the right script and hire the right stars and filmmakers. "When you're 
trying to cram too many movies into a finite number of release dates, it's 
inevitable some will suffer." […] 
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Adding to their costs, movie companies spend huge sums to globally promote 
and release their films -- as much as $150 million for some big event pictures. 
"In order to break through the clutter, we all feel the pressure to spend more in 
marketing," said Warner Bros. President Alan Horn. […] 
Rarely is there a weekend when multiple movies aren't vying for screens and in 
many cases the same audience, especially during such peak moviegoing seasons 
as summer, fall and winter holidays. 
This summer, Disney's much-anticipated sequel "The Chronicles of Narnia: 
Prince Caspian," got upstaged by two behemoths opening in proximity, "Iron 
Man" and "Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull." 
"There were these giant vacuum cleaners on either side of us, and it took 
significant amounts of business away for our movie," said Walt Disney Studios 
Chairman Dick Cook. […] 
Specialty distributors feel the pinch too. Not only are they spending more than 
ever on marketing -- a 44% jump last year to an average of $26 million per 
picture -- but in many cases their releases are getting booted off screens before 
being able to build word of mouth. 
Fox Searchlight had high hopes for "Young at Heart," a feel-good documentary 
about a chorus of rock-singing seniors, when it was released two months ago to 
gushing reviews. But when it didn't immediately catch on, it got kicked out of 
Hollywood's Arclight Cinemas after just three weeks. 
"Normally, we can hold them six to eight weeks," said Steve Gilula, who heads 
distribution at Fox Searchlight. "It's a jungle out there. If your gross isn't high 
enough, you're gone." 
Two of the summer's biggest star-driven comedies, Paramount Pictures' "The 
Love Guru," with Mike Myers, and Warner Bros.' "Get Smart," with Steve 
Carell, will open head-to-head June 20, much to the chagrin of the studios' 
respective movie chiefs. 
For months, Hollywood executives had figured that either Paramount or 
Warner would blink, shifting to another date. 
"I'm not happy about it, and Alan's not happy about it," said Paramount 
Chairman Brad Grey, referring to Warner's Horn. "But there was no place to 
go," given that every weekend of the summer had multiple movies or a potential 
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An amputated theatrical opening and release, or the worse-case scenario of 
failing to obtain a theatrical release at all, is likely to have grave negative 
effects on a movie’s overall revenue potential. Kevin Yoder, Co-COO at Los 
Angeles-based Nielsen NRG, a leading market research company in the 
motion picture area, says that “[t]he launch of a movie is like the end of a 
political campaign. If a candidate does not win on Tuesday, there is no 
Wednesday. In a movie campaign, if a movie does not perform strongly on 
the opening weekend, there is no second weekend” (Yoder, 2006). 
According to Yoder, the opening weekend affects all other revenue streams 
and ancillary markets. This industry thinking is supported by empirical 
research (Elberse & Eliashberg, 2003; Hennig-Thurau et al., 2006). Hennig-
Thureau et al. (2006) show that short-term box office (the revenues 
generated by a movie during its opening weekend) affects the long-term box 
office (the revenues generated by a movie during the rest of its theatrical 
release), and that both short- and long-term box office affect home video 
(ancillary markets) revenues. They furthermore find that opening weekend 
results relate to the number of screens allocated to a movie in the second 
week of its theatrical run, and that long-term box office influences the width 
of the home video release in terms of the number of copies made available in 
the rental market. One may conclude that the risk following from the 
theatrical licensing transaction uncertainty is significant.  
Frequency 
A studio distributor release between approximately 15 and 30 movies 
theatrically each year, each requiring licensing transactions to be made with 
the cinema operators. Transaction frequency is therefore relatively high. For 
ancillary markets, the frequency is even higher since all theatrical movies are 
released here in addition to the movies that go directly to home video or 
television.  
blockbuster on the schedule. […] 
The crowded market has forced studios to stake out key release dates for their 
big event movies far in advance to try to scare off heavyweight competition. 
Warner already announced the release date for its seventh "Harry Potter" 
movie -- Thanksgiving weekend 2010 -- even before the sixth film hits theaters 
this November. 
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For each movie, however, frequency is very low since in most cases only 
one license transaction is made with each licensee to cover the full 
exploitation period. For ancillary markets, a license may be renewed or sold 
to a new licensee following the expiration of the initial license period, but 
the frequency is still low as the license period would typically be somewhere 
between five to 25 years. 
5.4.2 Marketing Transactions 
The marketing transactions include a number of transactions and related 
activities aimed at placing a movie in the markets and increasing its public 
awareness. Murphy (1995b) makes a distinction between three categories of 
marketing activities: Advertising, publicity and exploitation, and similar 
categories are used for the related transactions here. 
Advertising Transactions 
A distributor’s core advertising transactions involve the commissioning of 
creative work in the form of advertising materials such as posters, trailers, 
TV-spots and featurettes, as well as buying media time and space for and 
physically placing the advertising, typically through ad agencies and 
subcontractors.  The first is handled by a distributor’s creative advertising 
department, while the latter is handled by its media department (Friedman, 
2006).  
Creative advertising does to some degree resemble the production process in 
that it involves the creative work of deciding on an overall advertising 
concept and strategy, and then producing the materials necessary for the 
various components of the advertising campaign. The most important 
components will typically be the trailers and so-called key art. Often, one or 
more short 30 to 90 second trailers (teaser trailers) will be prepared first and 
released as early as six months before the premiere, while the full length two 
minute trailers with more actual scenes will follow. The key art is images 
typically composed from a number of images from the movie which is then 
used for posters, print ads, DVD/Bluray-covers, etc. Depending on at what 
stage the production-distribution transaction is made and on what contracting 
type is used, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the creative advertising 
department may become involved as early as before the commencement of 
pre-production or as late as following the completion of post-production. 
The transactions may be fully integrated, with all creative advertising 
activities carried out in-house, or they may be of a market or hybrid kind, 
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with all the activities carried out by outside vendors specializing in movie 
marketing.  
The media transactions in which advertising time and space are acquired are 
market based. Agencies specializing in each type of media are commonly 
used (Friedman, 2006). In 2007, the last year for which detailed numbers 
were made available, the major studios on average spent 21.6% of their 
advertising budgets on network television and 13.9% on spot TV compared 
to 10.1% and 4.4% on newspapers and online advertising respectively 
(MPAA, 2008). It is fair to assume that the online share has since increased. 
While most advertising for a movie is placed in the four weeks prior to its 
premiere, distributors will often purchase advertising capacity more than half 
a year ahead of peak seasons (such as summer) to secure access as well as 
fixed rates.  
Specific Investments 
In terms of the advertising transactions, asset specificity is mostly limited to 
human specificity. Skilled personnel are required for the creative advertising 
transactions, including also when these activities are outsourced, since the 
distributor will need to assess and supervise both the progress and quality of 
the work carried out and coordinate this with the distributors’ other 
marketing activities. Skilled personnel are also required for the media 
transactions as an intimate knowledge of each particular media is necessary 
to reduce uncertainty. For instance, the staff buying television time must be 
familiar with each channel or network’s practice of rescheduling programs 
so that the media plan can swiftly be adjusted accordingly, thereby avoiding 
reaching out to the wrong demographics.   
In the project view of the production-distribution transaction, asset 
specificity is much greater and similar to that of the production transactions. 
Once resources have been invested into the creation of advertising material 
for a specific movie, they cannot be redeployed to another without a 
significant or total loss of value. And similarly to media transactions, once 
investments have been made into advertising space or time for one move 
they cannot ex post (after the advertising has run and the resources are 
converted into an increased awareness of the movie) be redeployed to 
another movie project. In 2007, the advertising investments on an average 
studio-distributed movie was USD 32.2 million (out of a total USD 35.9 
million marketing investment), thus equaling almost half of the average 
120 
 
production investment, USD 70.8 million (MPAA, 2008). For movies with 
low or medium production budgets, the marketing investments may be equal 
to or even far exceed the production investments. “The Blair Witch Project” 
(1999, directed by Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sanchez, financed by Haxan 
Films and Artisan Entertainment) provides an extreme example of this. The 
movie cost only USD 60,000 to produce, but according to two of the 
interviewees, it had a marketing budget close to the theatrical industry 
average of approximately USD 30 million when it was released in 1999 
(MPAA, 2006). In the project view of the production-distribution 
transaction, the investments into production and advertising are actually 
quite similar with regard to both specificity and significance.  
Uncertainty 
The creative advertising transactions are also similar to production 
transactions in regards to performance uncertainty since they involve a 
creative element. However, it may be argued that since the advertising 
materials are based on already created production materials, they may be 
more easily redone if not considered adequate. This uncertainty is relevant in 
view of both the advertising transaction and the production-distribution 
transaction. However, in view of the latter, the advertising transactions will 
reduce the overall uncertainty as new layers of information are added (the 
nature and perceived quality of the creative advertising materials and the 
level of support from media buys).  
Frequency 
As with the licensing transactions, the advertising transactions have a 
relatively high frequency in terms of these transactions, but a low frequency 
in relation to the production-distribution transaction.  
Publicity Transactions 
The publicity transactions include the distributor’s efforts to obtain free 
media time/space by promoting news stories about a movie, interviews with 
its stars or other forms of editorial media coverage. Generally speaking, one 
may say that the media offers editorial coverage in exchange for content 
made attractive and easily available by the distributor’s publicity 
department. These transactions are thus supported by various forms of 
dedicated assets produced specifically for this purpose by the distributor. 
These include so-called electronic press kits (EPKs) that often consist of a 
behind-the-scenes program (approx. 30 minutes), a short featurette (3-7 
121 
 
minutes), a number of 60 to 90 second self contained stories that can be 
“wrapped around” by local newscasters (so-called news wraps) and a 
selection of location footage and movie excerpts that can be built into a 
bigger editorial piece (Friedman, 2006). The production of these EPKs are 
sometimes outsourced to specialized outside vendors, which are often the 
same companies used for creative advertising. Close to the release of the 
movie, the publicity department will also often arrange press junkets, in 
which both national and international print and broadcast journalists are 
flown to Los Angeles to interview stars and others involved in the making of 
the movie. Some publications like Vogue and Vanity Fair require exclusive 
photo shoots or interviews months before publication and must therefore be 
catered to specifically to achieve temporal coordination with the movie’s 
release. Apart from the outsourcing of EPK productions, the publicity work 
is generally carried out by the distributor’s in-house publicity department. 
However, the very first publicity activities that are carried out concurrent 
with the production of the movie may be carried out by a vendor contracted 
by the producer or the distributor, depending on the project’s production-
distribution type of contracting. These vendors are so-called unit publicists 
and stills photographers. The first will write the production notes (a history 
of the filming), the biographies of key personnel and handle media requests 
for visits, while the latter will supply still photos (both on- and off-camera) 
to be utilized in later publicity work and possibly also in the key art for 
creative advertising.  
Specific Investments 
In view of the publicity transactions the asset specificity will be relatively 
low, with mostly specific investments required for skilled personnel.  
In the project view of the production-distribution transaction, asset 
specificity will be higher as publicity for one movie cannot be redeployed to 
others. The magnitude of the specific investments made for publicity will 
vary. While the media time/space for publicity will always be free, 
investments required for the dedicated assets supporting the publicity 
transactions may reach several million dollars, particularly for EPKs, certain 
press junkets and special events (see Box 5.7).  
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Uncertainty and Frequency 
Relying on editorial coverage will always imply a certain amount of 
uncertainty (Chen, Liu, & Zhang, 2012). The distributor will have no 
Box 5.7 
A Disney premiere and press junket for their 2001 release of Pearl Harbor, in 
which the press and guests were flown to Hawaii from North America and 
Europe, reached a total cost of more than $5 million. The event took place 
onboard a 97,000-ton Navy ship brought in from San Diego. 
Variety (Ryan, 2001) reported that guests watched at sunset as eight Navy 
SEAL paratroopers jumped out of a Black Hawk helicopter from 5,000 feet 
above. All then stood in silence as four F-15 fighter jets from the Hawaii Air 
National Guard flew over the carrier in a "missing man" formation to honor the 
more than 2,400 Americans killed in the attack, which drew the United States 
into World War II.  
The film was then shown. Disney made a one-of-a-kind print designed for the 
outdoor setting to guarantee state-of-the-art quality.  
When the movie ended, a massive fireworks display lit up the harbor with a 
deafening finale that rained down sparkles on the memorial and the USS 
Missouri battleship nearby.  
At the conclusion of the fireworks, elevators shuttled guests between parties on 
the flight deck and the hangar deck below.  
The $5 million costs included $250,000 for catering, $100,000 for the orchestra 
alone and an undisclosed amount for insurance against damage to the ship. 
"We're getting 10 times the cost of this thing in publicity," said Jerry 
Bruckheimer, the movie’s producer, and joked that "the next premiere will be on 
the moon" (Ryan, 2001). 
The movie grossed $75 million from 3,200 screens in its domestic opening 
weekend, but dropped by 60% to $30 million from the same number of screens 
in its second weekend and ended up with a total of $199 million following its 16 
week domestic theatrical run. Worldwide theatrical gross ended at $450 million. 
The movie’s production cost was estimated to $140 million (IMDbPro, 2011a). 
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guarantees as to the quality, favorability and amount of the editorial 
coverage, even though supplying publicity material such as EPKs will mean 
retaining control over certain elements of the coverage. Furthermore, the 
frequency of publicity transactions between distributor and each media will 
be relatively high, and this may be used by the distributor to award those 
who provide what the distributor sees as positive and helpful coverage.  
Exploitation Transactions 
The traditional third leg of movie marketing is exploitation - a label 
originally used as a catchall for what could not precisely fit under either 
advertising or publicity. However, it is primarily retained as a term to 
describe the modern phenomena of extensive merchandising such as 
videogame spin-offs, as is often seen on a large scale with movies like  the 
Spider-Man and Harry Potter installments and Disney’s animated movies.  
Generally, in the merchandising type of exploitation transactions, a movie’s 
title, icon or brand is translated to other products on an exclusive basis 
through limited licenses that grant access to the underlying rights in a 
particular movie to a manufacturer of specific goods and/or services in 
exchange for a royalty or fee (Ovadia, 2006). Due to scale economies in the 
production of consumer products, the license fee is sometimes formulated in 
gradually increasing steps tied to the product’s sales volume. These 
transactions are handled by a distributor’s merchandising or consumer 
products department.  
Since the merchandising type of exploitation transactions cover a wide group 
of products and services, it follows that they are not integrated transactions. 
While market-like in terms of manufacturers competing for licenses on both 
quality and price (license fees), they are best described as hybrid transactions 
due to the extensive supervision and control required by the distributor, thus 
also adding governance costs (see Box 5.8). 
In addition to the licensing fee, an important benefit to the distributor gained 
by these exploitation transactions is an increased awareness of the movie 
created by the store placements, marketing and sales of consumer products 
by the licensee. Without exploitation transactions, this particular awareness 
would be lost, so in order to achieve the same overall level of awareness the 
lack of exploitation transactions would have to be compensated for by 
additional investments in advertising and publicity transactions. 
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Other types of exploitation transactions are those of the brand placements 
and promotional tie-in types. A brand placement, often referred to as a 
product placement, is the inclusion of a branded product or brand identifier 
through audio and/or visual means in a movie, typically against a fee or a 
Box 5.8 
Al Ovadia, executive vice president at Sony Pictures Consumer Products, 
describes an merchandising type of exploitation transaction based on their 
movie “Spider-Man” (2002, directed by Sam Raimi, financed by Sony Pictures 
and Marvel Enterprises) (Ovadia, 2006): 
Toy Biz [a manufacturer], which happens to be owned by Marvel, our venture 
partner on Spider-Man was the master toy licensee. This was a given. Based in 
New York , Toy Biz had a history of creating products for Spider-Man. Since we 
wanted to distinguish the new Spider-Man character from what had been in the 
marketplace, our style guide featured costuming with textured, three-
dimensional, raised webbing, inspired by swimwear worn in the Australian 
Olympics. The style guide, a book containing specific design requirements that 
must be carefully followed so that each product design is consistent, is the art 
bible for the character and packaging and is given to every licensee.  
When production of the movie began in January 2001, we made full-body 
computer laser scans of the actors in costume, allowing the creation of more 
accurate likenesses than ever before. Let’s take a six-inch poseable Spider-Man 
action figure as an example. Toy Biz utilized these laser scans to create 
sculptures that were sent to our product development group for comment. Once 
comments were given and final approval obtained, these materials were sent to 
China for manufacture. The factory created molds into which plastic was 
injected in order to replicate the figure based on the agreed-upon specs. Every 
step required multiple approvals, so versions of the prototype went back and 
forth between Sony in Culver City, Toy Biz in New York and the Chinese factory 
during this process. A “first pass production sample” went to Toy Biz, which 
sent it to us for approval. Within Sony, the prototype had to be approved by 
director Sam Raimi, producer Laura Ziskin and others. Once approved, the 
factory went into production. Also, packaging design and copyright lines must 
be approved. All of this was being done a year before the picture’s release. 
[…] On Spider-Man, they [the department executives at Sony] had to approve at 
least 10,000 pieces of information. 
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promotional tie-in commitment (Karrh, 1998). In a promotional tie-in, the 
partnering company, often referred to as a movie’s promotional partner, 
agrees for a window of time to combine the focus of a movie with their 
services and product for mutual benefit (Ovadia, 2006). A promotional tie-in 
transaction may involve the partner’s commitment to spend a certain amount 
on advertising involving both their own product/service and the movie, and 
it may also involve promoting the movie in their stores and directly in 
relation to their products (see Box 5.9).  
 
Box 5.9 
Al Ovadia, executive vice president at Sony Pictures Consumer Products, 
describes promotional tie-in types of exploitation transactions based on their 
movie “Spider-Man” (2002, directed by Sam Raimi, financed by Sony Pictures 
and Marvel Enterprises) (Ovadia, 2006): 
Spider-Man had a number of promotional partners in the United States, such as 
Cingular, the wireless phone company; Carl’s Jr. and Hardee’s in the quick-
service restaurant category; Kellogg’s; Dr Pepper; Reebok; and Hershey’s, all 
deals done by the theatrical global promotions group to generate awareness for 
the movie using somebody else’s media buys to supplement the studio’s marketing 
campaign. Television advertising by their partners featured their product along 
with Spider-Man for mutual benefit.  
[…] Kellogg’s brought media to the table in exchange for the ability to feature 
Spider-Man on a wide range of on-shelf exposure (cereal, Eggos, Pop-Tarts and 
Keebler Cookies), and they created advertising to support that; it was the 
advertising component that was key for our theatrical marketing group because, 
in a very crowded and competitive environment, we need that extra media to lift 
our property above the noise and clutter. In addition, there was separate license 
agreements [merchandising type exploitation transactions] made beyond the 
promotional exposure for a Kellogg’s Spider-Man branded cereal and for a 
Spider-Man branded Pop-Tart (blue and red, with webbed icing). The goal was to 
turn Spider-Man into an event. The studio spends its marketing dollars in telling 
a story; Kellogg’s uses its marketing dollars in building awareness. 
[…] In what was perhaps a first, all in-store signage for Spider-Man carried the 
May 3 release date. Because the signage was up four to six weeks prior to 
release, this helped build tremendous awareness. The goal is to get a huge “share 
of voice” (in industry jargon) from our various partners so that their tie-in 
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Specific Investments 
In view of the exploitation transactions, the distributor is making specific 
investments in terms of human asset specificity, similarly to that seen for the 
other types of distribution transactions.  
Also in the project view of the production-distribution transaction, the 
specific investments required by the distributor will be low, but they will be 
more prominent on the licensee side of the transaction. Each consumer 
product requires the production of a prototype or master copy, and the 
licensee’s investments into these will be transaction specific. For video 
games, these investments may be several million dollars (and do as such 
resemble the movie production investments). Development costs for specific 
games are seldom published, but a study released in 2010 concluded that the 
average development cost was as high as USD 28 million for multiplatform 
games at that time and USD 10 million for a single platform game (Crossley, 
2010), and larger movies may have multiplatform games among their mix of 
consumer products (Ovadia, 2006). For toys, specific investments will be 
lower but design and manufacturing retooling will be required, and for 
simpler products such as T-shirts they will obviously be low.  
A promotional tie-in type of exploitation transaction will often involve 
advertising commitments from the promotional partner in the USD 5-20 
million range per partner for TV domestic TV advertising alone, with quick-
service restaurants predominantly representing the upper range, making them 
the distributors’ key target promotional partners. It is these media 
commitments which are the driving force from the distributor’s perspective 
since they complement the distributor’s own media buys, possibly also 
allowing the distributor to reduce its own media investments. Similarly to 
the distributor’s own media investments, these commitments represent 
transaction-specific investments from the promotional partner’s side.  
advertising creates billions of impressions over a wide range of age groups. In 
the U.S., Spider-Man had around six promotional partnerships with six different 
companies. Around the world, quick-service restaurants deals were made with 
partners including the KFC in the United Kingdom and South Africa, Wendy’s in 
certain Central American countries, Bimbo in Mexico, Lomitan in Chile and 
Magi Noodles in Australia. 
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Uncertainty 
Since there will be creative components to the production of consumer 
products, there will be elements of uncertainty related to the quality of the 
final product. Hence, as illustrated in Box 5.8 above, the distributor applies 
hybrid transaction structures to secure supervision and control. This type of 
uncertainty is somewhat lower for promotional tie-in type of transactions 
since the creative production component is typically lighter. There will also 
be uncertainty related to the projected sales volume for consumer products, 
so hence royalty based compensation is commonly used. Another market-
related uncertainty, particularly important from the licensee’s perspective, is 
related to the movie’s market performance. If a movie fails to attract the 
expected audience, there will be also less attention given to the consumer 
products and having carried the specific investments, which are sunk costs, 
the licensee risks incurring potentially substantial losses from the 
transaction. Additionally, this market uncertainty is lower for promotional 
tie-in transactions since the promotional partner will benefit directly from its 
media spend no matter how the movie performs, as its product is included in 
the advertising. 
Frequency 
As with the other distribution transactions, frequency is relatively high in 
view of the exploitation transactions. In view of the production-distribution 
transaction the frequency is low since only a limited number of exploitation 
transactions are made for each movie. 
Other Transactions 
Of the other marketing transactions in which a distributor engages the 
market research, transactions are probably the most important in terms of the 
production-distribution transaction. The goals of these transactions are to 
obtain consumer information that may help maximize the effect of 
advertising materials and general marketing for a movie and to provide the 
producers with constructive feedback (Yoder, 2006). While a distributor 
most often will have its own market research department that defines 
research needs and objectives, analyses results and provides the other 
distribution departments based upon such analysis, activities including 
drafting questioners and data collection are typically outsourced to a smaller 
number of outside research and consulting firms that specialize in consumer 
research for film and television. Since data needs to be collected nationwide 
to obtain representative results and since the collection method often 
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includes interviews and/or questionnaires in connection with screening 
materials, the outside consulting firms typically further subcontract at least 
part of the data collection activities.  
The market research transactions typically cover a number of different types 
of studies. One is the research testing of advertising materials through 
intercept studies. This provides information about a movie’s marketability 
(how well a movie can be marketed and what movie elements are attracting 
an audience). This research typically starts a year to six months prior to a 
movie’s release. Another type is recruited-audience screenings, in which an 
audience is recruited based on target characteristics typically defined by the 
distributor’s market research department. If it is confident about a movie’s 
target audience, it may want to recruit a representative target audience’s key 
strengths to build and focus on in addition to the potential for word of 
mouth, or if they are less certain they may want to recruit a broader audience 
to help identify potential target groups or to see just how broad the appeal 
will be. These studies thus test the playability of a movie (how well it plays 
for an audience and how satisfied different segments of the audience are 
after seeing it). Recruited-audience screenings are sometimes also used for 
so-called production screenings, which are held while the movie is still in 
(post)production, with the objective to assess the strengths and weaknesses 
in the story and editing, and to identify elements that can still be refined. 
Distributors will also commission opening weekend exit surveys. These 
provide information about who went to see the movie, the audience’s 
satisfaction and hence the potential for a strong word-of-mouth and key 
media draws (what worked, what did not). Finally, so-called tracking 
surveys are carried out that measure awareness and interest in movies 
currently in release, about to be release or coming soon. This is a syndicate 
study for all distributors in which all distributors see the results for all 
movies in the study, helping each distributor gauge their movies’ 
competitive strengths (Finney, 2010; Yoder, 2006).  
While the market research may be of great value to the distributor through 
synergy effects with other marketing transactions, the costs are relatively 
modest compared to its overall marketing expenditure. In terms of the 
market research transactions, the specific investments are limited to human 
asset specificity, which is also limited since much of the activities are 
outsourced.  
129 
 
In terms of the production-distribution transaction, the specific investments 
equal the costs of research carried out for the specific movie, but again, these 
costs are relatively low. As new layers of information are added in the form 
of information about a movie’s marketability, playability, tracking and exit 
polls, the uncertainty surrounding the production-distribution transaction is 
reduced.  
5.5 Exhibition Value Chain Activities and Transactions 
Exhibition activities and transactions are those following the distribution 
transactions still required to make a movie available for purchase by 
audiences through all retail channels, including cinema, home video, 
television and new media. Given the significance of the theatrical channel 
discussed in the previous sections, with its ripple effects on the other 
ancillary channels, it becomes an important element in understanding value 
creation and claiming among producers and distributors. It is in this respect 
that understanding exhibition sector activities and transactions is relevant 
here. Since the organization of neither distribution-exhibition transactions 
nor the exhibition transactions themselves are at the focus of this study, the 
following discussion will be brief.  
Within the value system perspective, exhibition activities and transactions 
may be divided into categories of delivery and presentation, as shown in 
Figure 5.6 below.  
 
Figure 5.6 - The exhibition value chain 
5.5.1 Delivery Transactions 
Delivery includes all activities required to get a movie from a distributor and 
making it available to the end-consumer. For theatrical exhibition (cinemas), 
that includes booking movies from distributors’ licensing departments, 
arranging for the physical or digital prints to arrive on time at the cinemas, 
advertise the booked movies in newspaper and other movie listings, and 
Delivery  
Activities 
Presentation 
Activities 
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often also placing marketing material for the movie inside the cinemas 
(Redstone, 2006). Most theatrical exhibitors own and operate a large number 
of cinemas and they typically have a centrally organized department that 
licenses the movies, while other activities are carried out at each cinema. 
While most transactions are integrated, some may be outsourced (shipping of 
materials, online ticket sales, etc.). In terms of value added for a specific 
movie project, the key output of the theatrical delivery transactions is 
booking the movie, and thereby actually making it available to the 
cinemagoing audience. Specific investments for any single movie are low. 
While an exhibitor will usually advertise for specific movies in connection 
with movie listings in the media, distributors will most often carry (at least 
some of) the media cost of such marketing investments by way of including 
so-called exhibitor allowances (sums granted as reimbursement for 
expenses) in their licensing agreements (Cones, 1997), the investments are 
therefore covered under the distributor’s media investments.  
5.5.2 Presentation Transactions 
Presentation covers activities and transactions that affect the quality of the 
consumer’s movie consumption experience. For the theatrical market, these 
include investing in technical and physical assets, securing a high picture 
and sound quality and providing a clean, comfortable and secure 
environment for the audience. From the specific movie perspective, these are 
important but non-specific assets, as they benefit each and every movie 
equally. Furthermore, in terms of value added for a specific movie, social 
aspects are also important. At the outset, the cinema offers a social 
environment for movie consumption where interaction between audience 
members is a natural part of the experience, both before and after the movie 
presentation (e.g. sharing expectations of the movie one is about to watch 
and other movies playing in the cinema before the show, as well as sharing 
opinions about the movie after seeing it). These social aspects, which may be 
enhanced by placing coffee houses, bars and restaurants inside the cinema 
complex or within its immediate surroundings, are generally more important 
for a movie release’s word-of-mouth diffusion effect than the social settings 
of the home video channels where movies are typically consumed alone or 
together with a narrower group of family and friends. Word-of-mouth, 
information shared between cinema-goers who have seen a movie and those 
who have not yet seen it, plays a key role in giving the theatrical channel its 
importance. De Vany and Walls (1999) conclude from their empirical study 
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of factors affecting a movie’s market performance that “the real star is the 
movie” (p. 285), meaning that it is the audience’s reaction to the movie as a 
whole, and their communication of such reactions, that determine a movie’s 
success rather than any single specific element such as star actor or director. 
With the more recent growth of social media, the impact from word-of-
mouth is becoming even more important (Chakravarty, Liu, & Mazumdar, 
2010).    
5.6 Uncertainty  
In the discussions of production, distribution and exhibition transactions 
above uncertainty has been uncovered in various forms, some generally 
applicable in the TCE literature and some more specific to the movie 
industry. For further discussions and analyses, it is helpful to categorize the 
most common types of uncertainty found in the context of movie industry 
transactions.  
Starting with the generally applicable forms of uncertainty, behavioral 
uncertainty is the kind of strategic uncertainty that arise from opportunism 
(Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985). In the above sections, we for instance 
recognize it in packaging transactions, in which talent may opt out of 
commitments ex post based on “contractual technicalities” such as 
screenplay approval, which may in some cases be similar to that described in 
Box 5.4, disguising the real objective of seeking termination. Another 
example may be seen in licensing agreements being terminated prematurely 
by cinema operators facing disappointing sales for a particular movie. The 
pure volume of transactions and the amount of these governing human 
behavior (talent/services) in a movie project expose it to opportunism and 
thus behavioral uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty, caused by outside 
disturbances, is also recognized. The situation described in Box 5.3 shows 
the impact of labor unrest and strikes, which are external to any particular 
movie project, and the discussion of production transactions covered the 
common exposure to weather disturbances with their potential ripple effects. 
Both types of uncertainties are present to a nontrivial degree and cannot be 
ignored.  
However, there are more industry-specific types of uncertainties that may 
play a more important part for the transactions and investments of special 
concern. The first of these more specific categories are attributable to the 
132 
 
creative element embedded in many of the transactions and will be referred 
to as performance uncertainty. Unlike behavioral uncertainty, which springs 
from opportunism, performance uncertainty originates from bounded 
rationality. No matter how experienced, a writer, director or actor cannot 
accurately describe or guarantee the quality of the work or performance to be 
delivered. And the phenomenon goes beyond these obvious core creative 
inputs and applies to all inputs with a creative element, such as packaging 
(choosing talent appropriate for each task), creative advertising and publicity 
(choosing a publicity strategy or a spin on how to place a movie in the 
public’s awareness). These are ex ante forms of performance uncertainty 
related primarily to the delivering end in a transactional dyad. Drawing on 
Thompson’s (1967) terminology, the sum of all production transactions may 
be described as the motion picture production technology, and the essence of 
ex ante performance uncertainty is that this technology is far from 
instrumentally perfect, meaning that the production transactions often do not 
produce the desired outcome. Similarly, but to a lesser degree, the motion 
picture distribution technology is also instrumentally imperfect and thus 
subject to ex ante performance uncertainty. 
The ex post form of performance uncertainty comes from the inherent 
difficulty of assessing the quality of creative work. So even after a 
screenplay is written or an actor’s performance is delivered it may be 
difficult to objectively and accurately assess the nature and qualities of the 
work. Even after the market has granted a creative product success, it can 
seldom be explained by the satisfaction of some preexisting need (Caves, 
2000). This phenomenon also goes beyond the core creative elements and 
applies to transactions with less obvious creative elements, such as the 
entertainment press’ perception and valuation of a publicity event. This ex 
post form of performance uncertainty is primarily associated with the 
receiving end in a transactional dyad. In the transactions studied here, there 
will typically be elements of both ex ante and ex post performance 
uncertainty, and there will hence be situations with certain degrees of both 
ex ante and ex post symmetrical ignorance. For instance, upon 
commissioning a screenplay, neither the writer nor the producer will know 
the quality of the work to be delivered, and even when completed and 
delivered, both parties may face difficulties accurately assessing the quality 
of the work.  
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A closely related type of uncertainty, which may nevertheless benefit from 
being separated, is the uncertainty related specifically to the form of a 
creative product, which will be referred to as product uncertainty. Unlike 
performance uncertainty, it does not relate to the valuation of a product or 
service, only to its nature and form. Consequently, there will be product 
uncertainty related to a screenplay until it is written, but once it is done this 
particular form of uncertainty will be eliminated. The hybrid type of 
screenplay transactions therefore involve product uncertainty, while this 
particular form of uncertainty is absent from the acquisition type of 
transactions. Moving downstream through the value system with a project, 
there will be product uncertainty related to the movie itself until post 
production is completed with the creation of a master copy, at which point 
that particular product uncertainty will be eliminated.  
Finally, in the discussions of the distribution transactions, a special type of 
uncertainty may be recognized in terms of a movie’s access to the various 
market channels (including exploitation channels), which will be referred to 
as channel uncertainty. A competitive theatrical market does not allow all 
movies a release of the scope its producers and distributors would ideally 
seek and in some cases no run in the cinemas at all. Access to ancillary 
markets and the scope of the releases are further dependent on a movie’s 
theatrical performance, which in turn is dependent on its opening weekend 
performance. These are factors creating channel uncertainty for which 
distributors must seek safeguards, such as contracting cinemas early (Fritz, 
2012) and employing personnel with strong relationships among exhibitors. 
As shown in Box 5.6, strategic behavior among competing distributors also 
adds to channel uncertainty. 
Each type of uncertainty does not of course exist in a vacuum, so 
interactions and overlapping types of uncertainty affecting transactions is the 
norm. For example, most transactions made under performance uncertainty 
will also be subject to behavioral uncertainty. A writer behaving 
opportunistically in the way of not putting sufficient resources into the work 
to achieve a good result may take cover under performance uncertainty if 
criticized by the commissioning producer. With such ambiguity, contractual 
safeguards may be difficult to enforce and would in this particular case be 
limited to language on “best efforts” and “industry standards” (Farber, 
2001a). Another type of interaction will be when efforts to reduce one type 
of uncertainty trigger other types. For instance, a distributor investing in staff 
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with strong relationships to exhibitors (human asset specificity) to reduce 
channel uncertainty will by doing so increase its exposure to opportunistic 
behavior and behavioral uncertainty, as specialized staff members will be 
more difficult to replace. Safeguarding may thus involve such tradeoff 
considerations.  
Finally, as a movie project moves downstream through the various 
production, distribution and exhibition transactions, the information about its 
nature and quality is revealed gradually. The product and performance 
uncertainty related to the movie will therefore be greatest for the early 
transactions (development) and lowest for the latest (delivery) transactions, 
with the implication for the production-distribution transaction being that the 
producer will generally face greater uncertainty than the distributor. 
5.7 Asset Specificity  
As discussed in various sections of this chapter above, as well as in Section 
4.4, the understanding of asset specificity entirely depends on the specific 
transaction to which the assets are deemed specific or nonspecific, and the 
context within which that transaction is seen also matters. The transaction of 
primary interest here is that between producer and distributor for a movie 
project, so it is a transaction between producer and distributor in the context 
of a movie project. This context is illustrated in Figure 5.1 above. A movie 
project may be seen as one complex transaction divided into three stages of 
production, distribution and exhibition, and as shown in this chapter each of 
these stages consists of numerous micro-level transactions and activities. 
The production-distribution transaction is thus one between two stages 
incorporated into a more complex transaction.  
It follows that within the context of one complex transaction, asset 
specificity may be defined in a number of ways depending on which stages 
and what levels of detail one is concentrating on. As shown in previous 
sections asset specificity may be defined as slight in terms of the lower 
levels, but still as high in terms of the top project level, or vice versa as in 
the case of licensing transactions. Hence, context matters and asset 
specificity would appear to be different if the transaction was stripped of this 
context as in Figure 5.7 below. 
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Figure 5.7 - Uncontextualized production-distribution transaction 
It should be noted that contextualizing the production-distribution 
transaction in a more complex project transaction, with increased levels of 
asset specificity as a result, may by itself increase expectations of finding 
vertical integration. Klein et al. (1978) note on the complexity of 
transactions: “[T]he costs of contractually specifying all important elements 
of quality varies considerably by type of asset. For some assets it may be 
essentially impossible to effectively specify all elements of quality and 
therefore vertical integration is more likely” (p. 301). Yet, as we shall see, 
market-type acquisition contracting is frequently used for production-
distribution transactions. 
Since it is the asset specificity at the top project level, originating from 
project-specific production-distribution investments, which is the main 
concern of this study, it is helpful to clearly categorize this specific type of 
asset specificity. The terms project specificity and project-specific 
investments will be used for reference to these types of asset specificity and 
transaction specific investments, respectively. These terms will allow us to 
more precisely and specifically discuss asset specificity in a project context. 
Other asset specificity concepts have been developed from case studies on 
projects in earlier research, but none that capture this specific feature. 
Masten et al. (1991) presented the concept of temporal specificity based on a 
case study of shipbuilding. It refers to the temporal coordination problem of 
replacing nonspecific assets required for a transaction in a setting where time 
is of the essence and tasks must be strictly ordered for work to proceed. So 
even if these assets are nonspecific at the outset, the temporal coordination 
issue causes them to expose one transaction partner to opportunistic behavior 
from the other in ways similar to transaction specific assets. When deciding 
on a governance structure they should therefore be regarded as being similar 
to transaction-specific assets. Building on the concept of temporal 
specificity, Chang and Ive (2007) introduce the term process specificity in a 
case study of the Channel Tunnel construction between France and England 
to help capture clients’ exposure to opportunism from contractors in the case 
Production Distribution 
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of ex post specification changes to a contract. Again, these are different 
features than those captured by project specificity. Project specificity refers 
to specific assets supporting a complex transaction (a project) that can be 
broken down into two or more stages, and while assets may not be deemed 
specific to transactions between these stages, they still represent the project 
specificity type of asset specificity if they are specific to the contextual 
complex transaction (the project). And as with any type of asset specificity, 
there is not necessarily a question of an asset being specific or nonspecific, 
but to what degree it is specific. 
 Much of the micro-level transactions carried out by producer and 
distributor, respectively, with third parties or internally is for the very 
purpose of creating assets specific to the production-distribution stage of the 
project transaction. The producer’s investments into concepts and 
screenplays, talent commitments and finally production are largely non-
salvageable outside the context of the specific movie. Similarly, the 
distributor’s investments into the production of creative advertising and its 
media buys, which represent the bulk of its marketing investments into a 
project, are also nonsalvageable outside the movie-specific context. With 
2007 figures showing a combined average production and marketing cost per 
major studio movie project of more than USD 100 million, and almost USD 
75 million for the so-called specialty movies (MPAA, 2008), it follows that 
asset specificity in the form of project specificity is high in both relative and 
absolute terms.  
The combination of high project specificity and significant uncertainty 
makes the required production and distribution investments risky. The 
episode referred to in Box 5.3 illustrates the risk, in this case for 
development. Due to environmental uncertainty and the demand of temporal 
coordination (similar to temporal specificity except the assets in questions 
here were not nonspecific), the project had to be abandoned. It follows that 
the investments made in development and preproduction are largely written 
off and lost. Similarly, if a project is abandoned at a later stage or 
underperforms at the box office, project-specific investments into production 
and distribution may be lost. Tom, COO at a major studio, sums it up: “[A]ll 
of the money you expend, whether negative [production] or P&A 
[distribution], is money at risk”. 
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When moving on to the contracting between producer and distributor in the 
next chapter, important implications are that significant project-specific 
investments are required of both contracting parties, and furthermore that 
these investments are made sequentially with most of the production-related 
investments generally required before the distribution-related investments. 
Since product- and performance uncertainty are gradually reduced as the 
project moves forward, this also means that production investments are 
generally riskier than distribution investments. Ryan, marketing and 
distribution executive at a larger independent production company, describes 
production as “a high-risk business with lots of money involved.”  
Consequently, as it will be shown in the following chapter, the high risk 
turns the financing of distribution and particularly production investments 
into a challenge for both transaction parties. 
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6 Production-Distribution Transactions  
Within the context set forth in the previous chapter, this chapter will provide 
a detailed description and within-case analysis, based on interviews and 
documentation, of the contracting cases for transactions between producers 
and distributors that were only briefly outlined in Chapter 4. It starts with a 
discussion of the horizontal cases of all rights and split rights deals, which 
later and in more detail are applied to each of the vertical cases. The vertical 
cases of acquisition and output contracting (see Figure 4.1) are each broken 
down into sub-cases of its most common forms for a more detailed analysis. 
Finally, layered contracting combining two or more of the sub-cases in 
vertical chains within a single project is discussed. Together with the 
previous chapter, this chapter will provide the basis for discussions of the 
empirical findings on relationships between structure and investments, which 
will be covered in the following chapter. 
6.1 All Rights and Split Rights Contracting 
Along the horizontal dimension of transactions between producers and 
distributors, two cases are defined in Chapter 4 that in effect catch all 
transactions. The first, all rights contracting, refers to transactions in which 
one single distributor is assigned all distribution and exploitation rights to a 
project from the producer (see Figure 6.1A). The second, split rights 
contracting, covers all transactions in which distribution and exploitation 
rights to a single movie are assigned from the producer to two or more 
distributors (see Figure 6.1B). The first contracting mode is simple in that it 
involves one producer and one distributor, while the latter may be more 
complex when distribution rights are split between several distributors from 
the producer’s hand. 
 
Figure 6.1A  Figure 6.1B  Figure 6.1 C 
P 
D 
P 
D D 
P 
D D 
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Generally, in split rights contracting, distribution rights are split along media 
and/or territory. As we shall see in the following sections, one quite common 
structure based on a territorial split is that one distributor contracts with a 
producer for all domestic rights, while others (one or more) contract for 
international rights. Rights may furthermore be split between media within a 
territory. A producer may for instance have a contract with a domestic pay-
TV operator, whereby the pay-TV operator pays a pre-negotiated 
compensation, sometimes expressed as a function of each movie’s box office 
gross, for all movies produced and delivered by the producer. Pay-TV rights 
would therefore have to be excluded from any other contract the producer 
makes with a domestic distributor, and the producer’s movies will thus all be 
subject to split rights contracting (see Lyons and Goldsmith (2000) and 
Lyons (2001) for an example). It could also be argued that rights may be 
split according to time, so that for example one domestic distributor is 
assigned all domestic rights for an initial 15 year period, and when this 
agreement expires the producer may contract a different distributor. 
However, in production-distribution contracting, distribution rights are most 
often contracted in perpetuity (Cones, 1997), and because we are primarily 
concerned with the contracting and joint value creation taking place for the 
production and initial release of a movie, this longitudinal perspective is of 
less importance than splitting according to media and/or territory. 
When split rights contracting is applied to a project, each distributor will 
carry out the distribution transactions within the limits of its territory and/or 
media. If a movie is contracted with one distributor in the US and another in 
the UK, the joint value creation in each of these territories will be different 
dependent on how each distributor chooses to carry out their distribution 
transactions. The UK distributor may for example choose to profile the 
movie differently than the US distributor by taking a different approach in its 
creative advertising and publicity transaction. Due to these differences, the 
joint product created by producer and each distributor, which may be best 
described as the movie’s image (see Table 1.1), will not be the same in both 
territories. Sometimes under split rights deals the image will vary from one 
territory to another due to differences in how each distributor sees and 
approaches a movie; as a result, the movie may perform poorly in one 
territory while becoming a significant success in another. An example is 
provided in Box 6.1.  
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Under all rights, contracting a distributor controlling a movie in all media 
worldwide may of course also choose to adjust its image to local tastes. The 
key difference between this and the split rights situation is that here the 
adaptations are made and coordinated within the hierarchy of a distribution 
firm, and the origin for territorial adaptation will not be variations in the 
marketing strategies chosen by different distributors, but the result of a 
marketing strategy chosen by one distributor that is subsequently adapted to 
local conditions. An example is provided in Box 6.2.  
Since each distributor under split rights contracting for a movie will carry 
out its own distribution transactions, there will also be a separate revenue 
stream created by each distributor as a basis for joint value claiming by 
producer and distributors. There will be no horizontal interlinking of these 
revenue streams. The UK distributor referred to in Box 6.1 will not benefit 
from the success of the US distributor. The cross-collateralization of these 
revenue streams can only take place once they reach the producer. 
Box 6.1 
Jennifer, marketing executive at a major studio specialty division, describes a 
collaboration between independent distributors, with each distributing the same 
movie under split rights contracting and how a specific movie that became a hit 
in the US had previously failed in the UK: 
 But people [foreign distributors] tend to look for us to do everything 
and they think we have a lot of money and resources, and most people think that 
the American people can make better materials, better previews or just… “It’s 
Hollywood!”. So… I guess, the most typical scenario, we would open the US 
first usually. We do everything, and then they buy the stuff from us. So they’ll 
say “I wanna use your trailer”, we work out our price, they are paying us a 
little bit... They wanna use the poster… For [“Movie Title”], it opened in the 
UK first through [UK distributor]. And they did their own materials and we 
didn’t like their materials. Plus it failed in the UK. And then it opened in the US 
so we re-did everything. So they were partners in the sense that we talked to 
them and stuff, but we did everything our own way and they did everything their 
own way. And the only thing we’ve done [together], we split some 
congratulatory ads in Screen International [a UK trade journal] and in Weekly 
Variety... But it’s really pretty separate. 
  Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio subsidiary 
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Box 6.3 
Emilie, marketing executive at a major studio, explains the difference between 
so-called one-pot (or in-the-pot) and two-pot horizontal co-production deals: 
In this day and age you see a lot of situations where studios are sharing 
projects. You’re seeing more and more... Again, many times, what the financial 
deal is between studios is: we’ll have domestic, they’ll have foreign. But it’s 50-
50. For every dollar I make they get 50 cents and every dollar they make I’ll get 
the same. And we split our costs. So a lot of them are “in the pot”-deals, we call 
them. And then occasionally you have a [two-pot] deal where you pay your 
P&A, they pay theirs, what they make they keep and what we make we keep. But 
I think that’s more unusual on those shared studio deals. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
Box 6.2 
Ryan, marketing and distribution executive at an independent production 
company, uses the movie “Pearl Harbor” (2001, directed by Michael Bay), 
which was distributed by Disney/Buena Vista throughout the world (and not 
produced by his company), to illustrate how projects are successfully adapted to 
local tastes: 
Take for example “Pearl Harbor”, the campaign in Japan was changed 
considerably. The movie-going public is made up substantially of young 
females, secretaries, young single girls… they make up a substantial majority of 
the Japanese movie-going audience. So they turned “Pearl Harbor”, instead of 
an action picture or as Pearl Harbor historic… they made it into a love story 
and they sold it as if it was a love story really. They sold it as a triangle of a 
three - a love story and the movie was smash huge hit there. And it 
outperformed in Japan and sold better than in any other part of the world. Or if 
you take the movie into Korea or Taiwan, the thing you’re gonna show on the 
one-sheet [artwork used for posters, ads, DVD-covers, etc.] is explosions, 
action, planes crashing, ok… cause those are historically very action oriented 
male dominated audiences.   
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, independent production 
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Finally, a division of distribution rights may be initiated by a distributor that 
at the outset has contracted all distribution rights from a producer. Instead of 
exploiting all distribution rights, the distributor may choose to bring in a 
second distributor for the exploitation of certain rights against committing to 
some form of joint value creation (see Figure 6.1C). This is not defined here 
as a separate horizontal case since it is a structure initiated between 
distributors, and not between the producer and distributor. However, it is 
included to show how an all rights production-distribution transaction may 
end up with distribution rights split between distributors and with other 
elements of the structure also resembling split rights contracting. A typical 
case would be that there is an all rights vertical contract between producer 
and distributor, whereby the distributor is committed to financing not only 
its distribution transactions but also the production transactions. By bringing 
in a second distributor that takes all foreign rights, the initial distributor 
would not only avoid having to carry the investments for foreign distribution 
transactions, but the second distributor would normally also be required to 
cover half the production transaction investments. Consequently, in the 
industry these horizontal transactions are usually referred to as studio co-
production deals, even though it may be argued that they initially and 
primarily are co-distribution contracts. Here, it will be referred to as 
horizontal co-production contracting. Depending on how value creation and 
value claiming are structured between the distributors these may be sub-
categorized as either so-called one-pot or two-pot contracts, which is 
explained in Box 6.3 above. In many ways, the two-pot contracts in 
particular will resemble split rights situations in that each distributor 
contributes to value creation by carrying only its own distribution 
investments, and that value claiming is based only on its own distribution- 
and exploitation rights. 
6.2 Acquisition Contracting 
Turning to the vertical dimension of transactions between producers and 
distributors, acquisition contracting represents the transaction mode closest 
to market contracting. Generally, under this mode the producer initiates the 
movie project without having the distributor contracted and the distributor 
later acquires the movie from the producer for distribution in its territories 
and media. Tom, COO at a major studio, provides a brief description of their 
typical acquisitions: 
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There are straight acquisition deals where we go out and buy 
another company’s product, so that they will have made a movie and 
are looking for a distributor. They would say to us: “We’ve just 
finished this picture, we’ve paid for it, would you like to distribute 
it?” And our people will go and look at it.  And it is usually 
representatives from distribution [licensing], from marketing, from 
international, from home video. They would look at this and say, 
“You know we really like this movie and we think we should 
distribute this movie.” And I would say to them “ok.” And the way to 
do that would be either we buy the movie in what’s called an 
outright negative pickup, we just buy it. “Say, how much money do 
you have in the movie?” “We’ve spent 30 million dollars on it, but 
we want 35 to buy it.” “Ok, here is 35 million dollars.” Or – they 
would say: “We’ve paid for it, we keep the rights, we own it, you 
distribute it, but because we have taken the risk of development, 
taken the risk of making the movie in the first place, and because we 
have taken the all important negative [meaning production] risk to 
finance the movie, we expect a low distribution fee, not your typical 
contractual fee of 30% domestic theatrical, for example, but we want 
it to be less than 15%, we want it to be 12.5%.” Then I might say yes 
and I might say no. When we say 12.5% that would be in all markets, 
ok. And so we will just distribute it in all media throughout the world 
if we can get these rights. Sometimes they would say: “We have 
international investors, all rights are available...” – this is more 
common – “all domestic theatrical rights… or all domestic rights so 
we want you to give us, our picture cost 30 million dollars, we would 
like you to give us 40% of that number or 12 million dollars for all 
domestic rights and distribute for 15%.” Or 17.5% or 20%... And 
[our] business affair people make that kind of deals. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
The first scenario Tom describes, in which he refers to a flat acquisition 
price, is one common form of acquisition contracting, outright negative 
pickup deals, a term he also uses to describe it. In the industry, this form is 
also sometimes referred to as just pure acquisitions (Cones, 1992). The 
second scenario, in which he refers to the percentage distribution fee, is the 
other standard from, often referred to as an acquisition distribution deal 
(Cones, 1992; Farber, 2001a). And he speaks of both of these as all rights 
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deals, meaning that the distributor, his studio, acquires rights to all media 
throughout the world. His final scenario is a variation of the acquisition 
distribution deal, in which the compensation paid to the producer is a fixed 
advance against a percentage distribution fee, and this is also a split rights 
deal in which his studio only acquires the distribution rights to all media in 
North America, while others (the international investors) retain distribution 
rights to foreign territories. While acquisition contracting is, as we shall see, 
common and often associated with lower budgeted movies, it is not 
uncommon also among bigger budgeted movies released by major studios. 
In 2005, for instance, six of the 18 movies released by Universal, a major 
studio distributor, were acquisition-contracted movies (Snyder, 2005).  
6.2.1 Outright Negative Pickup Deals 
The term negative pickup is old and refers to the acquiring distributor 
picking up the physical negative prints – the film rolls – of a completed 
movie (Cones, 1992), and it illustrates the market-like nature of these 
transactions. Simplified, the producer negotiates a price for the finished 
movie with target distributors, with the distributor putting forward the best 
offer then making the payment and picking up the finished product.  
The events and venues where much of these transactions take place also 
reflect their market-like nature. These are annual film festivals and markets 
where producers show their brand new movies for the first time to festival 
audiences and among them, distributors’ acquisition executives. The 
Sundance Film Festival (January) and Toronto Film Festival (September) are 
considered among the most important festivals for domestic acquisition and 
the Berlin Film Festival (February) and Cannes Film Festival (May) for 
international distributors. The key markets are Berlin and Cannes (conjunct 
with the festivals), as well as the American Film Market in Santa Monica, 
CA (November).  Examples of festival-based acquisitions are provided in 
Box 6.4.  
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Box 6.4 
Variety reports from the 2010 Sundance film festival in Park City, Utah 
(McClintock, 2010a): 
After nearly 72 hours of negotiations, Focus Features [a subsidiary/specialty 
division of major studio Universal] closed the biggest deal of the Sundance Film 
Festival late Thursday, paying $4.8 million to distribute Lisa Cholodenko's "The 
Kids Are All Right" in the U.S., U.K., Germany and South Africa. […] 
While Focus was hammering out the terms of its pact, two other distribution 
deals closed early Thursday, all contributing to the busiest festival in recent 
memory in terms of acquisitions, whether Sundance, Toronto or Cannes. 
Publisher Hannover House's film and homevid arm picked up domestic 
distribution rights to Joel Schumacher's dark teen chiller "Twelve" for around 
$2 million. Film hadn't even made its public debut when the pact was inked. 
"Twelve" is Sundance's official closing-night film, and unspools tomorrow night 
at the Eccles theater. 
Spencer Susser's "Hesher" also found a home, with Newmarket plunking down 
around $1 million for U.S. distrib rights. A Canadian deal for the pic is 
currently closing. 
"Hesher" premiered here last week to mixed industry reaction, but has been a 
crowdpleaser. Film stars Joseph Gordon-Levitt as a mayhem-prone loner who 
takes up with a family still reeling from a death. Pic also features Devin Brochu, 
Natalie Portman and Rainn Wilson. 
Earlier in the week, Lionsgate swooped in and paid $3.2 million to distribute 
Ryan Reynolds thriller "Buried" in the U.S. Repped by UTA's Independent Film 
Group, pricetag for "Buried" was comparable to "Kids" in terms of domestic 
rights, insiders say. 
Indie execs say they are heartened by the number of distribution deals coming 
out of Sundance, considering how quiet the fest circuit has been. 
Focus Features CEO James Schamus told Variety that there are always 
shakeout periods. 
"We went through an insane market glut where there was too much product. 
Films failed and got lost in the shuffle," Schamus said. "But there are very smart 
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dealmakers out there, and new filmmakers coming up all the time. I'm 
optimistic." 
Focus did not say in which quarter of 2010 it would release "Kids." It is Focus' 
first festival acquisition since "Hamlet 2," which the company picked up for $10 
million two years ago at Sundance. 
The following, reported one day earlier, offers more detail on the “Kids” 
acquisition (McClintock, 2010b): 
Sundance dealmaking looked to be coming to a head Wednesday, with Focus 
Features in the home stretch to win North American rights to Lisa Cholodenko's 
lesbian parenting comedy "The Kids Are All Right," starring Annette Bening and 
Julianne Moore. 
Deal figure hovered around $5 million, with the final tally depending on the 
overseas territory rights that Focus will snag as part of the package. They 
included the U.K., Germany and South Africa. 
Cinetic brokered the domestic sale, while Inferno is handling foreign sales on 
the pic. 
Pact was nearly two days in the making after the film's raucous Sundance 
premiere on Monday night. Among the other parties making a run for the film 
were [distributors] Fox Searchlight, Summit, Sony Classics and the Weinstein 
Co. 
Bening and Moore star as moms of a daughter ("Alice in Wonderland's" Mia 
Wasikowska) and a son (Josh Hutcherson) who seek out the sperm donor (Mark 
Ruffalo) who fathered the kids. Screenplay was co-written by Cholodenko and 
Stuart Blumberg. 
Film played like gangbusters at the Library Center premiere, with lots of laughs 
and sniffles from the aud. 
Virtually every indie distrib and studio specialty buyer was at the screening, 
including Summit's Rob Friedman and TWC's Harvey Weinstein. Introducing the 
film, fest chief John Cooper noted that if something bad were to happen at the 
venue that night, "there goes the independent film industry!" 
"Kids" unspooled in the fest's Premiere section, which usually features films that 
have high-profile casts. 
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At these events the producers (sellers) present their movies (product) to 
distributors (buyers).  Since the top festivals attract the most buyers, they are 
also the most competitive in terms of getting a movie accepted and included 
in one of the official programs/sections. Being able to pick and fill the 
programs with the most interesting movies, the top festivals thus reduce the 
distributors’ search costs in a similar way, as a good literary agent reduces a 
producer’s search costs when looking for concepts and screenplays. The 
continuing top informal rating of a festival is therefore dependent on its 
ability to choose and deliver interesting movies for the distributors’ 
acquisition executives every year. Producers who fail to gain acceptance for 
a movie at these festivals may take it to one of the markets that are open to 
all movies. Lower profile festivals are often of limited value since few if any 
buyers attend. But buyers do attend markets since there will typically be 
attractive movies put forward that they do not want to miss, even if the 
majority of movies on offer may be deemed uninteresting. Markets are also 
the preferred venue for movies that do not naturally fit any top festival due 
to genre or style. At the markets the producer, or its sales agent, can 
purchase screening slots at market cinemas and invite buyers to see it. 
Sometimes producers engage two sales agencies, one to represent the movie 
towards domestic distributors and another to work towards foreign 
distributors (as in Box 6.4 “Kids” was represented by Cinetic and Inferno for 
domestic and foreign sales, respectively). Sales agencies are typically 
specialized towards either domestic or foreign sales with significant human 
asset specificity in the form of sales executives, with strong relationships to 
either domestic or foreign distributors’ acquisition executives. 
As shown in Box 6.4, there will typically be bidding situations for attractive 
product that determine which distributor gets the movie. Considering the 
performance uncertainty related to the ultimate performance of any movie 
among audiences, the highest bidder in these acquisition markets sometimes 
overpays. Jennifer, marketing executive at a major studio specialty division, 
comments: 
At the preem, Cholodenko said the pic was many years in the making, but that it 
was a push to ready the film for Sundance. "We did rush to get it over here," she 
told the crowd. 
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Jennifer: And at the festivals [the producers] often try to create a 
bidding circumstance where... you know, they take [the movie] to a 
festival because they hope that everyone will see it in one room and 
that a lot of people will be interested, and then you get nervous 
somebody else will get it before you and you’ll overpay. So that’s 
what they’re hoping. 
TG: And those things happen a lot? 
Jennifer: It used to happen more than it did... and then there were 
high profile cases of people paying way too much... I guess one of 
the examples everyone always brings up is this one called “Happy 
Texas” and Miramax [a mini-major distributor] paid, I don’t know, 
something like five million for domestic rights, and then it just… they 
didn’t get anything going. Cause there becomes the festival fever, 
because at the festivals you often see a series of movies that aren’t 
that promising and then when you see one that actually has 
something it appears better there than it would in your own 
screening room. Cause it’s like bad, bad, bad, bad... Oh, that’s fine, 
that one is really good. So then you start to get excited and then it 
gets competitive because you don’t want somebody else to win over 
you. But I think most people are savvy about that now and people 
really don’t want to get burned so people take a deep breath and 
say: “Do I really want this, what can we really do with it, how much 
can we really make or am I just getting excited because I don’t want 
them across the room to get it?” I think people are smarter about 
that now. 
Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty 
division 
While most outright negative pickup deals are made at a stage in which 
production is completed so that the full movie can be shown at a festival or 
market, they may also occur at earlier stages. Sometimes, producers will sell 
a movie “off a product reel” (Thompson & Siegel, 2008), which means that 
while the movie is in production the producer will cut together a short 
sequence from the scenes that have been shot and show it to distributors. 
They will then assess the project based on the reel, as well as the package of 
screenplay, director, actors and other talent. The deal may also be made as 
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early as prior to the commencement of production (Cones, 1992, 1997), but 
while this is not uncommon for deals with international distributors (and is 
then referred to as presales) it is rarer for domestic theatrical or all rights 
deals. A deal closed before production will of course entirely depend on the 
project’s package, and obviously they are made either at markets or by 
producers approaching distributors for the movie specifically between 
markets and not at festivals.  
The reason and motivation for closing a deal before the completion of 
production may vary, but the competitiveness of the acquisition market at 
any given time will often play a role. Ryan, marketing and distribution 
executive at a larger independent production company who also has 
extensive experience with major studio distribution companies, explains: 
Ryan: [A distributor acquires early] because if they don’t somebody 
else will. And to remain competitive you have to get involved into the 
movies at earlier stages. Cause if you think... If it’s a really 
interesting script, with good elements, the right director and the 
right money, chances are someone’s gonna buy it as a pre-buy. And 
if you sit there and wanna wait until the movie’s done, that’s fine, 
assuming no one else has bought it. So it’s always the question of if 
someone else’s gonna buy it or at what stage they are gonna buy it. I 
mean obviously, as I always used to say “I would rather pay more 
for a movie and watch it”. 
TG: Right, as a distributor. 
Ryan: Yes, as a potential distributor. Like, yeah, I’ll pay five dollars 
on the script stage. But I would rather pay, if I liked it, seven dollars 
after having watched it and know that I made a right decision. I’d 
rather pay more for the privilege of watching it than prematurely 
having to saying yes or no. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
So doing a deal before the production is completed increases the buyer’s risk 
since product and performance uncertainty will be significantly higher and 
some, like Ryan, would then from a distributor’s perspective prefer instead 
to pay a higher price than to take the additional risk. However, from the 
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producer’s perspective the argument may of course be the opposite. From his 
current producer’s perspective Ryan prefers to make the deals before going 
into production: 
Ryan: Ideally, in the ideal world you wanna try... Well, there is 
couple of ways of doing it. One, you want to... The most common 
way, the most common time that this is done is when you have a 
script that you’re thinking is ready to shoot, you’ve attached a 
director and you’ve attached a primary cast. You have an approved 
budget and you have hopefully a start date for the picture and you 
have all the talent ready to go. Then at that particular time you want 
to start approach the distributors to sell the picture for a particular 
territory or territories. 
TG: Why is it that you want to do it then rather than when you have 
finished the movie? 
Ryan: Well, because when you screen the movie that is done…, what 
you’re doing in the pre-sale situation is you’re hopefully giving a 
buyer, you say: “Read this script, imagine... here’s who is in it and 
they are playing these particular parts.” You’ve got the director and 
what you are basically doing; you’re trying to paint an image. You 
are trying to... You’re selling the picture to them. What you’re trying 
to do is peak their interest and peak an emotion. And at the same 
time, give them a reason why they have to have this movie. And also 
on paper you’re reading a script and at the same time the buyer is 
thinking “who would the four quadrants, who are the demographics 
to the movie? Who’s gonna see this picture? How am I as the 
distributor gonna sell the picture? What is the marketing? What am I 
selling?” […] And it’s a pre-sale, so the movie is not done. […] 
You’re reviewing all this in your head. Then it is selling it there. If 
you sell a movie when it’s done, so people come to the screening and 
they sit down and at that time, there’s nothing you can do. It’s 
screening. You’re watching it. And this is the movie. There’s nothing 
you can really do to massage it or kind of use their sixth sense really 
or use any kind of sales tools or mechanism to try getting them to 
buy it. For once you screen the movie, there’s not much you can do. 
It’s right there on the screen for you to see. And if it’s awful, ... what 
if it’s awful? What do you do? You fix it? Maybe, but, there it is. 
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Here’s the script and here’s the movie. There’s not much you can 
do, once you screen it. So, the last thing you want try to do... I 
always come from the conclusion that 80% of the movies will not 
turn out as expected.  
TG: You mean in the production? 
Ryan: Yes.  And 10%... 80% won’t turn out, 10% will be OK, and 
10% are good. Now, those are my odds. Give me different people, 
they may disagree. But if you go on, a substantial majority of the 
pictures will not turn out. Or there’ll be problems with them, 
whatever kinds of problems. You need to try to pre-sell. So, that’s 
why it’s a pre-sale business. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
Brad, CEO of an independent production company, confirms Ryan’s views 
on the timing of acquisition deals and ties it explicitly to the risk factor: 
We sell pictures before they are made, we sell pictures while they 
are being made, and we sell pictures after they are done. Depends 
on when you can sell it. Obviously I prefer to sell it whenever we 
can. So we do all three in fact. […] I prefer to have them in early as 
long as we get a reasonable price. And that’s because those of us, 
who operate as independents, are trying to lay off the risk. We are 
ultimately going to sell the picture and the more sales we can get the 
quicker the better in terms of getting to our goal to lay off the cost of 
the movie, trying to build in a profit for the company. 
   Brad, CEO, independent production company 
Since many outright negative pickup contracts will be split rights deals, there 
may also be conflicts between a producer’s incentive to contract early and 
obtaining the most attractive deals. Since a movie’s performance in ancillary 
markets will be dependent on its performance in the primary market (see 
Section 5.4.1 above), a distribution deal for the domestic theatrical market 
will normally be the most important. George, an independent producer, 
explains these potential conflicts in split rights contracting:  
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George: Nobody is fighting over India. But if you have the UK, 
France, Italy, or any other heavy territories unavailable, [the studio 
distributors] will fight for it. […] If they believe in North America…, 
you have to be very confident in the movie to take it for North 
America. That’s where your gamble is huge! Because to release a 
movie… it’s 20, 25, 30 million dollars. Whereas Japan is nothing 
compared to that. If they really believe this movie is worth this kind 
of spending, they want Japan too. Sometimes you have a problem 
because you sold territories and they want territories, they almost 
force you to go and buy them back. 
TG: Has that actually happened to you, that they...  
George: It happened to me with the last movie. And normally you 
cannot buy it back because you sell it to independent distributors 
that rarely get a studio-movie, and you go to them and say: “Look, 
I’ve sold the movie just now to [domestic studio distributor] and they 
really want Latin America” and the distributor say: “Tough luck. 
I’m not selling it. We have a contract.” It can be people that we’ve 
even dealt with them for years and they still don’t wanna sell it back 
to you. 
 George, Producer/President, independent production company 
While there are incentives for producers to contract prior to production, 
being able to do so largely depends on the nature of the project and the 
package at that stage. Projects that have star names committed, that are 
written by writers with strong track-records, that are handled by high profile 
reputable producers and that are set to be directed by a successful director – 
or projects that contain any combination of these elements following its 
packaging transactions – will be perceived as easier to assess at the packaged 
stage, while projects containing more unknown and lower profile talent will 
be perceived to have a higher performance and product uncertainty. For the 
latter, a distributor would have to rely more on its own assessment of the 
screenplay and talent qualities, which is less tangible than a star actor’s 
popularity and a writer, director and producer’s track record. Hence, many 
would consider the uncertainty too high for making a commitment and wait 
for the producer to complete production before considering acquisition. 
Julia, marketing executive at a mini-major distributor, elaborates: 
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I mean if you’ve got a… a tried and true director, someone who has 
done it before and he clearly has a vision, producers who’ve done 
this before, played in this sandbox many times before and gotten it. 
Maybe it’s a first time writer but you read the script and it’s a 
terrific script. If you’ve got actors, you know… I mean we’ve worked 
with both. It depends on what the package is. I think, the scariest 
thing for a distributor would be to collab with an untested director, 
untested producer and untested filmmakers in general with the 
concept on paper and then asking for a financial commitment. And 
there’s a purpose for that. That’s often when of course a venture 
capitalist comes in. They are willing to take more of a risk and that’s 
when people get loans from their families. They finance their first 
project so it’s actually shot, in the can, and on the screen. And then 
often it goes around to the distributors and appears at the festivals.   
 Julia, Executive VP Worldwide Marketing, mini-major distributor 
Ryan’s company mainly produces bigger-budget movies at the level referred 
to by Tom, COO at a major studio, in the introduction to Section 6.2 above. 
We may call these studio-level movies. These are movies that typically will 
have star talent committed and are more likely to be written and directed by 
proven talent. Note that Ryan, who handles these types of movies, says the 
most common time to do the deals is immediately following the packaging 
transactions, prior to production. Brad’s company produces movies ranging 
from the lower tier studio-level budgets to low budget theatrical movies. 
Also note that the movies acquired following production referred to in Box 
6.4 and by Jennifer, executive at a major studio specialty division who 
typically handles lower budget movies, are sold for much smaller amounts 
than studio-level movies. In fact, “Happy Texas,” which Jennifer refers to as 
an example of overpayment and which Variety also refers to as an example 
of high priced festival acquisitions (Harris, 2005b), was acquired for USD 
10.2 million and its production cost has been estimated at only USD 1.7 
million (IMDbPro, 2012b). Hence, it seems to be a pattern between the 
timing of acquisition deals and the project’s budget level being grounded in 
the nature of a project’s elements and the related product and performance 
uncertainty. The relationship between budget level or size of transaction on 
the one hand and contracting on the other will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter, but TCE generally predicts that integration is more 
likely with higher frequencies or higher transaction volumes. 
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While an acquisition deal may be done prior to production, this does not 
directly imply any contribution to production investments on the 
distributor’s part. Brad, CEO of an independent production company, says: 
The fact that you have made the agreement in advance doesn’t mean 
[the distributors] pay. They sometimes pay a deposit. We try to get a 
deposit, but that deposit is refundable if the picture is not delivered 
by a certain date. The balance is paid on the delivery of the movie or 
sometimes after the delivery of the movie. 
   Brad, CEO, independent production company  
They distributor’s payment of the acquisition price (except for any deposit or 
advance) will typically also be subject to the distributor having accepted 
delivery of all documentation required to establish that the producer in fact 
controls all the rights granted to the distributor (Farber, 2001c). 
Value Creation 
With outright negative pickup deals, understanding both value creation and 
value claiming is quite straightforward and uncomplicated at the outset. The 
producer carries out all production transactions and finances the related 
investments, which have a high degree of project specificity. The movie is 
acquired by the distributor, which adds the layers of licensing and marketing 
transactions, covering the related investments, which also have a high degree 
of project specificity, before exploiting the movie through various exhibition 
transactions to the ultimate audience. Value creation is thus shared 
sequentially, first via the producer’s investments and then via the 
distributor’s investments until there is a finished movie marketed and 
licensed to the appropriate retail outlets. This is the cumulative product, or 
joint product, representing the joint value created from the producer’s and 
distributor’s efforts and investments.  
The sources from which a producer can draw finance to cover its production 
investments when using outright negative pickup deals vary, but typically 
the financing is primarily secured via outside procurement through project 
financing. Few producers operating with acquisition contracting have the 
internal resources and/or access to debt on the firm’s general credit 
necessary to cover production investments. Consequently, the financing is 
typically raised on a project-to-project basis from investors providing equity 
and debt to the specific project. As project investors, they can only look to 
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project assets, project-related contracts, and project cash flow for security, 
repayment and a return on their investments (Finnerty, 1996). As Brad points 
out above, distributors’ acquisition payments are always made upon delivery 
of the movie so they cannot be used directly to finance production even 
when contracted prior to production. Such contracts may however be used as 
security towards lenders and thus indirectly help to facilitate production 
financing. An example is provided in Box 6.5 below, and this is usually 
referred to as pre-sale financing. Loans can in some cases also be drawn 
against rights for which no acquisition deals are made, which is known as 
gap financing. Brad explains: 
The bank will often also discount the value of other sales… that is, 
potential sales. If I’ve sold Germany, but haven’t sold Italy they’ll 
still lend me some money against Italy based on my track record and 
the fact that I’ve shown I have enough sales on the picture that it’s 
likely that I’ll sell the picture out at that level. So it’s a way the bank 
has to sort of assuring itself that the unsold territories have value. 
   Brad, CEO, independent production company  
Other common sources include so-called soft funding in the form of tax 
incentives and subsidies (Kilday, 2009), which are offered by cities, states 
and foreign countries as incentives to attract film productions. Project-
specific equity (i.e. not producer’s equity) is also a common production 
financing element and, as indicated by Julia above, may be provided by 
variety of sources ranging from third-party sources, such as specialized film 
investment funds, venture capitalists and wealthy individuals, to insiders 
such as producers, directors and actors (as well as their families and friends) 
(see Box 6.6). Producers may also ask the cast, crew and suppliers to accept 
a lower payment against the producer’s commitment to make additional 
contingent payments from the movie’s revenues. The difference between the 
normal fee and the reduced fee is then referred to as the deferred fee, and 
such deferrals may be an important source of finance specifically for lower 
budgeted movies. While these are all common sources, the variety is big and 
according to Ryan, distribution and marketing executive at an independent 
production company, “each movie basically has sort of its own financial 
makeup.” 
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Distributors will typically draw on internal resources (company equity and 
debt) to cover the acquisition price and their distribution investments. None 
of the interviewees were aware of any cases in which distributors have raised 
project financing to cover distribution investments for a specific movie, and 
no examples of this were found in the documentation.  
 
Box 6.5 
Johnny, producer and president of a production company that normally operates 
under an output deal with a distributor, provides an example in a movie he was 
not able to make under his output deal but still produced primarily using 
outright negative pickup deals: 
A movie I’m starting in two weeks is called [title]. We couldn’t get [distributor 
1] or [distributor 2] or any of these companies to make the movie. They don’t 
wanna do it. So we started to go to other companies like [foreign distributor]. 
So what we ended up doing was: The budget of the movie is about 7,5 million 
dollars. So we’ve got a little over 5 million dollars from [foreign distributor] 
for the international rights. We got one and a half million dollars from 
[domestic home video distributor], for all those rights in the US and we still 
ended up not having enough money to make the movie. So we found an equity 
investor for 750,000 dollars. That’s an equity investment against the domestic 
rights. And they also have a little piece of international rights. So all these 
pieces, they make up the budget. All the people pay for the movie when you 
deliver the movie to them. So, you take all these agreements that say they’re 
gonna pay five and a quarter million on delivery and one and half million on 
delivery and 750 on delivery. And in your budget you have interest and 
financing costs. Right. And you take all those agreements and you go to a bank. 
And you make an interparty agreement amongst everybody. And the bank loans 
me… we created a stupid company called [title] Productions, for the movie 
specifically. And the bank funds this thing against the fact that these 
distribution companies will pay the bank. So it’s for 7.5 million dollars, the 
bank is gonna loan us 7 million dollars, the rest being their interest… and you 
go and make your movie. And when you make a movie like that, you tell them up 
front that the leads, in our case, are [star actor 1] and [star actor 2]. They’re in 
the movie and that’s all they care about… is that those two people are in the 
movie. And the rest… – “whatever.” 
  Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
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Value Claiming 
Value claiming also takes place sequentially. The producer receives its share 
in the form of the flat acquisition price paid by the distributor. For the 
producer to obtain a positive return on the production investments the price 
must exceed the total production investments, as illustrated by Tom’s quote 
in Section 6.2 above, in which a movie with total production investments of 
USD 30 million is acquired for USD 35 million. Having paid the acquisition 
price in an outright negative pickup deal, the distributor retains all film rental 
and revenues it is able to generate from its exploitation of the movie. For the 
distributor to reach a positive return on its investments, these revenues must 
exceed the sum of the acquisition price and its licensing and marketing 
investments, which is the “what can we really do with it, how much can we 
really make” question referred to by Jennifer above.  
The case of “Happy Texas”, as referred to above, provides an illustration of 
each party’s risk arising from project-specific investments and the various 
Box 6.6 
The Los Angeles Times reports on star actor-director Kevin Costner’s 
investments into the production of movies in which he stars (Horn, 2008): 
Costner has one of the longest -- and best -- track records for putting his money 
where his movie is. Including 1990's Oscar-winning "Dances With Wolves," 
2003's "Open Range" and Friday's "Swing Vote," the 53-year-old actor-director 
has proved remarkably adept at betting on himself, even though Costner says 
it's not that much of a gamble. […] 
Costner decided to star in the film and looked for a backer for "Swing Vote's" 
tentative $20-million budget. But the model some financiers wanted to use -- by 
raising capital through foreign pre-sales -- didn't strike him as equitable. 
"They want to raise it on your name, but you're not actually benefiting from 
that," Costner says. "So I looked to my wife and said, 'Why don't we just do 
this?' And she said, 'OK.' " 
When the film went slightly over budget, Costner kicked in an additional $1.3 
million. But then Disney bought the film's domestic distribution rights, and with 
other territories sold off, Costner says he's now about $1 million in the black. 
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forms of uncertainty. Miramax, a distributor, acquired the movie from its 
producer for USD 10.8 million at the Sundance festival. The estimated 
production cost was USD 1.7 million, so the producer ended up making a 
solid return on the production investments. However, this outcome was of 
course unknown at the time these production investments were made and at 
which stage there were a significant performance and product, as well as 
environmental uncertainty, related to the production of the movie. Screening 
the completed movie at the Sundance festival, the product uncertainty related 
to the movie in itself was eliminated and the project was also no longer 
subject to the environmental uncertainty surrounding the production process. 
Miramax, in addition to other distributors seeing the movie, made a positive 
assessment of the project, finally putting its value at USD 10.8 million, 
meaning that the Miramax executives expected to see revenues exceeding 
this acquisition price plus the distribution investments to be made. However, 
the movie ended up only generating a domestic box office of USD 1.9 
million (IMDbPro, 2012b). While both distribution investments and 
revenues from ancillary markets are unknown, it is fair to assume that 
Miramax ended up with a significant loss on its investments, which 
illustrates the impact of performance uncertainty in relation to how a movie 
ultimately plays for a commercial audience. So, when outright negative 
pickup deals are contracted following the completion of a movie, the risk 
directly related to project-specific production investments and uncertainties 
surrounding the production process, which we may call the production risk, 
rest with the producer, while the risk directly related to project-specific 
distribution investments and the uncertainties surrounding the distribution 
process, which we may call the distribution risk, rests with the distributor. 
Note that when outright negative pickup deals are utilized, part of the 
distribution risk comes from the acquisition of the movie - assessing the 
value of the movie before it has been released to a commercial audience 
(performance uncertainty) and then paying an acquisition price (a project-
specific distribution investment). In the case of “Happy Texas,” this latter 
element of the distribution risk caused the producer to end up with a very 
healthy return on its production investments despite the overall project 
ending up at a loss, which was taken by the distributor and added to by the 
high acquisition price. Of course, in other cases distributors may acquire 
movies for low prices, inflicting losses on producers even if the movies 
ultimately earn overall profits, thus resulting in the opposite value claiming 
result.  
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Contracting 
The contracting of outright negative pickup deals is relatively simple 
compared to other types of production-distribution transactions. The key 
commitments that need to be contractually safeguarded are the delivery of 
the movie and the payment of the acquisition price. The primary concern of 
the distributor is that it obtains all rights and access to all materials necessary 
to distribute and exploit the movie and that nothing interferes with the 
distribution, such as claims from the talent or crew participating in the movie 
or third parties (copyright claims, etc.) (Farber, 2001b). The rights obtained 
will typically also include the rights to cut trailers and re-edit the movie at 
the distributor’s own expense. Ryan, marketing and distribution executive at 
a larger independent production company, elaborates:  
I mean if you’re just going to the Toronto Film Festival or Sundance 
and sit back and screen completed movies, yeah, sure, you can make 
changes in the movies. You can cut it out, you can shorten it. You 
can say, “You know, I love your movie but you got to take out that 
scene and the middle part, it’s too slow and I’m a little confused by 
the end”. There are a lot of things you can do in the post-production 
process. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
The producer’s primary concern is the timing of the payment of the agreed 
acquisition price and that the conditions that need to be met before payment 
are made (delivery of materials and documentation) and are clearly defined 
so that no unexpected holdup in payment can be justified (Farber, 2001c). 
These are fairly standard contractual safeguards that seldom impose or cause 
any significant disturbances in the execution of the transaction.  
If the contracting is done prior to production it will be somewhat more 
complex, as the distributor will seek safeguards against any undesirable 
changes in the nature of the movie from the time the contract is made until 
the movie is delivered. The contract will therefore typically list so-called 
approved elements, including the script, budget, director, lead cast and 
maybe more. If the producer wishes or for any reason needs to make changes 
to any of these approved elements (e.g. replace a lead actor, see Box 5.4), it 
will require the distributor’s approval. If changes are made without the 
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distributor’s approval, the distributor may be able to avoid its obligation to 
acquire the movie (Cones, 1997), which would have serious ripple effects 
since the acquisition agreement most likely is used as security for pre-sale 
financing. Ryan exemplifies: 
You’ve gonna have to guarantee that “this movie will be in color, 
will be shot on 35mm, will be shot in English language, it will... will 
be no more restrictive than an R rating, or you can say no more than 
PG13 so therefore it is only one time you can say “fuck.” It’s gonna 
star Tom Cruise and x y z and Meg Ryan, and it’s gonna be directed 
by so and so.” And if it doesn’t... if the movie all of the sudden 
doesn’t have those elements - you don’t take delivery. You don’t 
have to pay. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
 These additional safeguards reflect the additional performance and product 
uncertainty affecting the distributor when contracting prior to production, 
which add a degree of production risk to the acquisition element of the 
distributor’s investments. The distributor wants to ensure that the completed 
movie turns out as close as possible to its image based on the package 
assessment, or that if changes are made the changes are to the distributor’s 
liking. This requires that a certain degree of decision making control is 
shifted from the producer to the distributor. From the producer’s perspective 
this additional safeguard granted to the distributor may be seen as added 
uncertainty since some control over creative elements is given up throughout 
the production process. The producer would generally be less flexible when 
adapting to disturbances (such as replacing a lead actor due to behavioral or 
environmental uncertainty).  
In an all rights outright negative pickup deal, the distributor may ask for the 
copyright ownership in a movie to be transferred as an additional safeguard, 
but typically the producer will retain copyright ownership. Thus, the 
acquisition deal will in legal terms be a licensing agreement and not an 
acquisition in the form of a transfer of ownership. However, since the term 
of the licensing agreement will normally be “in perpetuity” (i.e. forever), the 
contract will still in effect transfer all financial benefits generated by the 
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exploitation of the movie in the specified media and territories to the 
distributor forever (Cones, 1997). 
In sum, based on the above, one may conclude that even within the sub-case 
of outright negative pickup contracting there are variations as to placement 
on the market-hierarchy continuum (Figure 6.2). The pre-sale deals require 
more safeguards in their governance structure than those contracted 
following production and should therefore be placed further away from the 
ideal market form than the latter.  
 
Figure 6.2 - Positioning of outright negative pickup contracting 
6.2.2 Acquisition Distribution Deals 
The acquisition distribution type of contracting is similar to the outright 
negative pickup deal in that the producer negotiates the terms for the 
finished movie with one or more distributors, and the distributor putting 
forward the best offer then gets the product. And again, the contracting may 
take place prior to or following production, and it may be all rights or split 
rights deals. However, in the acquisition distribution deal, the producer’s 
basic financial remuneration is not a flat fee payable upon delivery but a 
revenue-sharing arrangement between the producer and distributor for the 
monies generated by the distributor’s exploitation of the movie. The key 
difference between these two forms of acquisition contracting is thus in the 
value claiming, but as we shall see this dimension has ripple effects on 
others, including value creation and uncertainty, and hence also for desired 
safeguards. For practical purposes the discussion in this sub-section starts 
with investigating value claiming. 
Value Claiming 
When Tom, COO at a major studio, refers to a distribution fee of somewhere 
between 12.5 and 30% in the introduction of Section 6.2 above, that is a 
standard type of revenue sharing in which the distributor retains a percentage 
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of the gross receipts it generates from the exploitation of the movie. The 
distribution fee rationale is to compensate the distributor for its selling 
efforts and the maintenance of its home and branch offices, worldwide sales 
organization and the use of monies for releasing costs (Cones, 1992), or in 
other words, to cover its nonspecific costs as well as providing a return on its 
project-specific investments. The percentage of the distribution fee will 
typically vary between market channels or media. The percentages referred 
to by Tom above are for the theatrical market. At the outset, as summarized 
by Tom, the acquisition distribution deal may not seem significantly more 
complex in terms of value claiming than the outright negative pickup deal. 
However, what significantly adds to its complexity – and flexibility – is that 
the value-sharing arrangements, including the definitions of both what 
constitutes revenues and the mechanisms devised to share these, are 
contractually defined on a case-to-case basis and not controlled by standard 
terms defined by law or regulations.  
In his critical analysis of acquisition distribution contracting, Cones (1997) 
points to a number of common contractual terms that may invite 
opportunistic behavior on the distributor’s part in the value-sharing 
arrangements. First, the contractual definition of gross receipts determines 
the pool of revenues that is subject to the revenue sharing, so by applying a 
narrow definition or alternatively exclude items from the definition, the 
distributor reduces the amount to be shared with the producer (in most cases 
without any effect on the distributor’s actual revenues from the movie). 
Generally, “gross receipts” is defined as all monies actually received from 
all sources by the distributor (or its subsidiaries or affiliates) from the 
exploitation of the rights granted pursuant to the distribution agreement 
(Cones, 1997). However, a number of exclusions are often made and some 
revenues may also not be collected from the distributor’s licensing 
transactions. The latter typically occurs when a distributor and theatrical 
exhibitors or cinema operators agree on so-called settlement transactions 
(also known as “selling subject to review”, “adjustments” and “look sees”). 
These are renegotiations of the licensing terms initiated by the exhibitor after 
an engagement has been completed, when the movie’s performance is 
known. Such renegotiations are made even if the original licensing 
agreement includes sliding scale provisions to reduce the exhibitor’s risk 
from performance uncertainty (i.e. the exhibitor normally retains a larger 
share of the box office revenues when a movie performs poorly). According 
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to Cones, distributors routinely settle for a payment that is somewhere 
between 10 and 30% less than what is owed to the distributor by the 
exhibitor according to the ex ante licensing agreement. Such settlements 
obviously also reduce the distributor’s revenues from a given movie, but 
may still be deemed beneficial by the distributor since it may be made in 
return for some future benefit. These benefits may include more favorable 
licensing terms on the distributor’s next movie, to get a future somewhat 
mediocre movie into specific cinemas that the operator otherwise would 
have passed on or generally in some other way gain goodwill with the 
cinema operator. The distributor’s refusal to make an adjustment may result 
in a premature termination, as discussed in the previous chapter. Settlement 
transactions are of an informal character and are normally made as oral 
agreements, and combined with the typical sliding scale complexity of the ex 
ante licensing agreement (which also allows for certain deductions on the 
exhibitors side) (Fellman, 2006; Redstone, 2006), this makes it difficult for a 
producer or its auditor to determine the exact nature of the licensing 
transaction in question. The typical acquisition distribution contract will 
include provisions that allow the distributor to make settlement transactions 
within its sole business judgment (Farber, 2001d). 
Among the deductions and exclusions from gross receipts, the royalty-based 
system used for home video revenue reporting is potentially the most 
important. Most distributors, and all major studio distributors, have their 
own home video division acting as DVD/Bluray manufacturers and 
wholesalers (see Box 5.10). Rather than accounting for and deducting the 
actual costs associated with each movie to determine its net income, these 
home video divisions report a percentage of their wholesale receipts as a 
royalty fee to the parent company, and only this royalty is included in a 
movie’s gross receipts. The distributor will of course endeavor to set the 
royalty rate as low as possible, and it has traditionally been set to a default of 
20%. The royalty percentage used in the gross receipts definition of any 
acquisition distribution deal (or any other revenue sharing contracting) will 
primarily depend on the producer’s (or any other party’s) leverage in the 
negotiations with the distributor (Blume, 2006).  
Another area where distributors may exclude revenues from gross receipts is 
in the cross-collateralization between individual movies and markets, and in 
the related issue of allocating revenues between movies bundled for 
licensing (Cones, 1997). The latter is common for licensing transactions with 
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television buyers and foreign sub-distributors. Movies are sold in packages 
that may include a high number of movies for a lump sum, and it becomes 
difficult to objectively contribute value from the transaction to each 
individual movie. Consequently, the distributor will typically grant itself 
significant contractual discretionary judgment, which of course may be used 
opportunistically to steer revenues away from gross receipt pools (or so-
called pots) in which larger shares are allocated to producers. This is also 
referred to as de facto cross-collateralization. 
Once gross receipts is defined, the question of determining the allocation of 
the monies, and how they are shared between distributor and producer must 
be dealt with. From the monies defined as gross receipts in the acquisition 
distribution agreement, the distribution fee is typically deducted off the top 
before any other deductions are made. The distribution fee is charged on an 
ongoing basis, meaning that from the gross receipts reported in any 
accounting period, a percentage share is deducted and retained by the 
distributor (see Figure 6.3 below). From the balance, a standard acquisition 
distribution contract would allow the distributor to further deduct its 
expenses before any payments are made to the producer (Farber, 2001b). 
Among these items the distributor’s marketing costs would dominate, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, but other expenses directly related to a 
movie would also be deducted and recouped (various taxes, checking- and 
collection costs, residuals and royalties for unions, etc.). In addition to these 
direct costs the distributor would normally add further imputed costs such as 
an advertising fee equal to about 15% of the advertising costs, interest 
typically calculated at 125% of the prime rate, and in some cases also 
additional overhead charges  (such as a 10-15% distribution overhead), to 
cover its indirect costs (Blume, 2006; Cones, 1997). Only when these items 
are covered by a movie’s gross receipt would payments commence to the 
producer under a standard acquisition distribution agreement. Any payments 
made to the producer from a movie’s revenues are generally referred to as 
the producer’s backend. A movie’s net profits are typically defined as any 
gross receipts that remain following the deduction of production costs with 
imputed costs (i.e. following the recoupment of production 
investments)(Cones, 1992). So generally speaking, in the allocation of gross 
receipts the distribution fee and the recoupment of the distributor’s direct 
and imputed costs would have the highest seniority, followed by recoupment 
of the producer’s direct and imputed costs. However, the producer would 
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typically retain net profits, basically meaning that once costs are fully 
recouped, gross receipts less the distribution fee would be claimed by the 
producer. In this context “net profits” is therefore a contractually defined 
term that may have a very different meaning from one movie to the next. 
The distribution fee represents a form of horizontal revenue sharing, while 
the layered recoupment of distribution and production expenses represents 
vertical revenue sharing. The recoupment order and declining seniority with 
which the various items are ordered is often referred to as a movie’s 
waterfall. 
 
Figure 6.3 - A simple waterfall recoupment diagram 
When acquisition distribution contracting is used, it is quite common for the 
distributor to pay to the producer an advance of the producer’s share of the 
gross receipts as defined in the particular contract’s value claiming 
provisions (1992, 1997). Such advances may be paid upon signature of the 
contract (what Brad refers to as a deposit in 6.2.1 above) and/or more 
commonly upon delivery. If an advance is paid, the distributor will then add 
it (plus interest) to the items it recoups before further payments are made to 
the producer. If a movie performs poorly, so that the gross receipts never 
reach the level necessary for the distributor to recoup the advance, the 
advance is normally still not subject to repayment by the producer (since at 
least theoretically, a movie can always generate more future revenues). 
Hence, these advances are also referred to as minimum guarantees. If the 
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advance or minimum guarantee is high in relation to a movie’s conceived 
revenue potential, the acquisition distribution deal may in effect resemble an 
outright negative pickup deal. 
The above description and discussion of the value claiming arrangements of 
a typical distribution acquisition contract are of course not complete, and 
several of the interviewees indicated that there will be a case-to-case 
variation from one movie to another. Box 6.7 below provides an illustration 
of such variations on the standard acquisition distribution contracting 
described above. 
 
Box 6.7 
Variety reports from the 2005 Sundance Film Festival (Harris, 2005b):  
The voracious 2005 Sundance acquisitions market was noteworthy not just for 
the number of big-money deals, but for the complexity of the deal-making. 
There are more splits rights deals and more backend guarantees. Films no 
longer sell to the distributor willing to pay the highest advance. It's no longer 
about being the first person to run through the snow with an open checkbook. 
Buyers and sellers are more like studio accountants. They have sophisticated 
reps, armed with reams of sales data, conversant in contractual arcana like 
gross corridors and break points. 
By the time the fest wrapped on Sunday, more than a dozen films found 
distribution deals; another dozen were well on their way.[…] 
"Financers are less willing to give up the backend as these movies work on a 
broader level," says UTA agent Jeremy Barber, who was part of the team that 
repped Craig Brewer's "Hustle & Flow" to Paramount Pictures and MTV Films. 
Although the Paramount deal calls for a $9 million advance, the studio's 
winning play was giving producer John Singleton two put pictures budgeted at 
$3.5 million each. 
"Filmmakers have become far more savvy about holding on to the upside," 
Barber says. 
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Some producers are building greater profit participation into their production 
budgets. Like the founders of InDigEnt, Paul Allen's Vulcan Prods. keeps its 
budgets down by asking cast and crew to take smaller salaries. Then, when it 
came time to sell the pic, William Morris Agency and Traction Media negotiated 
a smaller advance in exchange for significant gross participation. 
David Slade's "Hard Candy" went to Lions Gate Films, which agreed to give the 
filmmakers 20% of the pic's gross.[…] 
High-level Sundance dealmaking can be traced back to "The Blair Witch 
Project." In 1999, the fest's business culture focused almost entirely on the value 
of the advance. But when Artisan Entertainment and Summit Entertainment 
jointly acquired "The Blair Witch Project," the companies instituted a series of 
box-office bumps in an effort to keep down the amount of money they needed to 
pay up front. 
The film finally grossed $249 million worldwide and, after a long dispute during 
which Artisan seemed unwilling to pay, the Blair Witch team was very rich. 
Today, there's nothing accidental about the backend potential of Sundance 
deals. The total advances on last year's "Saw," "Garden State," "Napoleon 
Dynamite" and "Open Water" barely top $10 million, but the pics have earned 
$157 million in domestic release. All are expected to enjoy rich DVD afterlives. 
These newfangled deals may take longer to negotiate, but they seem more 
sensible in the long run. Historically, big advances haven't translated to big 
business. Buyers and sellers remember all too well the sad case of Miramax 
Films' "Happy Texas" ($10.2 million advance) or Castle Rock Entertainment's 
"The Spitfire Grill" ($10 million advance). 
Still, sometimes the magic doesn't work. Last year's grand prize winner at 
Sundance, Shane Carruth's "Primer," was acquired by ThinkFilm for North 
America shortly after the festival. The deal was weighted toward the back end, 
but the film grossed just $425,000. 
John Pierson, a former producer's rep whose sale credits include "Clerks," 
"Slacker," She's Gotta Have It" and "Roger & Me," still puts stock in the old 
approach to Sundance dealmaking. 
"Get it up front. That's your bond," Pierson says. 
But a new generation of dealmakers has come to the fore in Sundance. And it's 
no coincidence that Pierson isn't selling any movies this year. 
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Looking at some of the acquisitions referred to in Box 6.7: In the acquisition 
made by Lions Gate Films, a mini-major distributor, for the movie “Hard 
Candy”, the producer obtained 20% of the gross receipts, meaning that 20% 
payments are made to the producer from all gross receipts in the same 
manner as the distributor receives its distribution fee. In the industry, such 
allocations of gross receipts (horizontal revenue sharing) are generally 
referred to as gross corridors. As indicated in the article, obtaining gross 
corridors may be particularly important for producers relying on deferrals 
financing since it allows the producer to start the payments of contingent 
compensations earlier thus reducing the risk taken by cast, crew and service 
providers. In the acquisition of the movie “Hustle & Flow” by Paramount, a 
major studio distributor, the producer received an advance of USD 9 million, 
but in addition to that the distributor committed to distribute and finance 
production investments of USD 3.5 million for each of the producer’s next 
two movies. Such commitments are known as put pictures. Reference is also 
made to the acquisition of the movie “The Blair Witch Project”, by Artisan, 
a mini-major distributor, for domestic exploitation and Summit, an 
international sales company, for international exploitation. Here the advance 
was kept down by offering the producer a series of so-called box office 
bumps, more generally known as box office bonuses. These are additional 
lump sum payments made to the producer when the box office gross reaches 
certain predetermined levels. Such bonuses simplify the accounting as 
backend payments are triggered by revenue figures at the ticket sales level, 
which is relatively easy to verify, rather than by the accounting of the 
distributor’s gross receipts less a series of deductions.  
While not complete, the above discussion of value claiming arrangements in 
acquisition distribution contracting is sufficient for concluding that, first, 
these value claiming arrangements are far more complex than in outright 
negative pickup contracting (but less so when high advances are included), 
and second, that they therefore also add a layer of behavioral uncertainty 
based on potentially opportunistic behavior by distributor. 
Value Creation 
Turning to value creation issues, acquisition distribution contracting is at the 
outset similar to outright negative pickup contracting. The producer and 
distributor primarily contribute sequentially to a joint value in which the 
producer carries out all production transactions and finances the related 
investments, while the distributor handles all distribution transactions and 
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related investments. However, since the producer’s value claiming is now 
dependent on the performance of the joint product the distributor’s value 
creation becomes highly relevant to the producer. This is different than in the 
outright negative pickup case, in which only the performance of the 
producer’s own output (how well a movie plays at a market or festival) 
determines the producer’s value claiming in the form of an acquisition price 
(pointedly exemplified by the “Happy Texas” case, in which the producer 
claimed USD 10.8 million from its product despite the producer and 
distributor’s joint product ending up only generating USD 1.9 million at the 
box office).  
When using acquisition distribution contracting, the producer will be 
concerned with the distributor’s contribution to the value creation, or 
generally its treatment of the movie, which will always take place ex post 
contracting. Hence, the experience and ability of the distributor, as well as its 
ex ante commitments, become crucial elements to the contracting (Farber, 
2001b). First, commenting on commitment, Tom, COO at a major studio 
distributor, says: 
Tom: They [producers] will say to us we’re not gonna sell it to you 
unless you at least guarantee 20 million dollars in P&A. We have a 
movie called “[Title]” that’s coming out from [TV company], which 
is a sister company. They said to us “you can have the right to 
distribute, we will pay all the negative costs, all you have to do is to 
distribute it, but if you exercise your right to distribute you must 
spend at least 20 to 25 million dollars in P&A.” Perfectly legitimate. 
And we may say fine or we may not say fine.  
TG: Right, and these deals are done before the movies are actually 
produced? 
Tom: Yes, almost always. I mean it was with “[Title].” I shouldn’t 
say almost always. Sometimes the filmmakers wait until the film is 
finished, before they deicide how tough they’re gonna be. But in the 
case of “[Title]” it was an established property, already in 
television. They knew they had a built-in market, so they said: 
“We’re going to make a relatively inexpensive animated feature, but 
we want to know that we have a release date in the summer of next 
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year. You can have it, but you got to commit by such and such date 
to at least such and such amount of money”. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
So, a minimum amount of distribution investment on the distributor’s behalf, 
as well as a time frame for the release are two types of commitments sought 
by producers in this type of contracting. Even though one may argue that it 
follows implicitly from the investment commitment producers may 
furthermore look for an explicit commitment to a minimum width of the 
theatrical release. Julia, marketing executive at a mini-major distributor, 
says: 
There’s typically a minimum screen commitment and there’s a 
minimum P&A commitment. So just throwing out numbers: 1500 
screens, 15 million dollars. If we then as a distributor decide it 
would benefit us to spend another million and a half, or 2 million 
dollars, or 3 million, whatever that figure is – somehow the magic 
number – then that’s above and beyond contractually what we have 
obligated ourselves to. But we would make that decision in the hope 
to generate additional box office, and by generating additional box 
office then the hope is that we would generate the additional rental 
and sale on home video and DVD. 
 Julia, Executive VP Worldwide Marketing, mini-major distributor 
Moreover, beyond these quantifiable commitments, the distributor’s identity 
matters in acquisition distribution contracting. The producer may seek a 
distributor with experience in marketing and releasing a particular type of 
movie, or a distributor with a staff that has certain proven abilities. The 
importance of experience and ability is evident from the case discussed in 
Box 6.8. 
 
Box 6.8 
James, an independent producer, explains how a distributor’s identity and track 
record of a distributor is important to the producer, making reference to a 
specific studio distributor’s recent acquisition of a specific big budget movie 
(referred to as Case Studio and Case Title): 
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Sometimes there’s just some kind of robust reception to the film, a strong feeling 
of a common interest. Or, you know, their track record. [Case Studio] just got 
[Case Title] and one of their selling points was that they went to these guys and 
they said “[Title 2 – a big budget movie previously distributed by the Case 
Studio]”. “Look what we did with [Title 2] - 300 million dollars. If you want 
this movie to perform, how many people had a 300 million dollar movie this 
year?”  Say what you want, they did. And I think that when you’re making a 
movie that’s this expensive you have to realize that you need to be in 
somebody’s hands that can go out there and get every single dollar that’s 
available for this franchise, because there’s just way too much risk. So if 
somebody’s had a similar kind of movie and has done well with it, or whatever 
else – those are the things that you also have to think about. They understand 
this audience, they understand how to speak to this audience. You can make 
arguments about different kinds of studios and what they do best. And if you 
really took a step back you really could see a pattern of why certain movies do 
well at certain studios. It really has to do with their own sort of confidence and 
their own skill in particular areas or genres. 
  James, producer/President, independent production company 
Emilie, marketing executive at the Case Studio, comments on their acquisition 
of the Case Title: 
Emilie: Well, they went with us because they think that we can ... I mean, it is 
not so much the success that we had this year as much as it was our ability to 
market big movies. I mean that’s what we are known for – the ability to market 
“[Title 2]” and “[Title 3, another big budget movie]” and “[Title 4, another big 
budget movie]” and big movies. People better shopping around…, [Art House 
Title] is not coming here first as much as I’d like them to because my taste runs 
more to [Art House Title] than it does the [Case Title] with all due respect to the 
[Case Title] filmmakers. And they [the Case Title producer] met with every 
studio in town you had to go audition for this movie and they were sold on our 
abilities and the integrated nature of this company with on the [internet 
division] and ... well, we own [theatrical, home video and international 
distribution division] and we own the [TV Network] and we own [cable TV 
division] and we own these magazines [pointing to a stack on her desk]. You 
know, with our ability to cross-promote a big movie on many divisions without 
going outside the [parent company] family. So, I think it depends… again, we’re 
back to what your objective is. Most of the acquisitions are smaller made films. 
If you had Tom Cruise, chances are that somebody gave you the money before 
you made it. You didn’t have to round up the money, to make the movie, and 
shop it around for people to look at it first. They would have said: “You got Tom 
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As a result of the various value claiming and value creation issues pertinent 
to acquisition distribution contracting, the identification of the best 
distribution offer may be difficult, as they are likely to differ in nature, and 
the producer may have to make a more strategic decision about what aspects 
to emphasize in the same manner as distributors do when making the offers. 
Among distributors’ offers for a movie one may have the highest advance, 
one may have a gross corridor built in, one may have the biggest P&A 
commitment, and finally, another may not top any of the above but come 
from the most reputable distributor within the movie’s genre. Sometimes the 
Box 6.9 
Variety reports from the 2007 Toronto Film Festival (Hayes & Jaafar, 2007): 
Pact for "The Visitor," a movie widely admired since its Friday preem, closed 
late Monday. […] 
Overture [a distributor] prevailed over the handful of other bidders because it 
"made a large, muscular financial commitment to the marketing of the film," 
London [the producer] said, "way beyond what's normal for this kind of 
picture." 
Overture chief exec Chris McGurk said a fourth-quarter 2007 release was a 
possibility, but "we're going to speak to the filmmakers after the festival and 
decide what's best." 
Cruise, I’m gonna write you a check”. So the [Title Case] situations are rare, 
when a big movie all of a sudden makes itself available. That doesn’t happen 
very often. It’s usually the smaller movies that are shopping for a home and a 
lot of times those independent movies are more critical and less commercial. In 
which case if you had a choice between us and [mini-major distributor], you 
might go to [mini-major distributor].     
TG: Because that’s what they do? 
Emilie: Because that’s what they do, right. We do [Case Title]. 
  Emilie, President of Domestic Marketing, major studio 
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quantifiable commitments will be the deciding factor (see Box 6.9), but other 
times the distributor’s identity will be the determining factor. George, an 
independent producer, provides an example of the latter: 
George: Part of the decision to go to [Studio 1] and not to [Studio 
2] or vice versa – in this case with [Studio 2], not with [Studio 1], is 
listening carefully to what they have to say about what they saw, 
how did they perceive the movie, how they wanna sell the movie. 
And only when we feel comfortable, that they got the idea... As an 
independent producer you make a movie for a reason. And normally 
it’s not only that you fell in love with the script, you think you can do 
it differently. Because, you know, it’s all the same stories and [Title] 
is maybe the best idea of a movie that’s based on [author’s] book, 
from which a zillion [concept] movies were made. Why did I decide 
to do this one and then why would [Studio 2] decide to take it and 
release it on 2,800 screens? Because I saw something in it and I 
decided to do it, which would be different. Then you need the studio 
to see it eye-to-eye with you. If they perceived it as just another 
[concept] movie I probably wouldn’t make a deal with them.    
TG: So, it’s about having this common understanding or... 
George: The same level of excitement! 
[…] 
George: You wanna know how much money they’re gonna pay us 
[the advance], which is the contribution to the negative cost, and 
how much money they’re going to spend on releasing the movie – 
that they are willing to commit – and what will be the profit sharing 
between us. And then... […] Sometimes you are willing to take lesser 
amounts of money up front, if you think that the people that you meet 
and the studio, they are really excited about the movie and they 
know how to sell it to the public. 
 George, producer/President, independent production company 
From George’s quote, we also see that identity and commitments are closely 
linked. His ultimate concern is the value he will be able to claim from the 
movie, and this is dependent on the distributor’s value creation contribution. 
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This contribution may be signaled in terms of quantifiable commitments to 
distribution investments, width of the release, and so forth, but alternatively 
the producer may choose to emphasize trust based on its specific discussions 
with the distributor staff (“seeing eye-to-eye”), or based on the distributor’s 
past performance with similar movies. From the producer’s perspective, this 
reduces the performance uncertainty related to the distributor’s value 
creation in the same manner as, from the distributor’s perspective when 
contracting prior to production, experienced talent reduces the performance 
uncertainty related to the producer’s value creation. 
Contracting 
It follows from the above that both negotiations and drafting will be more 
complex for acquisition distribution contracting than for outright negative 
pickup contracting. More elaborate contractual safeguards will be required to 
govern the distributor’s commitments and rights. A standard acquisition 
distribution agreement (Farber, 2001b, c) will include provisions on the 
distributor’s guarantee to release and on its investment commitments. On the 
guarantee to release, the contract will first state exactly that - that the 
distributor cannot choose not to release the movie. It may furthermore 
specify that the release must be theatrical and include cinemas in specified 
key cities (usually including at least Los Angeles and New York) and 
foreign territories (if the contract includes international rights). A minimum 
number of screens for the opening weekend may also be specified, and the 
producer may also seek limitations in imposing certain release dates upon 
the distributor to ensure that the movie is released at what is believed to be 
the most opportune time for the specific movie (for instance, to fit a certain 
season as for winter-themed movies or to reach cinemas before New Years 
to hit the so-called award season and qualify for the Academy 
Awards/Oscars and other awards). The producer will also want to avoid a 
release date being pushed too far back, as its backend revenues will be 
accordingly delayed. And maybe most importantly for the producer, the 
contract will specify the minimum financial commitment from the distributor 
towards advertising and promotion of the movie – a minimum joint value 
contribution. It is not unusual that the committed marketing amount  is equal 
to somewhere between 50 and 100% of the movie’s production budget (see 
Sections 5.4.1 and 7.1.1). However, sometimes the contract may also include 
limits on these marketing investments in terms of the maximum amount that 
the distributor may recoup from gross receipts before the producer starts 
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receiving a share of the revenues. While relatively rare, this provision occurs 
when the producer has no gross corridor or box office bonuses so that its 
revenues in effect equal gross receipts less distributor’s fees and expenses. 
Normally, the distributor would not have any interest in over-investing into 
the marketing to the extent that it would hurt the movie’s bottom line, but 
some, including Cones (1997), argue that distributor sometimes engage in a 
practice known as buying a gross. The distributor will then excessively 
advertise a movie during its theatrical release, thereby increasing the box 
office and gross receipts, and thus also benefit from both increased 
distribution and advertising fees while being able to recoup its investments 
prior to the commencement of payments to the producer. If the excessive 
advertising should create a loss for the distributor from the movie’s theatrical 
release, the distributor would normally be able to cross-collateralize this loss 
against revenues from other media and territories, thus still avoiding an 
overall loss. The producer, being positioned last in the waterfall, will be the 
party most likely to take a loss from this practice.  
Contractual commitments from a distributor beyond a minimum distribution 
investment and a guarantee to release theatrically are however relatively 
rare. First, especially when contracting prior to production, there may be too 
many unknown elements for determining what the best distribution choices 
for a movie may be. Second, the distributor will normally seek total control 
over all aspects of distribution, contending that it is in the best position to 
determine how to maximize revenues, and furthermore that in a competitive 
and changing marketplace flexibility is required for an optimal release (as 
for instance with regard to picking the best release date, see Box 5.6). 
Producers may therefore often seek approval or consultation rights instead, 
usually having to settle with the latter. Ryan, marketing and distribution 
executive at a larger independent production company, elaborates: 
Ryan: It’s difficult [getting commitments from distributors]. Because 
when you’re selling... I mean…, let’s go back to “[Title]” with [star 
actor]. So when we did a deal with... We did a deal with a [major 
studio] on “[Title].” It was a hybrid. We did have [major studio] 
agree to release the picture, spending a certain amount of money, 
the certain minimum they have to spend. It was a certain number of 
screens they had to commit to release the picture on. We had certain 
approvals over the date, the dating of the movie, artwork, trailers,… 
things of that nature. Now, approval is very unusual, you know it’s 
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very difficult to get approval, because of your studio and they turn to 
you and say “wait, wait, wait. We just paid an x number of dollars 
[advance] for this movie. This is what we do; we’ve done for the last 
40 years. We’re more than happy to hear your thoughts, more happy 
to share with you what we’re thinking, but in the event of a dispute 
or something, we think this is what we do for a business. So 
therefore you really are not gonna tell us, ok, how to do anything. 
We will be happy to listen to your thoughts, but you’re not going to 
dictate or have a right of approval.” Unless you’re Steven Spielberg. 
A lot of it has to do with leverage. Leverage and stature. If you’re 
Tom Cruise, as a star, you have a lot of approval rights.    
TG: So, basically it is difficult for you, as a producer, to get any 
approval rights in the distribution process. 
Ryan: Yeah. You can have consultation, but it’s very difficult for a 
producer to dictate or tell a studio what to do or how to do it. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
The specifics of the value claiming arrangement will also have to be 
negotiated on a movie to movie basis. Farber (2001c) writes: “Undoubtedly 
one of the most important provisions in the agreement, the division of 
proceeds and basis for arriving at that division […] is the subject of 
extensive negotiations” (p. 1774). Acquisition distribution contracts are 
extensive documents, and the direct transaction costs of negotiating and 
drafting the definitions of gross receipts and the detailed allocation of these 
alone from scratch for each movie would in some cases be prohibitively 
high. Standard contracts and standard definitions are thus utilized. However, 
“standard” does not refer to any industry-wide standard, but to the contracts 
that have been developed by each company. Brad, CEO of an independent 
production company, says: 
I use a contract where we control the contract. I use a form that I 
developed over the years – I’ve been doing this for quite a while – 
that reflects the AFM [American Film Market] standard ideas, 
although drafted my way – actually the AFM-contract to some extent 
was based on my contract. And, of course, when you’re dealing with 
big companies, sometimes they insist on using their own contracts, 
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so then you have to react to them - like the studios will almost 
always use their form agreements rather than our form agreement. 
But for normal international licensing we use our forms. 
   Brad, CEO, independent production company 
As always, there is a relationship between ex ante and ex post transaction 
costs. Complex joint value claiming arrangements will add governance costs 
in terms of accounting and auditing. Shrinking ex ante negotiation and 
drafting costs may result in less complete contracts, and subsequently, more 
ex post disagreements and disputes. Too much rigidity in commitments may 
result in maladaptation. Approval and consultation rights may instigate ex 
post haggling costs, and so forth. The joint value claiming arrangements for 
the typical acquisition distribution contract in which the producer finds itself 
towards the bottom of the waterfall has been subject to many disputes and 
lawsuits, with the Buchwald v. Paramount case stretching over four years 
from 1988 to 1992, which was probably the highest profile and most 
analyzed. Box 6.10 below describes a more recent dispute originating from 
one of the Sundance acquisition distribution deals listed in Box 6.7. In this 
particular acquisition distribution contract the distributor also added 
commitments to the producer’s future movies to sweeten its offer, and it was 
referred to by Variety as an example of a trend towards more complex 
acquisition distribution contracting. The contract may however have failed to 
provide a precise definition of that specific commitment, as the producer 
later accused the distributor of “asserting self-imposed, non-existent 
conditions” and finally turned to the court to decide whether the commitment 
has been fulfilled or not. Apart from the parties’ direct legal costs, they 
suffer ex post transaction costs from a loss of the relationship and the 
maladaptation costs of not producing movies. 
In sum, complex joint value claiming arrangements that also demand 
safeguards with regard to joint value creation increase the requirements for 
transaction governance. Safeguards are added in the form of various 
contractual commitments and shared decision-making control (approval and 
consultation rights). This places acquisition distribution contracting towards 
the hybrid end of acquisition contracting on the market-hierarchy continuum 
(Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.4 - Positioning of acquisition distribution contracting 
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Box 6.10 
Variety reports on a dispute between the parties of a Sundance Film Festival 
acquisition distribution deal (Abrams, 2011): 
It was one of Sundance 2005's hottest properties. Amy Pascal demanded a print 
from Los Angeles, and John Singleton's reps readied memos to make an eight-
figure deal. Negotiations carried on late into the night of the screening, and by 5 
a.m., Paramount had beaten out Miramax, New Line and Focus to nab its prize: 
the urban crime drama "Hustle & Flow." 
Six years later, Paramount finds itself the target of a $20 million lawsuit over its 
hard-fought deal. 
In a complaint filed Wednesday in Los Angeles Superior Court, Singleton, who 
produced "Hustle & Flow," claims the studio reneged on its promise to "put" 
two lower-budget projects as part of its distribution pact. "The gist of the 'puts,'" 
according to the suit, was that Paramount would finance and distribute the 
pictures so long as their budgets didn't exceed $3.5 million each, from which 
Singleton couldn't take more than a 7.5% fee per picture. 
Par counters that Singleton didn't hold up his end of the bargain. 
"Paramount was hoping that John Singleton would produce two more pictures 
before his agreement with our studio ended in 2010, but that did not happen," a 
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6.3 Output Contracting 
Output contracting represents a hybrid transaction mode closer to hierarchy. 
Generally, these contracts are not made for single movie projects, but to 
cover all movies made by the producer, its output, within a certain time 
period or limited by a certain number of movies. Cones (1992) defines the 
output distribution agreement as “a contract between a feature film 
production company and a film distributor which provides that, so long as 
the films produced by the production company meet certain specified 
minimum requirements, the distributor agrees to distribute all of such films” 
(p. 350). That an output contract covers a number of movies does not imply 
that it cannot be analyzed in the perspective of a single movie project. A 
comparative analysis can still be made between the conditions offered a 
studio spokesperson told Variety. "Instead, he went on to direct 'Abduction' for 
Lionsgate. Paramount fulfilled all of its obligations and his claims have 
absolutely no merit." 
Singleton's suit says he turned down offers from other suitors -- at least one of 
which offered more up-front coin -- but ultimately pacted with Paramount and 
MTV Films through his Crunk Pictures shingle because the studio offered both a 
$9 million advance against the backend in addition to the two other films within 
the next five years. 
"Hustle" grossed $23 million worldwide. Court docs explain that 18 months 
later, Singleton facilitated the studio's acquisition of "Black Snake Moan," 
penned by "Flow" scribe Craig Brewer. 
"Unfortunately, when Crunk attempted to exercise its right to 'put' the two 
pictures to Paramount, Paramount began asserting self-imposed, non-existent 
conditions on the 'puts' that prevented Singleton from making the pictures," the 
suit alleges. 
"The only reason Singleton granted Paramount the distribution rights to 'Black 
Snake Moan' was because Singleton believed that Paramount would honor the 
puts and Singleton would be in business with Paramount for many years," 
according to the complaint. 
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single movie project under acquisition versus output contracting. An 
implication, however, is that the contract will always be in place prior to 
production. 
Output contracting is a relatively widely defined term encompassing some 
significant variance to value creation and claiming dimensions, and thus to 
contracting. It is therefore useful to break the case down into a set of sub-
cases commonly found in the industry. In Boxes 6.11 through 6.13 below 
Tom, COO at a major studio, provides brief descriptions and examples of 
three types of output contracting, or “producer partnerships” as he also puts 
it, used by his studio. These correspond to the three sub-cases used here, and 
are: First-look deals (Box 6.11), co-production financing deals (Box 6.12) 
and output distribution deals (Box 6.13). 
Among output deals, first-look contracting is the most common, but since 
the annual number of movies produced and distributed under a first-look 
contract is usually lower than under the two other types, the overall volume 
of movies is quite evenly distributed between the three types (Bing & 
Dunkley, 2003). 
 
Box 6.11 
Tom provides a brief description of a typical first-look deal: 
Another kind of deal is that we have a producing entity like [individual 
producer’s] company or producers around the lot. [Individual producer] 
produced “[big budget movie title]”, [another individual producer] who 
produced “[another big budget movie title]”. They are just employees for hire. 
They say “Are we producing the movie?” “Yes.” “Ok, give me a fee.” “Ok, how 
much?” “A million dollars.” “All right, you have a million dollars against 5% 
or 2% or 3% of the gross receipts from this movie.” Why would they get so 
much money? Because they brought the project to us. [Individual producer’s 
name] brought “[big budget movie title],” [another producer] brought 
“[another big budget movie title],” they get a participation because they 
controlled the property. But they are employees for hire. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
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Box 6.12 
Tom provides a brief description of a typical co-production deal: 
The second kind of producer partnership is that a company comes in like 
[production company] and they say to me: “Look we are creative partners and 
business partners, but mainly business partners because we will defer to you 
creatively,” and creatively the final question is who has the final right to say 
yes, or no, greenlight, no greenlight, change that screenplay or don’t change 
that screenplay. And we retain that right. And I have the sole greenlight capacity 
at [Tom’s studio] and don’t give it to anybody else. So we would say to 
[production company]: “We’re making the movie and we are going to determine 
exactly what is changed, what is shot, what the final shooting script looks like, 
who directs it, who stars in it. But you’re welcome to participate if you wish.” In 
that case, they come in and they say: “We’ll put up half the money if you’ll put 
up half the money, but we want an overhead fee tacked on to the budget to help 
us pay for our [production company] overhead.” We say “ok.” They tack it on, 
they pay half, we distribute throughout the world except [four territories], where 
they have very important distribution-ownership relationships, and they say “We 
need to distribute on those markets.” Then we say “ok.” So we get a distribution 
edge, because we charge 15%, let’s say, around the world. We say “You know 
what, we distribute it around the world, we carve off a distribution fee off the 
top.” So it really is not a 50-50 straight joint venture because we have a 
distribution edge. We distribute in more of the world than they do. So we have 
an edge before we have to split money because distribution fees come off the top. 
Then you might say “Well why would they do this?” Two reasons: One, don’t 
forget we put that overhead thing on there. Now they pay half of it and we pay 
half of it because it is part of the budget. But we do make a contribution to their 
overhead. But secondly and more importantly, they may not have the 
distribution advantages we have, but they do get into our [North American pay 
TV service] deal, our [UK pay TV service]deal , they have the power of our 
domestic video operation, they have the power of our advertising buying rates, 
they have the power of our print rebate. So they say to themselves “Jee whizz, it 
costs us 12.5% to let these guys distribute but it’s worth it to us to participate in 
those deals. We got more than 12.5%.” That’s why they do it. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
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Note that the output term is also used in licensing transactions. A distributor 
may for instance have an output deal with a pay television service under 
which the distributor is obligated to supply all its theatrically released 
movies and the pay television service commits to presenting these movies to 
a set of predefined terms. In Box 6.12 Tom makes reference to licensing 
deals of this nature that his studio has with pay television services in North 
America and the UK.  
6.3.1 First-Look Deals 
A first-look deal is a contract between a producer and distributor whereby 
the distributor provides financing and/or other assistance to the producer in 
exchange for the distributor having the right of first refusal for projects 
developed by the producer (Cones, 1992). The development and production 
transactions are carried out by the producer, but the financing for both is 
typically provided by the distributor, which also carries out and finances the 
distribution transactions. Hence, through the financing, the distributor gets 
more heavily involved at an earlier stage in each project. 
Many production companies have one or two key principals functioning as 
individual producers (project managers) on the movies they produce. For 
instance, Jerry Bruckheimer is the key principal of Jerry Bruckheimer Films 
(“Pearl Harbor”, “Black Hawk Down”, “Pirates of the Caribbean” and 
others) and Ridley and Tony Scott are the key principals at Scott Free 
(“Gladiator”, “Body of Lies”, “The A-Team” and others). In Box 6.11, 
Box 6.13 
Tom provides a brief description of a typical distribution output deal: 
Another type of producer relationship is exemplified by [individual producer’s 
name] and [his production company]. Now he comes in and says, “I want an 
output deal with you, will you agree to take up to eight pictures a year, no more 
than eight ever but no fewer than three. OK?” “I [individual producer’s name] 
will put up all the money, I am not asking [Tom’s studio] for anything, and you 
may distribute in the domestic marketplace but I’ve sold off international, and 
all I wanna pay you is the distribution fee. I don’t want any money. And you can 
charge me 12.5%.” That’s another kind of deal. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
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describing producers contracted with first-look deals, Tom refers to these 
individuals as his studio’s “employees for hire.” This statement reflects just 
how integrated this hybrid form of transaction is.   
Johnny is one of these key principals, and his production company has a 
first-look deal with a mini-major distributor. Johnny elaborates on his 
company and the basics of the contract: 
It’s myself and five people help me find the scripts, and assistance, 
and I’ve got a first-look deal with [mini-major studio], which means 
you can’t work anywhere else unless you show them the material 
first. And if they pass then you can work anywhere else. […] They’re 
paying you, they’re paying your staff, they’re paying for your offices 
and so on. There’s an expectation that you’re gonna deliver them 
material that they’re gonna want. Because they’re paying you a lot 
of money to see that material. So, there’s an expectation, that you’ll 
be calling them all the time and say “I have something for you to 
read.” And they essentially want to get that phone-call from you. 
[…] They’re advancing me certain monies against my producer fees 
and if I don’t make a couple of movies for them... When you have a 
deal like that it should in the end of the day cost the distributor 
nothing. Because they recoup the money that they have advanced to 
me. They set me up like this, but they’ll get it all back.[…] If you 
haven’t done any movies and they just paid you all this money, they 
don’t renew you deal. They’ll say “Buddy, that was the bad 
decision... So we’re not giving you a deal.” […] The reason why you 
do it is because... I wanna pay my development executive 150,000 
dollars a year, I wanna pay that guy 50,000 dollars a year and I 
wanna pay my assistant 50,000 dollars a year and I don’t pay that. 
[Mini-major studio] does. So, this is my company, but they pay 
everything. So, they pay my phone bill, they pay my Federal Express. 
They pay for the water you’re drinking right now. I don’t pay for it. 
It’s all these costs I don’t have to pay for. So, they help you to create 
a home to work from. And, you know, it costs maybe a million 
dollars a year, - that they put up. So you’re gonna have all of this 
and... I’m not gonna put up a million dollars a year cause I don’t 
have a million dollars a year. And I don’t get the profits from the 
movies like they do. So it wouldn’t make sense for me… it would 
really never make sense for me to personally bankroll all of this. 
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Cause I would never make financial sense because the only thing I 
get from my movies is my producer fee. I don’t get these other 
things. [Mini-major studio] gets all the profit. Whoever is financing 
the movie gets all the profits, so they can afford to pay for these 
things I can’t. 
  Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
The offices of Johnny’s company are also located within the office complex 
of the mini-major distributor with which it has the first-look deal. This is a 
normal arrangement for first-look producers and the reason Tom refers to 
them as “producers around the [studio]lot” (in Box 6.11) - they are located in 
office buildings and bungalows on his studio’s premises. 
While relatively rare, sometimes producers and distributors also engage in 
second-look contracting. These are contracts, similar to the first-look deals, 
between producers that have an output deal with a primary distributor on the 
one hand and a secondary distributor on the other. Hence, the secondary 
distributor gets the right of first refusal for all projects developed by the 
producer that the primary distributor passes on.  
First-look deals may be exclusive or non-exclusive. Johnny’s contract, 
described above, is non-exclusive so if his first-look distributor decides to 
pass on a project that his company has developed, he is able to take it to 
other distributors for an acquisition distribution contract and go ahead with 
production (his company does not have a second-look deal). However, some 
first-look contracts are exclusive, meaning that if the first-look distributor 
chooses to pass on a project, the producer cannot take it to any other 
distributor and the project will not be made. Exclusive first-look deals 
therefore represent more integrated hybrid transaction structures than the 
non-exclusive deals. Johnny comments: 
I’m like [name of first-look distributor]. But I can work elsewhere. 
Like for example: The guy whose offices are a couple doors down 
there, he is a producer and his deal is exclusive, which means he 
can’t work anywhere else. So, they’re paying him a couple of 
hundred thousand dollars a year, pay his assistant, he’s based in-
house. Basically, he’s here like an in-the-house production company. 
For I would just go: “Hey, give me an answer, you have five days 
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and I’m gone, you got five days to answer whether you want to do 
this or not. Buy the script or else I’m going away.” 
  Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
The project described in Box 6.5 was an example of this. Johnny’s first-look 
distributor passed on it, so instead of doing the movie as an all rights project 
for the first-look distributor, Johnny took it to a number of other distributors 
and financed it as a split rights project primarily through pre-sales financing 
with outright negative pickup deals. Under an exclusive first-look deal, 
Johnny would not have been able to do this. 
Sometimes contracts are designed as hybrids between the typical exclusive 
and non-exclusive forms. For instance, in a first-look deal between director 
Martin Scorsese’s production company Sikelia Productions and Paramount, 
a major studio distributor, Sikelia is able to take projects Paramount passes 
on elsewhere, but with Paramount then having an option to co-distribute and 
take a 50% ownership share in any such project (McClintock, 2006a). Other 
times, the producer-distributor relationship may be formally exclusive, but in 
effect non-exclusive if the production company principals take on other 
projects outside the context of their company. This is most common for 
talent that are also production company principals (Fleming & Garrett, 2007; 
Goldsmith, 2005; Snyder, 2006). 
From the vertical nature of the contracting, first-look deals are normally also 
all-rights deals in which the distributor controls all exploitation rights 
throughout the world. However, the distributor may choose to use a first-
look project for a horizontal co-production. For instance, “Titanic” was a 
project that came out of an exclusive first-look deal between Twentieth 
Century Fox, a major studio, and Lightstorm Entertainment, a production 
company in which writer/director James Cameron is one of three principals. 
Before greenlighting the project, Fox chose to structure it as a horizontal co-
production with Paramount, another major studio. The distributors both 
financed production transactions, and Paramount got domestic distribution 
rights, while Fox retained all international rights (Galloway, 1995; Laski, 
2001).  Furthermore, the horizontal dimension of a project’s governance 
structure may change during its execution as parties adapt to changing 
circumstances. “The Brothers Grimm” (2005, directed by Terry Gilliam) was 
at the outset structured similarly to “Titanic,” developed and produced by 
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Mosaic Media, a production company under contract with MGM, a studio 
distributor. MGM had a horizontal co-production contract with Miramax, 
another distributor, and the distributors chose to include the project under 
this co-production contract. MGM further agreed to assign much of its 
decision making control to Miramax, in effect giving the co-production 
partner control over the production. Miramax obtained domestic distribution 
rights to be released under its label Dimension, while MGM intended to take 
international rights, but retained this in the form of an option as control over 
the production that was assigned to Miramax. The production turned out to 
be riddled with problems and disputes between Mosaic (and director Terry 
Gilliam) on the one hand and Miramax/Dimension principals on the other. 
Consequently, while the movie was in post-production, MGM decided not 
exercise its option for international rights (only retaining a minor project-
investor position). Miramax was then left with worldwide distribution rights, 
but lacking a worldwide distribution network, it ended up selling off 
international distribution rights through distribution acquisition contracting 
on a territory to territory basis at the film market in Cannes (Rooney & 
Dunkley, 2004). Hence, due to a distributor’s various horizontal priorities, a 
project initiated and realized under a first-look deal may also in certain 
circumstances end up being subject to other forms of contracting towards the 
end distributor (see also Section 6.4 on layered contracting below). 
Value Creation 
Looking at joint value creation, the production and distribution transactions 
are carried out by the producer and distributor, respectively, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, and for acquisition contracting above. However, the essential 
difference in terms of value creation is that under first-look contracting the 
investments required for both the production and distribution transactions are 
covered by the distributor alone. Note that in Johnny’s case the distributor, 
in addition to all project-specific production investments, is also carrying the 
producer’s overhead costs, although these are subject to reimbursement from 
Johnny’s production fees. Sometimes, the monies allowed from distributor to 
producer are not separated into allowances for overhead and allowances for 
development. George, an independent producer who previously had a first-
look deal with a major studio, refers to them as “housekeeping deals” that 
pay for overhead and development. So, in these typical first-look cases, the 
producer does not have to finance any transactions, as all financing is 
handled by the distributor.  
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Distributors typically draw on their working capital (internal supply) to 
cover distribution transaction investments, but for production investments as 
required for their first-look deals, they may also draw on third-party or off-
balance sheet financing (outside procurement). Such outside financing is 
typically arranged for larger slates or bundles of movies so that one 
financing transaction may cover a substantial share of the production capital 
needed for more than one year of operations. The sources may be divided 
into two categories: First, financial co-producers contracted under co-
production financing output contracts (see Section 6.3.2 below) and, second, 
third-party investors. The line between these two categories may be thin and 
blurred, but generally entities that are not involved in any production 
transactions are described as third-party investors, while those also engaging 
in production transactions (for other movies), thus having production 
capabilities, are described as financial co-producers. The third-party funding 
from sources in either of these categories is often restricted in that investors 
establish a maximum cap of participation in a single movie (e.g. not more 
than 25% of production costs and not more than USD 30 million per movie) 
(Goldsmith & Hayes, 2008). Sources are diverse and vary with the climate in 
financial markets. For instance, international investment banks and hedge 
funds were particularly important sources prior to the 2008 financial crisis, 
after which some of these pulled out of motion picture financing, while 
private and corporate sources in the Middle East and India became more 
important afterwards (Szalai & Bond, 2009). An example of how a major 
studio arranges financing from a third-party investor is provided in Box 6.14.  
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Box 6.14 
Variety reports on a third-party financing source arranged for Paramount, a 
major studio (Gardner, 2006a): 
Paramount has closed a $300 million film financing deal with international 
investment bank Dresdner Kleinwort for production coin that will fund 30 films 
for the studio. 
Deal, dubbed Melrose 2, includes projects from Par's film divisions Paramount 
Pictures, DreamWorks, MTV Films and Nickelodeon Movies.  Not covered in the 
pact are specialty films from indie labels Paramount Vantage and Paramount 
Classics. 
While the deal is said to have just closed, money from Melrose 2 has already 
been put in play at Paramount to cover production costs on nine pics so far, 
starting with the March 2006 release "Failure to Launch." 
Other pics include "She's the Man," "Mission: Impossible III," "Nacho Libre," 
"Barnyard," "World Trade Center," "The Last Kiss," "Jackass: Number Two" 
and upcoming rollout "Flags of Our Fathers." Upcoming pics to fall under the 
fund are "Freedom Writers," "Norbit," "Shooter" and "The Spiderwick 
Chronicles." 
Melrose 2 is a follow-up financing arrangement to the 2004 Melrose fund that 
raised $225 million for 25 Paramount pics. That fund was arranged by Merrill 
Lynch. Dresdner Kleinwort arranged the senior notes on the first fund, paving 
the way for their lead involvement on the current pact. 
"We came up with a creative structure and added a few more bells and whistles 
than the last transaction, which made it very appealing to the studio and the 
investor community," said Laura Fazio, Dresdner Kleinwort managing director 
and head of media, global banking." We have great confidence in [Paramount 
Chairman] Brad Grey and the slate of films and that was reaffirmed by the 
investor community with this transaction." 
Current pact is similar in structure to 2004's $225 million fund, sources said, 
with money being used to fund a "substantial part" of the budget of each of the 
30 films in the slate with no exclusions expected.  
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Value Claiming 
Turning to joint value claiming, first-look contracts normally provide for the 
distributor to claim all revenues generated by the movie since, as Johnny 
points out above, the basic mechanism most is often that whoever finances 
the movie (production and distribution transactions) keeps the backend. 
Exceptions are made, however, and one typical exception is the one Tom 
refers to in Box 6.11 in which the producer claims a (minor) share of the 
gross receipts (horizontal revenue sharing), but where the housekeeping 
payments made by distributor to producer are seen as an advance on this 
share. Hence, the producer will not receive monies from the movie’s gross 
receipts until the distributor has recouped the full advance (plus interest) 
from the producer’s share (vertical revenues sharing).  
So, generally speaking, producer’s value claiming is in the form of the 
housekeeping payments. These distributor investments toward the 
producer’s overhead (which typically will include a fee to the key principal) 
and development costs will of course vary depending on the leverage of the 
producer relative to the distributor when the first-look contracts are 
negotiated. Among the more generous deals reported by Variety is a first-
look deal between director/producer J.J. Abrams’ production company and 
Paramount, a major studio. The five-year deal guaranteed the producer USD 
22.5 million: two million per year for overhead, another two million per year 
“draw” as an advance on J.J. Abrams’ producer and/or director fees, and half 
a million per year as a discretionary fund. At the other end of the scale there 
are first-look deals guaranteeing less than half a million per year, and these 
are often made as a first output contract between distributor and producer off 
the back of a successful movie for which the parties made an acquisition 
deal. Since this amount includes overhead support, some of the money 
provided to the producer is eaten up by costs added by and paid back to the 
distributor (office rental, etc.) Variety comments that some of these deals 
“don’t amount to much more than the right to pitch projects to the studio” 
(Berkshire, Brodesser, Dunkley, Harris, & Timothy, 2002; McNary, 2006).  
Contracting 
One will not find any standard agreement for a first-look contract, or for any 
other output contract, in the same manner as for acquisition contracts. 
Compared to acquisition contracts, production-distribution output contracts 
are relatively rare. They are not done on a per movie basis, but to cover all 
movies produced by the production company within a certain period. Most 
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contracts are made for a three- to five-year period, even though they 
sometimes may be as short as one year and as long as 15 years (McClintock, 
2006c). For the most prolific partnerships, one average length first-look 
agreement may end up covering as many as 20-25 movies. While rarer, first-
look contracts are sometimes limited by a certain number of movies rather 
than by a given time period, but then housekeeping payments are typically 
adjusted accordingly, and no longer determined on an annual basis. In early 
2012, Variety’s output deal overview (including first-look, co-production 
financing and output distribution types for major studio distributors) showed 
that there were a total of 155 such deals in force, and the peak registered by 
Variety was in 2000 when its list included 292 deals (Variety.com, 2012). 
However, while each contract is customized to its parties, there are some 
typical elements to their governance structure.  
First, the distributor, as the party putting production and distribution 
investments at risk, will typically have wide-ranging decision making 
control not only over distribution transactions, but also over the production 
transactions. Most importantly, the distributor will control production 
greenlighting, and by controlling greenlighting the distributor will also have 
de facto approval rights over the screenplay, budget, director, cast and other 
elements. How this plays out is illustrated in Box 5.2, in which it is the 
distributor that at the end of a long development process says, “Ok, let’s 
make a movie.” Michael, former chairman of a major studio and now head 
of a production company, describes the distributor’s decision making control 
under first-look contracting: 
[The distributor would] be funding all the development of the 
[production] company, they’d be funding the overhead, all the rest. 
Then they would say: “We like this picture, we don’t like this 
picture, develop this. OK, then hire this writer, make these changes, 
do this, get this director before we say yes. OK, now make the 
picture, make it within this price.” And you get a fee for producing 
the picture and some piece of the backend. You’d be an employee. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production company 
With authority over production transactions, the distributor will also be more 
involved in the operational management of the production. Reporting 
routines are established, with the producer reporting to the distributor, which 
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is not unlike the reporting of an in-house project manager to its company 
executives. Furthermore, beyond these reporting routines, the authority of 
the distributor will be recognized by important personnel such as the director 
and star cast, and they may thus bypass the producer and directly approach 
the distributor’s staff with their issues, thereby further involving the 
distributor in the operational management sometimes beyond what is 
intended by the contract (see Box 6.15).  
 
 
Box 6.15 
James, a producer, discusses the implications of the distributor’s decision 
making control over production transactions:  
I really think that studios sort of ruin producers, I really do, it’s kind of funny, 
‘cos I really think… You know they go out and support them, and they make 
deals with them and so on and so forth, but very few times do studios really 
support producers, because the producers are considered really to be like this 
expendable element on the movie. If I’m making a movie with Tom Cruise and 
I have the reputation I have of being a strong guy, a tough guy, blah blah blah 
and Tom Cruise and I just don’t get along. And on the fifth day of shooting, 
who do you think is gonna go home? It ain’t gonna be Tom Cruise! Once they 
go on camera it's all over with. Now it’s a matter of everybody getting along. 
Trying to figure out a way to get along, trying to figure out a way to make it 
work. Even though you have a conflict, part of the skill of the job is 
understanding and being able to recognize what kind of a creative 
environment is necessary to accomplish what you’re trying to accomplish. So I 
really think oftentimes the studios sabotage producers because they’re trying 
to play like the big shot, like the head of the studio stuff. And you have an 
argument with the director and the director will say: “Look, we can’t… I need 
an extra two days for the scene.” And you sit there and you talk to the studio 
and the studio says: “It’s not gonna happen. We’re not going to spend these 
two extra days.” And you say: “The reason why the director is suggesting that 
we need those extra two days is because of the following.” And you lay it all 
out, right. And you effectively communicate what the problem is, and they 
come to you and say: “Look, it’s not a matter of not understanding what the 
problem is, it’s a matter of we’re not gonna spend the money. So what you 
guys need to figure out to do is how you can communicate what you want to 
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While distributors have extensive decision making control over production 
transactions, they have no guarantee that the first-look deals will produce 
any project deemed worthwhile for the required production and distribution 
investments. Certain ex ante precautions may be taken. First, a distributor 
will most often only offer first-look deals to producers with a proven track 
record, which is seen as more likely to continue coming up with interesting 
projects. The producer’s experience and track record is often seen as a 
primary safeguard in first-look deals. Second, certain parameters may be 
incorporated into a first-look deal (as for instance the production budget 
range and genre) to steer the development in the direction of projects the 
distributor wishes to greenlight (Gardner, 2006b). However, producers and 
distributors cannot escape the performance uncertainty of the development 
transactions, and producers may not succeed with developing any projects 
receiving the greenlight from the distributor within the time span of a first-
look deal. In this case, the distributor will have no productions from which to 
recoup its housekeeping payments to the producer, and the deal will have 
failed to fulfill its purpose of providing movies to fill the distributor’s release 
capacity. The producer, on the other hand, will retain the monies received 
from the distributor and may therefore not incur any financial loss, but there 
will typically be a loss of reputation and relationship. As Johnny indicates 
above, such unproductive deals will not normally be renewed. Furthermore, 
even if the copyright ownership to the screenplay should be retained by the 
producer, the exploitation rights to the screenplay (including the rights to 
communicate in the scene in the number of days that we gave you.” And you 
say: “Fair enough.” You go back to the director and you say: “You know, I did 
everything that I knew how to do, but they don’t want to spend the money, and 
you know, at the end of the day it is their money. And at the end of the day we 
agreed to do it for this number of days and unless we can figure out a way to 
pull something from somewhere else, we gotta live with this.” And he says: 
“Fuck that bullshit, I’m gonna call the head of the studio,” and he picks up the 
phone, he calls the head of the studio and he says “blah blah blah” and he says 
exactly the same thing as you said and the studio’s guy says: “You know what, 
you’re absolutely right, go ahead and take the two days.” You might as well go 
home because now the guy thinks: You’ve fucked him and you didn’t tell them 
what was going on, you didn’t do this, you didn’t do that. 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
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create a motion picture based on the screenplay) may be controlled by the 
distributor, so the producer would often not be able to take any developed 
projects elsewhere upon the expiration of a first-look deal without buying 
back copyright and/or exploitation rights (Fleming & Gardner, 2006).  
The failure of a first-look deal to create any movies is not limited to deals 
involving relatively new and inexperienced producers. Even the most 
experienced may have such dry spells. For instance, in 2011 The 
Kennedy/Marshall Company, whose principals Kathleen Kennedy and Frank 
Marshall have a more than 30-year-long track record of successful movies, 
stretching from “E.T.” and the Indiana Jones-movies in the 1980s to the 
more recent “The Bourne Trilogy”, ”Tin-Tin” and “War Horse,” departed 
from a deal at Sony Pictures that did not produce a single greenlight in two 
years (Masters, 2011). From the producer’s point of view, this means that 
getting a first-look deal does not guarantee getting any movie made and 
distributed. Only in very rare cases involving experienced producers will a 
distributor commit to greenlighting a specified number of movies under the 
term of a first-look deal, which is then referred to as including put pictures 
into the deal (Harris, 2002a), possibly to win the producer’s contract in 
competition with other distributors. 
The safeguards built into a first-look transaction, primarily through the 
distributor’s decision-making controls, imply higher governance costs. 
Distributors must allocate human resources for supervision and making 
decisions, while producers must comply with the reporting system stipulated 
by the contract. Sometimes producers experience this as a significant effort. 
George, an independent producer who previously worked under first-look 
contracting, comments: 
You have much more freedom when you are independent. No, to 
work within a studio as a producer is a nightmare, because… Here 
is a script [George picks up a script]; [star actor] in a [concept] 
and so on and so on. I wanna work on the script. I think [star actor] 
is not that good for it so I can just talk to the director, “Let’s find 
somebody else.” I don’t mean it, but just as an example. I just can do 
it, say to the director “Over and out, let’s get somebody else.” At the 
studio you cannot make those decisions. You have to call the studio, 
even changing the side character, that’s, let’s say, a man. I want it to 
be a woman. He is written as a funny Jew. I wanna make him… 
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black, Chicano or whatever you want. You have to go to this 
executive and that executive and so on. It’s just a nightmare. 
 George, Producer/President, independent production company 
For productive first-look contracts, there will be ex ante transaction cost 
savings compared to acquisition contracting due to scale and scope 
economies for search, negotiation and drafting costs. Johnny discusses this 
aspect of his first-look deal: 
My deal with [first-look distributer] is that the first film I produce 
for them, I get x dollars and x backend; the second movie, I get x 
dollars and x backend, the third movie... It’s all negotiated. So when 
I sell them something, I don’t have to negotiate with them, I still 
know what my fee is. It’s pre-negotiated. So I made a deal with them 
for two years. […] We had one big discussion that covers years. […] 
So, you don’t have to start the relationship every time. […] 
Everything is pre-negotiated. So [first-look distributor] asked me if I 
wanted to make a movie for them a couple months ago. “We want to 
make this movie, will you do it?” OK. I started it the next day. My 
lawyer didn’t do anything. It already happened. 
  Johnny, Producer/President, pact production company 
In sum, one may conclude from the above that the hybrid governance 
structure of first-look contracting should be placed towards the hierarchical 
end of the market-hierarchy continuum (Figure 6.5). While several 
interviewees refer to producers working under such contracts as distributor’s 
“employees,” they clearly are not. The relationship is based on a contract 
between two companies and is thus defined by contract law. The “employee” 
reference does rather originate from the extensive decision making control 
typically granted the distributor within these contracts. Hence, in effect the 
distributor can to some extent control bilateral adaptation through fiat. 
Exclusive first-look contracts grant distributors further hierarchical controls, 
as it prevents producers from obtaining alternative distribution for any 
product it develops that the distributor does not greenlight.  
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Figure 6.5 - Positioning of first-look contracting 
6.3.2 Co-Production Financing Deals 
The co-production financing contracting between producer and distributor is 
similar to first-look contracting in that it is covers a number of movies (an 
“output”) and contracts typically run for a defined number of years. Also, as 
with first-look contracting, the distributor will typically not commit to 
distribute any project the producer brings forward, and the contracts may be 
exclusive or non-exclusive. Hence, with all these similarities, co-production 
financing contracts are sometimes referred to in the industry as just “first-
look deals.” Yet, a key difference is that under co-production financing 
contracting, investments for production and distribution transactions are split 
between producer and distributor. The split may be vertical, in which the 
producer would typically cover production investments and the distributor 
the distribution investments, or horizontal, in which the parties split both 
production and distribution investments. This key difference in the joint 
value creation between first-look and co-production financing contracts has 
implications for value claiming and transaction governance. Exactly how 
investments are split between producer and distributor varies from contract 
to contract, and this also creates variance in value claiming and governance.  
Value Creation 
In the example provided by Tom, the studio-distributor COO, in Box 6.12, 
the basic arrangement is a horizontal split in which producer and distributor 
each finance half of a project’s required investments, and that the gross 
receipts are split equally between them. This is quite typical for co-
production financing contracts, and so is the distribution fee that the 
distributor deducts off the top before revenues are split between the parties. 
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Less typical is the decision making control retained by the distributor, 
including the right to greenlight, and the final say on creative matters. Tom 
furthermore says that “We’re making the movie.” That means that in this 
particular case the producer is primarily a financial co-producer. The 
distributor therefore uses this co-production financing contract in 
conjunction with other first-look contracts, so that for each movie the 
production transactions will primarily be carried out by the first-look 
producer, while the financial co-producer contributes financing towards both 
production and distribution transactions via the distributor. The distributor 
has wide-ranging decision making control over the production transactions 
through each first-look deal, and it will typically also retain this control in 
contracts with financial co-producers. Distribution transactions are carried 
out by the distributor, but the required investments are partially financed by 
the financial co-producer. Financial co-producers will normally not have any 
decision making control in distribution transactions, but they may have 
certain consultation rights. Emilie, a marketing executive at the same studio 
where Tom is COO, comments on decision making in distribution 
transactions for the particular case in Box 6.12: 
We have a company that we are partners on a lot of movies called 
[production company name], which is more of a 50-50 partnership, 
where they’re with us every step of the way, but I make the majority 
of the decisions. I talk with them, I go over everything with them. We 
meet with them all the time but they don’t... In that kind of a deal, 
even though it’s a 50-50 financial deal... It’s more of a partnership. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
A similar, but more extensive, deal is described in Box 6.16. Here, the 
financial co-producer commits to co-financing every three out of four 
movies released by the studio distributor during the four-year term of the co-
production financing contract, estimated at approximately 45 movies.  
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Box 6.16 
Variety reports on an extension of a co-production financing contract between 
Relativity Media, a financing and production company, and Universal, a major 
studio distributor (Garrett, 2008): 
Under new four-year deal, financier's Relativity Capital subsidiary will funnel 
billions into studio's slate, providing a steady stream of coin to offset costs. 
Relativity will co-finance 75% of the studio's slate through 2011 under the 
arrangement 
This is Relativity's third co-financing deal with Universal and far more 
comprehensive than its previous two. Relativity's Gun Hill I fund co-financed 17 
Sony and Universal films, ending with "The Kingdom," although it was 
originally intended to cover 18 pics. It was followed by Gun Hill II, also 
intended to co-finance 18 pics from the same two studios. 
This deal is expected to cover 45 pics; each side can nix a certain number of 
projects from the arrangement. Universal, for example, might opt to retain full 
control over "The Mummy 3," although that decision has not been finalized. 
Unlike the previous two funds this one is not built around pre-selected pics. 
"It's more or less the entire slate," [Relativity’s founder and CEO]Kavanaugh 
said. 
U vice chair Rick Finkelstein said the deal's comprehensive nature was a big 
part of its appeal. "It's much simpler to have this in place," he said. "Now we 
can focus on the product and less on having to arrange co-financing." 
Chief difference in this pact is that Relativity will provide coin from its Relativity 
Capital subsidiary rather than rely on third-party investors. 
"The key focus for us is it's our own money," Kavanaugh said. "We're 
responsible: It's ours to win, ours to lose." 
Deal, unveiled days after Kavanaugh prevailed in the latest round of his legal 
battle with Michael Sitrick over earlier business dealings, provides U with a 
steady stream of capital for the bulk of its slate. 
"This co-financing model works for us on a number of levels," Finkelstein said. 
"It helps smooth earnings and it provides us with a lot of cash. Thirdly, it shares 
risk." 
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A co-production financing contract in which the producer acts as financial 
co-producer on some projects, but also covers key production transactions on 
others, is described in Box 6.17. As indicated by the article’s title, the 
primary function of this particular contract may be seen as being to co-
finance the distributor’s production and distribution investments for 25 
movies, but the contract also stipulates that projects developed by the 
producer shall be among the 25 movies. There is thus a put pictures 
provision for projects in which the producer carries out at least the 
development transactions. Also, while primarily a financial co-producer, the 
company’s executive staff includes experienced production executives, and 
this investment into human assets that are specific to production type 
transactions signals an involvement in the production transactions beyond 
the financing. 
 
Box 6.17 
Variety reports on a co-production financing contract made between Warner 
Bros., a major studio distributor, and Legendary Pictures, a production company 
that primarily will act as a financial co-producer (McClintock, 2005a): 
$500 mil pic fund feeds Warner Bros. 
WB, Tull tally pix for Legendary film slate 
Warner Bros. Pictures has made a deal with venture capitalist Thomas Tull's 
Legendary Pictures, which will invest $500 million in a slate of films they will 
jointly produce. 
Tull told Daily Variety that Legendary and Warners would be 50-50 co-financing 
Revolving nature means that Relativity Capital might have $400 million to $500 
million invested in U pics at a time. Subsidiary was formed in January with 
Gotham hedge fund Elliott Assoc., an investor in earlier funds. 
Although some have criticized Kavanaugh's earlier slate deals for their return, 
Universal has not been among them. In October, after "The Kingdom" bowed, U 
chair Marc Shmuger told Daily Variety the studio would do it again. 
"We didn't bat a thousand," he said, "but we did pretty damn well." 
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partners on 25 films to be produced over the course of the multiyear pact. The 
slate will include films developed by Legendary, which is backed by a cadre of 
private equity funds. 
Legendary's president is former TriStar production head Chris Lee, who is 
producing "Superman Returns" for Warners. 
Larry Clark, former chief financial officer of Creative Artists Agency, is 
Legendary's chief operating officer and CFO, while marketing vet Scott Mednick 
is chief marketing officer. William Fay, previously president of Centropolis 
Entertainment, is Legendary president of physical production. 
Warners and Legendary intend to team up on major event releases and varied 
genre films, which the studio will distribute. […] 
"From the very beginning, we built this plan specifically around private equity 
and returns," Tull told Daily Variety. "I myself would not have done this deal six 
or seven years ago. But the advent of DVD and overseas expansion of the box 
office has made the movie business much more attractive as an asset class." 
Tull, who serves as Legendary's chair and CEO, will move to Los Angeles from 
Atlanta. He was most recently director of media and entertainment holding 
company the Convex Group. 
Tull incorporated Legendary nearly a year ago, but kept the company's 
formation under wraps. 
"As the process of mounting, marketing and distributing motion pictures remains 
highly competitive and costly, we welcome the partnership of a skilled, 
knowledgeable team who can help us manage our risk as we continue to develop 
and produce top-quality filmed entertainment for the global marketplace," 
Warners president and chief operating officer Horn said in a statement. 
Legendary's investors include ABRY Partners, AIG Direct Investments, Bank of 
America Capital Investors, Columbia Capital, Falcon Investment Advisors and 
M/C Venture Partners. San Francisco-based investment banking firm Perseus 
acted as financial adviser to Legendary Pictures in the transaction. 
Legendary is expected to be based on the Warners' lot, where some execs noted 
that the cash infusion from private equity was a "vote of confidence" for the 
movie biz. 
Variety later reports further details on the contract (McClintock, 2005b): 
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From Boxes 6.16 and 6.17, one sees that the financial co-producers’ sources 
of financing are similar to those of the studio distributors’ third-party 
investors described in the previous section (and in Box 6.14).  
As briefly discussed under value creation in Section 6.3.1 above, financial 
co-producers are generally defined as such and not as third-party investors 
because they engage in production transactions. These may be within the 
context of the co-production financing contract, as is the case for Legendary 
Pictures (Box 6.17), or it may be outside, as is the case for Relativity Media 
(Box 6.16). Relativity, which is one of the industry’s biggest financial co-
producers, having co-production financing deals with two major studios, 
Sony and Universal, also has a so-called “single-picture business” in which 
it finances and produces movies that are contracted to distributors under 
acquisition contracting on a movie-to-movie basis. Under its co-production 
Blasting onto the scene, recently formed Legendary Pictures is putting up no less 
than half the production budget for Warner Bros. Pictures' "Superman Returns" -
- as well as having footed half the bill of "Batman Begins." 
[…] Legendary and Warners will split all revenue streams equally after the 
studio recoups costs. Warners will handle worldwide distribution. […] 
When Warners and Tull announced their pact in late June, all they said was that 
Legendary planned to invest $500 million in 25 pics over the next five years, 
suggesting Legendary might attach itself to a series of smaller projects. 
Revelation that Legendary is co-producing such tentpole pics as "Superman" 
[production budget estimated to USD 209 million] and "Batman" [production 
budget estimated to USD 150 million] suggests that the frosh production and 
financing company is confident the pool of money will grow to be much more 
than $500 million as returns are reinvested, explaining why Legendary insists it 
still will have enough money to fund the full, 25-pic slate. […] 
Unlike other private equity fund deals, such as the $230 million fund at 
Paramount, Legendary is an active investor, meaning it considers itself a full 
producing partner, involved in all stages of the process, including budgeting, 
casting, greenlighting, marketing and merchandising. 
In 2007 the co-production financing contract was extended to last through 2012, 
with Legendary Pictures increasing its investment fund to USD 1 billion 
(McClintock, 2007). 
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financing contracts, Relativity is not involved in the production transactions, 
but for the single-picture business it is also creatively involved, and these 
transactions are supported by a specialized and experienced production team 
within the company, i.e. assets specific to production transactions (Siegel, 
2008a, b). 
Finally, there are co-production financing contracts in which the producer is 
carrying out all types of production transactions in addition providing 
finance for the required investments. These are the most interesting co-
production financing contracts in terms of representing a sub-case in this 
study since the producer here operates as the sole producer and not in 
conjunction any other producer on a specific project. In these contracts, the 
financial split will typically be vertical. An example is provided in Box 6.18, 
described by Michael, who is chairman and CEO of a production company 
that has this type of co-production financing contract with a major studio 
distributor.  
 
Box 6.18 
Michael, head of a production company, talks about the financing and 
production of their movies under the co-production financing contract with a 
major studio distributor: 
Michael: We finance all our company. We finance all our development, all of 
our overhead, all of our infrastructure. Everything. All of our productions. [The 
output distributor] just gives us an advance on each picture that they accept. 
[…] 
TG: At the time you take a project to [the distributor] and they accept it, they 
give you an advance that you use as a part of the production financing, is that 
correct? 
Michael: It would be used as a part of production financing, yes. 
[…] 
TG: Where do you get the production financing from? What are your sources? 
Michael: We have equity in our company, which is a piece. We have the 
domestic advance and each of the partners internationally provide us with an 
advance based upon the percentage of the budget that their territory is 
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In Michael’s contract there are no housekeeping payments, as in the first-
look deals. All investments required for development transactions are carried 
by the producer. Investments for the production transactions are carried by 
both the producer and distributor. The distributor’s contribution is made in 
the form of an advance which the distributor recoups from its gross receipts 
before any of its revenues flow to the producer, not unlike the use of 
advances described for the acquisition contracting above except in Michael’s 
case advances are paid prior to production and not upon delivery. The 
producer’s contribution to the production investments has two main sources: 
Some is drawn from the company’s equity (internal supply) and some comes 
from international partners (outside procurement). These international 
partners that Michael refers to are distributors in several foreign territories 
with which the production company also has output contracts. Michael’s 
company uses these advances for partial production financing in a similar 
way as distributors’ advances are used for pre-sale financing under 
acquisition contracting (see Box 6.5), with the exception that these 
distributors are already contracted and committed. Michael thus benefits 
from search, negotiation and drafting scale economies in these foreign output 
responsible for. They provide it to us and we take it to the bank and bank it. 
[…] 
TG: When you take a project to [the distributor] and they accept it, how does 
[your company] work with [the distributor] from that point on? 
Michael: We don’t work with [the distributor]. We make the picture ourselves, 
finance it, develop it, cast it and manufacture it so to speak. They sometimes 
don’t even see the film until the rough-cut or the fine-cut of the film and that’s it. 
That doesn’t mean... There are some films that we’re involved with them, that 
are more their films, which they have avgreater degree of control over. But in 
the main, our films, the ones that we finance, we maintain the requirement to 
make them, complete them, risk financing of them, package them, everything. 
TG: You’re really a quite independent company then. And this goes hand in hand 
with the way that you finance your pictures yourselves. 
Michael: Exactly. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production company 
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deals in a similar fashion as described by Johnny for first-look deals above. 
So, to obtain the financing for its part of the production investments 
Michael’s company is therefore dependent on making the co-production 
financing contract with the domestic distributor a split rights type of 
contract. Without retaining exploitation rights to foreign territories in which 
it can make separate output deals with local distributors, Michael’s company 
would not have been able to raise its share of the production financing in the 
way it does. However, not all co-production financing contracts for 
producers carrying out production transactions are as dependent on split 
rights as Michael’s. In a very similar contract between Pandemonium, a 
production company, and Disney, a major studio distributor, the distributor 
takes all exploitation rights, excluding only the Spanish and Japanese 
territories, as well as Italian and domestic free-TV rights, to be retained by 
the producer. Pandemonium must therefore draw on different sources of 
finance to cover its production investments, to which Disney only 
contributes a minor share. Consequently, Pandemonium raised USD 370 
million in debt and equity financing with the aim to co-finance 15 to 20 
movies over the contract’s five-year term. Since the senior debt component 
of the funds would be replenished over the course of its term as a revolving 
securitization, the funding allowed Pandemonium to contribute a total of 
about USD 1 billion in production financing under the contract (Brodesser & 
Diorio, 2003; Harris & Dunkley, 2001). A similar example is provided in 
Box 6.19. Here, Dreamworks, a producer, carries out and finances all 
production transactions, and the distributor, Disney, carries out and finances 
all distribution transactions. However, Disney is also providing debt 
financing, which together with other debt financing from a bank syndicate 
and equity from a corporate investor provide the financing necessary for 
Dreamworks to cover its production transactions.  
Unlike in the example provided by Tom in Box 6.12, Michael’s production 
company does not provide any financing for the distribution transactions 
(and neither does Pandemonium nor Dreamworks). These are carried by the 
distributor alone, and the distributor recoups these off the top (following the 
deduction of its distribution fee and prior to recoupment of its advance). 
Accordingly, the distributor retains decision making control for these 
transactions, but only while working closely with the producer. Michael 
comments on the producer’s involvement and distributor’s control: 
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We are very much involved: Coordinating the release date and the 
marketing planes [between territories]. They [the distributor] have a 
high degree of participation and involvement and some areas of 
control over that segment of the... […] They would control the final 
decision on the release date of the film, for example. Or final control 
of how many screens they would arrange initially, domestic, and so 
forth. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production company 
 
Box 6.19 
Variety reports on a co-production financing contract between Dreamworks, a 
producer, and Disney, a studio distributor (Siegel & Graser, 2009): 
Disney has officially added DreamWorks to its Magic Kingdom. 
The Mouse House inked an exclusive long-term distribution pact with 
DreamWorks over the weekend. Accord will add six more pics to Disney's 
release schedule beginning in 2010 and pairs Steven Spielberg with the family-
friendly studio. Overall, Disney will distribute 30 DreamWorks pics through the 
Touchstone banner over the next five years. 
Studio's annual output will now grow to 20 pics per year -- a dramatic departure 
from its cost-cutting strategy, instituted in 2006 to reduce its overall annual slate 
to some 12-15 films. 
Under terms of the new deal, Disney will handle distribution and marketing for 
DreamWorks' titles through its Touchstone banner, collecting 10% of the gross 
of each pic. 
It will also retain homevid and TV rights for the films, outside of India [home 
territory of Dreamworks equity investor Reliance Big Entertainment], and cover 
overhead costs for DreamWorks, which will remain based on the Universal lot. 
[…] 
Under the deal, Disney will provide a much-needed bridge financing loan to 
DreamWorks, which has had trouble raising money to match a commitment from 
Mumbai-based Reliance amid the worsening global credit crunch. 
DreamWorks said it is halfway to raising the $325 million it needs to take 
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advantage of an additional $325 million from Reliance -- both figures have 
already been downsized from original goals of $700 million in loans and $500 
million from Reliance. 
The Disney loan (the amount was undisclosed) will help DreamWorks reach that 
goal and enable it to continue operating as a major production shingle at a time 
when belt tightening is eliminating thousands of jobs in Hollywood. 
For Disney, outside of the influx of creative talent, more pics on its sked means a 
greater opportunity to utilize the impressive distribution and marketing machine 
it set up worldwide but hasn't been able to exploit given its smaller slate. 
"The DreamWorks deal gives Disney the opportunity to leverage its global 
infrastructure without incurring further financial risk," said Walt Disney Co. 
topper Bob Iger, who has had a long relationship with DreamWorks execs after 
pairing with them to launch DreamWorks TV in 1994 while at ABC. 
A separate report confirms that Disney would cover all distribution investments 
(P&A) under the contract (Siegel, 2009). 
The Hollywood Reporter provides further detail on Dreamworks’ financing 
(Diorio, 2009): 
[…]DreamWorks on Monday announced that it has concluded the arduous 
process of rounding up a total $825 million in corporate financing for the 
reborn film company. That sum includes a $325 million JP Morgan-led bank 
syndication, a matching amount from DreamWorks principal Reliance Big 
Entertainment and a $175 million commitment from distribution partner Disney. 
[…] 
In a recent interview, Snider succinctly summed up the business and creative 
aims of the reincarnated studio. "Commercial, quality entertainment is the 
mantra," she said. 
In other words, don't expect any art films or limited releases, as 
DreamWorks begins to pump movies through Disney's distribution 
pipeline. Its agreement with the Burbank studio also provides for TV and 
home entertainment distribution of its film titles. 
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Value Claiming 
Joint value claiming under co-production financing contracting most closely 
resembles that of a split rights acquisition distribution contract for a single 
project (see Section 6.2.2). From its gross receipts the domestic distributor 
will typically deduct a distribution fee (usually in the 12-15% range) off the 
top. If the distribution investments are split between producer and distributor 
(horizontal splits, see Boxes 6.12 and 6.16), revenues are normally also split 
directly following the distribution fee deduction. If the distributor covers 
distribution investments alone (vertical splits, see Boxes 6.17, 6.19 and 
Michael’s case), it will then typically deduct an amount equal to its 
distribution investments, which may also include interest and other imputed 
costs (see Figure 6.6 below). If the distributor also has paid an advance to 
the producer (as in Michael’s case) this advance, plus possibly further 
imputed costs, will typically also be deducted before cash flows to the 
producer. How far upstream in the waterfall the producer is positioned will 
greatly depend on the bargaining power between the parties to each 
individual contract, but generally those which co-finance distribution 
investments in addition to production investments will be placed further up, 
while those which only co-finance production investments will find 
themselves further down. A horizontally split finance will typically be 
reflected in a horizontally split waterfall, while a vertically split finance will 
result in a vertically split waterfall but follow the industry’s usual “last in, 
first out” principle. 
In addition to its share of the gross receipts, the producer may also receive an 
overhead or production fee which is paid out of each project’s production 
budget. For producers carrying out production transactions, such fees are 
always included, but they may also be included for financial co-producers 
(as seen in Box 6.12). 
In some rare cases, the distributor may also make housekeeping payments 
towards the producer’s overhead (Box 6.19). 
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Figure 6.6 - Simple waterfall diagrams for vertically and horizontally split 
contracts 
For some split rights co-production financing deals, like for Michael’s 
company, the producer’s possibly most important source of value claiming is 
the foreign territories that are not directly tied up in the production financing 
through output deals. These are territories the producer, or its sales agent, 
can sell to local distributors through acquisition contracting (outright 
negative pickup or acquisition distribution deals), and these revenue streams 
then belong exclusively to the producer. Control and ownership of the 
exploitation rights for these territories will typically represent an important 
part of the producer’s safeguard for its equity (internal) financing.    
Contracting 
With each party putting up part of the part of the project financing, both will 
seek safeguards to protect their highly project-specific investments and the 
nature and combination of these safeguards will vary from contract to 
contract, following the variations in the contributions to the joint value 
creation. Looking first at decision making control, and starting with the 
production transactions, control may rest with the distributor as in the case at 
Tom and Emilie’ studio presented in Box 6.12. Here, the investments are 
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split horizontally 50/50 between the parties, and the producer is a financial 
co-producer not carrying out the transactions. However, financial co-
producers will typically have consultation rights and stay involved with the 
production throughout (see Boxes 6.16-17). Hence, the financial co-producer 
may safeguard its investments by investing in personnel with production 
expertise, i.e. human capital specific to the production transactions. In 
Michael’s case (Box 6.18), and this is typical for vertically split deals, it is 
the producer that has decision making control over the production 
transactions, even though the distributor contributes to the investments. 
However, the sharing of investments only starts following the greenlighting 
of a movie. The development transactions, for which product uncertainty is 
the highest, are financed by the producer alone. In Michael’s case, it is also 
the production company that carries out the production transactions. 
Furthermore, in co-production financing contracts that involve advances 
from the distributor used towards production investments, the distributor 
may seek provisions for cross-collateralization between projects. Hence, if 
one movie should underperform in the market to the degree that the 
distributor is not able to recover its advance, its loss may be recovered from 
better performing projects under the same contract.  
While Michael’s co-production financing agreement primarily provides for 
the producer to finance production transactions (less the distributor’s 
advance), the producer has an option to also participate in some projects in 
which the distributor finance production. Michael stresses the difference in 
decision making control between these and their standard co-financing 
projects: 
We have a couple of projects involved with more… traditional studio 
finance aspects. But in that case you’re a form of an employee. 
Independent boy, but you’re a boy. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production company 
The greenlight decision will often be shared between producer and 
distributor in some form. In Michael’s case it is his company that makes the 
decision, but the distributor has the option not to participate (and thus also 
not provide any advance). These projects the producer may then take to any 
other domestic distributor. This resembles non-exclusive first-look 
contracting. In Tom’s case with the financial co-producer (Box 6.12), it is 
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the distributor that greenlights projects, and often in such horizontally split 
cases it is the producer that has the option not to participate. In the extensive 
co-production financing contract between financial co-producer Relativity 
and studio distributor Universal (Box 6.16), the contract intended to cover 
most of the distributor’s movies, but as an exception each party is given the 
option to exclude a certain number of movies. Usually, in less extensive 
contracts, a financial co-producer and the distributor will negotiate ex ante 
which of the distributor’s movies the producer shall participate in, as in 
Relativity and Universal’s prior contracts. The distributor may for instance 
offer participation in a selection of upcoming movies, and from this selection 
the producer will choose which it wishes to co-finance (Laporte & Snyder, 
2006). According to Emilie, marketing executive at the same studio as Tom, 
distributors will often not offer but try to exclude projects for which they are 
highly confident about a positive result, such as popular franchises and 
sequels. In some rare cases the producer may control the greenlight even 
when the distributor is covering a significant share of the production 
investments without leaving any option for the distributor not to participate. 
A co-production financing agreement between Revolution Studios, a 
producer, and Sony, a studio distributor, included this allocation of 
greenlight control (Laporte, 2006b). This contract, however, was a result of 
competitive negotiations between Revolution and several distributors at a 
time when the apparent talents of Joe Roth, Revolution’s founder, for 
picking and producing successful movies were in great demand. He had just 
stepped down from a successful run as head of Disney, a major studio 
(Lyons & Goldsmith, 2000). Furthermore, the contract was extensive in that 
it also included as a commitment on the producer’s behalf to produce a 
minimum of 39 movies during its six-year term, thus supplying a significant 
share of the distributor’s release slate. The competitive environment in 
which the contract was negotiated, and its extensive reach, may help explain 
the unusual delegation of greenlight control.  
Under co-production financing contracts, it is not uncommon for the 
distributor to commit to a certain number of put pictures, which ensures the 
producer that a minimum number of the movies it (co-)finances will be 
marketed and released by the distributor. In some rarer cases the distributor 
commits to releasing all movies (see Box 6.19), but this is more typical for 
output distribution contracts. When no put pictures are contracted, the deals 
will typically be non-exclusive, since it would be unacceptable for a 
210 
 
producer financing its own development transactions and with funds for 
production transactions risking that the distributor in effect prevents any 
movies from being made by rejecting all for distribution or greenlight, as 
distributors would be able to do under exclusive first-look contracts. 
Copyright ownership will normally be taken by the producer under vertically 
split co-production financing contracts. It is the producer that finances the 
initiation of the projects and the origin of the copyrighted properties through 
its development transactions, and the distributor’s contribution to the 
production financing, if any, is typically defined as an advance. In 
horizontally split contracts in which the producer is a financial co-producer, 
ownership will typically be shared between producer and distributor. 
Some more closely integrated alliances between producers and distributors 
are created by combining a co-production financing contract with shared 
equity. Typically, the distributor will take a minority equity stake in the 
production company against an investment in an existing company or co-
founding a new production company with individual producers. An example 
of the first is a co-production financing alliance between Fox, a major studio, 
and, New Regency, a producer, made in 1997. Here, a co-production 
financing contract with a 15-year term was joined with the distributor 
investing USD 200 million against a 20% ownership share in the well-
established production company. In line with the equity partnership and the 
contract’s long term there was also significant flexibility built in with regard 
to the producer’s option to co-finance or fully finance its movies (Petrikin, 
1997). Hence, it could be used as both a co-production financing and an 
output distribution contract. The Sony-Revolution alliance discussed above 
had a similar equity structure between distributor and producer. An example 
of the distributor participating in setting up a new production company is 
found in the alliance between Illumination, a producer, and Universal, a 
major studio. In 2008, the distributor offered Chris Meledandri, who was 
then President at Fox Animation, the animation division of a major studio, to 
set up a new co-owned production company to provide the distributor with 
family-friendly movies under a co-production financing contract. The 
distributor furthermore took the lead in identifying and bringing in third-
party investors for the new company so that it could contribute to the 
financing of its movies (Fleming, 2008b). In some rarer cases, the producer 
may also take an equity stake in the distributor, but these are then 
independent or mini-major distributors (Zeitchik, 2009b). 
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In sum, co-production financing contracting represents a lesser integrated 
form of output contracting than first-look contracting. As the parties share 
highly project-specific investments, this is reflected in more shared control 
in the contracting. Again, exclusive contracts represent a higher degree of 
integration than non-exclusive contracts. Furthermore, contracts supported 
by shared equity are also more integrated, as they give one party ownership 
control and/or supervision of the other (Figure 6.7). 
 
Figure 6.7 - Positioning of co-production financing contracting 
6.3.3 Output Distribution Deals 
Output distribution contracting is similar to the other forms of output 
contracting discussed in the two previous sections in that it covers a number 
of movies (an “output”), contracts typically run for a defined number of 
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difference is again in joint value creation: Under an output distribution 
contract, the producer will be responsible for all investments, including those 
required for a project’s production and distribution transactions. An example 
is provided by Tom, COO at a major studio, in Box 6.13 above.  
While there are variations among output distribution deals, they vary less 
than co-production financing deals. Differences between deals are primarily 
found in how marketing transactions and distribution investments are 
organized. 
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investments required for production and distribution transactions. This is 
typical for output distribution contracts; it is primarily what defines them as 
a separate category of output contracts. However, while the producer is 
responsible for distribution investments, it may be the distributor who 
provides the cash flow on the producer’s behalf. Tom explains: 
When [head of the production company] comes in [with a movie], he 
has already paid for the cost of making the movie, he has paid for 
the negative, now he is responsible for P&A [distribution 
investments] also. But we advance it. So we say, “You know what, 
his move cost 35 million dollars, we’re advancing 25 in P&A.” What 
are the odds that we will not recoup 25 million from all of domestic 
theatrical, home video, pay-television, airlines, DVD? We feel very 
comfortable. We have never failed – on “[title of underperforming 
movie]” we made 9 million dollars. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
In other words, since distribution investments are recouped prior to 
production investments in a movie’s waterfall, the distributor generally 
assesses the risk associated with the investments required for its own 
distribution transactions to be low enough for providing a cash flow loan to 
the producer covering its own out-of-pocket distribution costs for a movie. 
Imputed distribution costs do of course not need to be cash flowed, so the 
amount cash flowed may be lower than the amount recouped. And again, 
since these are multi-picture contracts, the distributor may also include 
cross-collateralization provisions, thereby allowing it to recoup any 
unrecovered advances from other more successful movies. So while the 
producer is responsible for the distribution investments under output 
distribution contracts, the distributor will typically advance the monies 
required (Harris, 2002b), thus representing one source of financing for the 
producer. 
Under distribution output contracting it is not common for the producer to 
raise project financing, but rather to raise corporate finance sufficient to 
cover the investments anticipated under the contract. One may say that the 
production company becomes the project company (for this slate of movies). 
In this context, the producer’s other sources of financing (used in addition to 
distributor advances) vary and are usually a mix of equity (internal supply) 
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and debt (outside procurement), which is similar to that discussed for co-
production financing contracting above. Some producers are primarily debt 
financed, as in the Box 6.20 example in which the projects and thus the 
lenders’ collateral are based on intellectual properties (comic book 
characters) that are well established in the market, which may signal less 
uncertainty. Others are primarily equity financed, as in the Box 6.21 
example in which the projects are primarily original and the production 
company is also relatively new, which may signal a higher degree of 
uncertainty. For these two extreme examples, financing governance 
structures therefore seem to follow TCE predictions (Williamson, 1988). 
Production transactions are all carried out by the producer, while distribution 
transactions are split between the producer and distributor or carried out by 
the distributor alone. Hence, in the industry, output distribution contracts are 
sometimes referred to as rent-a-distributor and rent-a-studio deals. In the 
example provided by Tom in Box 6.13, the distributor carries out these 
transactions under the supervision of the producer. The producer “rents” the 
services and expertise (assets specific to distribution transactions) from the 
distributor, rather than integrating similar assets into the production 
company. However, to supervise the distribution transactions the producer 
also needs experienced distribution staff, so producers operating under 
output distribution deals will typically have its own marketing and 
distribution executives supervising and collaborating with the distributor’s 
marketing and licensing divisions. Alternatively, the producer may use 
outside procurement by hiring such services from specialized movie 
marketing consultancy firms, which are typically run by former studio 
marketing executives (Graser, 2008).  Emilie, marketing executive at the 
same studio where Tom is COO, comments on the collaboration with 
producers under output distribution contracts, using the same example as 
Tom in Box 6.13: 
And certain relationships that we have are straight distribution 
deals. For example a company called [producer]. We are their 
distributor and their marketer. They fund their own movies, both the 
negative cost and the P&A cost. So we execute their marketing 
campaign and conceive their marketing campaigns. It’s not my 
decision at the end of the day. I say, “You should spend x amount of 
dollars to open this movie. And you should target this audience and 
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you should do this and this”. And they think that they only wanna 
spend this much. It’s their money. They make the decision. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
Under some output distribution contracts the producer also carries out the 
marketing transaction, leaving only the licensing transactions to the 
distributor (Hayes, 2007; Mohr & McClintock, 2006). This requires the 
producer to make further overhead investments in assets specific to 
marketing transactions unless it chooses to outsource the job to a 
consultancy rather than to the distributor, which may be difficult as 
consultancies primarily are set up to work with the distributor’s marketing 
departments rather than as a replacement. However, if integrated into the 
production company, it gives the producer full control over all transactions 
from development through marketing. Under these contracts, the distributor 
would normally not advance marketing investments.  
 
Box 6.20 
Los Angeles Times reports on a non-exclusive output distribution deal between 
Paramount Pictures, a major studio distributor, and Marvel Studios, a producer 
(Eller, 2008a): 
After the success of this summer's blockbuster "Iron Man," Paramount Pictures 
and Marvel Studios have extended their distribution deal for five more movies. 
Under the agreement, Paramount will take a smaller distribution fee from 
Marvel -- 8% rather than the 10% it had received for releasing "Iron Man" -- in 
exchange for gaining worldwide distribution rights to the pictures. Paramount, 
which released the action movie in the U.S., Canada and some overseas 
territories, will also now distribute Marvel's films in such key markets as Japan, 
Germany, France, Spain, Australia and New Zealand.  
Previously, Marvel had licensed distribution rights to local distributors in those 
territories. Paramount will distribute "Iron Man 2," due out May 7, 2010, 
worldwide with the exception of Germany, where the sequel was already 
committed to a local distributor. 
The other films included in the newly extended Paramount pact are "Thor" in 
2010, "Captain America" in 2011, "The Avengers," also in 2011, and "Iron Man 
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3," which does not yet have a release date. 
Paramount Pictures Vice Chairman Rob Moore said the company agreed to 
take a lower distribution fee because it would get more films to distribute in a 
greater number of territories, which could be more lucrative for the studio. 
David Maisel, chairman of Marvel Studios, a unit of publicly traded Marvel 
Entertainment Inc., said that given the success of "Iron Man," it made sense to 
continue the distribution pact with Paramount on "improved economic terms." 
By releasing through one worldwide distribution partner, Maisel said, Marvel 
believed that it could "maximize the upside" of its movies.  
In a regulatory filing Monday, Marvel said it had received its first "Iron Man" 
check from Paramount in the amount of $60 million.  
The company forecast revenue in its film production division of $125 million to 
$140 million this year, up from its earlier projection of $65 million to $80 
million. 
Marvel, which used to rely on studios to bankroll its movies, has been self-
financing its pictures since securing a $525- million loan arranged by Merrill 
Lynch & Co. in 2005. In its filing, Marvel said it would fund 33% of the budget 
of each film covered by the new distribution deal and its film facility would 
provide the remaining 67%. 
Maisel, who declined to divulge the cost of any individual movie, has told Wall 
Street analysts that the company's budgets range from $135 million to $165 
million.  
In an earlier report Marvel’s CEO Ari Arad commented on the company’s debt 
financing (Gross, 2006): 
[…] Just after Labor Day, Marvel rolled out a $525-million debt facility to 
finance the production of up to 10 big-budget ($165 million a pop) live-action 
films based on comics characters. "It's taken time for the financial markets to 
recognize the incredible value of these properties," Arad says. Wall Street will 
help transform Marvel from licensor to producer in a deal that will give it 
complete creative control and allow the company to build a film library. […] As 
great as it is for Marvel to finance its own movies -- quite a turnaround from its 
bankruptcy filing less than a decade ago -- unlike other deals if it ends up 
defaulting on the debt, a bunch of banks could end up with a group of 
superheroes. "If we screw up, the investors own the IP," Arad says. 
216 
 
 
Box 6.21 
Variety reports on a non-exclusive output distribution contract between Media 
Rights Capital, a producer, and Universal, a major studio distributor (Garrett, 
2010): 
Media Rights Capital's new deal with Universal represents the biggest rent-a-
studio pact with a major since Disney joined hands with DreamWorks. 
Agreement calls for Universal to distribute 20 MRC pics over five years 
beginning in 2011. The deal ratchets up the relationship between MRC and U, 
who first joined forces on "Bruno," and are next set to collaborate on "The 
Adjustment Bureau," set for release Sept. 17. 
Previously, MRC has secured distribution on pic-by-pic basis. Warners, for 
example, distributed Robert Rodriguez's "Shorts," and Sony will handle "30 
Minutes or Less," the upcoming comedy from "Zombieland" helmer Ruben 
Fleischer. 
The arrangement gives MRC access to studio distribution at a time when it has 
become more precious -- and this could help MRC entice stars to its 
productions. The deal does not preclude MRC from preselling pics domestically 
or worldwide. 
U will also benefit from MRC's ability to sign big stars without having to 
shoulder the cost for their paydays. MRC will pay the studio a flat distribution 
fee, as is typically the case for such arrangement. 
The scope of the deal is noteworthy. Paramount's old deal with Marvel, for 
example, covered five pics. 
MRC co-CEO Modi Wiczyk said the arrangement will enable to company to 
offer its creative partners greater choice and security. "It's a privilege to get a 
major studio distribution slot," he said. "You can count on one hand the names 
that have done deals like this," he added, citing Regency and DreamWorks. 
U intends to use the deal to expand its slate. It will not cut into the number of 
pics the studio makes; the studio intends to produce and distribute the same 
amount of films each year. 
U already plans to release the M. Night Shyamalan horror thriller, "Devil" for 
MRC. The studio also released Ricky Gervais' "Invention of Lying" 
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Value Claiming 
Under output distribution contracts, the parties’ value claiming is generally 
relatively straightforward. The distributor deducts a distribution fee 
(typically in the 10 to 15% range) off the top from its gross receipts, then 
recoups its distribution investment advance (if any), and then all further cash 
flows to the producer.  
In those cases, in which the marketing transactions are left with the producer 
so that the distributor only does licensing, the distribution fee is typically 
lower. That does of course reduce the distributor’s potential upside from the 
transaction, but distributors may still seek such contracts for at least two 
reasons: First, the additional movies released under such contracts may bring 
the total volume of movies released up to a level that is deemed optimal for 
the distributor’s licensing capacity, thus better utilizing the distributor’s 
resources, without requiring any further project-specific investments from 
the distributor. The outcome of this economies of scope and scale reasoning 
will of course depend on the full mix of the distributor’s acquisitions and 
output deals. This type of output distribution deal will for instance be 
particularly attractive to  a distributor in periods with insufficient access to 
internationally for MRC and recently acquired "Ted," written and directed by 
Seth MacFarlane. 
Variety earlier reported on MRC’s financing and the background of its 
principals (Littleton & Schneider, 2008): 
MRC is bankrolled through equity investments from a clutch of blue-chip heavy 
hitters including Goldman Sachs, AT&T, ad giant WPP and investment fund 
D.E. Shaw. [MRC principal] Wiczyk established key relationships in the 
industry and in the global finance community through his stint at Endeavor [a 
talent agency], where he specialized in setting up film financing projects for the 
agency's clients. Satchu [MRC’s other principal] comes from a background in 
finance and launching Internet-based businesses. 
Wiczyk emphasizes that MRC is not a private equity fund looking to 
make passive investments in film and TV production with a strict 
timetable for recoupment and profit disbursements. 
MRC has "built a syndicate of investors who have both deep pockets and 
a deep understanding of our business," Wiczyk says. 
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internal or external funding for making its own project-specific investments 
(Fleming, 2008c; Goldstein, 2008a). Furthermore, utilizing capacity needs to 
be balanced against potentially creating situations in which the distributor’s 
movies compete against each other in cinemas (Harris, 2002b). Second, 
increasing the overall volume of movies through output distribution 
contracts may create value for the distributor more indirectly by increasing 
its market share. Jennifer, marketing executive at a major studio’s specialty 
division, comments: 
Jennifer: [Parent distributor] would take on some of those projects 
for market share, so [movie franchise] isn’t something that we can 
make a lot of money on but it counts for the market share. So you 
want it to be successful, so the market share comes up... 
TG: Why is that important? 
Jennifer: Only because people think it’s important, because the 
trades write about it, and because it’s one of the measures that 
people look at from Wall Street. It’s not really important. 
Profitability is more important. But it’s like a rating. It’s one of 
those things... 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
Distributors may also agree to lower distribution fees in exchange for higher 
volume in the form of all rights deals (or split rights deals for a wide range 
of territories and media), in the form of a higher number of movies or in the 
form of higher profile and budgeted movies (event movies). Paramount, a 
studio distributor, reduced its distribution fee from 10 to 8% when 
expanding a contract with Marvel Studios, a producer, from a primarily 
domestic to a primarily worldwide deal. Marvel’s movies included in the 
deal were also high-profile event movies with high production budgets (see 
Box 6.19 above).  
Contracting 
When operating under an output distribution contract, the producer will have 
decision making control over all transactions from development through 
marketing, including the greenlighting decision. Even when marketing 
transactions are carried out by the distributor, which is most common also 
under these contracts, the producer will have the final word. This is not 
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uncomplicated for the distributor since the licensing transactions, which the 
distributor controls, need to be closely coordinated with marketing, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Emilie, marketing executive at a major 
distributor, comments on her approach to marketing transactions when the 
producer has final say under an output distribution contract: 
I run a marketing department. It’s my job to open movies. So, I have 
to do the best job I can with whatever I have available to me… 
Clearly I feel it’s better if I control because that’s what my job is, as 
opposed to somebody else telling you “This is how much you have to 
spend.” Then you have to look at other things. I mean if it were less 
than you would spend were it your own movie and you could make 
the decisions, then you might look at the release date… You know, 
“Listen, if it were my movie I could spend x amount of dollars, I 
could put it out during the summer cause that’s when the kids are 
out of school, but they’re only giving me this much money to spend, 
so maybe I should go in the spring when there is not so much 
competition and TV rates are lower.” Those kinds of decision. You 
look what you have and then you try to make the best decisions. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
So while the producer may not have decision making control over licensing 
transactions, these will have to be adjusted to the decisions made for 
marketing, as for instance setting the release date (licensing) according to the 
advertising budget (marketing). 
Under output distribution contracting, the distributor generally commits to 
distribute all movies provided by the producer that meet certain ex ante 
determined conditions (basically establishing the movies as fit for theatrical 
release). However, restrictions such as those described by Tom in Box 6.13, 
defining the minimum and maximum annual number of movies, are typically 
included to ease the planning for both parties. Hence, the producer also 
makes a commitment to delivering a certain number of movies for which 
they cover all production and distribution investments. Sometimes the scope 
of the contract is even more precisely set out, identifying the exact number 
of movies, the identity of the projects, approximate release dates, and so 
forth (see Boxes 6.20 and 21).   
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Like other forms of output contracts, output distribution contracts may be 
exclusive or non-exclusive. The contract described by Tom in Box 6.13 is 
exclusive, meaning that the producer cannot take any projects to other 
domestic distributors during the term of the contract. The contracts described 
in Boxes 6.20 and 6.21, however, are non-exclusive.  
Most output distribution contracts are split rights deals, but they vary from 
those in which the distributor gets domestic rights only (Box 6.13) to others 
that may include most territories and media (Box 6.20), thus approaching an 
all rights situation. While the contract may cover extensive foreign 
territories, the producer will typically only cover domestic distribution 
investments. 
In sum, when positioning output distribution contracting on the market-
hierarchy continuum, it mostly resembles first-look contracting in that 
extensive decision-making control is given to one of the parties. This is the 
contractual reflection of that one party’s – the producer’s – commitment to 
cover both production and distribution investments. It may be argued that 
exclusive output distribution contracts are more integrated than non-
exclusive ones, but here exclusivity limits the control of the party which is 
otherwise granted most of the control over the transaction. The positioning 
of output distribution contracting relative to other types of output contracting 
is indicated in Figure 6.8 below. 
 
Figure 6.8 - Positioning of output distribution contracting 
6.4 Layered Contracting and Production Studios 
Sometimes a movie project may be subject to more than one vertical 
production-distribution transaction. A production company operating under 
an output distribution contract with a distributor may for instance acquire a 
movie from another producer using an outright negative pickup deal and 
then funnel this movie through its output distribution contract with the 
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distributor (Laporte, 2006a; Mohr & McClintock, 2006). Hence, a second 
layer of contracting is added. These vertical chains may also reach across 
more than two layers. Box 6.22 below provides an example with three 
layers. 
In the Box 6.22 example, it is unproblematic to classify the companies at 
each end of the vertical chain as distributor (Warner) and producer 
(Emmett/Furla). The category of the two middle transaction parties is 
however more ambiguous and seemingly subject to which transaction layer 
one is looking at. Starting with the first transaction layer between Warner 
and Alcon, this is an output distribution contract in which Alcon is defined 
as the producer, supplying the movie and covering all the required 
production and distribution investments. The second layer transaction is an 
acquisition contract between Alcon and Millennium in which Alcon 
purchases a completed movie from Millennium. In this contract, Alcon 
would be defined as distributor since it is acquiring the distribution rights 
and Millennium as producer since it is the owner of these rights, as discussed 
in Section 6.2. Finally, the third layer transaction between Millennium and 
Emmett/Furla is a standard first-look contract in which Millennium is 
defined as the distributor and Emmett/Furla as the producer. Hence, the two 
middle transaction parties may be defined as both producer and distributor, 
depending on in which context of contracting layers it is seen.  
 
Michael, who is head of a production company operating under a co-
production financing contract with a major studio distributor, describes his 
Box 6.22 
Variety reports on the movie “16 Blocks” (2006, directed by Richard Donner) 
(McClintock, 2006b). The movie was produced by Emmett/Furla Films under a 
first-look deal with Millennium Films, which sold the movie to Alcon 
Entertainment, which channeled the movie through its output distribution 
contract with Warner Bros., which release it. Hence there are three layers of 
vertical production-distribution contracting involved: 
1) Warner – Alcon output distribution contract 
2) Alcon – Millennium acquisition (type not specified) 
3) Millennium – Emmett/Furla first-look contract 
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company’s role as a middle transaction party between the studio distributor 
and independent producers in layered contracting situations: 
Michael: We’re [working on a] project-to-project basis too, but 
we’re not producing the films, producers come to us with the films. 
Independent producers come to us with the films or ideas and we 
decide what to finance. They’re basically the same, except we have 
more control over our destiny in terms of good and bad, and 
deciding which pictures to make, what to develop, who to hire, how 
to package them. We don’t have to wait around for the studio to say 
“Yes.” We do that. 
TG: So… producers come to you with their projects. Do you also 
have deals with producers? 
Michael: Yes. 
TG: How do they work? 
Michael: Same as the studio.  
TG: Same as the studio?  
Michael: Exactly. 
TG: So you cover their overhead, they have to show you the projects, 
and… 
Michael: Exactly the same as the studio. 
TG: So in this sense you’re operating as… 
Michael: A studio. Exactly the same. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production company 
To distinguish production companies like Michael’s, that also take this 
middle role in layered contracting situations from those that do not, these 
companies will henceforth be referred to as production studios. A production 
studio may be defined as a company that acquires, either via acquisition or 
output contracts, movies from producers that it does not itself distribute, but 
which are funneled through an output contract between the company and a 
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distributor. Also, the term “production studio” is sometimes, but not always, 
used for these companies in the industry trade journals. For instance, 
producer Hyde Park Entertainment, which has an output deal with Fox, a 
major studio, but also its own first-look deals with other producers, is 
described as “a studio within a studio” (Brodesser, 2005).  Among the 
production studios covered in examples so far are Alcon, Millennium (Box 
6.22), Media Rights Capital (Box 6.20), Dreamworks (Box 6.19), Relativity 
(Box 6.16) and Regency/New Regency (Box 5.1).  
Generally, to operate as a production studio a company will need, first, 
financing to cover at least acquisitions and/or housekeeping payments and 
production investments, and second, an output distribution or co-production 
financing contract with a distributor. A first-look contract would not suffice 
as it would not provide for the necessary decision making control and it is 
generally not applied for companies with financial resources (then in fact it 
would typically become a co-production financing contract). Normally, a 
production studio would also not base the distribution of its movies on 
acquisition contracts, even though Media Rights Capital used only this 
strategy prior to signing an output distribution contract with Universal, 
which in this regard represents an exception (Box 6.21). 
However, not all companies operating under an output distribution or co-
production financing contract with a distributor are production studios. 
Some, like Marvel (Box 6.19), produce all movies in-house and do not 
contract other producers to fulfill its delivery requirements under its output 
contract, and is thus defined as a production company, not a studio. Only 
those that choose to use outside procurement through acquisition or first-
look deals with other producers to fully or partly cover its slate are defined 
as production studios. 
For producers seeking a distribution partner, either for an acquisition 
contract or for a first-look contract, the production studios offer an 
alternative to distributors. Consider a producer that has the option to contract 
either directly with a distributor or with a production studio operating under 
an output contract with the same distributor. If the producer contracts with 
the production studio it will not deal directly with the distributor of its 
movies, but only indirectly via the production studio. However, it may 
achieve greater flexibility with regard to distribution that way. Assuming 
that the distributor is not committed to release all movies from the 
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production studio, when the production studio likes one of the producer’s 
projects it will be able to offer production (and distribution) financing and at 
the same time shop it to a number of distributors should the production 
studio’s output distributor turn it down. The production studio may either 
add financing to a project package before pitching it to distributors, or 
alternatively, greenlight the movie prior to contracting distribution and then 
sell the project to distributors. Hence, from the producer’s point of view, the 
financing source would not be restricted and tied to the output distributor. 
With layered contracting, one also sees alternative investment structures 
associated with the various forms of production-distribution contracting. 
Third-party investors may contract with production studios rather than 
distributors for both production and distribution investments, but those are 
the funding structures already covered for the producer’s financing in the 
two previous sections on co-production financing and output distribution 
contracting. With layered contracting, one may however see investors 
contracting further upstream in the vertical contracting chain to participate in 
movies that are eventually most likely destined for a particular distributor. 
One example is provided in Box 6.23. 
In the Box 6.23 example the producer, Parkes/MacDonald, has a first-look 
contract with a production studio, Dreamworks, which again operates under 
an exclusive co-production financing contract with a distributor, Disney (see 
Box 6.19). Parkes/MacDonald then enters into a financing contract with a 
third-party investor, Imagenation. The financing contract provides funding 
for Parkes/MacDonald’s development transactions and gives Imagenation an 
option to co-finance production transactions, thus splitting the production 
investments with Dreamworks (see Figure 6.9). Hence, by contracting with 
Parkes/MacDonald, Imagenation will invest in movies developed and 
produced by this producer, greenlighted and co-financed by Dreamworks 
and distributed and co-financed by Disney. Had it instead contracted with 
Dreamworks, it would have participated in a broader range of movies 
developed by Dreamworks in-house or by any other producer operating 
under a first-look deal with the production studio. And had it contracted with 
Disney, the range would have been wider still, potentially including product 
from all the distributor’s acquisitions and output deals.  
Generally, layered contracting offers an investor greater choice as to which 
level in the vertical chain it wishes to contract.  
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Figure 6.9 - Investment and production-distribution structure for Box 6.23 
example. 
Disney 
Dreamworks 
Parkes/MacDonald Imagenation 
Output distribution 
First-look 
Investment 
Box 6.23 
The Hollywood Reporter reports on a third-party financier contracting directly 
with a producer positioned in a second layer output deal (Zeitchik, 2009a): 
With studios tightening their budgets, production banner Parkes/MacDonald 
has found a new source of funding -- Abu Dhabi's Imagenation. 
As part of a new venture, the Middle East funder will pipe $10 million into 
Parkes/MacDonald development projects in a revolving fund, with the money 
replenished as it is used. Imagenation also will be given the opportunity to co-
finance productions if the projects are greenlighted. 
Parkes/MacDonald has a first-look deal with DreamWorks, so all projects from 
the Imagenation venture would go first to the Steven Spielberg-Stacey Snider 
studio. But any projects that DreamWorks passes on could be shopped to other 
studios, or produced directly with Imagenation. The venture, principals said, is 
for future projects only; it will not be applied to anything Parkes/MacDonald 
now has in development. 
While the deal is being made specifically with Parkes/MacDonald, it creates 
associations that go beyond the banner. The venture indirectly extends the 
global relationships of DreamWorks, which is financed by India's Reliance 
Entertainment, to the Middle East. And it creates a link between Imagenation 
and Disney, which will distribute DreamWorks films domestically. […] 
The two entities will work together but with a clear division of responsibilities, 
principals said. "It's our intention to involve Imagenation, but we aim to provide 
the creative guidance as they are providing the financial backing," Parkes said. 
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6.5 Cross-Case Overview and Summary 
In Sections 6.2 and 6.3 above, detailed descriptions and within-case analyses 
were made for the vertical contracting cases, and then divided into sub-cases. 
While broadly similarly structured conceptually, only limited comparisons 
were made between cases. A more systematic cross-case analysis will better 
show relationships between cases and sub-cases, and thereby provide pattern 
clarification. While the next chapter in its entirety contains in-depth cross-
case analyses of patterns related to project-specific investments, and a 
broader initial analysis is also made here to help summarize the cases. For 
this purpose, a case and conceptually ordered matrix is provided in Tables 
6.1 and 6.2 below. This is the same matrix divided into two parts for 
acquisition and output contracting sub-cases respectively. Read vertically, 
the matrix also provides comparable summaries for each of the vertical sub-
cases. 
Each of the sub-cases outlined in the above matrix represents what the data 
indicate to be most typical. However, as seen in the previous sections on 
each sub-case, there are variations. Some contracts used in the industry will 
also be crossovers between the types defined here. One should therefore be 
careful reading a sub-case as being representative for any specific real-life 
contract in the same manner as one should be of seeing the archetypical 
citizen of any country as representative for any specific citizen of that 
country. 
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 Outright Negative 
Pickup 
Outright Negative 
Pickup (pre-sale) 
Acquisition 
Distribution 
Acquisition 
Distribution (pre-
sale) 
V
al
ue
 C
re
at
io
n 
Development 
transactions 
Producer Producer Producer Producer 
Development 
investments 
Producer Producer Producer Producer 
Production 
transactions 
Producer Producer Producer Producer 
Production 
investments 
Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Distribution 
transactions 
Distributor Distributor Distributor Distributor 
Distribution 
investments 
Distributor Distributor Distributor Distributor 
Production 
risk 
Producer Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer Producer /  
Distributor 
Distribution 
risk 
Distributor Distributor Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer / 
 Distributor 
 
V
al
ue
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la
im
in
g 
Revenue 
sharing 
No No Horizontal and 
vertical 
Horizontal and 
vertical 
Producer’s 
primary 
market 
Distributors 
(Festivals) 
Distributors 
(Festivals) 
Audiences and 
Distributors 
Audiences and 
Distributor 
Producer’s 
fees and 
payments 
Production fee 
Purchase price 
Production fee 
Purchase price 
Production fee 
(Advance) 
Production fee 
(Advance) 
Producer’s 
backend 
No No Yes Yes 
Distributor’s 
fees and 
payments 
n/a n/a Distribution fee Distribution fee 
Distributor’s 
backend 
Distributor retains 
all revenues 
Distributor retains 
all revenues 
Yes Yes 
 
C
on
tra
ct
in
g 
Time of 
contracting 
After completion Before greenlight After completion Before greenlight 
Split / All 
Rights 
Split most common Split most common Split most common Split most common 
Control – dev 
transactions 
Producer Producer Producer Producer 
Greenlight Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Control – prod 
transactions 
Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Producer Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Control – distr 
transactions 
Distributor Distributor Distributor / 
(Producer) 
Distributor / 
(Producer) 
Put pictures n/a n/a n/a n/a 
P’s identity 
matters 
No Yes No Yes 
D’s identity 
matters 
No No Yes Yes 
Transaction 
basis 
Bidding Bidding Bidding /  
Relational 
Bidding / 
Relational 
 
Table 6.1 -  Cross case analysis (acquisition contracting)  
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 First-Look Co-Production 
Financing* 
Output Distribution  
V
al
ue
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re
at
io
n 
Development 
transactions 
Producer Producer Producer 
Development 
investments 
Distributor Producer Producer 
Production 
transactions 
Producer Producer Producer 
Production 
investments 
Distributor Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer 
Distribution 
transactions 
Distributor Distributor (Producer) / 
Distributor 
Distribution 
investments 
Distributor Distributor Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Production risk Distributor Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer 
Distribution risk Distributor Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer 
 
V
al
ue
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la
im
in
g 
Revenue sharing No Horizontal and vertical Horizontal (and 
vertical if advance) 
Producer’s 
primary market 
Distributors Audience Audience 
Producer’s fees 
and payments 
Housekeeping 
Production fee 
Production fee Production fee 
Producer’s 
backend 
No Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Distributor’s fees 
and payments 
n/a Distribution fee Distribution fee 
Distributor’s 
backend 
Distributor retains all 
revenues 
Yes No 
 
C
on
tra
ct
in
g 
Time of 
contracting 
Before start of 
development 
Before start of 
development 
Before start of 
development 
Split / All Rights All Rights Split most common  Split most common 
Control – dev 
transactions 
Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer Producer 
Greenlight Distributor Producer /  
Distributor 
Producer 
Control – prod 
transactions 
Distributor Producer / 
(Distributor) 
Producer 
Control – distr 
transactions 
Distributor Distributor Producer 
Put pictures No Yes (in most cases) Yes 
P’s identity 
matters 
Yes Yes Yes 
D’s identity 
matters 
Yes Yes Yes 
Transaction basis Relational Relational Relational 
* Excluding financial co-productions 
 
Table 6.2 - Cross case analysis (output contracting) 
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6.5.1 Value Creation  
For value creation, a pattern emerges from outright negative pickup 
contracting in one end to first-look contracting in the other. For acquisition 
contracting, both transactions and investments are clearly split between 
producer and distributor. And most so under outright negative pickup deals, 
in which the producer carries out all production transactions, covers all 
production investments and carries the production risk. The distributor 
carries out all distribution transactions, covers all distribution investments 
and carries the distribution risk. Pre-sale contracts for both acquisition sub-
cases blur the line somewhat, as the contract is typically used by the 
producer as a safeguard to secure production financing from third parties 
(banks used in pre-sale financing). With pre-sale contracts, the distributor 
also takes on some production risk as it makes a commitment prior to 
production, either in the form of a purchase price or in the form of promises 
as to the width and thrust of its distribution. Acquisition distribution 
contracts also blur the line by the producer taking on some of the distribution 
risk through being compensated by revenue sharing rather than a fixed 
purchase price. If advances are used in these contracts, they will however 
more resemble outright negative pickup contracts in this particular regard, as 
discussed in Section 6.2.2. Within the acquisition contracting case, one may 
therefore see an outright negative pickup contract and a pre-sale acquisition 
distribution contract as polar cases, in which value creation is clearly divided 
in the first and more interdependent in the latter. 
At the other end of the scale is first-look contracting. Here, production 
transactions are carried out by the producer and distribution transactions by 
the distributor, but all investments are covered by the distributor. Hence, 
both the production- and distribution risk are carried by the distributor alone. 
It is closely followed by output distribution contracting, which may be said 
to mirror first-look contracting. Production and distribution transactions are 
carried out by the producer and distributor, respectively, (though the 
producer sometimes also takes on marketing transactions), but here it is the 
producer that covers all investments, and thus carries both production and 
distribution risk. Distributors sometimes provide cash flow for distribution 
expenses, but producers are still responsible for these investments. These 
two sub-cases therefore represent the most integrated forms of contracting 
with the distributor and producer, respectively, as the main contributor to 
value creation.  
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The third output sub-case, co-production financing contracting, closely 
resembles pre-sale acquisition distribution contracting in terms of value 
creation. A nuance in production investments is that for co-production 
financing contracts the distributor will typically contribute more directly 
towards the financing (with an advance or direct investment), while its 
contribution under pre-sale acquisition distribution contracting is typically 
much more indirect (the contract is typically used by the producer as a 
safeguard for third-party investments). This nuance is then reflected in the 
distributor’s exposure to production risk, which under a pre-sale acquisition 
distribution contract is indirect through its distribution commitments, while 
under co-production financing contracting the direct exposure of its 
production investment is added to the distribution commitments. But apart 
from these differences related to production investment, the two sub-cases 
are very similar with regard to value creation.  
Hence, looking at value creation, one may consider first-look and co-
production financing contracting as the polar sub-cases under output 
contracting, and one sees that the least integrated output sub-case almost 
coincides the most integrated acquisition sub-case.  
6.5.2 Value Claiming 
Value claiming from the producer and distributor’s joint product is handled 
by the distributor as the downstream transaction partner through the 
collection of film rental and license fees (see Figure 5.1). As described in 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 above, the producer’s share of joint value is claimed 
from the distributor in two basic forms, either as lump sum payments or 
through some form of revenue sharing.  
Following the order of cases and sub-cases from the outright negative pickup 
contract as the polar sub-case towards the market end of the market-
hierarchy continuum with the first-look contract at the other end, one sees 
that no revenue sharing is utilized for the polar contracting forms, but only in 
the middle forms. In outright negative pickup contracts (also for pre-sales), 
the producer’s value claiming is primarily in the form of a lump sum 
purchase price paid by the distributor. The producer also collects a lump sum 
production fee paid out of the movie’s production budget, but this is a 
relatively minor amount and represents standard practice across all contract 
forms. Once acquired, the distributor retains all revenues from its 
exploitation of the movie. In the other polar end for first-look contracts, the 
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producer receives housekeeping payments, typically drawn against its 
production fees, but since the distributor covers all investments, it also 
retains all revenues. Relative to a movie’s production budget, the producer 
claims less value under this contract form, but that is because it has no 
production investments to recover. 
For the other sub-cases, revenue sharing is part of value claiming. First, in 
all these middle sub-cases, the distributor charges a distribution fee. Unlike 
the production fee, it is not a lump sum amount, but a percentage of the 
distributor’s gross receipts. Since the distribution fee therefore represents a 
horizontal revenue sharing mechanism, all of these sub-cases have an 
element of horizontal revenue sharing. In all of these sub-cases, in which the 
production and distribution investments are split between producer and 
distributor, there is also an element of vertical revenue sharing since a “last 
in, first out” principle seems to dominate, where distribution investments are 
recouped prior to production investments. The exception is the financial co-
production type of co-production financing contracting (not included in 
Table 6.2), but there investments are also split horizontally, with each 
transaction party contributing to both production and distribution 
investments. The data also indicate that the most complex revenue sharing 
arrangements are found in the middle for acquisition distribution and co-
production financing contracting, while the arrangements for output 
distribution contracting are simpler (primarily horizontal with a distribution 
fee only except when the distributor advances distribution investments).  
As one would expect, a pattern thus emerges between value creation and 
claiming in which shared investments entail revenue sharing, and in which 
vertically shared investments are reflected in vertically divided revenues. 
The most market-like type of contracting, the outright negative pickup 
acquisition, represents the exception since the producer in effect is bought 
out of the project upon delivery and prior to release for the territories and 
media covered by the contract. But here the joint project investments are also 
shared in a non-integrated, non-coordinated manner more typical of market 
transactions. The upstream transaction partner creates a component to the 
joint product and sells it to the highest bidder, who uses this component as 
an input to complete the joint product. The buyer has no influence over the 
supplier’s investment and vice versa.  
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This brings us to the issue of what constitutes the producer’s primary market 
under the various contracting forms, which has not been explicitly addressed 
in the previous sections. The primary market is understood as the group of 
possible buyers that primarily determines the potential for value claiming. 
As was clearly illustrated by the “Happy, Texas” mini-case of outright 
negative pickup contracting, the value a producer may claim from its movie 
when using this form of contracting is not directly dependent on the movie’s 
performance among the movie consuming public, but on the purchase price a 
distributor will be willing to pay. And due to performance uncertainty, these 
are not always connected. Hence, under outright negative pickup contracting 
the producer’s primary market is  distributors. Furthermore, as certain key 
film festivals represent key market venues and these festivals filter a small 
number of participating movies from a large number of submissions, thus 
determining market access for producers, one may also argue that these 
festivals indirectly represent the primary market since failure to gain access 
is likely to significantly reduce the potential for value claiming.  
Again, a similar situation is found at the other polar end sub-case of first-
look contracting. Also here, the scope of the producer’s value claiming is 
dependent on the distributor and not directly on the audience since there is 
no revenue sharing. The producer’s housekeeping payments are determined 
in a contract potentially covering a number of movies entered into by the 
parties prior to the commencement of any work on these projects, and thus 
of course with the performance of these projects being unknown. As shown 
in Section 6.3.1 above, there are however some fairly common exceptions in 
which the housekeeping payments are drawn against a producer’s share of 
the distributor’s revenues. In these cases, the producer will see additional 
payouts if its share of revenues exceeds housekeeping payments received so 
here the producer’s primary market would consist of both the distributor and 
audience. 
For all other sub-cases, the producer’s primary market is made up of both 
distributors and audience. If the producer’s revenue share is small, the 
distributors will dominate (e.g. an acquisition distribution contract with a 
substantial advance), and if the share is large the audience will dominate 
(e.g. an output distribution contract with a low distribution fee).  
A pattern thus emerges with regard to the producer’s primary market, in 
which the producer looks to distributors in the polar sub-cases of outright 
233 
 
negative pickup and first-look contracting, and to audiences in the middle 
sub-cases. However, the polar cases are not alike. Under outright negative 
pickup contracting, the producer looks to distributors as potential market 
buyers, while under first-look contracting it looks to distributors more as 
potential “employers,” to borrow the terminology of the interviewees. 
6.5.3 Contracting 
The primary difference in contracting between acquisition contracting and 
output contracting is that in the first the contracting is done on a movie-to-
movie basis, while under the latter it is done for a slate of movies (an output) 
defined either by a specific number of movies, a specific period of time or by 
both. Hence, under acquisition contracting, the transaction parties will 
search, negotiate and contract for a specific project, while under output 
contracting, an alliance is established between the transaction parties ex ante 
under which the individual projects are carried out. 
In terms of the horizontal dimension of split- or all rights contracting the 
data indicates that both may be combined with all vertical cases except first-
look contracting, which seems to always be of the all rights type. First-look 
contracts with split rights referred to in the data turned out to better defined 
as co-production financing contracts (which in the industry are sometimes 
referred to as just first-look deals). The pattern is therefore that the most 
integrated vertical case is also horizontally integrated, while the less 
integrated vertical cases may be more horizontally diverse. 
For the allocation of decision-making control between the transaction 
parties, there is a fairly clear pattern in which it reflects value creation 
contributions (particularly investments) across the cases and sub-cases. The 
most unified control is found in first-look and output distribution contracts, 
in which the decision making control for all transactions rests almost entirely 
with either the distributor or producer, respectively. For co-production 
financing contracting and pre-sale acquisition contracting, control is shared 
between the parties in a way that typically reflects how production and 
distribution risk is shared, with one exception: Producers are typically not 
given any control over distribution transaction beyond any minimum 
commitments by the distributor negotiated in the contract, even when 
sharing the distribution risk. For other acquisition contracting, control 
generally rests with the producer ex ante and the distributor ex post 
contracting, but again the distributor typically makes certain commitments 
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with regard to the distribution transactions under acquisition distribution 
contracting, thereby reflecting the producer’s share in the distribution risk.  
One important commitment from the distributor to the producer under output 
contracting is the promise to in fact release some or all of producer’s a 
movies even though these are not identified ex ante, allowing for put 
pictures. And the pattern is again that it follows value creation contributions, 
particularly investments. Under first-look contracts in which the distributor 
covers all investments, no put picture provision is included, while under 
output distribution contracting in which producer covers all investments, 
such provisions are required as an additional safeguard for the producer’s 
investments. Under acquisition contracting, put picture provisions are 
generally not applicable since the contracting is done on a movie-to-movie 
basis (one may of course argue that there is an implicit put picture provision 
for the movie contracted), but as seen in Boxes 6.7 and 6.10, there are some 
rare exceptions in which put pictures are added to enhance the distributor’s 
offer. 
Finally, while not discussed systematically and explicitly under every case 
and sub-case in the sections above, a cross-case pattern also appears as to the 
significance of each transaction partner’s identity. Only under outright 
negative pickup contracts made following completion does the identity of 
either party seem important. The festival bidding situations are typical for 
this type of contracting (see Box 6.4). These transactions resemble “ideal” 
market situations in which faceless sellers put up products for sale, for which 
information (on quality, etc.) is transparent, while faceless buyers place their 
bids and the price mechanism determines which seller and buyer transacts. If 
the same outright negative pickup contract is made as a pre-sale, however, 
the producer’s identity will matter to the distributor. In Section 6.2.1 Julia, a 
marketing executive at a mini-major distributor, says that “the scariest thing 
for a distributor would be to collab with an untested director, untested 
producer and untested filmmakers in general with the concept on paper and 
then asking for financial commitment.” If asked to make a commitment prior 
to production, the distributor will seek an experienced producer - someone 
who has “played in this sandbox many times before and gotten it,” as Julia 
puts it. The distributor’s identity will however not be similarly important to 
the producer since there is no revenue sharing, making the producer’s value 
claiming dependent on the distributor’s performance. Generally, the 
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producer only needs to be confident in the distributor’s ability to pay the 
lump sum purchase price upon delivery.  
Under acquisition distribution contracting the distributor’s identity is more 
important to the producer. The producer’s value claiming is dependent on 
the distributor’s performance of the distribution transactions. It becomes 
important for the producer to find a distributor that sees the movie “eye-to-
eye” with the producer and shares the “same level of excitement” as George, 
an independent producer, puts it in Section 6.2.2. And again, if the contract 
is made as a pre-sale, the producer’s identity becomes important to the 
distributor. 
For all forms of output contracting, both parties’ identity will matter since 
the contracting is not made on the basis of specific product. The contracting 
is instead done on the basis of the parties’ identity, typically with an 
emphasis on each party’s experience and track record with production and 
distribution transactions respectively.  
The pattern emerging is therefore one going from the insignificance of 
identity for the most market-like sub-case to turning immediately more 
important when moving towards the middle sub-cases and being significant 
for both parties in the most integrated from of acquisition contracting and all 
forms of output contracting. 
While the data indicates that identity is important for all except the most 
market-like sub-case, it also indicates that the underlying variable causing 
identity to become a factor is uncertainty. Julia speaks of untested producers 
in the same context as untested talent. And it is clear from her statements 
that when preferring a tested producer for pre-sale deals, it is for the same 
reason as when packaging a project with tested talent: to reduce ex ante 
performance uncertainty. When George chooses a distributor that shares his 
level of excitement and sees the movie eye-to-eye with him, it is because this 
reduces his perceived ex ante performance uncertainty on the distributor’s 
end. He believes this distributor will be less likely to underperform in its 
distribution transactions for the movie, which he relies on both for his 
immediate value claiming from the particular movie and for his continuous 
reputation as a successful producer. And when the producer of the Case Title 
movie in Box 6.8 chooses the Case Studio, it is because it perceives the ex 
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ante performance uncertainty for the particular distribution transactions 
required for the Case Title to be lowest with that particular distributor.  
6.5.4 Sub-Case Positioning 
To sum up, the sub-cases specified in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 may be placed on 
the market-hierarchy continuum approximately as indicated in Figure 6.9 
below. Under acquisition contracting, the producer and distributor transact 
on a movie-to-movie bases while they under output contracting form 
alliances under which the project transactions take place. Yet, the above 
analysis shows that in certain aspects (value creation and claiming), a co-
production financing contract may more closely resemble a pre-sale 
acquisition distribution contract than a first-look contract. Similarly, a pre-
sale acquisition distribution contract may more closely resemble a co-
production financing contract than an outright negative pickup contract. 
 
Figure 6.10 - Cases and sub-cases approximate position on a market-
hierarchy continuum 
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7 Empirical Contracting–Investment Relationships 
This chapter will address the various empirical relationships between 
contracting and project-specific investments found in the data. Since these 
relationships are identified by looking at how variations in contracting form 
affect investments, the analysis is as such primarily of a cross-case type.  
Relationships are presented thematically and conceptually ordered as 
illustrated in Figure 7.1 below. In the first section, relationships between 
vertical contracting and project-specific production and distribution 
investments are discussed. The next three sections add relationships with star 
talent and reputation, with coordination and with horizontal contracting, 
respectively. Finally, in the last section all identified relationships and the 
interactions between them are summarized. 
 
Figure 7.1 - Chapter structure (sections in parentheses) 
7.1 Contracting and Project-Specific Production and Distribution 
Investments 
This section discusses the relationship between production and distribution 
investments. First, how the two correlate and create joint value for the 
transactors; second, how distribution investments depend on production 
investments; third, how contracting balances the risks between the two types 
Production 
Investments 
Vertical Contracting 
Distribution 
Investments 
Horizontal Contracting (7.4) 
(7.1) 
Stars and Reputation (7.2) 
Coordination (7.3) 
(7.5) 
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of investments; and finally, how production investments relate to distribution 
investments via contracting.  
7.1.1 Production Investments, Distribution Investments and Joint Value 
As established in Chapter 5, almost all production and distribution 
investments are project-specific. Hence, a fairly good picture of the balance 
between project specific investments into production and distribution 
transactions is provided by statistics on the average negative (production) 
and domestic marketing (distribution) costs for movies released theatrically. 
Average investments in movies released by the major studio distributors 
(Motion Picture Association of America members4), including mostly higher 
budgeted movies given wide releases, are shown in Figure 7.2 below. Over 
the seven-year period covered here distribution investments are on average 
relatively stable at approximately 50% of production investments. However, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, the numbers will vary for individual movies, 
particularly so for those with lower production costs for which distribution 
investments may reach levels many times as high as that of production 
investments. Such variance is reflected in the numbers shown in Figure 7.3, 
which covers movies released by the major studio subsidiaries and 
affiliates.5 These are the specialty divisions that mostly handle lower 
budgeted arthouse and genre movies. Also here, the seven-year average 
distribution investments end up at approximately half the production 
investments, but the variations are greater from year to year. This is mainly 
due to a greater variance between movies, which makes any year’s average 
more dependent on which particular movies were released that year. A “The 
Blair Witch”-like movie (see Section 5.4.2) will greatly affect the averages, 
with lowering production costs and hiking distribution costs. The low was in 
2001, when the average distribution investment was less than one-third of 
the average production investment, while the high 2005 distribution average 
was almost two-thirds of the production average that year. Similar numbers 
for movies released by independent distributors are not available. 
 
                                                     
4 Paramount, Sony (Columbia Tristar), Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, Walt Disney, 
Warner Bros. 
5 Such as Fox Searchlight, Miramax, New Line, Sony Pictures Classics, etc. 
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Figure 7.2 - Average production and distribution costs in million dollars for 
MPAA-member theatrical movies 2001-2007 (the most recent period for 
which such figures are released) (MPAA, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 7.3 - Average production and distribution costs in million dollars for 
theatrical movies 2001-2007 from MPAA-member affiliates/subsidiaries (the 
most recent period for which such figures are released) (MPAA, 2008) 
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In the context of joint value creation, Figures 7.2 and 7.3 may be seen to 
illustrate how the average project-specific investments made into production 
and distribution transactions for these movies create joint value represented 
by the total height of each column. The relationship between total joint 
investments and joint value is however more complicated, and one should be 
careful not to understand joint investments or joint value as equal market 
value of the joint product. First, the producer and distributor may contribute 
to value creation in ways that are not always well reflected in the amounts 
invested since the productivity of invested funds will vary. For instance, a 
positive discrepancy between value and investments may occur when a 
producer is able to hire star talent at rates below their typical market rate (see 
Box 6.5) and a distributor may identify and narrow in on a target audience, 
thus achieving more productive use of its marketing investments (see Box 
7.1). Similarly, negative discrepancies may simply occur from overpayments 
or poorly executed production and distribution transactions. More broadly, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, the performance uncertainty of any production 
and distribution transaction is likely to create positive and negative 
discrepancies. Second, due to the high ex post performance uncertainty 
related to a movie’s ultimate market reception, the joint value will often be 
significantly higher or lower than market value (see Box 7.1). Hence, total 
joint investments should only be seen as a ceteris paribus proxy to joint 
value, and joint value may not equal the joint product’s market value. 
7.1.2 Production Investment Effects on Distribution Investments 
In Box 7.1 below Tom, COO at a major studio, discusses the relationship 
between production and distribution investments and concludes that the two 
tend to correlate, which fits the picture emerging from Figures 7.2 and 7.3.  
However, he is careful to point out that they correlate not according to any 
informal industry rule or practice based on a fixed ratio between the two, but 
because distribution investments are based on an assessment of each movie’s 
elements and their market potential. And generally, elements and market 
potential justify higher distribution investments for movies with higher 
production budgets. Sometimes, based on a positive assessment, distributors 
decide to invest more than an average ratio to production costs would 
indicate, while at other times they will decide to spend less based on a 
negative assessment. Assessments may take place at any stage, e.g. prior to 
production (assessing marketability based on a package), upon viewing of 
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the completed movie (assessing playability) and during the release (assessing 
market reception via tracking and exit polls). The assessments made up until 
the release will basically be of the value created from production 
investments, and since the value will be a ceteris paribus function of 
investments, it follows that distribution investments will be dependent on 
production investments, as illustrated in Figure 7.4 below. 
 
Figure 7.4 - Relationship between production and distribution investments 
with product uncertainty as a moderating variable 
 
Box 7.1 
Tom, COO at a major studio, comments on the relationships between 
investments and value, and between production and distribution investments: 
Tom: When we finished [Title of a somewhat underperforming movie], and then 
put the P&A in, you could say the movie cost 110 million dollars if you add 
P&A to the cost of the negative… or more like 120 million dollars. Was that the 
value of the movie? An accountant would say no, it’s cost or market, whichever 
is lower. I would have sold it that day for 100 million. Not 120. So no, you got to 
be careful with the word “value”.  
[…] 
TG: I would expect that if there is movie of a certain size… or negative cost, 
then it should be matched to a certain P&A level, or is that not the case? 
Tom: It tends to work out that way, but not for the reason you would think. 
Implicit in your question is the thought that someone would say “this movie cost 
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7.1.3 Contracting: Balancing Uncertainty between Investment Decisions 
At the outset, investment decisions for a movie may be seen as sequential 
decision making on progressively sunk costs, as suggested by Caves (2000), 
and as such, a type of the adaptive, sequential decision-making problems 
central to TCE (Williamson, 1985). Costs are sunk because investments are 
project specific. The further downstream in a project’s value chain a decision 
is made the more information will be available, so uncertainty is declining. 
Generally then, production investment decisions will be made under greater 
100 million dollars, so gosh, we have to spend - for a 100 million dollar movie 
we have to spend 40 in P&A and everything else to really get it out properly.” It 
sort of makes sense. But what actually happens is that because we spend a 100 
million dollars, we have certain elements in the movie: major movie stars, 
major special effects, major this and major that, and it has a certain size to it. 
Because of its size we have so much in the negative that we think “you know 
what, we really have to have a big opening weekend because if we do not open 
the picture strong we run the risk of losing a lot of this money.” Because all of 
the money you expend, whether negative or P&A, is money at risk. So we would 
rather not spend an incremental dollar in P&A and put it at risk if we didn’t 
have to. So if the picture cost 50 million instead of the 100, I might say “You 
know what, I don’t want to spent 40 because suppose it’s a bomb, so I do not 
want to take the risk, because we don’t have to do that much money to come out 
on a 50 million dollar movie so lets have a P&A budget of 35.” Also the 
elements of a 50 million dollar picture don’t demand as wide a release, as many 
prints, as big an impression in the marketplace because it is a smaller movie. 
And so… it can take a little time to find its audience. Its ok, we are not at risk 
that much. But the two do tend… the two do correlate. So the more money we 
spend on the negative cost, the more money we are likely to spend in the P&A. 
True. Sometimes the reverse will happen. We have a little movie called [Title 1] 
coming out next [date] with the singer [artist name]. It’s really an inexpensive 
movie. But she is so popular among young girls of 8 to 16 that we thought to 
ourselves: “We may have an upside here if we really advertise heavily to that 
group.” So we are spending more money than we did releasing [Title 2], which 
is a drama that cost more than twice as much, still not expensive. Cost about 22 
million dollars, but more than twice as much as this other [Title 1], which is like 
a 10 million dollar movie. And the reason is that we think that we have a real 
marketing opportunity with the [artist name]-picture that we don’t have for 
[Title 2]. 
    Tom, COO, major studio distributor 
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uncertainty than distribution investment decisions. The uncertainty of a 
distribution investment decision will very much depend on the degree of 
product uncertainty still present at the time it is being made. If a 
commitment is made upon greenlight, uncertainty will equal that of the 
production investments made at this point, while product uncertainty will be 
eliminated completely if the decision is made following completion. The 
degree of product uncertainty may be seen as a moderating variable on the 
relationship between production and distribution investments since to a 
varying degree it will affect the distributor’s ability to assess the value 
created by production investments. 
As seen in the previous chapter, contracting measures may be taken by the 
parties towards balancing uncertainty between them. If contracting is used to 
balance uncertainty, a trade-off is agreed upon, whereby the production 
investment risk is reduced at the expense of a higher distribution investment 
risk. A review of how the various contracting forms rebalance uncertainty 
shows how producer’s and distributor’s investment risks are affected, 
starting with those types that do balance risk before discussing the type that 
does not. 
Under pre-sale acquisition contracting, distributors make commitments prior 
to production, thus increasing the uncertainty for their own investment 
decisions while decreasing uncertainty for production investment decisions, 
as production investors then obtain these commitments regardless of the 
quality of the completed movie (provided it meets certain technical 
standards). Producer’s incentives to contract early, i.e. to obtain a pre-sale 
acquisition, and distributor’s incentives to avoid pre-sale contracting, which 
follow accordingly, were clearly stated by the interviewees (see Section 
6.2.1). However, while distributors make commitments prior to production, 
and thus prior to assessing a movie’s playability, they may make upwards 
adjustments to these decisions upon reviewing the completed movie (see 
Julia’s’ comments on minimum commitments in Section 6.2.2). Hence, there 
will still be elements of sequential decision-making. Downward adjustments, 
however, are ruled out as they would undermine the commitment. Tom, 
COO at a major studio distributor, comments: 
Tom: Once we get passed the minimum – we’ve already committed 
to a minimum – once you get passed it you may spend nothing.  
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TG: But the minimum you will always have to do? 
Tom: That’s your deal. 
      Tom, COO, major studio 
Under co-production financing, output contracting the mechanisms are 
similar, but the distributor’s commitments will typically be less formal and 
rather take more of a relational character. Michael, head of a production 
studio operating under a co-production financing contract and former 
chairman and CEO of a major studio, who has handled these contracts from 
both sides of the table, comments on the distributor’s final control over 
distribution decisions, including the distribution investment decisions: 
Many of these things they have final control over but they have to 
exercise it very carefully too. Because you’re the supplier of the 
product, and they don’t want to make you feel like they’re not your 
partner. 
  Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production studio 
Furthermore, under many co-production financing contracts, the distributor 
will also be a production investor, and the production and distribution 
investment decisions will therefore be partly integrated with the same 
decision maker. 
Both first-look and output distribution types of output contracting have 
production and distribution investment decisions integrated with a single 
party, the distributor and producer respectively, and balancing uncertainty 
between parties by reducing production risk at the expense of distribution 
risk is thus not an issue. 
Non-presale acquisition contracting, on the other hand, has no balancing 
mechanisms for reducing production investment risk. As always, the 
production investment decisions are made by the producer under significant 
product uncertainty since the full production budget has to be committed 
upon greenlight, but here the distribution investment decisions are made by 
the distributor after the completion of production at a point when product 
uncertainty has ceased. Hence, when the production investment decisions are 
made, there is not even a commitment to distribute the movie. The number 
of theatrical distributors is limited and the number of theatrical distributors 
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with resources to provide a movie with a wide release is even more limited. 
Therefore, when a theatrical movie is greenlighted, the producer slips into 
small number bargaining for distribution. If the movie has a higher 
production budget that requires a wide theatrical release to recoup 
investments, the number will be even smaller. One agent comments to 
Variety: “[The studio distributors’] attitude is: Producers need us because 
they only have five other places they can go” (Harris, 2004). A fundamental 
transformation (Williamson, 1975) therefore takes place upon greenlight 
even if no distributor is contracted, establishing a bilateral relationship. 
Another level of specificity is added beyond the project specificity since the 
value of the assets created by the production investments is not only reduced 
outside the context of the project, but also outside the context of a potential 
future contract with one out of a few distributors. Ryan, marketing and 
distribution executive at a larger independent production company, says: 
“Production financing 101” in film business would say “You do not 
start shooting a movie unless you have a US [distribution deal].” 
And we are not talking about these little one or two or three million 
dollar movies, we know they are not going theatrical, they’re going 
straight to home video and TV. We’re talking about what’s called 
pictures that are theatrically driven. […]There was this Whoopie 
Goldberg’s called “Theodore Rex”, the Whoopie Goldberg-movie 
years ago, it was like a 35 million-dollar movie. And they started 
shooting; it was financed without a US deal. […] And it ended up 
they couldn’t sell it. It got screened and there’s no [theatrical] buyer 
for the US. Went right to home video. So somebody lost a lot of 
money - a lot of money. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
7.1.4 Production Investments’ Dependence on Distribution Investments 
and Contracting 
It follows from the above discussion that not only are distribution 
investments dependent on production investments, but there is also a reverse 
dependency between production and distribution investments. And since 
these investments are primarily made sequentially, this relationship also 
involves contracting. There are generally two major concerns in terms of this 
relationship. First, provided the production budget is at a level where a 
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theatrical release is deemed necessary to realistically recoup investments, the 
production investment risk will be significantly higher when no distributor is 
contracted prior to greenlight. If, as in Ryan’s “Theodore Rex” example, no 
distributor is later willing to commit to the investments necessary for a 
theatrical release much of the production investments are likely to be lost. 
This is a channel uncertainty issue, but related to distribution, not exhibition, 
access. Second, as shown above, distribution investments are adjusted to the 
elements created by production investments and the two therefore tend to 
correlate. While not all elements are known upon greenlight, the elements 
necessary to assess marketability usually are. If production investments are 
made into expensive elements such as star talent, these may be matched with 
certain distribution commitments which, as we have seen, will typically be in 
the form of a minimum width of the release and a minimum marketing 
investment. These commitments reduce production investment risk, as the 
producer is not only ensured market access (less channel uncertainty), but 
also a certain level of value creation on the distribution side of the joint 
product (less distribution performance uncertainty). Without contracting 
providing such balancing between production and distribution investment 
risk, the production investment risk may become prohibitively high, 
especially for higher budgeted movies. Ryan adds: 
You need to sell the US especially to really put the financing 
together. Unless you are... There are certain companies obviously 
that can take that risk. But it’s a risk you don’t wanna take. 
Ryan, President Worldwide Marketing & Distribution, 
independent production company 
These statements from Ryan should be seen in the context of his other 
statement, in which he says that 80% of the movies made do not turn out as 
expected, quoted in Section 6.2.1. The underlying product uncertainty is thus 
the source of channel uncertainty. If the producer and production investors 
could be certain that a movie would turn out well, the small number 
distribution bargaining would be less of an issue. Brad, CEO of an 
independent production company, is more explicit and specific about 
channel uncertainty and the production investment risk: 
High budget pictures are seldom produced without having a North-
American distribution deal in place – the risk is too high. It happens, 
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but very seldom. If it happens, like in the case of Gaumont’s “The 
Fifth Element”, it is usually a strong company on the production 
side that can carry large risks. Also, in this case they had a top cast 
attached, including Bruce Willis, so you knew you would get a North 
American deal. But, I would not do it this way. But, they are French 
– they do things different, I guess. 
   Brad, CEO, independent production company 
The variance in how production-distribution contracting is used to balance 
uncertainty, and thus investment risk between production and distribution is 
reflected in the producer’s primary market row of the cross-case matrix 
presented in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. For outright negative pickup contracting 
distributors represent a producer’s primary market, as its value claiming is 
not dependent on a complete joint product. Here, the producer sells a 
component, the movie itself (the completed production transactions) to one 
out of a small number of distributors, and its value claiming depends on the 
distributor’s value assessment of that component. Under first-look 
contracting, the producer’s primary market is also distributors, but for a very 
different reason: The producer does not make any production investments 
and looks to the distributor as an “employer.” The production investment 
risk is carried by the distributor and the decision making is internalized. For 
all other forms of contracting, the producer’s primary market is the audience 
(for generating joint value) and distributors (for negotiating the most 
favorable share of that joint value), which means that some degree of 
contractual balancing between production and distribution investment risk is 
present. 
From the above, a pattern between production and distribution investments 
and contracting emerges: There seems to be a fairly direct relationship 
between contracting and production investment via distribution 
commitments and uncertainty (see Figure 7.5 below). For production 
investments, one seeks safeguards in distribution investment commitments to 
ensure that a complete joint product will materialize. For a complete joint 
product, one is dependent on sufficient project-specific investments to carry 
out all required transactions throughout the project’s value chain, and as 
established in Chapter 5, the transactions requiring substantial specific 
investments are located in the production and distribution stages of the 
chain. Without a complete joint product, value creation will collapse since 
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there is a mainly multiplicative production function between elements 
(Caves, 2000), and value claiming will subsequently suffer and increase the 
likelihood of investors having to take losses on their investments. Any 
contracting form providing distribution commitments reduces channel and 
distribution performance uncertainty, which encourages production 
investments. 
However, other variables also affect this relationship between contracting 
and specific investments. Product uncertainty is the source of channel 
uncertainty, so the greater the product uncertainty, the greater channel 
uncertainty.  Budget, or the size of the required production investment, also 
seems relevant since distribution commitments are considered less important 
for production investments into lower budgeted movies. These movies are 
less dependent on a theatrical release and will thus have wider distribution 
options. Therefore, producers are not subject to the same level of small 
number bargaining for the distribution of these movies as for the higher 
budgeted movies, so one may then argue that the specificity of these 
production investments is lower.  
 
Figure 7.5 - Relationships between contracting, commitments, channel and 
distribution performance uncertainty and production investments with 
product uncertainty, budget and asset specificity as moderating variables 
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A relatively novel but interesting mini-case is the production and distribution 
of the movie, “What Just Happened” (2008, directed by Barry Levinson), a 
movie that may be categorized as mid-range, with a production budget 
estimated at USD 25 million and stars including Robert DeNiro, Sean Penn 
and Bruce Willis (IMDbPro, 2012d). The movie was handled as a non-
presale acquisition by its producer, 2929 Productions, and was first shown at 
the Sundance festival, though without finding a buyer. It was then shown 
again at the Cannes festival later the same year, but again without being sold 
for domestic distribution (Goldstein, 2008b). Ultimately, it was released 
theatrically in North America by Magnolia Pictures, which is the distribution 
arm of 2929 Productions. So production and distribution ended up closely 
integrated, but with a release through a much smaller and less resourceful 
distribution company than what was originally envisioned. Data on 
distribution investments are not available, but since the movie was pushed 
for a domestic acquisition at two major festivals it is reasonable to assume 
that these were low compared to what the producer had expected when the 
greenlight decision was made. The width of the release never reached more 
than 88 screens, and the domestic box office gross stopped at just above one 
million dollars (IMDbPro, 2012d). The producer may have seen its own 
distribution company as a fallback position for distribution when deciding to 
greenlight the movie without any other domestic distribution commitments. 
However, the mini-case underlines producers’ small number bargaining 
situation, as it is not only an issue of securing theatrical distribution, but to 
get the necessary commitments from a distributor with the capacity and 
resources to provide distribution investments that match the scope of a 
movie’s production investments. This particular case is novel because the 
production company also has a distribution arm, but the basic structure of the 
project and its faith is common enough to have earned the label MFNs 
(movies for nobody) in the industry (McNary & Garrett, 2007). These are 
theatrically driven movies made for acquisition contracting that fail to find a 
domestic theatrical distributor, like Ryan’s “Theodore Rex” example above. 
7.1.5 Interdependent Investments 
In sum, the relationship between production and distribution investments 
will typically be interdependent. Distribution investments are based upon 
assessments of the value created by production investments, and production 
investments may be dependent on distribution commitments. The latter 
dependency will be stronger for higher budgeted movies requiring wider 
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theatrical releases and weaker for lower budgeted movies less dependent on 
a theatrical release to recoup their production investments. Furthermore, 
investments depend on contracting. Provided a movie has a certain size and 
thus requires a theatrical release – and these are the movies with which this 
study is concerned – contracting forms that balance production and 
distribution risk through distribution commitments encourage production 
investments (see Figure 7.5) and therefore indirectly also distribution 
investments (see Figure 7.4). 
7.2 Stars, Reputation, Contracting and Investments 
This section extends the relationships between contracting and investments 
to also include star talent, attractive material, reputation and contract 
uncertainty. It first focuses on how the presence of stars affects investments 
and how their presence depends on investments, then expends to also include 
reputation and contracting in these relationships. A similar analysis is then 
made for attractive literary properties, and finally, the effects of contract 
uncertainty in these relationships are discussed. 
7.2.1 How the Presence of Star Talent Affects Investments 
In his comment on channel uncertainty in Section 7.1.4 above, Brad says that 
“in this case they had a top cast attached, including Bruce Willis, so you 
knew you would get a North-American deal,” thereby suggesting that star 
talent reduces channel uncertainty. In view of Ryan’s Whoopi Goldberg 
example, Brian’s use of the word “knew” may be seen as a bit strong, but the 
argument seems to be that the likelihood of obtaining sufficient distribution 
is significantly increased when star talent is involved. From the discussion of 
the packaging transactions (Section 5.3.1) we know that the objective of 
these transactions in which star talent is attached to a project is to reduce 
product uncertainty. A top cast, as in Brad’s example, reduces product 
uncertainty with regard to the quality of its performance (affecting the 
movie’s playability) and possibly even more so with regard to its value as a 
marketing tool (affecting marketability). Jennifer, marketing executive at a 
major studio specialty division, explains the importance of the latter when 
financing a movie’s production investments: 
You get trapped, because if you spend 8 million dollars making a 
movie and it doesn’t turn out so good, you’re gonna loose 8 million 
dollars unless you figure out some way to get out from that. So what 
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we try to do is often back ourselves up, that even if this movie 
doesn’t turn out to be executed that well, it’s got something in it that 
we can sell. So, it’s got a story-line that is interesting or it’s got a 
star that is interesting or two stars that are interesting or a director 
who is a name director - so that we, in marketing, have something to 
work with even if the movie itself doesn’t turn out so good. And then 
we would try to find a way to come out at least even on it. 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
It may hence be argued that the relationship between star talent and channel 
uncertainty suggested by Brad is not direct, but indirect via product 
uncertainty. Furthermore, from Jennifer’s statement, it is apparent that it is 
not only an issue of reducing channel uncertainty, but also of distribution 
performance uncertainty; star talent gives her something to work with in 
marketing even if the movie itself does not turn out well. In Jennifer’s case 
there is in fact no channel uncertainty with regards to distribution since here 
the distributor is financing production investments and thus contracted prior 
to production. Nonetheless, she will face channel uncertainty with regards to 
exhibition, as illustrated in Box 5.6. The issues of channel and distribution 
performance uncertainty are of course interlinked. One may say that it is 
because product uncertainty affects distribution performance uncertainty that 
distribution channel uncertainty arises. If a distributor sees that it may not 
have anything to work with for marketing, it is less likely to get involved in 
a project, and exhibitors will not be interested in a movie for which the 
distributor cannot provide proper marketing. 
In sum, star talent reduces product uncertainty which again reduces channel 
and distribution performance uncertainty, as shown in Figure 7.6 below. 
Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, reduced channel uncertainty 
encourages production investments. This extends the relationship from star 
talent to also include production investments. Distribution investments are 
not included in this figure, but as discussed in the previous section they are 
positively affected by production investments and star talent is among the 
key elements assessed when distribution investment decisions are made. 
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Figure 7.6 - Relationships between star talent, product, channel and 
distribution performance uncertainty and production investments 
This is a reoccurring pattern in the data. The relationship between star talent 
and production investments is stressed by Johnny in Box 6.5 when he 
explains how he finances a movie under outright negative pickup deals: 
“And when you make a movie like that, you tell [investors] up front that the 
leads, in our case, are [star actor 1] and [star actor 2]. They’re in the movie 
and that’s all they care about… is that those two people are in the movie. 
And the rest… – ‘whatever.’” 
Furthermore, investors sometimes target star talent directly for production 
investments. As discussed in Section 5.3.1, star talent often has ownership in 
production companies which they use to develop projects that are of 
particular interest to them, and many of these production companies have 
output deals, most often first-look deals, with studio distributors or 
production studios. Instead of investing directly with a studio distributor or 
production studio, investors sometimes contract directly with the star talent’s 
production company, thereby more specifically targeting their investments, 
as discussed in Section 6.4. An example involving a foreign investor, 
Reliance, and a number of star talent production companies is provided in 
Box 7.2. 
 
Box 7.2 
Variety reports on financing agreements between Reliance Big Entertainment, 
India’s largest entertainment company, and a number of production companies 
controlled by Hollywood star talent (Frater, 2008): 
Reliance has signed a string of development deals with the production shingles 
of a stellar array of top Hollywood talent: Nicolas Cage’s Saturn Prods., Jim 
Carrey’s JC 23 Entertainment, George Clooney’s Smokehouse Prods., Chris 
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Distribution 
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Uncertainty 
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Uncertainty 
Production 
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In the Reliance case the investor seeks out, with the assistance of a major 
talent agency, established star talent with production companies that already 
have first-look distribution contracts (see Figure 7.7 below). Offering these 
companies development financing, it acquires an option to participate in up 
to half of the production financing for any of these developed projects the 
studio decides to greenlight, with the studio covering the balance under its 
first-look contract. In effect, the investor turns the first-look contract into a 
co-production financing contract that provides more control and influence to 
the star talent. For the investor, these contracts offer safeguards that reduce 
uncertainty in a number of ways. First, they allow the investor to handpick 
talent in which it believes. Second, they only commit the investor to 
development investments, which are relatively modest compared to a 
Columbus’ 1492 Pictures, Tom Hanks and Gary Goetzman’s Playtone Prods., 
Brad Pitt’s Plan B Entertainment and Jay Roach’s Everyman Pictures. 
Deals are described as “production silos” under which Reliance Big 
Entertainment provides development coin to enable the talent to nurture or 
acquire movie projects before taking them to the studios with which they have 
first-look arrangements. In a second stage, deals allow Reliance to participate 
in up to 50% of a movie’s subsequent production funding and to secure rights in 
India. 
“We are totally respectful of the existing first-look deals that each of our 
partners enjoys and are confident that the respective studios will welcome our 
development silos and our subsequent co-financing ability,” said Reliance prexy 
Rajesh Sawhney. “We are breaking completely new ground and not just as an 
Indian-based company.” 
Khanna said the silos will likely become involved with 30 projects in the next 
couple of years, of which at least 10 will go into production. Reliance execs and 
CAA [a major talent agency] reps, who brokered the deals, were at pains to 
explain that Reliance coin is supplementary to the stars’ first-look deals rather 
than alternatives. 
“We will increase the speed and safety of the elevator, but the destination is still 
the top floor,” said Reliance Big Entertainment CEO Amit Khanna. 
“We have great relations with the Hollywood studios. We already work with 
them in music, video distribution in Indian theaters and through our Indian 
DTH platform, which is now in soft launch,” he said. 
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project’s total costs. While the investor has an option to participate in the 
production investment, it is not a commitment, and the investor will 
therefore have the opportunity to assess each project’s package before 
making a production investment commitment. Should the star talent choose 
not to participate in a project personally, the investor is not committed to 
invest. Hence, and third, if the investor chooses to participate with a 
production investment, product uncertainty is reduced by the participation of 
the star talent, which also reduces distribution performance uncertainty. And 
finally, there is little channel uncertainty for any of these projects since first-
look contracts are already in place. The production investor thus benefits 
from both distribution contracting, discussed in Sections 7.1.3 and 7.1.4 
above, and star talent participation, discussed here. 
 
Figure 7.7 - The contracting structure of the Reliance case (Box 7.2) 
Another talent-driven approach is taken by investor Media Rights Capital 
(MRC). As in the Reliance case this investor also targets production 
investment projects through talent, but unlike Reliance it does not choose 
talent already working under first-look contracts with studios. Also, it is 
primarily targeting directors, not actors, but as discussed in Section 5.3.1, 
top directors will typically attract top actors. MRC’s proposition to attract 
talent is asking them to “forgo the big upfront payday that is the norm for 
major studio development pacts in exchange for more creative latitude, the 
flexibility to sell to any outlet and most important, a larger ownership stake 
in the final product” (Littleton & Schneider, 2008). Hence, projects are sold 
to distributors using acquisition contracting on a movie-by-movie basis, and 
since all projects contain “bankable talent” (Littleton & Schneider, 2008), 
the investor does not insist on the acquisition contracts being made as pre-
sales. “With our deep capital base, we have the luxury of not having to pre-
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sell all our films. We have the ability to select the appropriate and optimal 
deal and distributor for each territory, each media and each project,” MRC-
principal Modi Wiczyk says to Variety (Fleming, 2007). The copyright 
ownership share offered to talent is meaningful and valuable because MRC 
typically contracts relatively short licenses with distributors (15 years), after 
which the exploitation rights revert to the copyright owners who are then 
free to resell the movie to the same or a different distributor. The initial 
investment and distribution strategy of MRC thus heavily leans on star talent 
to reduce channel uncertainty, resembling the Gaumount-strategy that Brad 
is quoted as advising against in Section 7.1. However, as quoted in Box 6.21, 
MRC subsequently complements its movie-to-movie acquisition contracting 
strategy with an output distribution contract. This allows it to channel any 
movie for which it does not make (or is not able to make) a favorable 
acquisition contract through its output contract. The star talent safeguard 
against channel and distribution performance uncertainty is supplemented 
with a distribution contract safeguard. MRC thus ends up in a position 
similar to the Reliance case, with the exception that the distribution 
contracting is made by the investor and not the talent production company. 
MCR’s role very much resembles that of a production studio (see Figure 
7.8), but is typically more limited to finance and distribution contracting that 
only allows the star talent production company (or jointly owned special 
purpose vehicles mainly controlled by the talent) to retain greater control 
over development and production transactions (Fleming, 2008d). 
 
Figure 7.8 - The contracting structure of the MRC case  
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7.2.2 Contracting Star Talent: Investment, Distribution and Reputation 
Dependencies  
With its ability to reduce uncertainty and thus encourage investments, star 
talent plays an important role in value creation. And since the amount of 
talent that at any time can claim “star talent” status will be limited, this also 
puts them in a favorable position for negotiating their share of value 
claiming. Reducing uncertainty for a movie by involving star talent therefore 
comes at a price. In some instances, the price has become prohibitively high. 
“The Adventures of Tintin,” an animated movie released in 2011 and 
directed by Steven Spielberg and produced by Peter Jackson, faced 
difficulties receiving a greenlight due to the high fees required by these two 
stars. Universal, a major studio with a long working relationship to Steven 
Spielberg, turned the project down before it was eventually produced under 
horizontal co-production contracting between two other major studios, Sony 
and Paramount, which co-financed it. In 2006, Twentieth Century Fox, 
another major studio, decided not to greenlight a comedy starring Jim Carrey 
and Ben Stiller, two very popular comedy star actors, on the basis that their 
fees outweighed the odds of breaking even. And Paramount was reported to 
barely break even on the “Mission Impossible III” with an estimated 
production cost of USD 150 million, despite the movie earning a box office 
gross of nearly USD 400 million worldwide, which according to the reports 
was largely due to a gross corridor for its star Tom Cruise who ended up 
earning more than USD 80 million from the movie (Eller, 2008b). 
For talent-controlled production companies like those discussed in the 
Reliance and MRC mini-cases above, contracting star talent is not an issue in 
the sense that the star controlling the company is already integrated. For 
other producers, however, the high compensation demanded by star talent 
may pose a significant challenge for the packaging transactions when trying 
to attach actors and director to a project. Tom, COO at a major studio, 
explains this particular problem from a distributor’s/financier’s perspective: 
There are two words that mean nothing: “attached” and 
“committed.” It means nothing - because unless the talent sign… - 
they [producers] say “I have got Brad Pitt committed.” “Oh, so he 
must be in the movie?” “Well no, he has screenplay approval.” So 
all Brad Pitt has to do is say, ”I don’t like this draft.” So they can’t 
come up with anybody. So, they can’t walk in the door and - they 
often say this –“I got Brad Pitt.” But of course they don’t have 
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authority to commit Brad Pitt 17.5 million dollars, so they don’t 
have Brad Pitt. The only way to have Brad Pitt is just to say, “We 
hereby commit to you, pay or play, which means that even if we 
don’t make the movie, you get paid, 17.5 million dollars - you are 
locked in as long as we have a commencement of principal 
photography by July 1st of next year.” Ok, we understand that, so 
therefore it’s a real commitment. Then it’s committed. And then we 
don’t use that word: We use “signed.” 
     Tom, COO, major studio 
There is thus also a reverse relationship between production investments and 
star talent (Figure 7.9), and this relationship may be extended to include 
production-distribution contracting, which affects production investments 
(see Figure 7.5). For producers operating independently without an output 
contract or without some form of contracted access to production financing, 
it will be significantly more difficult to complete a package including star 
talent. When asked why they tend to obtain star-driven movies through 
output deals rather than acquisitions, Jennifer, marketing executive at a 
major studio specialty division, says: 
We don’t usually find those for acquisition. Most of the films up for 
acquisition tend to be the more artistic, low-budget ones. You know, 
things that people are able to put together themselves. We are able 
to attract more star power because we are part of a major studio. 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
 
Figure 7.9 - Relationships between contracting, production investments and 
star talent 
Michael, head of a production studio, also points to the relationship between 
production-distribution contracting, access to production financing and 
access to talent. However, his view is broader, seeing distribution 
contracting as one element of a producer’s reputation. When asked about the 
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benefits from having an output contract when carrying out packaging 
transactions, he says: 
Michael: First of all, credibility. Agents believe that you’re capable 
of getting pictures made, and have the money to pay them, make 
them their commissions,… They wanna put their emphasis on the 
people that have the money to do it. So, they look at the people 
running the company and say, “OK, that guy has been in business 
for 25 years, ran two studios or produced 47 movies, they know what 
they’re doing. That person has an office on the lot of Fox, they 
wouldn’t have an office there if they had no distribution deal with 
Fox […]. They have international partners, and they have nine 
people working in their company. Clearly, it’s a real business.” The 
guy working across the street and says, “I’m gonna be in the movie 
business” and opens an office in Santa Monica and says, “I’m 
called The Movie Company,” nobody knows their name, and they 
don’t have a distributor, and nobody is working for him. The talent 
wouldn’t put their emphasis there - they wouldn’t believe him.      
TG: So the better the studio [output] deal you have the higher up 
you are on the mailing list of agents… 
Michael: You got it.        
TG: OK 
Michael: The appearance of power, proximity to power and 
perception of power. 
   Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production studio 
The importance of reputation is also expressed by George, an independent 
producer who previously worked under first-look contracting. He stresses his 
reputation when explaining how he obtains production investments for star-
driven, high-budget movies for which he may start production without 
having a distributor contracted. When suggested that his approach sounds 
risky, he comments: 
Yes, of course it’s risky. It’s very risky. This whole business is risky. 
But you know, our business is “people,” and ... I was lucky, so with 
people that are financing my movies I tell them: “I want to do this 
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movie and I know I’ll get the distribution for this movie.” And they 
know I’ll get distribution on this movie. The independent movies I 
made over the last few years, all of them were distributed by studios, 
all of them wide. Doesn’t mean I will not fail on my next movie, I 
might fail. 
 George, Producer/President, independent production company 
So in George’s case his reputation, which one may in a relational contracting 
perspective (Carson, Madhok, & Wu, 2006) argue represents informal 
distribution access, replaces the distribution contract, which is the formalized 
distribution access, as a means to attract production investments. Thus, his 
access to star talent is through the relationships shown in Figure 7.10a 
below. 
 
Figure 7.10a - Relationships between reputation, production investments 
and star talent 
Following Michael’s argument above, it may be argued that reputation (and 
contracting) directly affects a producer’s access to start talent, which again 
attracts production investments as discussed in the previous section. The 
logical order of relationships between star talent and production investments 
may therefore also be switched, as illustrated in Figure 7.10b. 
 
Figure 7.10b - Relationships between reputation, star talent and production 
investments (the intermediate uncertainty variables between star talent and 
production investments omitted for simplicity) 
A producer’s reputation and having an output deal seem to be closely 
interlinked. First, output contracting directly enhances a producer’s 
reputation, as Michael is arguing above. Second, distributors will typically 
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only offer output contracts to producers who are already reputable. One 
producer who had just gotten his first first-look deal told Variety: “Basically, 
when you can get a deal, you don't need one” (Harris, 2005a), suggesting 
that he had achieved a reputation which would have allowed him access to 
star talent and investments even without an output deal. Other producers use 
the additional leverage provided by their first-look deal to attract and line up 
outside investors, making them less dependent on the studio distributor and 
possibly being able to turn their first-look contract into a co-production 
financing contract (Harris, 2001). Furthermore, the relationship between star 
talent and production investments is interdependent. The inclusion of star 
talent encourages production investments by reducing uncertainty (as 
discussed in Section 7.2.1), but to include star talent a producer will typically 
need to have access to production financing. The relationships identified 
here between contracting, reputation, star talent, uncertainty and production 
investments may thus be summed up as illustrated in Figure 7.11 below. 
 
Figure 7.11 - Relationships identified between contracting, reputation, star 
talent, uncertainty and production investments 
7.2.3 Contracting Attractive Literary Properties 
Patterns similar to those identified for star talent above were also found for 
other core creative inputs vital to the packaging of a project, namely 
screenplays and/or literary properties. The attractiveness of literary 
properties may be similar to that of star talent in that the most popular 
properties will ultimately attract production investments (see Figure 7.6 
above). Producer Michael Shamberg, who has worked under both output and 
acquisition contracting and produced several high profile movies, including 
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“Pulp Fiction”, “Garden State” and “LOL”, says to Variety that he would 
take five good scripts over a bucket of money any day because “you can 
always get the money if the material is good” (McNary & Garrett, 2007). 
In his comments on the packaging benefits from having an output contract in 
the previous section, one of the interviewees, Michael, refers to agents 
generally, which covers talent agents representing star actors and directors, 
but it may also cover literary agents representing the work of writers. A 
relationship similar to that between contracting/reputation, production 
investments and star talent set out in Figures 7.9 and 7.10a above is for 
instance found in the following statement from a producer with an output 
deal at Paramount, a major studio, who says to Variety: "If you don't have 
[an output deal], people are going to think you don't have any juice. You 
won't get decent material from agents without a deal" (Harris, 2004). These 
are the same relationships, but with attractive literary properties or, more 
generally, attractive material substituting for star talent.  
 
Box 7.3 
When asked if producers working under output contracting have any benefits 
over others when it comes to obtaining attractive scripts James, an independent 
producer who previously worked under output deals with a major studio, says: 
Yes, they do. Because obviously what [agents] are trying to do is to get them 
sold. And they know that the studio has an ongoing relationship with an 
individual, and therefore they have an investment in that guy that they’re trying 
to get back their money on. And so… the more things that that guy has that they 
want, they will be in a better place to get their money back on their investment in 
that piece of talent. So the agencies will always send those things to – they’ll say: 
“Who do we think can get this thing done at Warner Bros. that we have a 
relationship with?” Now, sometimes you know they are obviously in a weird spot 
because they represent... Let’s say CAA [a major talent agency] represented me 
and I was at Paramount. What do they do now? They’ve got Tom Cruise there 
and they’ve got me there, you know what I mean? If I’m smart I’m gonna go 
somewhere else, because I know CAA ain’t gonna send me the script first. It’s 
going to Tom Cruise’s company, because they have a lot more riding on their 
relationship with Tom Cruise than they do with me. So… but they will always 
send it to those guys first. And then what they’ll do with somebody who is not 
attached to the studio. They’ll say: “You know, we don’t have anyone strong at 
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In Box 7.3 above James, an independent producer, provides more detail for 
the argument that a producer’s access to attractive material is primarily 
dependent on its production-distribution contracting. According to James, 
agents will see producers operating under an output contract as more able to 
purchase the material. Due to the frequent use of option contracting for 
material acquisitions (see Section 5.3.1), the ability to acquire will typically 
equal the ability to produce a movie based on the property. To effectuate an 
acquisition thus requires substantial production investments, and operating 
under an output contract is seen as signaling access to the required 
production financing. As a result, the relationship very much resembles that 
between contracting, production investments and access to star talent 
illustrated in Figure 7.9 above. Furthermore, and implicitly referring to first-
look contracts more than other forms of output contracts, James argues that 
agents will be aware that distributors have an added incentive to greenlight 
projects from first-look contracted producers, as this will be their only way 
to recoup the housekeeping payments they have invested in the producer 
relationships. Also, referring primarily to talent-controlled production 
companies in which the principal will typically be represented by a talent 
agency, James adds a producer’s talent agency affiliation as a moderating 
factor. If two producers represented by the same agency have an output 
contract with the same distributor, the more reputable of these two will 
always receive attractive material first, so the other would therefore be better 
off contracting with another distributor. Finally, according to James, only if 
an agency lacks a strong relationship with an output producer at a major 
studio distributor will they approach independent producers working under 
Fox. So, do you have a good relationship with Fox?” You say “yeah, I know 
these guys really well, we’ll talk about this and that and ...” They say “Great, 
why don’t you take this in to Fox if you like the material.” Because they’re just 
trying to figure out – for them it’s about averages: “The more people that read 
the screenplay, at a studio level that’s able to buy it, the more likely we are to sell 
it”. So it’s not about… “Well, you know, it’s their kind of movie.” They just want 
to get everyone that they can to read this, on the same weekend, with the 
producer or another piece of talent involved at each one of those places so 
they’ve got somebody championing that thing through so that somebody steps up 
and buys it. 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
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acquisition contracting with material. The objective will then be to have a 
movie produced based on the material under a pre-sale acquisition contract 
with a studio. And in these cases, the choice of producer will primarily rest 
on a producer’s reputation or perceived relationship with major studio 
distributors (similar to the effect of reputation argued by George in the 
previous section). Hence, producers working under acquisition contracting 
are generally second in line to those working under output contracting for 
attractive material. 
It follows from James’ statement in Box 7.3 that agents representing 
attractive material are ultimately targeting the greenlight decision makers, 
and to create a bidding situation they try reach as many of these as possible 
at the same time (similar to that described  by Jennifer in Section 6.2.1 for 
distribution rights bidding). For output distribution and some co-financing 
contracts, the producers will be the decision makers themselves, but for first-
look and pre-sale acquisition contracts, producers are used as a link to and 
allies in selling the material to the distributors that will ultimately make the 
decision. Producers are also decision makers for movies made under non-
presale acquisition contracting, but these are typically limited to lower 
budgets not considered sufficient or appropriate for the most attractive 
material. In sum, agents send their best material to the producers perceived 
most capable of effectuating an acquisition, and production-distribution 
contracting seems to be the primary determinant in the agents’ ranking of 
producers.  
Generally, the same patterns as shown for star talent in Figure 7.11 above 
seem to also be replicated for attractive material and/or literary properties. 
The emphasis here has been on the relationships between contracting, 
production investments and access to attractive material, but the relationship 
from attractive material via reduced uncertainty to production investments is 
also evident in the data. For instance, when MGM, a studio distributor, and 
Relativity, a financing and production company, acquired the film rights to 
Robert Ludlum’s novel, “The Matarece Circle,” for three million dollars in 
2008, it was seen as a reduced risk approach to creating a new movie 
franchise rivaling the highly successful Bourne-movies, which are also based 
on Ludlum’s work (Getlin, 2008). The material coming from the same 
author and within the same genre, as adapted for an already successful movie 
franchise, was thus seen as reducing product uncertainty and thereby as 
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attractive for the relatively high investments required to launch a rivaling 
franchise.  
The strength of the relationships shown in Figure 7.11 may of course vary 
from case to case depending on the particular material (or talent) in question. 
As discussed previously, a small number of top talent is perceived as being 
able to significantly reduce product and distribution performance risk while 
others will have less impact (see Section 5.3.2). Similarly, the most popular 
material (e.g. film rights to some best selling books, a spec script from a 
popular and successful screenwriter or film rights to comic book characters) 
may also be seen as to significantly reducing uncertainty (see Section 5.3.1). 
Other talent and material will have less impact on uncertainty, but then on 
the other hand also require less from producers in terms of contracting, 
reputation and access to production financing. 
7.2.4 Moderating Effects from Contract Uncertainty 
The producer’s contractual or non-contractual relationship with distributors 
and sources of production financing, which for some contract forms are the 
same, is primarily what Michael is referring to when he sums up the 
packaging benefits flowing from output contracting with “the appearance of 
power, proximity to power and perception of power” in Section 7.2.2 above. 
It follows, then, that a producer’s ability to attract star talent and material 
will also depend on the perceived “power” of the distributor with which it 
has a relationship, and particularly so for first-look contracts, in which the 
greenlight decision rests solely with the distributor. The impact of this 
dependency is evident when a distributor’s perceived ability to greenlight 
projects is rapidly changing. In the mini-case described in Box 7.4 below, 
the distributor’s ability to greenlight is seen as deteriorating, thus 
significantly reducing the value of the first-look contracts for producers in 
terms of getting agents’ attention for attractive inputs. While they retain their 
contractual benefits and housekeeping payments, these producers are 
reduced to “lame ducks” for the remainder of their contract period. In the 
context of each of these output contracts, the distributor’s diminished ability 
to greenlight projects may have been ex ante unforeseeable, at least for the 
producer and possibly for both parties. It may therefore be described as a 
negative outcome of environmental uncertainty (the distributor’s position 
deteriorated beyond its control) and/or behavioral uncertainty (the distributor 
failed to disclose its true position). Safeguards will typically be included in 
output contracts protecting producer’s continued rights to housekeeping 
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payments and other benefits in case of disturbances on the distributor’s end 
(Harris, 2005a), but  since this type of uncertainty still will negatively affect 
the contract’s effect on the producer’s ability to attract star talent and 
material, it may be seen as a moderating variable in the relationship between 
contracting, production investments and the ability to attract star 
talent/material, as indicated in Figure 7.12 below. To distinguish this type of 
uncertainty, which is directly related to the production-distribution contract 
from the project-related types it is labeled “contract uncertainty”.  
 
Box 7.4 
When Sony Pictures, a major studio, acquired MGM, another major but 
struggling studio, it created uncertainty among the producers that had output 
contracts with MGM as to Sony’s intentions and the future status of these 
contracts. Variety reports (Harris, 2005a): 
[…] Some producers say they've been told not to worry about violating their 
first-looks and that they can take their projects anywhere without fear that 
MGM will cut off the electricity over contract violations. 
However, an MGM rep said the studio will honor all obligations to its 
production companies -- and producers are obligated to submit their projects to 
the studio, per their contracts. […] 
While MGM is keeping producers off the streets, it's also negated the core 
reasons a producer might want a deal in the first place: Someone to call and the 
backing that gives people a reason to take their calls. 
Many producers say their deals are less about the money than the ability to call 
an agent or executive and identify yourself as being part of a larger and more 
powerful entity. 
"It's more of an emotional thing," says a producer based at Warner Bros. 
"There's prestige in being on the lot. It's nice to be able to call an agent and 
say, 'It's (producer's name) at Warner Bros.' " 
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Figure 7.12 - Relationships identified between contracting, production 
investments, star talent/material and contract uncertainty 
Another example of contract uncertainty is provided by James, an 
independent producer, in Box 7.5 above in which he describes the negative 
effect of management changes at a distributor for producers contracted with 
output deals under the outgoing management. Again, this is primarily 
relevant for first-look contracts (or pre-sale acquisition contracts if the 
producer-distributor relationship is not contractual) because these are the 
contracts under which producers are most dependent on distributors for 
greenlighting. While James does not extend his argument to attracting star 
talent or material, he clearly explains how a producer’s ability to get a 
project greenlighted may be negatively affected by a management change, 
and it is reasonable to assume that agents will anticipate such negative 
effects, recognize the producers’ new “lame duck” status and thus allocate a 
lower priority to the affected producers. In James’ example, the disturbance 
on the distributor’s end is clearly within the distributor’s control and the 
uncertainty is therefore best described as behavioral contract uncertainty. 
 
Box 7.5 
James, an independent producer who previously worked under output deals with 
a major studio, comments on how potential management changes at a studio 
distributor add uncertainty to an output contract, using the departure of Bill 
Mechanic as chairman at Fox Filmed Entertainment, a major studio, as an 
example: 
Inevitably, you have to recognize that relationships change and studio heads 
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7.3 Coordination of Production and Distribution Transactions 
Coordinated activities between producer and distributor are sometimes 
required for either party to carry out certain transactions, and a lack of 
coordination seems to deter specific investments into these transactions. The 
transactions particularly standing out with clear coordination needs in the 
data are packaging transactions (hiring star talent) on the producer’s end and 
exploitation transactions on the distributor’s end. These are among the 
producer and distributor’s more complex transactions and they are discussed 
in sequence here, with an emphasis on relationships between coordination on 
the one hand and contracting and investments on the other.  
change. Look what happened to Fox. You know, Fox was with Bill Mechanic. 
Bill Mechanic wanted to make a certain kind of movies, he wanted to make “The 
Fight Club”, he wanted to make darker, skewed, maybe less obviously 
commercial, more… you know, commercially challenging material that 
ultimately was kind of dark and interesting. Well, that’s great. So if I’m a 
producer there, the mandate is: “This is what we are looking to make and we’ve 
chosen you because we love [Movie Title] and we love this and we love that and 
we know that you think the way we think and you’re gonna do the kind of stuff 
that we love.” Great. Bill Mechanic gets fired, he leaves and now the other guy 
comes in, you know. And the other guy comes in and says: “Well, I’ll tell you 
what, we’re not gonna make no dark movies, ‘cos I saw what happened to the 
last guy who was here, who made all the dark movies.” So now all of a sudden 
you’re sitting there saying “Hey, I got all these movies in development.” 
“Why?”  “Because that’s what Fox said they wanted to be making.” So now all 
of a sudden, where are you going? You’re dead! You’re either in a situation that 
you can’t win or you throw everything out that you got and you say “OK. This is 
a new guy. Can I wrap my head around what it is that they wanna do?” A, and 
B: Are you even gonna get a chance to do that, or are they just going to say: 
“We’ve seen what this guy makes and we don’t wanna do that. It’s not good, it’s 
not bad, it’s just not what we wanna do.” So like I said, with the changeover in 
management it becomes very difficult sometimes because whoever comes in 
there, who is in, quotes “the movie sort of green light guy” would like to believe 
that they have a pattern with which they work that becomes discernible. And so 
you either fit that or you don’t. 
  James, producer/President, independent production company 
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7.3.1 Producer’s Coordination Needs 
In Section 7.2.2 above, Tom explains how most producers will not be able to 
hire star talent without the financial backing of a major studio distributor to 
cover their high fees. Such backing is obtained through contracting, most 
typically through output contracts, but also through pre-sale acquisition 
contracts. Since hiring star talent to a large degree is a question of attracting 
the necessary production investments, one may say that more integrated 
contracting facilitates the necessary coordination to allow for investments in 
star talent.   
Furthermore, hiring star talent requires coordination between producer and 
distributor to facilitate offers of so-called gross deals. These are agreements 
between producer and talent in which the talent’s compensation is defined as 
a share of the distributor’s gross receipts from the movie (i.e. a gross 
corridor is defined and allocated to the talent), and it typically also includes 
an upfront advance payment drawn against this share. For the most popular 
stars, the gross corridor may often be as wide as 25%, and the most 
favorable deals have reached 35% (Dunkley & Brodesser, 2002), and the 
upfront payment or advance may reach more than USD 20 million (see 
Section 5.3.2 above). For commercially successful movies, the talent’s 
backend from a gross deal will typically greatly exceed the advance 
payment, as illustrated in the “Mission Impossible III”/Tom Cruise-example 
in Section 7.2.2 above. Technically a producer may of course grant a star 
25% of distributor’s gross before contracting a distributor, but it would entail 
some serious complications.  
First, a producer granting this type of gross deal to talent prior to contracting 
a distributor would face an uphill battle when turning around to negotiate 
with distributors since the gross deal has significant implications on the 
distributor’s own break-even point. A hypothetical example based on a 
simple standard industry estimate technique (Blume, 2006) illustrates the 
problem: Assuming a typical waterfall recoupment order as illustrated in 
Figure 6.3, and that a distributor would need to make distribution 
investments of USD 25 million in the movie (which is approximately the 
2007-average for studio-affiliated specialty distributors), the distributor’s 
gross would need to reach USD 33.3 million for the distributor to make a 
cash break-even, and USD 41.7 million to break even if a 15% distribution 
fee should be calculated. If the movie for instance should end up grossing 
USD 30 million, the distributor would be left with a cash loss of USD 2.5 
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million (i.e. also without any distribution fee, interest or other imputed costs 
covered), while the star actor would walk away with USD 7.5 million. The 
complete production investment would also be lost. Since talent gross deals 
have such impact on their investment risk distributors would see any gross 
deals attached to a project as a significant liability. Considering that 
producers at the outset face a relatively small number bargaining when 
contracting a distributor, adding this type of liability would significantly 
increase its channel uncertainty, even though having the star would have an 
opposite effect.  
Second, without a distribution contract it would be impossible for the 
producer to provide a precise definition of “distributor’s gross”. As 
discussed in Section 6.2.2 above, there may be significant variations in how 
this term is defined with important value sharing implications. Hence, star 
actors and their agents are likely to view any gross deal offer for a movie 
without distribution contracted as highly uncertain and thus less valuable.  
More typically, when packaging a movie without a distributor contracted, a 
producer may offer talent participation in the producer’s gross receipts, i.e. 
the monies received by the producer from distributors. Such offer requires 
no coordination with distributors. Producers utilizing these types of talent 
contracts, however, will often seek revenue sharing distribution agreements 
in which the producer’s participation starts pari passu with the distributor’s 
recoupment of its distribution investments, as reported in Box 6.7. For the 
talent, participating in the producer’s gross is of course much less attractive 
than participating in the distributor’s gross, partly because the all-important 
producer-distributor split remains unknown; thus, such offers are not 
necessarily sufficient to attract star talent. 
When asked why most commercial movies seem to be made with 
distributors attached prior to production, Michael, the head of a production 
studio and former chairman of a major studio distributor, names talent gross 
deals as one of the factors that demand integrated contracting for a project: 
Because they are expensive. Expensive big stars - gross participants. 
All those reasons drive it to be part of the studio process. You might 
make a six-million-dollar film and be sure of a million dollars [in 
foreign revenues] and hopefully get an acquisition of it in the post-
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production phase. You won’t make a sixty-million-dollar film and do 
that unless you’re a boob [an idiot]. 
   Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production studio 
Michael’s comment is echoing Brad’s comment in Section 7.1.4 above on 
the significance of budget, and budget may also here be seen as a moderating 
variable. Star talent gross deals are typically associated with higher budgeted 
movies. Lower budgeted movies are less dependent on star talent, thus also 
on gross deals, and the need for coordination is therefore less.  
7.3.2 Distributor’s Coordination Needs 
Turning to the distributor’s needs for coordination between its distribution 
transactions and the production transactions, the data suggests coordination 
issues in a number of areas. Possibly most striking is the coordination needs 
for exploitation transactions, in which a key issue is the long lead time 
required by the distributor’s partners. For merchandising types of 
exploitation transactions, Ovadia (2006) suggests a lead time of one to two 
years prior to a movie’s release, the longest time typically required by video 
game licensees in order to have the games ready concurrently with the 
movie’s release. But also toys may sometimes require up to two years. For 
the “Spider-Man” example provided in Box 5.8, an announcement was made 
to prospective licensees two years before the movie was released, and it is 
evident from the text why so much time was needed (e.g. processing 10,000 
approvals). If brand placements are included in a distributor’s exploitation 
transaction mix, these must be made prior to production so that the brands 
and products can be incorporated into the movie. And promotional tie-in 
types (see Box 5.9) also require significant lead time as explained by Emilie, 
marketing executive at a major studio, below. When asked about how she 
works differently with movies obtained through acquisition and output deals, 
she says: 
When it’s an acquisition, usually the movie is made. We haven’t had 
anything to do with the early set-up of the movie, any early 
awareness, what have you. If it’s a movie that we made then I am 
usually involved from the minute we make the decision to make it, so 
I’m working on this year’s movies right now, next year’s movies, one 
movie for the following year… long-term planning. You know, it 
affects areas like third-party partners, McDonalds and Coca-Cola. 
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They plan way far ahead and dictate their advertising campaigns 
way far ahead and allocate their dollars. The acquisition movies, 
they’re done. So usually you get it a couple months before you throw 
a campaign together.  
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
With these demands for long-term planning many exploitation transactions 
will be impossible to combine with non-presale acquisition contracting. 
Since not even the most basic form of coordination – the producer and 
distributor agreeing on doing the movie together – is possible, these movies 
will thus not be able to benefit from the extra distribution investments and 
value creation that these exploitation transactions could have brought (e.g. 
media buys).  
While the exploitation transactions offer a striking example of coordination 
requirements, the distributor’s need for coordination with production 
transactions is much broader. For movies made under output deals, which 
Emilie refers to as “the movies we make,” she as head of marketing is 
involved from the moment the greenlight decision is made. When asked why 
this is important and what kind of inputs she provides she says: 
I will weight in on casting decisions, you know, “Is it better if you 
had so and so and so and so. Or would you rather have a big star or 
an unknown? If I got you this could you take that?” That kind of 
thing… so sometimes casting decisions. Sometimes rating issues: 
“PG or PG13? We could shoot it a little bit this way or a little bit 
that way. Do you think it really affects the marketing of the movie?” 
So those are the initial conversations and then beyond that when the 
movie is in production you can do a lot of marketing. You can get a 
lot of stuff done while they’re shooting a movie and hold on to it for 
later. And not have to run around trying to find everybody... actors 
go to another project. So if you make a film and then you go to 
release it… you really should have enough photos of Mel Gibson 
and he is in, you know… God knows where, shooting another movie. 
You got to sort of track him down and his folks done this and maybe 
he has his hair differently, you got to do a shoot, you have to find a 
wig. So if you’re involved in the shooting, you can do special photo 
shoots. You can have your blinds if it’s an R-rated movie. You can 
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clean up some dialogs [for trailers]; you can shoot all your 
magazines covers for your publicity campaign. It’s just accessibility. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
Jennifer, who is a marketing executive at a major studio specialty division in 
which a much higher ratio of their movies are acquisitions, points out many 
of the same issues, but from a different angle: 
When you acquire a movie, you often have, almost always have 
really bad [still] photography because no one’s had money to go 
and do photography during the shoot… still photography usually 
stinks. And for our kind of movie that’s really bad, because you are 
trying to get a New York Times Sunday pre-opening piece or an LA 
Times piece and you want a big photo of it and the photography is 
often just horrible. So we have to go back and try to get the cast 
back and get them back in costume or something and re-shoot 
something. And also EPK material, Electronic Press Kit, usually 
hasn’t been done so there are no interviews with anybody. Or they 
have been really badly shot so we often have to go back and try to 
re-create those materials. There’s obviously been no press on the set 
in most cases so… For one of our [output] productions we would 
bring press on to do the production pieces. You lose that 
opportunity. And, you know, also you loose any opportunity to help 
shape the movie. You can’t say: “This piece of casting is not so 
good” and “What if you did this” and… In our own productions, we 
have a lot to say and we have a lot of voting: “Is this person more 
marketable than that person? Who is better for publicity? Who will 
actually get out and work [for publicity] on the film and who 
won’t?” And when something is acquired all those things are done 
and you have nothing to say about it. 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
The contracting forms that allow producer and distributor to collaborate 
already from the packaging stage of development will thus not only provide 
distributors with all the lead time needed, but also allow them to provide 
feedback to producers that may better coordinate production transactions 
with distributors’ marketing strategies. This feedback may be in the form of 
approvals (for presale acquisition, first-look and some co-production 
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financing contracts) or consultation (for output distribution and some co-
production financing contracts). Above, both Emilie and Jennifer emphasize 
casting. Through casting, the distributor may seek to ensure that a movie’s 
marketability matches the scope of its production and the revenues required 
for break-even. Casting may also affect the efficiency of their publicity 
transactions because some actors are more willing and positive to publicity 
work than others. Emilie also emphasizes rating, which is primarily a 
question of coordinating the producer’s and distributor’s thinking on target 
audience, which also will affect which marketing tools are available for the 
distributor. For example, a movie that from its general theme is suitable for a 
broad family-oriented audience will be difficult for the distributor to market 
if elements of the production (certain language or scenes) bump it up to a 
higher rating, thereby excluding the youngest audience and signaling to 
parents that it may be unsuitable as a family movie. For both these areas, the 
distributor may utilize market research tools that are seldom used by 
producers (see Section 5.4.2, other transactions). Also, according to Jennifer, 
without coordination some transactions are carried out so poorly that they 
have to be re-done, which is poor production economics, and some will 
simply not be done (e.g. publicity during production) and potential value 
creation may therefore be lost in the same way as discussed for exploitation 
transactions above.  
Nevertheless, that potential value creation may be lost does not mean that it 
always is lost. Even when contracted prior to production, the distributor may 
choose not to utilize some marketing tool if they feel there is a negative 
tradeoff between these and certain aspects of value creation in production. 
However, these tradeoffs can only be evaluated by distributors if they are 
contracted prior to production.  Julia, marketing executive at a mini-major 
distributor, provides an example in a relatively low-budgeted arthouse movie 
they distributed: 
“[Movie Title]” which is a picture that in the “inde” world has done 
extremely well - it was very well received from an Academy 
perspective [for Oscar nominations]. That’s a picture that we were 
involved in production on and I think the campaign… We were 
involved as a marketing group very little during the production 
phase of that campaign. There was no on-set publicity; there was no 
on-set promotion. The decision was made not to do that because of 
the performance the director was required to get out of those actors. 
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It would just not work to have, you know, PepsiCola on Saturday, 
Entertainment Tonight on Sunday. It would have been counter-
intuitive to what he was trying to get out of them. So we picked the 
campaign up after the picture effectively was finished. In my 
opinion, that picture would not have benefited from us being there 
on set and working that out at an early stage. 
 Julia, Executive VP Worldwide Marketing, mini-major distributor 
7.3.3 Coordination Efficiency 
The marketing executives interviewed also made comments suggesting that 
the coordination between producer and distributor tends to be most effective 
for producers with whom they have built a relationship through repeated 
transactions. When talking about how her studio specialty division 
sometimes likes to continue working with certain filmmakers that eventually 
“graduate” to make movies for the parent studio, Jennifer ads: 
Yeah, and that makes my job much easier because it’s... When you 
are first getting to know the people, there’s this whole thing about 
teaching them the process, how we do it, how they wanna do it, how 
to collaborate. And once you have it done one time, it’s much easier 
to do it next time because you don’t have to... It’s like dating, you 
don’t have to go through that first date, you just get right to the 
point. 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
Similarly, when asked if the relationships built with her studio’s output 
producers affect her collaboration with these compared to producers from 
which the studio have made an acquisition, Emilie replies: 
Oh absolutely. But also because there’s a short hand, that comes 
with it... Certain producers that I’ve worked with repeatedly - they 
trust us. They know we do a good job and there’s a short hand that 
goes with doing business with them that makes my life easier. And 
I’m sure it makes their life easier. When you’re starting from 
scratch, you have to get to a point, you know... Filmmakers and 
producers, generally, don’t trust studio people. I mean, they just 
don’t. You probably heard that from people. They just think that we 
have no talent and we are not creative and we only see the bottom 
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line and we won’t protect their art, and… generally speaking. So, 
the people that I’ve already convinced we are good guys and “we 
are gonna take care of you, and we believe in you and your movie,” 
that’s a good place to start. But the other ones, they come and they 
merely think that you’re gonna give them not enough attention. So 
clearly it’s easier to have a relationship. 
   Emilie, President Domestic Marketing, major studio 
Because the coordination generally seems to become more effective with 
repeated transactions between producer and distributor, there may also be a 
coordination benefit to output contracting over pre-sale acquisition 
contracting. While the latter may allow collaboration already at the 
packaging stage, the collaboration may be less effective than under output 
contracts.  
7.3.4 Coordination-Centered Relationships between Contracting and 
Investments 
The coordination-centered relationships identified in the data throughout the 
subsections above are summarized in Figure 7.13 below. Generally, more 
integrated contracting forms allow for better coordination between 
production and distribution transactions within a project, and better 
coordination allows for greater specific investments in both production and 
distribution elements. The transactions with the most striking coordination 
needs, packaging star talent and exploitation, in which investments most 
greatly benefit from improved coordination, are both complex transactions 
typically associated with higher budgeted movies. The impact on the 
investments of producer and distributor not being able to coordinate these 
will therefore likely be less for lower budgeted movies. As discussed above, 
higher budgets generally entail more complex production and distribution 
transactions, and the importance of coordination and its impact on 
investments is thus increasing with budget and complexity. 
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Figure 7.13 - Relationships identified between contracting, coordination and 
investments, with budget and complexity as moderating variables 
7.4 Horizontal Contracting Effects on Investments 
The horizontal contracting structure applied to a project may affect project-
specific investments in both production and distribution transactions. Two 
patterns are identified in the data. First, all rights contracting seems to 
encourage distribution investments, and second, when split rights contracting 
is used, more vertically integrated forms of domestic distribution contracting 
seem to encourage production investments.  
7.4.1 Effects on Distribution Investments 
A movie’s performance in ancillary markets will generally depend on its 
primary market performance (see Section 5.4.1 above), and the data 
indicates that foreign territories are most often seen as ancillary markets. 
Hence, there is an expected spillover effect from a movie’s domestic market 
performance to its performance in foreign territories, and distributors making 
domestic distribution investments will thus seek to also control foreign 
territories to fully benefit from their domestic investments.  
In Section 6.2.1 above, George, an independent producer, explains how a 
domestic distributor based on this logic almost forces him to buy back 
certain foreign territories he has presold as a condition for taking domestic 
rights. The distributor is hesitant to make the required domestic distribution 
investments unless it can also harvest the expected foreign externalities from 
these investments. George adds that his general experience is that 
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distributors will ask for foreign territories before making a commitment to 
invest in domestic distribution. 
James, another independent producer who previously worked under output 
deals with a major studio, argues that the horizontal contracting will also 
affect how aggressively a distributor pushes a movie in the primary market:  
There’s just no way in the world, having been through as many 
[movies] as I’ve been through, that anybody’s going to convince me 
that a domestic distributor that doesn’t have the overseas rights to 
the movie is going to take the domestic release… and go out as 
aggressively as they would if they had the rest of the world. It’s just 
not gonna happen. Cause every dollar here has a spillover effect 
overseas. Everybody over there knows what’s going on over here, 
what’s a hit, what’s not, you know, they know when movies are 
coming out, they’ve seen the television, they’ve seen the premiere. 
Every dollar you spend here does have a ripple effect. It’s not dollar 
for dollar, but it has a ripple effect. And that’s something that as a 
producer you are well aware of, but, like I said, if they’re not the 
same group they’re not going to treat it the same way. 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
When asked about preferences for all rights or split rights acquisitions, 
Jennifer, marketing executive at a major studio specialty division, reiterates 
the same view with added detail and reasoning from the distributor’s 
perspective: 
Jennifer: We would prefer to have worldwide rights, or English-
speaking rights. We have a lot of pay-television deals through [the 
parent studio]. So we have good deals in Germany, in France, in 
Italy, in Spain where we get money through pay-TV. And if we have 
to make a North America-only deal we forego all that. So it’s really 
hard for us to come out on a North American deal, it’s very risky. 
We don’t have any cushion, we don’t have any way to say: “But 
even if we totally fail we’re gonna get this amount of money from 
Germany, this amount of money from France”- you know, it doesn’t 
exist. So it’s kind of like doing a tightrope without a safety net. And 
we did it with “[Movie Title, same as in Box 6.1].” “[Movie Title]” 
was essentially a North America-only deal, I mean we had one or 
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two other territories, and we came out great because the movie did 
really well and it got great reviews, but we don’t like to do the high-
wire act too many times. We’d much rather have worldwide rights, 
or at least give us couple of territories where we can get some form 
of television money. 
TG: OK, so you see it as more of a high-wire act… How does it 
affect then the way you think about it marketing wise if you have a 
movie that you know you only got North American rights on… or if 
you have worldwide? 
Jennifer: Well, I can be more aggressive if we have worldwide 
rights. I can be more aggressive about spending in the US to get it 
going. Cause I know that if we can get something going here, it’s 
gonna go all over the world and every dollar I’m spending here is 
gonna help the future. And also I have this safety net of foreign 
money coming in from TV, so even if I screw up, I’m gonna be 
ultimately saved. But if it’s North America you have to be really 
cautious, because you could just throw yourself into a big loss and 
you are not even helping [your company for] the rest of the world, 
you’re not helping [your] International Home Video [division]. 
You’re helping other people on the movie rather than helping 
yourself. 
 Jennifer, President Marketing, major studio specialty division 
Jennifer’s last sentence seems to reflect the thinking of George’s distributor 
too; if he cannot buy back the pre-sold territories for them, they will be 
helping other people rather than helping themselves. Jennifer’s comments 
also show that the wish to control all rights is not only a question of being 
able to exploit the upside from cross-territorial externalities, but possibly 
more so a question of protecting the downside. The distributor is reducing its 
investment risk by adding a “cushion” of foreign output licensing deals, 
primarily for pay-TV (of the type also described by Tom, COO at a major 
studio, in Box 6.12). These licensees will typically pay a fixed price for each 
movie supplied by the distributor that has received a theatrical North 
American release. These revenues are thus not dependent on audience 
reception, and as such these deals provide a “safety net” of predictable 
income for the distributor. 
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It follows from the above that in these cases referred to by the interviewees, 
more horizontally integrated contracting has a positive effect on distribution 
investments. First, split rights may deter distribution investments since it 
may increase the distributor’s exhibition channel uncertainty by excluding 
ancillary output licensing deals.  Second, all rights contracting may invite the 
distributor to more aggressively invest in primary market distribution since it 
will be able to also benefit from ancillary market spillover effects. The 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 7.14 below. 
 
Figure 7.14 - Relationships identified between horizontal contracting, 
uncertainty, spillovers and distribution investments 
Similar relationships may also be present in horizontal co-production 
contracting. Emilie, marketing executive at a major studio, suggests that the 
majority of these contracts are made as so-called one-pot deals, meaning that 
studios co-financing and co-distributing a movie split all revenues rather 
than each retaining their own revenue streams (see Box 6.3). Based on the 
above, one may argue that this is done to align investment incentives and to 
avoid free rider behavior from the distributor holding foreign rights.  
7.4.2 Effects on Production Investments 
The degree of horizontal integration also affects production investments, 
even though these patterns are somewhat sketchier than for distribution 
investments. However, two patterns were found. First, split rights 
contracting may pose a coordination problem between the producer and the 
various distributors that deter investments. Second, under split rights 
contracting, foreign distributors’ production investments are dependent on 
the domestic distribution contracting. 
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Split rights contracting affects the relationship between distributors and 
producers, and James, an independent producer, links the production 
investment argument to how this type of agreement typically reduces the 
distributors’ control and influence. When asked if split rights means greater 
control for the producer, he replies: 
Yeah, absolutely. It does. But it only puts him in a stronger position 
because you have less people…, well, more people with lesser risk, 
essentially. That’s what I think sort of empowers the producer in that 
place. You have less money at risk from any individual guy so no one 
guy can come up and say: “Yeah, well, it’s our 100 million dollars 
so I don’t care what you say,” you know, “blah, blah, blah.” It’s like 
“this is our 28,” and this guy’s got 14, this guy’s got 9, and this 
guy… so you are in effect the pinnacle of a spoked wheel that sort of 
goes in those different directions and it’s all sort of feeding back to 
you… But, but you know, in effect I don’t see necessarily that kind of 
power being something that’s going to generate better movies. I 
think it’s just ..., unfortunately what it really means is that more 
people are indifferent about the result. You’re running something 
that nobody cares about, because nobody cares enough about it to 
fund it. 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
From here, James makes a production investment argument similar to the 
distribution investment argument made by Jennifer above, in which she says 
than an extra investment primarily benefits other people on the movie, not 
yourself. James says:  
It’s hard to convince somebody for example that this extra amount of 
money is really going to make [the movie] better if you’ve got a 
feeling like “We’ve only got 20% in it, what the hell do we care?” 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
Under a split rights contract, no distributor is likely to hike its contribution 
towards the production investments (i.e. its acquisition price) without all 
other distributors matching this hike with amounts relative to their “share” of 
the movie (and what “share of a movie” any single territory represents is 
often not specified or agreed upon in the contracts). A distributor making a 
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unilateral extra production investment would be “helping other people on the 
movie” since production investments generate added value to a joint product, 
of which all distributors have a share. Seeking extra investments for 
production budget hikes from a group of split rights distributors will thus 
first pose a coordination problem. Second, split rights contracting is typically 
associated with vertical contracting types in which distributors have less 
control over production transactions (see Tables 6.1 and 6.2), so hesitating to 
invest any extra in production may not only be a question of “not caring,” 
but also of lacking safeguards to protect the investment. However, James’ 
argument is primarily a question of adaptation: New information may reveal 
that extra project-specific investments into production are desirable, but the 
lack of horizontally integrated contracting poses transaction (coordination) 
costs, preventing such investments and thus resulting in ex post 
maladaptation.  
A stronger pattern for production investments is found in how, under split 
rights contracting, the vertical contracting form of the domestic contract 
affects the availability of production investments from foreign distributors.  
When Michael, head of a production studio operating under a co-production 
financing contract, describes the financing of his company and thus the 
sources for his production investments in Box 6.18 above, he says that “each 
of the partners internationally provide us with an advance based upon the 
percentage of the budget that their territory is responsible for.” These 
partners are distributors in larger foreign territories such as Japan, the UK, 
Australia, Spain, Italy and France, with which his company has output deals. 
Some smaller territories are included in the contract with the domestic 
distributor, and the rest are sold under a contract with an international sales 
agency. As discussed in Section 6.3.2 above, the advances his company 
receives from these various output deals represent a substantial part of the 
production financing share Michael’s production studio covers under its co-
production financing contract with the domestic distributor. However, these 
foreign output deals, and consequently a substantial share of the producer’s 
financing under the co-production financing contract, is dependent on that 
same contract. Michael explains: 
In the international market, all international distributors in order to 
make a deal make it a condition we’re having US distributors. If a 
product is American-international product, they want you to have a 
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major North American distributor if they gonna guarantee the 
release internationally in their territory. Almost all of them require 
that. And then on a contrary side, if you don’t have a domestic 
distribution deal, you’ll have to go around and sell each picture to a 
studio for domestic distribution, which is possible to do. But it’s 
hard to run a business that way… - it’s not necessarily hard to make 
an individual picture that way - cause you can’t really forward plan 
too easily. If you know all your domestic distribution is covered by 
one company, it’s one less challenge you have to deal with on every 
picture.  
   Michael, Chairman and CEO, pact production studio 
Here, one recognizes the “foreign territories as ancillary market”-thinking 
also from the foreign distributors’ perspective. The foreign distributors see a 
North American theatrical release as a guarantee for the movie having the 
required marketability and playability also in their territories and 
furthermore expect to benefit from an awareness created through the North 
American release plus possibly also from marketing materials created by the 
North American distributors (see Box 6.1 above). Without a North American 
theatrical release, contracted foreign distributors typically perceive the 
uncertainty as too great for guaranteeing a release and thus an advance from 
their own territory. Exceptions do occur (see Box 6.5), but then typically for 
movies that contain star talent or similar elements that can substitute for the 
North American distribution contract in terms of reducing uncertainty. 
While some co-production financing contracts are not or less dependent on 
split rights (as for Dreamworks and Pandemonium discussed in Section 6.3.2 
above), it is a reoccurring pattern in the data that they are of the split rights 
type and that producers rely on foreign output deals to cover their part of the 
production investments. When asked if an all rights deal with the domestic 
distributor would have made it difficult for him to cover production 
investments Michael, replies: “You wouldn’t have any financing resources. 
You wouldn’t have any. Zero.”  
The relationships between split rights contracting, domestic vertical 
contracting and production investments are illustrated in Figure 7.15 below. 
The relationships are very similar to those shown between vertical 
contracting and production investments in Figure 7.5 above, but the model 
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below may be seen as a special case in which production investments come 
through foreign distribution contracts. The similarities are underlined by 
Ryan, marketing and distribution executive at a larger independent 
production company, who says that their foreign equity investors providing 
project-specific production finance are no different from the foreign 
distributors with regard to the requirement of having North American 
distribution contracted. 
 
Figure 7.15 - Relationships identified between vertical, horizontal 
contracting, uncertainty and production investments 
7.5 Summary of Empirical Relationships 
A summary of the empirical relationships detected in the data and discussed 
in the previous sections is illustrated in Figure 7.16 below. It includes the 
key variables studied and identified, but to increase legibility it excludes 
some finer distinctions (e.g. between domestic and foreign contracting as in 
Figure 7.15 above and the role of commitments in Figure 7.5). Considering 
that it only reflects the patterns that clearly emerged from the data and yet 
draws a somewhat complex picture, it also serves as a reminder of the 
limitless detail and complexity of the empirical world.  
While somewhat complex, it does provide an overview over which variables 
affect each other. It shows that the factors that directly affect project-specific 
production investments are channel and distribution performance 
uncertainty, as well as the degree of coordination between producer and 
distributor. Project-specific distribution investments are directly affected by 
the same two factors plus the production investments and externalities linked 
to horizontal distribution. Of these variables that directly affect investments, 
vertical contracting directly affects channel and distribution performance 
uncertainty as well as coordination. Similarly, horizontal contracting affects 
channel and distribution performance uncertainty plus externalities. There is 
thus a relatively direct relationship between contracting and project-specific 
investments through these intermediate variables.  
Domestic 
Contracting 
Foreign 
Contracting 
Uncertainty 
Production 
Investments 
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The figure also clearly illustrates the centrality of channel and distribution 
performance uncertainty. Treated as one composed variable, as here, it 
affects both production and distribution investments, and is affected by both 
vertical and horizontal contracting. Furthermore, it affects and is affected by 
a number of other intermediate variables, thus playing a key role in how 
these affect investments and how they are affected by contracting. 
Borrowing one of James’ metaphors from above, one may say that channel 
and distribution performance uncertainty is the closest one gets to the 
pinnacle in the spoked wheel of contracting-investment relationships. 
 
Figure 7.16 - Summary of empirical relationships (with effects from 
moderating variables marked by dashed arrows) 
The centrality of star talent and material is reflected in how it affects channel 
and distribution performance uncertainty via product uncertainty, and thus 
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investments. Similarly, a project’s budget level, determining the degree of 
asset specificity for project-specific production investments, is central as it 
affects channel uncertainty, and it further affects the complexity that 
moderates the effect of coordination on both production and distribution 
investments. Reputation is important, as it affects access to star talent and 
material, vertical contracting and channel and performance uncertainty. And 
finally, contracting uncertainty needs to be considered since it moderates the 
effect of vertical contracting on channel and distribution performance 
uncertainty, and therefore also on investments.  
The complexity is also mirrored in the length of certain relational chains and 
hence in the interplay between variables. For instance, vertical contracting 
affects reputation, which again affects access to star talent and material, 
which reduces product uncertainty and therefore channel uncertainty, which 
again encourages investments in both production and distribution (for which 
the first also affects the second). Along the way down this chain, there are 
other interactions between variables (e.g. reputation directly affects channel 
uncertainty), and variables outside the chain will also affect the outcome 
(e.g. producer-distributor coordination, which is dependent on vertical 
contracting, will directly affect investments). 
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8 Implications for Understanding the Origins of 
Specific Investments 
This chapter will review the findings presented in the previous chapter from 
the perspective of the express research objective to better understand the 
effects of governance structure on specific investments. Broader implications 
for the proposed transaction value model and TCE theory are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
First, a note on governance structure and specific investments: In the context 
of this study, governance structure equals contracting since all vertical cases 
represent contractual exchanges (integrated and spot market exchange cases 
are excluded or do not exist). Specific investments or asset specificity as 
identified in this study does not fit neatly into Williamson’s (1991) 
categories, but may best be categorized as product specificity, a category 
developed by David and Han (2004) to include such empirical measures of 
asset specificity such as customized final product, customized input 
component, and development cost of final product,6 which is also similar to 
Masten’s (1984) product or design complexity. Since Williamson 
emphasizes physical and human asset specificity, his focus is on how 
specific investments create production cost savings. In the context of this 
study and with the type of asset specificity examined here, looking for 
production cost savings following specific investments creates little 
meaning. However, production cost savings should not be seen as an end in 
itself, but as a mean of value creation, and product-type specific investments 
create value directly instead of indirectly via production cost savings. 
Williamson (1985) posts the following key tradeoff with regard to physical 
type specific investments: “Do the prospective cost savings afforded by the 
special purpose technology justify the strategic hazards that arise as a 
consequence of their nonsalvageable character?” (p. 54). In the context of 
product-type specific investments it may be reformulated as: Do the 
prospective added value afforded by specific investments justify the strategic 
hazards that arise as a consequence of their nonsalvageable character?  
The following sections will discuss the theoretical implications of the 
relationships between contracting and specific investments presented in the 
                                                     
6 Interestingly, this is the category of asset specificity measurements that has obtained the 
strongest support when testing asset specificity as an independent variable in the empirical 
TCE literature (David & Han 2004). 
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previous chapter. These relationships are related to both the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions of contracting (see Figure 3.3). Since no simple direct 
relationship was discovered, the discussion is organized around each of the 
intermediate and underlying variables identified: uncertainty, coordination 
and spillovers. Finally, in a more holistic view of the relationships identified 
between contracting and specific investments, the concept of 
interdependence as developed by Thompson (1967) for organizational 
design theory is discussed and adapted to the current TCE context. 
8.1 How Contracting Affects Specific Investments due to 
Uncertainty 
It has been the aim of this study to contribute to expanding TCE theory not 
necessarily by incorporating new concepts and constructs, but primarily by 
further developing the understanding of interplays between its already 
defined core constructs. It follows from the proposed transaction value 
model that specific investments are treated as the dependent variable and 
contracting is chosen  as the focal independent variable; the study is thus 
turning one of the most important and tested tenets of TCE upside-down. 
This ensuing research strategy is also in line with suggestions made by the 
authors of two recent reviews of the empirical TCE literature (David & Han, 
2004; Macher & Richman, 2008). As established in the previous chapter, it 
is particularly interesting in this context that when no clear direct casual 
relationship from contracting to specific investments is identified, the most 
prominent intermediate variable to emerge establishing such relationships is 
uncertainty, another core TCE construct.  
This section will first discuss the effects of contracting on specific 
investments via uncertainty directly, and then also the indirect function of 
resources in this relationship. 
8.1.1 Uncertainty as a Sole Intermediate Variable  
As described in Chapter 2, the previously established TCE relationships 
between specific investments, uncertainty and contracting may be illustrated 
as in Figure 8.1 below. A certain level of uncertainty is assumed to always 
be present, and this causes disturbances to which the capacity of each type of 
contract to respond will differ (Williamson, 1985). The two key established 
relationships are (marked as arrows 1 and 2 in Figure 8.1):  
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As specific investments increase, the transaction costs associated with less 
integrated forms of contracting increase and more integrated forms become 
preferred over the less integrated forms (1).  
For any fixed nontrivial level of specific investments, increased uncertainty 
raises the transaction costs associated with less integrated contracting 
forms, and more integrated forms become preferred over the less integrated 
forms (2). 
 
Figure 8.1 - Established TCE relationships between specific investments, 
uncertainty and contracting form 
While the first of these two relationships have received relatively strong 
support in the empirical literature, the empirical results for the second are 
less convincing (David & Han, 2004). However, as David and Han also 
point out in their review, this may partly be a result of misreading the theory, 
testing uncertainty as having a direct effect on contracting instead of a 
moderating effect as shown in Figure 8.1. It follows from (2) above, that at 
low levels of specificity any changes in uncertainty will have little or no 
effect on the preferred contracting form (Harrigan, 1986), and such results 
may be misread as a lack of support for the theory if the level of asset 
specificity is not properly taken into consideration. 
Turning to the findings between these three variables described in the 
previous chapter, two further relationships may be added. First, in the cases 
studied here, uncertainty is dependent on the contracting form. More 
vertically integrated contracts provide the producer with more commitments 
and safeguards regarding the distributor’s share of the joint value creation, 
thereby reducing channel and distribution performance uncertainty. By 
Specific 
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Uncertainty 
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adding product uncertainty, it has the opposite effect on the distributor. The 
increased level of uncertainty for the distributor may be moderated by 
assigning more control over production transactions to the distributor, but 
this is a zero-sum game, as it reduces the producer’s control. More integrated 
forms of contracting therefore imply a tradeoff between less uncertainty for 
the specific upstream investments and more uncertainty for the specific 
downstream investments. Differences in uncertainty that follow from 
sequential decision-making are to some degree leveled out by more 
integrated contracting. 
Also, more horizontally integrated contracts reduce market performance 
uncertainty. There are primarily two mechanisms causing this reduction in 
uncertainty: cross-collateralization and the exploitation of established 
downstream market channels, if any. With horizontally integrated contracts, 
the distributor may cross revenue streams from various territories and media 
and thus recoup losses in one channel with profits made in another. It also 
allows distributors to utilize established exhibition sector output contracts 
(e.g. pay-TV agreements) that will typically deliver a fixed pre-negotiated 
fee. The presence of both mechanisms reduces the uncertainty under which 
specific distribution investments are made. However, for revenue-sharing 
contracts, the distributor’s ability to cross revenue streams may be seen as 
increasing the producer’s market performance uncertainty since the 
producer’s share from profitable channels is less likely to be paid out. 
Distributors absorb their losses from revenues that would otherwise have 
been subject to a split with producers. Hence, the effects of this mechanism 
on uncertainty become a zero-sum game between the distributor and 
producer because revenue streams are essentially crossed when they reach 
the distributor instead of when they reach the producer. The overall 
uncertainty effect of more horizontally integrated contracting will thus 
largely depend on the distributor having established downstream market 
channels. 
Second, in the cases studied here, reduced uncertainty allows for and 
encourages specific investments. This relationship requires somewhat more 
of a clarification since the interviewees would often emphasize risk rather 
than uncertainty. They stressed the risk associated with making substantial 
specific investments, and that this risk under certain circumstances will be 
too high and thus deter investments, a pattern that is also reflected in the 
secondary data. In the TCE literature, Chiles and McMackin (1996) 
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distinguish between risk and uncertainty by defining risk as “the subjective 
possibility of loss as perceived by the decision maker” (p. 80), which is 
different from uncertainty that does not feature any perceived probability or 
loss. A useful clarification of the relationship between the two concepts is 
provided by Yates and Stone (1992), who define the critical elements of the 
risk construct as: (a) potential losses, (b) the significance of those losses, and 
(c) the uncertainty of those losses. They argue that higher uncertainty 
increases the probability of a loss or the loss likelihood. The overall risk they 
describe as an essentially multiplicative relationship between loss likelihood 
and the loss significance. The latter is a function of the specific loss and the 
subjective significance attributed to that loss (e.g. the decision maker’s risk 
preferences7). For any specific decision maker (e.g. a production investor), 
the overall risk of any specific loss (e.g. the complete loss of the production 
investment) will therefore be a function of uncertainty since the level of 
uncertainty will determine the likelihood of the loss. 
The findings presented in the previous chapter show that high channel 
uncertainty discourages specific production investments, and that high 
product uncertainty discourages both distribution commitments (thus 
increasing producer’s channel uncertainty) and specific distribution 
investments. While there has been a lack of attention to specific investments 
as a dependent variable in the empirical TCE literature, these findings are in 
line with empirical findings in the broader economic literature. Among the 
most interesting studies is one by Guiso and Parigi (1999), which 
investigates the effect of uncertainty on the investment decisions in a sample 
of Italian manufacturing firms. Their micro data allow them to identify 
shocks to specific firms that are easily lost in the aggregate data more 
commonly used in the economics literature, and they do find a negative 
relationship between investment and uncertainty. Other things being equal, 
they find that firms with a higher perceived uncertainty are less responsive to 
increases in expected future demand and invest less. A review of the 
empirical economic literature on the effect of uncertainty on investment 
decisions shows the same results (Carruth, Dickerson, & Henley, 2000). 
Furthermore, and most interesting in the context of this study, Guiso and 
Parigi find uncertainty to have a substantially stronger negative influence on 
the investment choices of firms that cannot easily dispose of excess capital 
                                                     
7 Risk neutrality is a default behavioral assumption in TCE (Williamson 1985), but extensions 
for risk aversion and risk seeking have been made (Chiles & McMackin 1996). 
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equipment in secondhand markets. Writing outside the TCE paradigm, Guiso 
and Parigi do not refer to asset specificity, but rather to the degree of the 
irreversibility of investment decisions. As an example of complete 
irreversibility, they describe machines that are designed to be used only in a 
specific firm and accordingly cannot be converted to alternative uses even 
within the firm’s industry, which clearly would be defined as asset 
specificity within a TCE perspective. A recent study that further investigates 
the negative effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment decisions also 
finds that the negative effect increases with the degree of irreversibility 
(Belanova, 2012), which may imply that the negative effect of uncertainty on 
specific investments increases with the degree of specificity. 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that investment decision makers try to 
avoid making investment commitments under high uncertainty because: a) 
investments are considered as sunk costs (irreversible) due to the project 
specificity, and b) there is a real possibility of loosing the complete 
investment or at least a significant share it if the movie does not turn out as 
expected and/or fails in attracting a sufficiently large audience (see e.g. 
Ryan’s “Theodore Rex” example). The potential losses are therefore 
substantial, and particularly so for higher-budget projects. Hence, unless a 
decision maker has a particularly strong risk seeking attitude, the loss 
significance is high, which makes the overall risk very sensitive to the level 
of uncertainty. 
It follows that deciding to make a specific investment under a certain level of 
uncertainty entails a transaction cost in the form of an opportunity cost, since 
it precludes the option of making the investment under lower uncertainty and 
hence with a lower overall risk (e.g. in the future when more is known).  The 
higher the uncertainty, the higher the overall risk and thus the higher 
transaction cost. 
The two additional relationships identified for the cases studied here may be 
added as propositions to the established relationships between contracting, 
uncertainty and specific investments (as indicated in Figure 8.2 below): 
(8.1) More integrated contracting balances out uncertainty between the 
transactors’ respective specific investments and becomes preferred over less 
integrated forms when seeking to reduce uncertainty for particular specific 
investments. 
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(8.2) As uncertainty decreases for a particular specific investment, the 
transaction costs associated with that specific investment decreases, thereby 
encouraging a higher specific investment to be made. 
 
Figure 8.2 - TCE relationships between specific investments, uncertainty and 
contracting form identified in this study (established relationships marked 
with dashed arrows) 
The causal logic and interplay between these two relationships may be 
further illustrated by looking at two scenarios drawn from the data presented 
in the previous chapters: The production-distribution contracting for a high-
budget and low-budget theatrical movie. The high-budget movie will require 
large specific upstream investments (production investments). The loss 
significance will be high because: a) the amount invested is substantial, and 
b) the degree of specificity is higher since only a few distributors will be 
able to provide the required width of distribution. This specificity is added to 
that which follows from the investment’s project specificity. The investment 
is therefore highly sensitive to the loss likelihood determined by the level of 
uncertainty. Under more integrated contracting, distribution commitments 
are made at the time of the investment decision, thereby significantly 
reducing channel and distribution performance uncertainty. This may 
sufficiently reduce the overall production investment risk to a tolerable level, 
thus allowing these specific investments to be made. On the other hand, the 
low-budget movie will only require more modest specific upstream 
investments (production investments). The loss significance will be lower 
because: a) the amount invested is lower, and b) the degree of specificity is 
lower since more distributors are available to offer a narrower release still 
sufficient to recoup the production investments (and a significant share of 
the investment may also be recouped in ancillary markets alone should the 
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movie fail to obtain a theatrical release). This investment is less sensitive to 
the loss likelihood and to channel and distribution performance uncertainty. 
Less integrated contracting may thus be preferred for lower budgeted 
movies. Additionally, substantial specific distribution investments may be 
made for movies with low production budgets if they turn out well (see e.g. 
the “Blair Witch” mini-case discussed in Section 5.4.2). An uncertainty 
tradeoff provided by more integrated contracting would clearly not be 
desirable. Adding product uncertainty to a sizeable specific distribution 
investment would significantly increase its overall risk, while reducing 
channel and distribution uncertainty would have much less of an effect on 
the specific production investment’s overall risk due to its much smaller 
size.  
In the previous chapters, distinctions have been made between the primarily 
empirically grounded types of uncertainty defined in Section 5.6 and 
throughout the following analyses, and it was shown in Chapter 7 that 
different types may have distinctly different functions in the relationships 
between contracting and specific investments. Based on these findings, one 
would expect two otherwise identical quantitative studies of the relationships 
shown in Figure 8.2 above, in which uncertainty is operationalized as 
channel uncertainty in one and as contract uncertainty in the other, to yield 
very different results. The latter would clearly be less likely to confirm the 
propositions made above. To avoid such discrepancies and improve 
reliability, a more precise linking of these empirically grounded types of 
uncertainty to theoretically developed categories within TCE would be 
desirable, but the TCE literature seems to offer only limited guidance.  
As described and discussed in Sections 2.1 and 5.6 above, the distinction 
between environmental and behavioral uncertainty is useful for separating 
uncertain external circumstances relevant to a transaction from an uncertain 
performance by the transactors. However, these categories’ value here is 
limited, as it may be unclear whether a specific type of uncertainty belongs 
in one, the other or neither of these. Is for instance product uncertainty 
environmental or behavioral? An argument may be made for it being 
environmental, as it is an inherent quality of creative goods such as movies 
that their value cannot be accurately assessed until they are released to 
consumers (Caves, 2000). On the other hand an argument may be made for it 
being behavioral since the quality of a movie is a function of production 
activities and thus the behavior (which may be strategic) of a transactor. 
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Some may deem both arguments feeble and conclude it does not belong in 
either category, or that each category is too broad to convey useful 
information about its attributes. In the current context, the distinction made 
by Walker and Weber (1984) between volume uncertainty (the inability to 
accurately forecast the volume requirements in a relationship) and 
technological uncertainty (the inability to accurately forecast the technical 
requirements in a relationship) is not helpful either. Both are environmental 
uncertainties, and neither captures the differences between the empirically 
grounded categories. 
Also, David and Han’s (2004) review reveals that the operationalization of 
uncertainty in empirical studies covers a wide range of measurements. In 
addition to behavioral, they create the primarily environmental categories of 
market conditions and technology, but these are less theoretically grounded 
than just the groupings of the operationalized measures used in the reviewed 
studies. And even with two new categories added, a number of their 
reviewed measures remain uncategorized.  
One possible way forward may be to follow the lead of Carson et al. (2006) 
and more carefully distinguish between volatility and ambiguity as aspects 
of uncertainty. They define volatility as the rate and unpredictability of 
change in an environment over time, which creates uncertainty about future 
conditions. Since it is difficult to anticipate all possible future contingencies 
ex ante, ex post adjustments usually become necessary in a volatile 
environment, and as such volatility is a key facilitator of opportunistic 
behavior. Drawing on Ouchi (1980) and others, they define ambiguity as the 
degree of uncertainty inherent in perceptions of the environmental state, 
irrespective of its changes over time. Ambiguity is therefore less about an 
uncertain future as about uncertainty about present and past experiences.  
While it is the volatility aspect of uncertainty that most often has been 
chosen for the operational measurements of uncertainty in the empirical TCE 
literature (Carson et al., 2006; David & Han, 2004), it is not difficult to 
recognize the ambiguity aspect in the uncertainty that engulfs the 
production-distribution contracting in the motion picture industry. This is 
particularly true if one relaxes the limitation of ambiguity as uncertain 
perceptions of the environmental state, but instead looks at it as uncertain 
perceptions in general. This is a more internally focused aspect of ambiguity 
adapted to capture the instrumental imperfection of production and 
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distribution technology (Thompson, 1967) discussed in Section 5.6.  
Performance uncertainty, which is also a key driver of channel uncertainty, 
is to a large extent a result of different parties having different perceptions of 
a project’s key inputs (screenplay, talent, etc.) ex ante and eventually also of 
its ex post quality as a finished product (prior to release). A striking example 
of the latter is the mini-case of the “Happy, Texas” acquisition discussed in 
Section 6.2.1 above, in which uncertainty in distributors’ perception of the 
completed movie resulted in a gross over-valuation. In highly ambiguous 
environments like these, opportunistic behavior will sometimes go 
undetected, while at other times accusations of opportunism may be made 
where there are none (Carson et al., 2006). While quite general, the 
following statement from James, an independent producer, captures this 
aspect of the uncertainty: 
There’s always this marketing - production problem where, you 
know, marketing people always think that the production people 
make lousy movies and they can’t sell them, and the production 
people sit there and think that they make great movies and these 
idiots in marketing don’t understand how to get an audience. It’s 
been going on from the beginning of time. 
  James, Producer/President, independent production company 
The volatility aspect of uncertainty is much less prominent in this 
environment. There is volatility in terms of what types of movies and what 
stars are most popular among audiences at any given time, but only limited 
so within the life cycle of a movie project from initiation through theatrical 
release, which is the relevant timeframe in this study. One may argue that the 
demand for any particular movie is highly volatile (prior to release), but this 
is primarily a function of the ambiguity with regard to its qualities (product 
uncertainty as well as production and distribution performance uncertainty), 
and not a result of general demand changes in the market. On an aggregate 
level, movie demand among audiences is in fact remarkably stable when 
seasonal cyclical variations are accounted for (Vogel, 2010). Consumer 
prices in the theatrical (and some ancillary) markets are also standardized 
and thus relatively stable, and this stability continues into the distribution 
sector through standardized contracts and terms used with many exhibitors. 
While there are technological changes and advances (3D exhibition, video-
on-demand, etc.), there is very little technological volatility within a 
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project’s life cycle. In general, it would be difficult to argue that the high 
level of uncertainty identified in this study and in previous studies of the 
motion picture industry is a result of volatility. 
Since the production-distribution transactions studied here take place in a 
high-ambiguity-environment with relatively modest volatility, it may be 
more likely that the findings made here will be valid in other similar 
environments than in environments with a low ambiguity but high volatility. 
Both kinds are highly uncertain environments, but yet quite different in 
terms of the uncertainty’s nature. 
It follows from the above, that using the term “uncertainty” in propositions 
(8.1) and (8.2) and in Figure 8.2 above may be too broad and thus reduce the 
validity of the propositions made. A narrower category of uncertainty is 
preferred. Hence, in relation to the lack of an uncertainty category 
established in the TCE literature that both captures the nature of the 
empirically derived categories used in previous chapters and reasonably 
precisely differentiates between these types of uncertainty and others, two 
steps are made in proposing a more theoretically grounded category with 
validity outside the context of this study. First, and simply, the term 
“ambiguity” is used instead of the broader “uncertainty” which also captures 
volatility. The second step is constructing a concept that unites the type of 
ambiguity found in product uncertainty, channel uncertainty and distribution 
performance uncertainty. Since the product (movie) is derived from 
activities in the production transactions, production performance uncertainty 
is also implied and included. Essentially, these empirical categories are 
united via the joint product concept discussed under value creation in 
Section 6.2.1 and elsewhere above. Looking at the cumulative output created 
by the production and distribution transactions for a particular movie (its 
image, see Table 1.1), and thus under the scope of the production-
distribution contract, all these empirical uncertainty categories become 
related to the product, or more precisely, the joint product. Ambiguity about 
this joint product stems from ambiguity about the movie’s form (product 
uncertainty) about the quality and nature of the production and distribution 
performances (production and distribution performance uncertainty), and 
finally about its completeness (channel uncertainty). A joint product 
ambiguity category or type of uncertainty is therefore proposed to capture 
the ambiguity surrounding the joint product created in a transaction dyad. 
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Hence, the effect of contracting on specific investments via uncertainty may 
be more precisely stated and illustrated as follows: 
(8.1) revised: More integrated contracting balances out the joint product 
ambiguity under which the transactors’ respective specific investments are 
made and become preferred over less integrated forms when seeking to 
reduce joint product ambiguity for particular specific investments. 
(8.2) revised: As joint product ambiguity decreases for a particular specific 
investment, the transaction costs associated with that specific investment 
decreases, thereby encouraging a higher specific investment to be made. 
 
Figure 8.3 - TCE relationships between specific investments, joint product 
ambiguity and contracting form identified in this study (established 
relationships marked with dashed arrows) 
While the joint product ambiguity construct is significantly narrower and 
thus more precise than uncertainty, one should be careful not to consider it a 
“black box.” Micro analysis is likely to reveal dynamics within the construct 
similar to those identified in this study,8 which may be important for a 
thorough understanding and reliable operationalization.  
8.1.2 Adding Resources to the Mix 
In Section 7.2 above, it is shown that star talent and attractive material affect 
uncertainty or, as now more precisely defined, joint product ambiguity. It is 
further shown that access to star talent and attractive material is affected by 
the production-distribution contracting form. Hence, scarce resources such 
                                                     
8 As for instance how product uncertainty affects distribution performance uncertainty, and 
both affect channel uncertainty (see Section 7.2.1).  
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as these seem to be highly relevant for the causal relationships between 
contracting and the specific investments established above.  
It is not an aim and beyond the scope of this study to integrate resource-
based theories into TCE or vice versa (Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & 
Salomon, 2006), so resources are strictly discussed in a TCE context. In this 
context, the focus is primarily on how transactors anticipate resource 
dependencies and organize with respect to them (Williamson, 1996). 
By adding resources as an additional intermediate variable and drawing on 
the findings presented in Section 7.2 above, two additional relationships may 
be proposed (see Figure 8.4 below):  
 
Figure 8.4 - TCE relationships between specific investments, joint product 
ambiguity, resources and contracting form identified in this study 
(established relationships marked with dashed arrows) 
The first relationship is between resources and joint product ambiguity: 
(8.3) Joint product ambiguity is dependent on the resources dedicated to the 
product, and more resources reduce the joint product ambiguity. 
As shown in the case of star talent this may be a dynamic process, whereby 
the resource reduce product uncertainty (less uncertainty about the form of 
the product) and performance uncertainty (less uncertainty about the quality 
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of activities carried out in one or more transactions required to create the 
joint product), which again reduces channel uncertainty (less uncertainty 
about the ability to conclude all transactions required to complete the joint 
product).   
Since a reduction in joint product ambiguity will encourage specific 
investments, adding resources offers an indirect means for encouraging 
specific investments. The relationship between resources and specific 
investments is illustrated in the Box 7.2 mini-case, in which an investor 
seeks out and ties its investments to specific resources (stars), thus providing 
the joint product transactors (producer and distributor) acquiring any of these 
resources access to specific investments.  
Furthermore, a pattern emerged which showed that these scarce resources 
were in higher demand for projects requiring more specific investments (i.e. 
higher-budget movies requiring substantial investments with high 
specificity). These investments have a higher loss significance, which may 
be sought to be offset by a lower loss likelihood to keep the overall risk 
lower. Adding resources (attractive material and star talent) reduces joint 
product ambiguity and thus the perceived loss likelihood. More generally 
therefore, one would expect to see a higher demand for resources for specific 
investments with a high loss significance, which implies that the demand is 
also sensitive to the transactor’s risk preferences. 
The second relationship is between contracting and resources: 
(8.4) The transactors’ ability to attract resources is dependent on the 
contracting form used between them; more integrated contracting increases 
the transactors’ ability to attract resources. 
In this study, it is found that more integrated contracting has a positive effect 
on a transactor’s (producer’s) reputation in that those providing scarce 
resources (e.g. talent agencies) typically perceive it as being more able to 
conclude the transaction (see Sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3). In some cases, 
typically for the most attractive resources, less integrated contracting may in 
fact preclude access to the resource. If transactors anticipate a dependency 
on such resources to reduce joint product ambiguity to an acceptable level 
for any specific investments required, they may need to use integrated 
contracting for their transaction.  
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However, the importance of reputation, and thus relational contracting 
(Carson et al., 2006), in the causality of this relationship means that 
integrated contracting between transactors may not always be necessary for 
either to obtain attractive resources since a positive reputation may have 
other sources (see for instance the case of George in Section 7.2.2). On the 
relationship between formal and relational contracting, the data support both 
the view that these may be complements (as in Michael’s case in Section 
7.2.2)(Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and the view that these may be substitutes (as 
in George’s case) (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). However, there is no 
indication in the data that formal contracting should undermine relational 
contracting (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Hence, for more reliable tests of the 
effect of contracting on resources, reputation may be added as an 
intermediate variable. Furthermore, continuity (or frequency) may have a 
similar effect to that of reputation. No such pattern emerges in this study, but 
since reputation and continuity are the key factors in the calculative 
approaches to relational contracting, one may expect similar effects here as 
well. The sanctions in both cases loom under the “shadow of the future” in 
the form of a loss of future business (Carson et al., 2006; Poppo & Zenger, 
2002; Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008).  
It follows from the above that in the causal relationship between contracting 
and specific investments, resources are akin to contractual commitments in 
their ability to reduce joint product ambiguity and thus attract specific 
investments. A contractual joint value creation commitment from one 
transactor (e.g. a distributor committing to a minimum width of the theatrical 
release) reduces joint product ambiguity much in the same way as acquiring 
a resource (e.g. the services of star talent). Or in the case of a transactor with 
internalized resources (e.g. a talent-owned and controlled production 
company), the result may essentially be the same (the talent/owner 
committing to personally participating in the project rather than hiring 
another talent of similar standing). However, since access to resources is also 
dependent on contracting form, it is more likely that resources will augment 
the effects of contracting on joint product ambiguity than that it will provide 
a substitute to contracting as a means to reduce such ambiguity. 
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8.2 How Contracting Affects Specific Investments due to 
Coordination 
The second intermediate variable identified in the relationship between 
contracting and specific investments is coordination. In the core TCE 
framework, coordination is a means of cooperative adaptation by transaction 
parties to disturbances to avoid the cost of maladaptation, which Williamson 
(1991, 1996) traces back to Barnard (1938). It is the conscious, deliberate 
and purposeful efforts to craft adaptive internal coordination mechanisms, 
the “marvel of internal organization” (Williamson, 1991). It offers an 
alternative to the other type of adaptation, which is the autonomous kind in 
which transaction parties each adapt without any cooperative efforts. Instead, 
each is independently relying primarily on the price mechanism to guide its 
adaptation to avoid the cost of maladaptation. This is the “marvel of the 
market,” which Williamson (1991) traces back to Hayek (1945).  
The benefits of coordination come at the costs of added bureaucracy and 
reduced incentive intensity, so at the outset it will have a disadvantage 
relative to autonomous adaptation. However, as bilateral dependency 
between transactors increases with asset specificity, coordinated adaptation 
will be preferred by transactors over autonomous adaptation. This is the 
basis upon which Williamson (1991) proposes his discriminating alignment 
of market, hybrid or hierarchy as the governance structure with different 
levels of asset specificity. Hence, the concept of coordination and its 
relationship to specific investments are at the core of TCE theory. 
Also, a slightly different and in this context less relevant type of 
coordination costs associated with internal organization have been identified 
and emphasized by other TCE scholars (Demsetz, 1988; Masten et al., 
1991), which relate to the costs of organizing resources within firm 
boundaries. These are sometimes also referred to as organization or 
management costs. 
Yet, the coordination issues emerging from the data in this study are 
somewhat different from those initially emphasized by Williamson. As a 
means of adaptation to disturbances, coordination as described by 
Williamson is primarily associated with volatility types of uncertainty for 
which it offers transactors efficient realignment preventing opportunistic 
behavior. The coordination issues identified here are less about adaption to a 
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volatile environment, but more about inherent coordination needs between 
the numerous micro-level transactions embedded in the transactors’ joint 
value creation. The type of coordination issues emphasized by Williamson is 
primarily related to ex post transaction cost efficiencies and the ex ante 
anticipation of these (i.e. contractual or hierarchical safeguards against 
maladaptation), while those identified here are more directly associated with 
production cost or value creation efficiencies. Mesquita and Brush (2008) 
introduce the label production coordination for this latter type, which they 
define as “the handling of the organizational complexity inherent in 
decomposing production tasks and managing their interdependent parts 
across firms” (p. 785). This is more closely related to Thompson’s (1967) 
approach to coordination, which again was based on March and Simon 
(1958). If the emphasis on production tasks is replaced with micro-level 
transactions, it serves as a fairly precise definition of the coordination issued 
identified here.  
Production coordination may not be the most prominent type of coordination 
scrutinized in the empirical TCE literature, but it is grounded in TCE theory 
as a means offered by more integrated governance structures to economize 
on production costs. Instead of a tradeoff between the costs of coordination 
(governance) mechanisms and minimizing the ex post transaction costs of 
maladaptation, the relevant tradeoff here is between the costs of coordination 
mechanisms and the potential gain of production economies. Also, this may 
all be considered transaction costs since foregoing production economies 
benefits may be defined as an ex ante transaction cost (see Section 3.4). 
Criticism of TCE for ignoring this type of coordination (White & Lui, 2005) 
is based on the same false assumption as the criticism of TCE for ignoring 
value creation issues (Zajac & Olsen, 1993), namely that TCE ignores 
production economies and only focuses on transaction cost efficiencies. 
The findings presented in Section 7.3 show that more integrated contracting 
provides transactors with mechanisms to better coordinate their respective 
micro-level transactions required to complete their joint product. Upstream, 
certain packaging transactions are difficult or impossible to effectuate for the 
producer without more integrated types of contracting with a distributor 
since: a) the suppliers (stars, agents, etc.) may require financial commitments 
that the producer cannot solely provide, and b) suppliers may require certain 
value sharing arrangements that cannot be completed without the 
distributor’s consent. Downstream, certain exploitation transactions are 
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difficult or impossible to effectuate for the distributor without more 
integrated types of contracting with the producer since: a) suppliers (toy 
manufacturers and other types of licensees) may require a long production 
lead time for their products, and b) suppliers may require adjustments to the 
joint product that the distributor cannot satisfy alone (e.g. the inclusion of a 
brand in the movie). In addition, distribution executives report of better 
production efficiency for distribution transactions when being able to draw 
on the coordination mechanisms provided by more vertically integrated 
contracting (e.g. in creative advertising and publicity). More horizontally 
integrated contracting allowed for a better production coordination between 
distribution transactions across market channels.  
Hence, the first proposition on production coordination: 
(8.5) Production coordination is dependent on contracting, and more 
integrated contracting gives transactors: a) better production coordination 
and b) better production efficiency. 
The impact of frequency and continuity should also be noted here. Among 
the low frequency (acquisition) transactions, the more integrated types of 
contracting (pre-sale) offer better production coordination since the contract 
is in place prior to the joint value creation establishing routines and rules for 
communication and decision-making between the parties. However, higher 
frequency (output) transactions offer yet better production coordination 
because in addition to the coordination mechanisms offered by the contract, 
the transactors benefit from inter-organizational learning effects that 
increases the coordination efficiency (see Jennifer’s comments in Section 
7.3.3, p. 274). The data indicate that continuity under relational contracting 
has a similar effect. The output of these learning effects may be seen as 
additional specific assets of the human kind that enhance governance 
economies (lower coordination costs), in addition to production economies. 
The findings further show that certain specific investments are dependent on 
production coordination. If certain upstream packaging transactions cannot 
be sufficiently coordinated, they will not be effectuated and these specific 
investments (into star talent and material type of resources) will be foregone. 
Similarly, if certain downstream exploitation transactions cannot be 
supported with sufficient production coordination mechanisms, they will not 
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be carried out and these specific investments are also lost. Hence, a second 
proposition: 
(8.6) Specific investments are dependent on production coordination, and 
better production coordination will allow for increased specific investments. 
The effect of production coordination on specific investments rests on the 
complexity of the transaction in which the specific investment is made (e.g. 
packaging, publicity and exploitation transactions). The degree of 
complexity can vary substantially from a simple market type packaging 
transaction in which a script is purchased for a flat fee, to intricate talent 
transactions involving pay and play commitments, approval and control 
rights, value sharing arrangements and possibly also the bundling of 
resources (as in Johnny’s case, Section 5.3.2). Without complexity 
contracting providing coordination, mechanisms do not yield benefits 
beyond those without such mechanisms (Macher & Richman, 2008; 
Mesquita & Brush, 2008), so adding greater coordination to simple 
transactions has little or no effect on specific investments. Hence, a 
minimum level of complexity is assumed in proposition (8.6) above, and 
generally, complexity functions as a moderating variable in this relationship: 
(8.7) Complexity moderates the effect of production coordination on specific 
investments; greater complexity increases the positive effect of production 
coordination on specific investments. 
In Section 7.3, it was shown that the demand for production coordination 
and the impact of such coordination on investments was particularly high for 
bigger budget movies. This follows from these projects, which typically 
contain and require the more complex production and distribution 
transactions. In addition to the complex packaging and exploitation 
transactions discussed above, these movies may for instance also require 
complex licensing agreements with commitments from exhibitors prior to 
greenlight, and thus a rigid timeframe for the joint product creation (see 
Section 5.4.1 and Box 5.6). Lower budgeted movies will typically contain 
simpler types of production and distribution transactions, and the specific 
investments required will therefore be less sensitive to the lesser production 
coordination mechanisms offered by non-integrated types of contracting. 
The relationships between contracting, production coordination, complexity 
and specific investments are summarized in Figure 8.5 below (production 
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efficiency is excluded from the figure because the data does not provide 
evidence of a relationship between efficiency and specific investments). 
 
Figure 8.5 - TCE relationships between contracting form, production 
coordination, complexity and specific investments identified in this study 
8.3 How Contracting Affects Specific Investments due to 
Spillovers 
In Section 7.4 above, it is shown that in the presence of positive forward 
spillover effects from the primary theatrical market to ancillary markets more 
horizontally integrated contracting encourages specific investments into the 
joint product. The subject of spillovers and externalities has received 
relatively little attention in the TCE literature, possibly because when it does 
it tends to be in expressly inter-transaction contexts (Kang et al., 2009; 
Mayer, 2006; Nickerson & Silverman, 2003). It is also typically defined in 
this context, as for instance by Mayer (2006), who defines it as “benefits or 
costs that accrue to one or both of the parties to a transaction that go beyond 
the scope of the transaction” (p. 69). However, as shown in this study, an 
intra-transaction perspective is also relevant because one may have 
spillovers between the micro-level transactions carried out within the scope 
of the focal transaction. When a distributor under a production-distribution 
contract benefits from marketing spillovers between licensing transactions 
for various market channels, this is an example of such intra-transaction 
spillovers. The domestic marketing investment is an investment into a 
specific asset that yields scale economies, thereby providing the foundation 
for scope economies among market channels. As a common input of this 
type into the marketing in several channels, it creates the circumstances for 
which Teece (1980) argues that horizontally integrated structures are likely 
to be efficient modes of organization.   
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In the positive reverse relationship between contracting and specific 
investments identified in Section 7.4 spillovers is not an intermediate 
variable, but an underlying variable. The presence of the underlying variable 
is a condition under which an independent variable has a certain effect on the 
dependent variable. Changes in contracting form do not affect spillovers, but 
the presence of spillovers causes variation in the contracting form to affect 
specific investments. Since there are positive forward spillovers from 
domestic theatrical distribution investments into performance in foreign 
markets, distributors are willing to invest more aggressively when the 
horizontal dimension of the production-distribution agreement allows them 
to control more foreign markets and thus benefit from these positive 
spillovers. Hence, contracting is not used to create positive spillovers, but 
may be designed for a transactor to capture such spillovers. The positive 
spillovers are inherent in the nature of the transactions. The positive forward 
spillovers from the primary market channel to ancillary channels identified 
here create economies of scope and scale that encourages higher specific 
investments when captured and internalized through horizontally integrated 
contracting.   
It was further shown that when split rights contracting is utilized, foreign 
distributors put a great emphasis on domestic distribution commitments if 
considering a pre-sale acquisition for its territory. This is partly because such 
commitments reduce joint product ambiguity, as discussed above, but also 
because these foreign distributors capture and benefit from spillovers created 
by such domestic commitments.  
Based on these findings the following proposition is made (see Figure 8.6 
below): 
(8.8) In the presence of positive spillovers: (a) contracting forms that 
integrate these spillover effects with a transactor encourage this transactor 
to increase its specific investments (b). 
 
Figure 8.6 - TCE relationships between positive spillovers, contracting and 
specific investments identified in this study 
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The spillovers identified in this study are directly related to the joint product, 
which in previous chapters has been labeled as a movie’s image (see Table 
1.1). Of the spillover types discussed in the literature, it is most similar to 
brand spillovers. Hennig-Thurau et al. (2009) have studied brand spillovers 
for movies, seeking to measure the financial value of their brand’s extension 
rights (e.g. the sequel rights to a movie), hence considering the joint product 
of the initial movie as a brand. 
In view of the findings made here it is interesting to note that Kang et al. 
(2009) also find spillovers to affect specific investments. They use inter-
transaction spillovers to partially explain the phenomenon of unilateral 
specific investments in asymmetric transaction relationships (with dominant 
buyers). While they investigate knowledge and reputation spillovers, which 
are derived from creating the joint product rather than directly related to it, 
their argument is that transactors are more likely to make unilateral specific 
investments when the investment yields sufficient economic values for other 
transactions with the same or other transaction partners. Essentially, this is 
the same economies of scope and scale argument as presented above, namely 
that positive spillovers create scope and/or scale economies, thus increasing 
return on investment and justifying higher specific investments. 
8.4 From the Perspective of Interdependence 
A bigger picture emerging from the empirical relationships between 
contracting, empirical intermediate variables and specific investments 
summarized in Figure 7.15 is that there is a significant level of 
interdependencies inherent in the production-distribution transaction. 
However, beyond the critical recognition that specific investments create 
bilateral dependency between transactors, the subject of interdependence as 
such is not prominent in the TCE literature.9 It has received more attention in 
the alliance literature (Aggarwal, Siggelkow, & Singh, 2011; Gulati, 
Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005; Gulati & Singh, 1998), in which insights from 
the TCE literature have been supplemented with organization design theory 
(Barnard, 1938; Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 1967). The alliance approach is 
easily related to the context of this study, as the output types of contracting 
may be said to represent alliances between producers and distributors. As a 
                                                     
9 Williamson (1999) has however identified greater attention to technological and contractual 
nonseparabilities as a research opportunity in the further development of TCE. 
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concept, interdependence partly captures the relationships discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter, which suggest that it also deserves closer 
scrutiny in the present TCE context. 
Not surprisingly, given that asset specificity creates greater transactor 
interdependence and TCE prescribes integrated contracting to govern 
transactions requiring specific investments, the alliance literature on 
interdependence predicts that the greater the anticipated interdependence in 
an alliance, the more hierarchical the governance structure used to organize 
it (Gulati & Singh, 1998). The parallel to TCE is apparent: Whereas the 
alliance literature shows that greater interdependence creates coordination 
costs (a particular type of transaction costs) that are most efficiently handled 
in more integrated governance structures, the TCE literature shows that 
greater asset specificity creates transaction costs that are most efficiently 
handled in more integrated forms of governance. 
To measure the degree of interdependence, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest 
using Thompson’s (1967) distinction between pooled, sequential and 
reciprocal interdependence. Pooled interdependence describes situations in 
which the parties pool their resources to achieve a shared goal, the common 
benefits arise from combining resources into the shared pool and each 
partner uses resources from this pool. Adjusted to the present context, 
emphasizing transactions rather than activities, sequential interdependence 
describes situations in which the parties are serially arrayed so that the 
micro-level transactions carried out by one partner precede those of another, 
resulting in a higher degree of coordination than in pooled interdependence. 
Finally, reciprocal interdependence describes situations in which the parties’ 
micro-level transactions are carried out simultaneously. Each party is 
therefore simultaneously dependent on the other because its outputs are the 
other’s input.  
Thompson’s classification of interdependence provides an interesting 
perspective to the contracting forms studied here. Essentially, the 
interdependence between producer and distributor in acquisition type 
transactions may be described as sequential, while it is better described as 
reciprocal in output type of transactions. Hence, the different degree of 
interdependence is not only a matter of the inherent qualities of the 
transaction and its requirements in terms of; a) adjusting joint product 
ambiguity, b) allowing production coordination, and c) internalizing 
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spillover effects, but also a matter of how the transaction is carried out as a 
consequence of the chosen contracting form. The degree of interdependence 
may therefore both affect contracting and specific investments and be 
dependent on the same two factors.  
A hypothetical example based on the data and findings drawn from it above 
may illustrate the dual role of interdependence. Assume at the outset that a 
certain movie may be produced and distributed either under split rights 
acquisition contracting or under an all rights output deal. Under the 
acquisition transaction producer and distributor would be sequentially 
interdependent since production transactions would be carried out prior to 
distribution transactions. However, producer and distributor would only 
make the specific investments considered acceptable to each under 
conditions of unbalanced joint product ambiguity, limited production 
coordination and with positive spillovers divided between third-party foreign 
distributors. Given the ensuing level of upstream and downstream specific 
investments, one may turn around and argue that governance structures 
supporting sequential interdependence are sufficient in this case. Now, if one 
alternatively would decide to produce and distribute the same movie under 
output contracting, the producer and distributor would be reciprocally 
interdependent, as certain production transactions (e.g. talent packaging) 
would be dependent on the distributor’s micro-level transactions and certain 
distribution transactions (e.g. exploitation) would be dependent on the 
producer’s micro-level transactions. However, with a balanced joint product 
ambiguity, better production coordination and internalized positive spillover 
effects, each party would be likely to make higher specific investments. 
Considering these increased specific investments, one may now turn around 
and argue that only governance structures supporting reciprocal 
interdependence are sufficient. Hence, dependent on the choice of 
governance structure, the joint product will in fact not be the same movie. 
Under acquisition contracting, it is more likely to resemble the typical 
“independent movie” made on a lower budget, with less star talent and more 
modest marketing, while the output contracting version is more likely to 
resemble the typical “studio movie” made on a higher budget, with more star 
talent, heavier marketing and a wide release.  
Since the choice of governance structure affects the nature of the joint value 
creation, one may also say that it changes the value creation logic. In the 
example above, the production and distribution transactions carried out 
310 
 
under the acquisition contracting option contain all the traits of Thompson’s 
(1967) long-linked technology, while the resemblance is closer to intensive 
technology under the output contracting option. Similarly, the value 
configuration (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998) shifts from an almost pure system 
of value chains toward a value shop when moving from acquisition to output 
contracting.  
It follows that contracting, specific investments and interdependence 
ultimately need to be aligned with the type of joint value creation the 
transactors envision. Projects requiring substantially specific investments 
entail a high degree of interdependence that only more integrated forms of 
contracting can efficiently satisfy. Hence, without more integrated forms of 
contracting, the required specific investments should not be made. Projects 
with lower requirements for specific investments entail a lower degree of 
interdependence, thereby allowing for less integrated forms of contracting. 
These lower levels of specific investments may thus be achieved with less 
integrated contracting. 
Based on the above, the following is proposed (see Figure 8.7 below): 
(8.9) In the presence of a stronger interdependence between transactors (a) 
more integrated contracting forms encourage the transactors to increase 
their specific investments (b). However, the degree of interdependence is 
affected by the amount of specific investments (c) and all three elements 
must therefore be aligned with the joint value creation sought by the 
transactors. 
 
Figure 8.7 - The relationships between interdependence, contracting and 
specific investments identified in this study 
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8.5 Summary of Contracting Form’s Effects on Specific 
Investments 
For the cases studied here, the data reveal that contracting does indeed affect 
specific investments, and in this chapter a number of more general 
propositions are made based on these findings. 
For the horizontal contracting dimension, an effect on specific investments is 
observed in the presence of positive spillovers. More horizontally integrated 
forms of contracting allow a transactor to internalize these spillovers, 
thereby creating economies of scope and scale that justify higher specific 
investments to be made (see Figure 8.6 above). Similar effects based on 
spillovers are not identified for vertical contracting. 
Primarily for the vertical contracting dimension, but also to a lesser degree 
for horizontal contracting, the effect on specific investments is caused by 
two intermediate variables, as shown in Figure 8.8 below. First, more 
integrated contracting balances the joint product ambiguity between the 
various specific investments to be made by the transactors, and may thereby 
reduce the risk for certain investments from otherwise prohibitive levels. In 
the data studied here, this effect is particularly important for upstream 
specific investments. Also, while not included in Figure 8.8, the effects of 
resources augment this relationship. 
Second, more integrated contracting provides better production coordination, 
and the more complex micro-level transactions require more production 
coordination for either transactor to carry them out. Hence, without 
contracting providing a sufficient level of production coordination, some 
micro-level transactions cannot be effectuated, and specific investments into 
these, as part of the overall joint value creation, are then foregone.  
Finally, the interdependence construct captures many features of the above 
relationships and thus seems highly relevant to understanding the effects of 
contracting on specific investments. For transactors seeking to create joint 
value requiring higher specific investments, higher interdependence will be a 
product of the fundamental transformation that entails these investments. 
The interdependence may, among other factors, include both requirements 
for production coordination and joint product ambiguity adjustments, and 
more integrated types of contracting will be required to facilitate such 
requirements. Hence, transactors may strategically choose the type of 
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contracting aligned with the level of specific investments, and therefore the 
degree of interdependence, associated with the sought joint value creation.  
 
Figure 8.8 - Summary of the relationships between contracting and specific 
investments identified in this study (excluding spillover effects which were 
only identified for horizontal contracting) 
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9 Concluding Remarks and Reflections 
This final chapter discusses broader theoretical and methodological 
implications for the proposed transaction value model and TCE theory in 
general. First, I return to the TCE-based transaction value model proposed in 
Chapter 3 and discuss the implications of the conclusions about governance 
structure’s effects on specific investments drawn in the previous chapter. I 
then move on to a subject that emerged from derivative findings observed 
throughout the research process, namely the theoretical and methodological 
significance of framing TCE’s unit of analysis. I close with a discussion of 
the study’s limitations, suggestions for further research, an outline of some 
key implications for practice and policy and a few final remarks. 
9.1 Implications for a TCE-Based Joint Value Approach 
In Chapter 3 a model is suggested for a fuller-form transaction value analysis 
that goes beyond the reduced-form analysis’ concern with governance 
structure alignment (Williamson, 1991), which instead focuses on the 
ultimate goal of maximizing transaction value (Figure 3.2). The model 
shows how the minimizing of governance costs, with which the reduced-
form analysis is primarily concerned, needs to be considered in a tradeoff 
with production economies if the objective is to maximize transaction value.  
I also argue in Chapter 3 that the production economies component of the 
model is not separate from the transaction cost analysis. Rather, it is 
integrated into the transaction cost analysis since potential losses of 
production economies due to inferior structural choices are in fact ex ante 
transaction costs.  
The production economies are heavily dependent on transaction-specific 
investments since specific assets generally provide enhanced productivity 
and value creation (Bensaou & Anderson, 1999; Williamson, 1985). 
Transaction-specific investments thus affect both governance economies 
(directly and through governance structure) and production economies, but 
with opposite effects. While they have a positive effect on production 
economies improving productivity and value creation, they generally have a 
negative effect on governance economies adding transaction costs.  
Transaction-specific investments are therefore crucial to the tradeoff 
between governance and production economies, and this renders specific 
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investments, if possible, an even more significant construct in the fuller-form 
analysis than in the reduced-form analysis.  
It is well established by the empirical TCE literature that asset specificity 
and governance structure correlate, but in this dyadic relationship specific 
investments have almost entirely received an exogenous treatment (David & 
Han, 2004; Macher & Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Our 
understanding of the origins of transaction-specific investments has thus 
been underdeveloped. This is exposed in the analysis provided in Chapter 3, 
in which I only assume that more integrated structures induce specific 
investments. The assumption is based on TCE theory and the established 
empirical correlation, but on this basis only the directionality lacks empirical 
grounding and the causal explanation is sketchy at best. Since it is this very 
analysis that uncovers and concludes with the said key tradeoff between 
governance and production economies, the full transaction value model rests 
on this assumption. Consequently, the express objective of this study has 
been to investigate exactly how structure affects specific investments so that 
the assumption may be replaced with empirically grounded knowledge. 
The microanalytic empirical analysis of specific investments and production-
distribution contracting in the motion picture industry presented in the 
foregoing chapters supports the assumed basic relationship. But in addition 
to providing empirical grounding for its directionality, the causality is 
explained in great empirically grounded detail. And interestingly, the 
causality identified here is quite different from what was assumed based on 
previous theory. A more integrated structure’s superior ability to offer 
safeguards for specific investments was assumed to explain the causality, but 
as summarized in the previous chapter other factors emerged from the data: 
First, uncertainty was shown to play a significant role in that more integrated 
structures offer greater ability to balance joint product ambiguity (a specific 
type of uncertainty), which again induces specific investments. Hence, while 
not explicitly shown in the model, this key TCE construct is also central in 
any transaction value analysis because of its role in the relationship between 
structure and specific investments. Second, the presence of positive inter-
transaction spillovers is important since more integrated structures allow 
transactors to internalize these, which also induces specific investments. This 
is a variable that has been largely ignored in the TCE literature despite some 
notable advances (Kang et al., 2009; Mayer, 2006). Finally, but not least 
important, interdependence and coordination emerged as playing central 
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roles in the relationship between structure and specific investments. Specific 
investments are interdependent to a varying degree and the more 
interdependent can only be undertaken within structures that provide the 
required level of coordination. These latter findings are closely related to the 
bundled approach to analyzing transactions taken here (see next section), in 
which the focal transaction is seen in the context of the relevant micro- 
and/or macro-level transactions carried out by each transactor. This is a 
departure from TCE’s traditionally strict focus on single transactions. For 
interdependence and coordination, which have previously received limited 
attention in the TCE literature, it meant drawing primarily on Thompson’s 
(1967) organizational theory and adapting his use of the constructs to a TCE 
context. The result is primarily expanding the discussion of these constructs 
from one governance structure, the internal organization of a firm 
(hierarchy), to a broader range of structures on the continuum from market to 
hierarchy. 
If these findings are valid outside their current context of the motion picture 
industry, uncertainty, spillovers, interdependence and coordination all 
become important variables in any joint value analysis as intermediate and 
underlying variables in the relationship between governance structure and 
specific investments. A detailed knowledge of the relationships and 
interplays between these variables, as identified in Chapter 8, is therefore 
also essential from the perspective of the overall transaction value model. 
 
Figure 9.1 - Contributions to a TCE-based transaction value model 
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The contributions made by this study are emphasized in Figure 9.1 above. 
The dashed arrows represent relationships also included in reduced-form 
analysis, while the solid arrows represent the path of relationships added to 
obtain a fuller-form transaction value analysis. Beyond this conceptual 
contribution, the study has made a number of contributions in empirically 
grounding, explaining and validating the relationship between governance 
structure and transaction-specific investments (marked with a thicker solid 
arrow). This is the first relationship in the production economies path to 
transaction value, and without empirical grounding and causal explanation, 
the relationship would have remained assumed only and hence left the model 
on feet of clay. 
9.2 Contextualizing the Unit of Analysis 
TCE’s unit of analysis is the transaction and the theory is thus inherently 
microanalytic in its approach. When analyzing larger systems, e.g. in 
Williamson’s (1985) treatment of a firm’s efficient boundaries, chains of 
activities such as a firm’s value chain are unbundled so that one transaction 
may be analyzed at a time. However, while such analyses are illuminating 
and beneficial, Williamson (1999b, 2010) also calls for a reverse bundling 
process, arguing that the neglect of both technological and contractual 
nonseparabilities leads to incorrectly specified transactions, and that the 
practice of examining transactions as if they were independent will not do if 
there are significant interaction effects between them. He identifies such 
approaches beyond piecemeal analysis as a key research opportunity in the 
further development of TCE. 
Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) take a dynamic view and argue that a 
transactor may be bound by the governance structure applied to other 
transactions in which it is already engaged, and they refer to this condition as 
governance inseparability. This incorporation of history into transaction cost 
theory does not, however, inform the type of transaction contextualization on 
which this study’s analysis rests. 
The analyses in the present study have been entirely dependent on a bundled 
approach to the transaction in which it is scrutinized in the context of related 
transactions. The key contextualization is not vertical but horizontal (or 
hierarchical), defining layers of transactions where the focal transaction 
defines the relevant vertical chain of micro-level transactions. 
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Contextualizing the focal transaction in a macro level may also prove useful, 
as the production-distribution transaction is contextualized here from the 
perspective of a project. The approach is shown schematically in Figure 9.2 
below, and here a second micro-layer is also included for illustrative 
purposes. In the present study, the second micro-layer would have 
represented a transaction between suppliers and subcontractors (e.g. between 
an editing facility hired by the producer and suppliers of editing equipment), 
but this layer was excluded from the analyses since the data did not indicate 
that these transactions had much impact on the focal transaction. 
 
Figure 9.2 - Layered contextualization of the focal transaction 
An important choice and distinction is made by focusing on transactions 
rather than activities. These are sometimes mixed in discussions of 
transactions between activities, and interesting attempts have been made in 
incorporating these into a common unit of analysis (Nickerson et al., 2001).  
However, when focusing on activities rather than transactions in a TCE 
context, the opportunity to gain insight from the fundamental analysis of 
transactions’ dimensions is lost. If this study’s focal transaction had been 
analyzed as one between production and distribution activities rather than 
one between production and distribution micro-level transactions, important 
insight gained (in Chapter 5) about asset specificity and uncertainty 
grounded at this micro level is likely to have been neglected. 
The impact of this form of contextualization is clearly illustrated in the 
identification of asset specificity and interdependence. First, for asset 
specificity the aim is to determine the degree of specificity for investments 
required by the focal transaction partners, and it is demonstrated that only 
considering specificity in the context of the focal layer does not produce 
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sufficient insight. In this study, the dominant cause of specificity was found 
in the macro layer: Once production and distribution investments are made 
into a project they become largely unsalvageable outside the context of the 
project, and this is referred to as project-specific investments. In the focal 
layer, the key determinant of specificity is if a production investment is 
made into a movie that requires a wide theatrical release or only a more 
modest release since this significantly affects the degree of small number 
bargaining facing the producer when seeking distribution. For any single 
investment, there may thus be a fundamental transformation process 
associated with each layer, and the degree of specificity is determined by the 
cumulative effect of these. Second, the degree of interdependence in a focal 
transaction is largely determined by the nature of the micro-level 
transactions included in the bundle. It is shown here that exploitation 
transactions (a type of distribution micro-level transaction) greatly influence 
the degree of interdependence in a production-distribution transaction. The 
modest attention given to interdependencies in the TCE literature may be 
explained by its typical focus on single transactions, rather than on 
contextualized focal transactions.   
Sometimes the focal transaction may also itself be layered, as shown in 
Section 6.4, and this represents the most basic type of layered 
contextualization to be observed. Seen as a whole, a transaction of this type 
is not necessarily governed by a discrete governance structure, but by a 
package of structures that may include various forms (e.g. a production 
studio acquiring movies from independent producers to feed its output deal 
with a major studio). Similar types of layered focal transactions have also 
been recognized when MNEs gradually internalize foreign operators 
(Petersen et al., 2010). Failing to recognize the layered inter-transactional 
contextualization of the type illustrated in Figure 9.2 limits insight, but 
cannot be said to misrepresent the focal transaction. However, failing to 
recognize intra-transactional layering of a focal transaction may result in 
analyzing a fraction rather than a complete transaction, and this may be a 
case of what Williamson (1999b) refers to as incorrectly specifying 
transactions as a result of context ignorance.  
Since the inter-transactional type of contextualization discussed here is 
primarily horizontal, the focal transaction will define a layered bundle of 
transactions to be analyzed in order to obtain insight into the focal 
transaction (those within the dashed square in Figure 9.2). As foreseen by 
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Williamson (1999b), this entails certain practical challenges, as it requires a 
deeper knowledge of how a system actually works and a sensitivity to subtle 
but lurking strategic features. While qualitative approaches like that of this 
study are well equipped to meet such challenges, it is more difficult to see 
how quantitative approaches would be able to identify the relevant layered 
bundles of transactions. Quantitative studies of layered bundles may 
therefore be limited to those contexts for which a deep knowledge of the 
system already exists.  
9.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are a number of limitations to this study that will benefit from a brief 
discussion. Most of these follow as a result of the chosen research design 
and method, and the first is a result of choices made throughout the process 
due to a limited capacity for both data collection and analysis. On the macro-
layer, the data analysis is primarily limited to single projects, thereby 
limiting insights into the possible impacts of frequency at this layer (the 
plural perspective discussed in Section 4.4). For multi-project contracting 
(output contracts), the focus here is more on each separate project within the 
context of a multi-project contract and less on interaction effects between 
these projects. The data do for instance suggest that there are learning effects 
generating human asset specificity related to frequency and continuity that 
affect the efficiency of production coordination (reported in Section 7.3), 
and that there are vertical spillover effects between projects (e.g. between 
franchised movies, see Box 6.20). These relationships were only cursorily 
explored here and further enquiries may (and may not) have revealed 
relationships between frequency, vertical spillovers and specific investments.  
A choice was also made to quite strictly focus on TCE and its constructs. 
This follows the express research objective of elaborating on TCE theory to 
better understand the effects of contracting on specific investments. The flip 
side is that this approach may limit the overall understanding of certain 
phenomena. Applying theoretical triangulation by for instance also drawing 
on the resource-based view (RBV) of strategy (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984) in the discussion of how resources affect the relationship between 
contracting and joint product ambiguity (in Section 8.1.2) might have 
strengthened the understanding of resources in this particular context. 
Similarly, a deeper investigation of the learning effects generating human 
asset specificity discussed above could also have been seen within an 
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integrative perspective on the TCE and RBV approaches to strategy and as 
such represented a contribution to the recent research on how governance 
leads to the development of capabilities (Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 
2012). But, again, the primary objective was not to understand these 
particular phenomena, and to the extent such triangulation could have 
improved the understanding of the effects of contracting on specific 
investments, it would have been a different kind of theory extension 
(drawing on and possibly merging with neighboring theories) than what was 
sought here. 
This study’s relatively tight research design of focusing on the key 
established TCE constructs, as well as the use of semi-structured interviews, 
may have caused certain other origins of specific investments to go 
unexplored, which a more loosely designed study might have captured. 
Therefore, this study should not be seen as having unraveled the origins of 
specific investments (in the motion picture industry). That would be an 
overstatement. However, to reduce the risk of ignoring possibly important 
factors, all interviewees were asked to suggest topics relevant to the study 
objective. Also the depth (and length – some lasting two hours) of the 
interviews reduces this risk. The inclusion of some very rich documentation 
(monographs written about specific movie projects, production companies, 
release seasons, etc.) in the data had a similar effect. And, again, the 
objective was to focus on the constructs already established in the TCE 
literature. 
Finally, a note should be made about the generalizability or external validity 
of the research results. One should be careful to generalize any result from a 
case study unless the study is designed specifically for this purpose 
(Andersen, 1997), but given the design and case definitions used here one 
should be able to apply the results to relevant situations within the motion 
picture industry (but also see the note on further motion picture industry 
research in the next section). As discussed in Section 4.4, national contexts 
differ so care should be taken, particularly if applying results to the motion 
picture sectors in less market-driven and more culturally embedded and 
controlled environments. To what degree the results may be applied in any 
other or wider context greatly depends on the attributes of these contexts. 
The theory extension made in this study relies on contracting, specific 
investment, joint product ambiguity and other constructs of the types 
observed in the motion picture industry. It may therefore be more difficult to 
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apply the findings to other contexts in which these attributes differ (e.g. a 
high volatility rather than a high ambiguity context) or where the value 
configuration system differs (i.e. value shop or value network types rather 
than the value chain type) (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). However, the findings 
made here should be relevant for other value chain types of industries in 
which: (a) production involves customized projects, thus resulting in 
substantial specific investments of the product type; (b) there is a significant 
degree of joint product ambiguity; and (c) a variety of contractual 
relationships are used to govern joint value creation and claiming.  
9.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
Since this study is concerned with the further development of TCE theory 
towards a transaction value approach by enhancing our understanding of 
how governance structure affects specific investments, further research 
based on the theoretical implications set out in Chapter 8 is of course 
desired. Within the context of the motion picture industry, further research 
may draw on this study for understanding the inter-transactional 
contextualized system, which opens up for quantitative tests of the proposed 
theoretical relationships. Accessing quantitative data may be a challenge (see 
Section 4.1), but data on production investments and resources may be 
accessed from publicly available sources (such as IMDbPro). Following the 
categorization of contracting developed in Chapter 6, one may be able to 
trace and categorize a sufficiently large sample of contracts based on trade 
journals’ reports and overviews (such as Variety’s annual “Facts on Pacts”), 
thus overcoming the obstacle of gaining access to actual contracts. For other 
variables one may need to settle for proxies, such as for instance theatrical 
release width as a proxy for distribution investments.  
Further studies outside the context of the motion picture industry would be 
particularly welcome, as supportive evidence from such studies would also 
increase the external validity of the propositions made here. When designing 
such studies, the focus should be on analytic generalization (Yin, 2009), and 
a replication of this study within a context in which the developed theory 
would predict the same results is recommended. Other creative industries 
with high levels of ambiguity, and where cooperative joint value creation 
requiring significant to substantial specific investments are carried out 
through a variety of contracting forms, are interesting candidates (gaming, 
music, etc.). 
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The discussions of uncertainty in Chapter 8 (and in previous chapters) reveal 
problems of subcategorizing various types of the construct. This problem is 
also reported in recent TCE review articles (David & Han, 2004; Macher & 
Richman, 2008). As this study has revealed, different types of uncertainty 
have different effects in the relationship between contracting and specific 
investments. It is thus unsatisfactory that the key subcategories provided by 
theory (behavioral and environmental) do not capture the empirically 
grounded differences. Similarly, it has also been found that different types of 
uncertainty may have opposite influences on governance structure (Klein, 
1989).10 TCE seems to have a construct validity problem related to the 
uncertainty construct, and given its centrality in the theory a further 
development of the construct is called for.   
A further suggestion is concerning the relationship between the transaction 
as TCE’s unit of analysis and the transactor as the strategy decision maker. 
It is observed on several occasions throughout the data analysis that there 
may be significant discrepancies between what each transactor may see as an 
ideal form of contracting. The possibly clearest example is in the different 
preferences for acquisitions and pre-sale acquisitions between distributors 
and producers, respectively (see Section 6.2.1). Since the more integrated 
contracting form balances joint product ambiguity, it will be preferred by the 
transactor responsible for upstream specific investments, the producer, 
which at the outset faces the highest degree of ambiguity. The transactor 
responsible for downstream specific investments, the distributor, faces a 
lower ambiguity and will hence seek to avoid such balancing by utilizing the 
lesser integrated contracting form. The ultimate outcome in choice of 
contracting form will depend on various factors, which may somewhat 
vaguely be captured in the concept of each transactor’s ex ante bargaining 
strength. In these situations, each transactor will face a tradeoff between the 
transaction costs associated with adapting the other party’s contracting 
preferences on the one hand and the opportunity cost of a forgone 
transaction and value creation on the other.  
TCE’s strength lies in analyzing and understanding transactions, and when a 
focal transactor is chosen it can strategically advise with regard to 
                                                     
10 Klein (1989) makes a distinction between uncertainty related to turbulence (including 
complexity and volatility) and uncertainty related to unpredictability (including new 
technologies and volume), and finds that the first is related to more integrated governance 
structures, while the latter is associated with market-like governance structures. 
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governance structure, and as shown in this study, specific investments, 
which are decisive for both joint value creation and claiming (Ghosh & John, 
1999). However, the tools to predict outcomes when interests are conflicting, 
as illustrated in the example above, seem underdeveloped and as such this 
offers an interesting area for further TCE research.  
Finally, the transaction value model is widely adaptable beyond strategic 
management and media economics. As illustrated in Macher and Richman’s 
(2008) review, the applications of TCE are indeed covering a wide range of 
social sciences, and the model would apply to any value creation problem 
that can be formulated in terms of contracting. These may also emerge from 
related constructs not included in the model itself. The model would for 
instance predict that in a context in which the institutional environment does 
not support or allow integrated governance structures, specific investments 
would suffer with diminishing overall value creation as a likely 
consequence. And this prediction may be applied just as widely as to anti-
trust regulation on the one hand and bans on gay marriage on the other. The 
possibilities for further research based on the proposed transaction value 
model are therefore abundant.  
9.5 Implications for Practice and Policy 
As the external validity of my findings outside the motion picture industry is 
yet untested, the focus here is on practice and policy implications for this 
industry. These are also relevant for media economy scholars. 
For industry professionals, numerous implications follow from the results 
presented and discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Strategic advice on any specific 
area covered can also be read quite directly out of these findings, as for 
instance in relation to how production-distribution contracting may be used 
to attract star talent to a project or how star talent may substitute for 
distribution contracting when seeking production finance. Most important, 
however, is adapting a joint product view on motion picture production and 
distribution (see Table 1.1). Focusing solely on production, as is quite 
commonly done by both practitioners and media economists, does not 
capture the value creation relevant for understanding performance and return 
on investments. Production is better understood as one of two components 
required for the complete product, and it is this perspective that brings the 
production-distribution transaction and contracting to center stage. 
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In general, the results uncovered in this study suggest an awareness of the 
interdependency between contracting and specific investments. For this 
reason, professionals should be careful not to assume that positive or 
negative contracting experiences from movies with one type of requirement 
for production and distribution investments can be applied to other types of 
movie projects. Also, contracting is not only a result of the type of movie 
one seeks to realize, but may also be used strategically in the process to 
realize the project. Aligning the appropriate type of contracting with the 
investment and resource requirements of a proposed project will induce 
access to both. And the flip side is that while a contracting form may be used 
contrary to the predictions made here this increases the likelihood of 
maladaptation with sub-optimal joint value creation and sharing as a result. 
In the context of the previous media economic research suggesting a positive 
relationship between investments and performance (see Section 2.1.2), the 
results of this study would imply that significant attention should be paid to 
the strategic use of contracting and structure. If greater project-specific 
investments improve performance (ceteris paribus), applying contracting that 
encourage such investments may provide a significant strategic advantage.  
Following from the above, policy makers should be careful to consider the 
contracting implications of their policies for motion picture producers and 
distributors. Certain policies intended to support value creation may also 
have significant but less palpable reverse effects if they directly or indirectly 
entail structural limitations on integrated forms of contracting. Again, at a 
very basic level, such consideration is dependent on policy makers’ 
recognition of the joint product and joint value approaches to value creation 
in the motion picture industry. The key to meeting challenges identified in 
the production sector may lie in the distributors’ institutional environment, 
and if so, making policy adjustments here may be more effective than 
attempts to target the production sector directly. 
9.6 Final Remarks 
Two key arguments are made in this dissertation, where the second follows 
from the first:  
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1) By integrating transaction cost implications of production economies into 
its analytical framework, TCE may shift attention from governance 
alignment to transaction value; and  
2) Both governance structure and transaction-specific investments require 
endogenous treatment. 
A conceptual model for transaction value analysis is proposed, and since the 
model rests on the effects of governance structure on transaction specific 
investments that were heretofore only assumed, the empirical work has 
focused on this particular relationship.  
For readers of TCE literature, the finding that structure affects specific 
investments is hardly surprising given the correlation between the two 
established by the empirical literature on the reverse relationship (David & 
Han, 2004; Macher & Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). The 
causality of how exactly structure affects specific investments is hopefully 
regarded as more noteworthy.  
It is shown here how the strategic use of structure to reduce uncertainty, and 
thus the risk associated with specific investments, induces the transactors to 
make such investments in their joint product. Furthermore, it is not the 
behavioral uncertainty with which much of the TCE literature has been 
preoccupied (Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1975, 1985) that emerges as 
most important in this context, but rather the ambiguity associated with the 
joint product. It is also shown how internalized or contracted scarce 
resources may have similar effects on uncertainty and thus on inducing 
specific investments, but also how these resources may depend on structure. 
Coordination, which is embedded in the TCE theory but typically less 
explicitly investigated, also emerges as a key factor in understanding the 
causality. So do interdependencies and spillovers.  
By identifying these variables and key causal relationships between them, all 
embedded in a broader transaction value model, this study provides a basis 
for expanding the TCE literature’s attention from governance alignment to 
transaction value.  
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